Prerequisites to Human Activity on Mars: Scientific and Ethical Aspects

Humans want to go to Mars now. This entails many difficult but solvable challenges. However, human activity on Mars depends on the answers to three fundamental questions: (1) Is there life on Mars, does that life represent at second genesis of life? (2) Can Earth life, and humans in particular, adapt to the Martian gravity of 0.38?g, and will human generations on Mars speciate from humans on Earth? (3) Is there enough carbon, nitrogen, and water on Mars to create a global habitable environment? These answers must be determined on Mars and will decide the scope of human activities.     

Caring for Nature: From Fact to Value, from Respect to Reverence

Abstract. Despite the classical prohibition of moving from fact to value, encounter with the biodiversity and plenitude of being in evolutionary natural history moves us to respect life, even to reverence it. Darwinian accounts are value‐laden and necessary for understanding life at the same time that Darwinian theory fails to provide sufficient cause for the historically developing diversity and increasing complexity on Earth. Earth is a providing ground; matter and energy on Earth support life, but distinctive to life is information coded in the genetic molecules that superintends this matter‐energy. Life is generated and regenerated in struggle, persists in its perishing. Such life is also a gift; nature is grace. Biologists and theologians join in celebrating and conserving the genesis on Earth, awed in their encounter with this creativity that characterizes our home planet.     

The Missing‐Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well‐Being

Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well‐being: a theory that incorporates both an objective‐value constraint and a pro‐attitude constraint. Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike desire theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires. This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective‐value constraint on well‐being. Second, unlike objectivist theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating. This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro‐attitude constraint on well‐being. However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing‐desires cases. For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well‐being. This, objectivists say, is implausible. It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone's life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and, hence, that health is a component of her welfare. This paper focuses on the missing‐desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well‐being. My argument is that the missing‐desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well‐being. My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well‐being to become hybrid theorists.     

The Solution to the Consequence Problem According to Anti‐Individualism

Abstract: For quite some time now there has been an ongoing debate whether authoritative self‐knowledge is compatible with anti‐individualism. 1 One influential line of argument against compatibilism is due to Paul Boghossian (1998) . I argue that Boghossian misconstrues what the anti‐individualist really is committed to. This defence of compatibilism is elaborated by showing how the Twin Earth thought experiment is meant to speak in favour of anti‐individualism. Partly this will show that Boghossian is wrong in his denial that empirical background knowledge is imported into the Twin Earth experiment. The main points argued are that Boghossian fails to realize, both, (1) that anti‐individualism does not involve concept‐individuation in terms of reference, and (2) that anti‐individualism assumes a core of representational success. In effect, these two points constitute an entirely new way to defend compatibilism, a way that seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature.     

ON THE CORRECT TREATMENT OF INVERTED EARTH

Abstract: The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal covariation theory is in deeper trouble over Inverted Earth than is generally supposed even by the theory's detractors.     

Apologia pro Vita‐Fabula Sua: Defending Narrativity and How We Make Sense of Our Lives

This paper attempts to provide a defence for a narrative theory of the self in the face of criticisms from the anti‐narrative camp. It begins by addressing certain uncontroversial premises that both pro‐ and the anti‐narrative camps might be thought to agree on: the status of humans as homo significans or meaning‐makers, the natural form‐finding tendency and certain desiderata for significance and value that we possess, and the raw material of life and its constituents that we proceed from. Whereas the pro‐narrative camp seeks to provide the narrative theory of the self as a valid argument for how we proceed from the raw material of life and undifferentiated experience and these desiderata and tendencies (i.e.: the premises) to a conception of both selfhood and moral responsibility (i.e.: the conclusion), the anti‐narrative camp holds the conclusion to be false and the narrative theory of the self to be invalid. The Parfitian view holds the conception of the self to be ultimately false, whereas the Strawsonian view holds both the conception of the self and the conception of moral responsibility to be ultimately false. The grounds they provide, however, tend to be metaphysical in nature, demonstrating that they have fundamentally misunderstood how the narrative theory of the self functions as a semantic thesis. I will demonstrate certain defects in the metaphysical arguments that anti‐narrativists like Parfit and Strawson have made against what is essentially a semantic thesis about how we make sense of our lives. I will also attempt to shore up the semantic thesis in other relevant aspects.     

A Multicultural‐Ecological Assessment Tool: Conceptualization and Practice With an Asian Indian Immigrant Woman

A multicultural‐ecological (M‐Eco) method assesses multiple levels of a client's presentation, such as individual, micro‐, meso‐, exo‐, macro‐, and chronosystems. An M‐Eco method is a culturally sensitive practice of Bronfenbrenner's (1995) ecological perspective that focuses on behavior's contextual and interactional nature and an individual's interactions within his or her cultural group as well as meaning making of contexts. A través de una ecología multicultural (M‐Eco), se consideran múltiples niveles de la presentación de un cliente (individual, micro‐, meso‐, exo‐, macro‐y cronosistemas). M‐Eco es una práctica culturalmente sensible de la perspectiva ecológica de Bronfenbrenner (1995) que se centra en la naturaleza contextual e interaccional del comportamiento y en las interacciones de un individuo dentro de su propio grupo cultural, además de cómo se obtiene significado a partir de contextos.     

ASTROTHEOLOGY: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL

As we envision constructive undertakings in the field of religion and science for the next decade, the emerging agenda of astrotheology is opening up a new theater for enquiry. Astrotheology provides a critical theological response to the field of astrobiology while critically assessing exciting new research on life in our solar system and the discovery of exoplanets. This article proposes four tasks for the astrotheologian: deliberate on (1) the scope of creation: is God's creation Earth‐centric or does it include the entire cosmos? (2) the question whether a single divine incarnation on Earth suffices for the cosmos or whether multiple incarnations—one for each inhabited planet—is required; (3) whether astrobiologists and other space scientists are sticking to their science or smuggling in ideology; and (4) readying terrestrial life for contact with extraterrestrial life by enumerating issues to be taken up by astroethics.     

Coming to an end: A case study of an ambiguous process of ending psychotherapy

Aim: When the duration of therapy is not preset and the outcome is a matter for negotiation, the decision to end psychotherapy will be an experiential concern for the two participants. This case study draws attention to how ambiguities may be settled in a process where ending is initiated by the therapist and resisted by the client. Method and analysis: The actual case was strategically selected as exceptional owing to a combination of circumstances. The client and the therapist had developed a ‘good enough’ alliance (WAI) and reached a ‘good enough’ outcome (OQ‐45), and still the client felt she was far from finished. A close inspection of interactional data in sessions together with both clients' and therapists' reflections in post‐therapy interviews elicited information about both substantial content and structural aspects of this complicated process of ending. Findings and discussion: The discrepancy between therapist and client was not addressed, but rather postponed and revisited again later. Structural elements like preparations for a break for vacations and reducing the frequency of sessions were used to test experiential qualities, such as how the client managed life without therapy. Carefully preserving a ‘good enough’ emotional bond through the negotiations seemed important to both parties. Significantly, the client's autonomy was interpreted as the final proof of improvement and the client came to a point where she could affirm that she had got better only by accepting that treatment was coming to an end.     

How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience

I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in ‘body‐scaled’ units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye‐level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson’s (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I develop handles the Doubled Earth example in a natural and illuminating way, thereby avoiding the need to posit irreducible experiential ‘modes of presentation’. I also address a kind of neo‐Fregean ‘reference‐fixing’ view of size experience, that shares features with the Russellian view developed. I give reasons for favoring the latter. Finally, I argue that Peacocke’s claim that spatial experience is ‘unit free’ is not persuasive.     

A SCIENTIST AND A THEOLOGIAN SEE THE WORLD: COMPROMISE OR SYNTHESIS?

Abstract. A scientist (for whom the world is the universe) and a theologian (for whom the world is planet Earth) engage in dialogue, not contrived Platonic or Galilean dialogue, but true bidisciplinary dialogue that strives for higher viewpoint. S: Is the preservation of the human species a primary human responsibility? T: It may be a responsibility we share with God. S: The human species has a limited future if confined to the planet Earth. We must diversify our habitat by colonizing space. T: We are responsible for other life on the planet as well. The discussants conclude that besides protecting Earth ecologies, we should create new ecologies in space.     

Noah's Ark,Mt. Meru,and the God of the Rainbow

The warning is clear: Unless human beings reach a change of civilization in the ecological sense within the next ten years, we will not have a future—any future. However, a change of civilization does require a change of religious beliefs as well. As Lynn White Jr. asserted many years ago, our present science and technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our ecological and economic crises can be expected from them alone. “Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious,” as White assures, “the remedy must also be essentially religious.” Still, where do we begin? The author is convinced that any ecological reconstruction of Christian theology and missiology must begin with the Scripture. A solid re‐reading of the Bible will do. This is the reason why the author revisits the well‐known story of Noah's ark to reveal the inconvenient truth almost verbatim – the truth that the Noah's Ark is the story of God's new covenant of life with not only human beings but also with the Earth, represented by the animals from the ark. After scrutinizing the creation stories in Genesis 1 to 9, comparing in particular the two different commandments of God in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2, as well as in Genesis 1 and Genesis 9, the author confirms that a just and sustainable future can only be built upon the biblical God of the rainbow, who shows no favor to human beings, and who makes a new covenant of life with all flesh. What we need is a new vision of Christian beliefs and discipleship that honors God, values the Earth, and emphasizes humility [humus] of humanity [humus], concludes the author.     

Reading the Lives of Others: Biography as Political Thought in Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir

In this essay, I focus on two biographical works by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir that I read as political texts: Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (Arendt 1957 ) and “Must We Burn Sade?” (Beauvoir 2012 ). Reading Arendt's Varnhagen and Beauvoir's “Sade” side by side illuminates their shared preoccupation with lived experience and their common political premises: the antagonism between freedom and sovereignty, and the centrality of action and constructive relations with others. My argument is that these texts constitute an original style of political thinking, which I call politico‐biographical hermeneutics, or reading the life of others as exercises in political theory. Politico‐biographical hermeneutics, as I take it, is not a systematic methodology, but an approach to interpreting sociopolitical forces as they come to bear and are embodied and inscribed in the lived experiences, struggles, and works of representative or exemplary individuals. This approach identifies the political lessons of lived experience and supports one of the central claims of feminist philosophy, namely, that the personal and the political are not antithetical, but relational.     

Bio‐Theoacoustics: Prayer Outdoors and the Reality of the Natural World

What does it mean to pray when the Earth—the fabric of our bodies’ lives, and indeed of the incarnation itself—is profoundly endangered from human action? What would Christian prayer look like that was not “losing track of nature” but following its tracks, physically and spiritually immersed in the actual, present, threatened and wild life of the more‐than‐human world? Using categories outlined by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his Ethics, this essay asserts that prayer and worship that take place entirely within the wall‐, speech‐, and screen‐mediated bubble of anthropocentrism risk becoming an abstraction. The essay explores this assertion in three moves: first, it delineates Bonhoeffer's assertion of the “abstraction” created by forms of Christian life in which God is conceived in separation from the world. Next, it shows how these categories—“God” and “world”—come together in prayer outdoors, understood both literally and metaphorically. And finally, it proposes how prayer outdoors might take shape for individuals or communities: a bio‐theoacoustics of prayer for the life of the world.     

Cosmic Commons: Contact and Community

Abstract

As we Homo sapiens on planet Earth prepare for possible contact with extraterrestrial life (ET)—especially extraterrestrial intelligent (ETI) life—we need to consider ethics. What will be the ethical posture we adopt as Earth meets space? This article advocates an ethic of praxis based upon the concept of a Cosmic Commons. Intelligent extraterrestrial beings, from their experiences in biotic and abiotic environments, should share with us a universal regard for intelligence (intellilife), respect for biotic evolution, and a sense of responsibility for shared common space in our places in the universe. As we venture from Earth into space, what will be required? Not anxiety over human dis-placement to new worlds; nor should we invest our efforts in irresponsibly exploiting the natural goods of other planets. Rather, we need an ethical transformation of terrestrial human thought and conduct prior to, during, and as a consequence of extraterrestrial explorations and engagements. We need an anticipatory Cosmic Charter.     

Should technological imperatives be obeyed?

This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one‐sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ‘technological imperatives’ to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ‘Can implies Ought’ (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid.     

A Constructivist Approach to Defining Human Emotion: From George Kelly to Rue Cromwell

In Being Human: Human Being, Rue Cromwell proposed that scientific knowledge does not need to converge in order to progress and that embracing diversity of knowledge domains benefits researchers more than the quest for unification. Principles from Kelly's personal construct theory and Cromwell's book are used to suggest a more meta-theoretical approach to emotion research, as well as defining emotion, by explaining how (a) various theories of emotion are not necessarily in competition with one another, as one can view various theories of emotion as simply being different (and perhaps not similar enough to one another to be compared in a clear-cut fashion); and (b) one cannot definitively claim that one theory of emotion is the correct or best account of all of emotional life, without simultaneously ignoring the difficulties that arise when considering multiple theories (or alternative constructions) that rely on different fundamental assumptions. This second point draws on Cromwell's discussion of how “unity of knowledge” is an oxymoronic concept.     

Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.     

Disjunctive illusory inferences and how to eliminate them

The mental model theory of reasoning postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities in which the premises of an inference hold and that these models represent what is true but not what is false. An unexpected consequence of this assumption is that certain premises should yield systematically invalid inferences. This prediction is unique among current theories of reasoning, because no alternative theory, whether based on formal rules of inference or on probabilistic considerations, predicts these illusory inferences. We report three studies of novel illusory inferences that depend on embedded disjunctions—for example, premises of this sort: A or else (B or else C). The theory distinguishes between those embedded disjunctions that should yield illusions and those that should not. In Experiment 1, we corroborated this distinction. In Experiment 2, we extended the illusory inferences to a more stringently controlled set of problems. In Experiment 3, we established a novel method for reducing illusions by calling for participants to make auxiliary inferences.     

5~6岁儿童传递推理能力的发展特点

通过有效的实验设计,在控制儿童记忆容量影响的前提下,考察了5~6岁儿童在长度传递推理和重量传递推理能力上的发展水平。结果表明:(1)5~6岁是儿童传递推理能力迅速发展的时期。在大概6岁左右,大多数儿童已经能够进行真正意义上的传递推理。(2)此年龄儿童在长度传递推理和重量传递推理能力上不具有显著差异。(3)条件排列的一致与不一致对于被试的推理成绩并不具有显著影响。