How fair versus how long: An integrative theory-based examination of procedural justice and procedural timeliness

Although studies have linked procedural justice to a range of positive attitudes and behaviors, the focus on justice has neglected other aspects of decision-making procedures. We explore one of those neglected aspects: procedural timeliness—defined as the degree to which procedures are started and completed within an acceptable time frame. Do employees react to how long a procedure takes, not just how fair it seems to be? To explore that question, we examined the potential effects of procedural timeliness using six theories created to explain the benefits of procedural justice. This integrative theory-based approach allowed us to explore whether “how long” had unique effects apart from “how fair.” The results of a three-wave, two-source field study showed that procedural timeliness had a significant indirect effect on citizenship behavior through many of the theory-based mechanisms, even when controlling for procedural justice. A laboratory study then replicated those effects while distinguishing procedures that were too fast versus too slow. We discuss the implications of our results for research on fostering citizenship behavior and improving supervisors’ decision-making procedures.     

Epistemic Rationality

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science, especially those with “naturalist” inclinations, argue that if there is to be any such thing as normativity or rationality in these domains, it must be instrumental—roughly, a matter of goal satisfaction—rather than something involving normative “oughts” that are independent of the satisfaction of our epistemic, cognitive, or other ends. This paper argues that while such an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is perfectly respectable, even insofar as it concerns specifically epistemic ends, it cannot be the whole story about such normativity. Rather, it must be accompanied by a “categorical,” goal‐independent sort of normativity that cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality, both because instrumental rationality itself depends on a noninstrumental relationship between a belief/claim/theory and the evidence that renders it rational, and because the epistemic rationality of many beliefs is independent of the goals of their believers.     

Wide and narrow scope

In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment, showing how this notion solves the symmetry problem as I’ve presented it. I also show that the concept of rational commitment is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and that it is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of rationality.     

From “I” to “We”: Different forms of identity,emotion, and belief predict victim support volunteerism among nominal and active supporters

Understanding how to attract and maintain volunteers is crucial for the operation of victim support organizations. We propose that volunteerism can be understood in a similar way as collective action. Active (N = 99) and nominal supporters (N = 134) completed measures of identities (personal, social, and organizational), emotions (sympathy, outrage, and pride), and efficacy beliefs (self‐, group, and organizational). The results revealed a different pattern of predictors of volunteerism for the two samples. Among nominal supporters, commitment to volunteerism was predicted by personal identity (“I”), sympathy, and self‐efficacy; among the actively engaged, volunteerism was predicted by social identity (“we”), outrage, and self‐efficacy. These results suggest that engagement with volunteerism is associated with qualitatively different processes for those nominally versus actively supportive of volunteer efforts.     

Naked Subjectivity: Minimal vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard

In recent years a significant debate has arisen as to whether Kierkegaard offers a version of the “narrative approach” to issues of personal identity and self-constitution. In this paper I do not directly take sides in this debate, but consider instead the applicability of a recent development in the broader literature on narrative identity—the distinction between the temporally-extended “narrative self” and the non-extended “minimal self—to Kierkegaard's work. I argue that such a distinction is both necessary for making sense of Kierkegaard's claim that we are ethically enjoined to become selves, and can indeed be found in Either/Or and the later The Sickness Unto Death . Despite Kierkegaard's Non-Substantialism, each of these texts speaks (somewhat obliquely) of a “naked self” that is separable from the concrete facticity of human being. In both cases, this minimal self is linked to issues of eschatological responsibility; yet the two works develop very different understandings of “eternity” and correspondingly divergent accounts of the temporality of selfhood. This complicates the picture of Kierkegaardian selfhood in interesting ways, taking it beyond both narrativist and more standard neo-Lockean models of what it is to be a self.     

Anti-Skepticism Under a Linguistic Guise

In this paper I consider the plausibility of developing anti-skepticism by framing the question in linguistic terms: instead of asking whether we know, we ask what falls within the extension of the word “know”. I first trace two previous attempts to develop anti-skepticism in this way, from Austin (particularly as presented by Kaplan) and from epistemic contextualism, and I present reasons to think that both approaches are unsuccessful. I then focus on a recently popular attempt to develop anti-skepticism from the “function-first” approach associated with Craig, which I also show to be problematic. I then argue that the apparent prima facie plausibility of fighting skepticism on linguistic grounds is due to a methodological spill-over from linguistics. Once we recognize this, it becomes clear that the skepticism debate should not be conducted in linguistic terms.

     

Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism

In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.     

Conceptual Constructs and Social Classes: A Review of Capitalizing Religion

Capitalizing Religion is a good addition to the growing number of works in the last decade that examine the intertwinings of religion, spirituality, and capitalism in the neoliberal present. Through an examination of scholarly discourses on modern religion and contemporary fiction and spirituality manuals, Martin demonstrates how, within the consumer capitalist present, the ideologies of individualism, consumption, quietism, and productivity shape conversations, habits, relationships, and fantasies. Martin tells us that the goal of social theory should be to account for how individuals and their choices are propelled by the material, historical, and structural forces that constitute them. He is a writer who has long been particularly attentive to the fact that “religion” is not some particular entity that exists “out there” that can be examined, but rather a bounded construct whose definition – through processes of inclusion and exclusion – performs works of distinction that benefit some interests, groups, and individuals to the detriment of others. Capitalizing Religion reminds us that the choices that many sociologists of religion make in dividing social formations into categories such as “religious,” “spiritual,” “institutional,” “individual,” or “paranormal” don’t just describe the world, but rather attempt to constitute it through taxonomies that are anything but natural and given.     

“It's Just Your Turn”: Performing Identity and Muslim Australian Popular Culture

Academic accounts of Muslim integration and inclusion in multicultural Australia are often at pains to emphasize that Muslim identity and Australian national identity are compatible with each other. While this political manoeuvre remains both important and relevant, it nevertheless chances reinscribing the very terms of debate it seeks to contest and worryingly aligns closely with prevalent governmental techniques to “domesticate” Muslim difference. Furthermore, it risks presenting both “Muslim” and “Australian” identities as self-evident, taken-for-granted categories. In this article, I consider two Muslim Australian popular cultural productions – namely, the television programme Salam Café and the stand-up comedy show Fear of a Brown Planet – in order to explore how Muslim and Australian identities, and the relationships between them, are performed, contested and rearticulated. What is most salient about both productions, the article argues, is that they present the identity of “Australian” as a site of political and cultural contestation, with the “nation” a contingent site through which multicultural politics are actualized. Such a move is salient for Australian multiculturalism more broadly, but is especially so for Muslim communities – not least because it undermines the West/Islam dichotomy altogether.     

Rational Thought And Rational Behavior: A Review Of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.

Standard economic theory says that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions and then to select the one with the highest weight. Such a procedure would maximize subjective expected utility. But, because of constraints on time and available information, people and other animals often bypass this process by using “fast and frugal” heuristics to make decisions. Rationality is thus said to be “bounded” by time and information constraints. The articles in this book describe and organize common heuristics. They show that use of such heuristics is generally the best approach to many real world problems and therefore not irrational. Heuristics evolved, they say, not as deviations from rationality but as aids to rationality in cases where the standard model would have proved to be too slow or inefficient. Although the approach of almost all of the authors of these papers is that of cognitive psychology—a focus on internal cognitive mechanisms—their findings and even their theories may be interpreted in terms of reinforcement and punishment acting on behavioral patterns.     

Lay discourses about Brexit and prejudice: “Ideological creativity” and its limits in Brexit debates

Much research on Brexit has studied whether the vote to leave the EU is a marker of growing prejudice. In this article, we study instead how the relationship between support for Brexit and prejudice is constructed, negotiated and contested in lay discourse. Our analysis of focus groups (N = 12) conducted prior to and following the EU referendum shows that support for Brexit was predominantly constructed as based on nationalism and anti-immigration prejudice, especially in Remain-supporting accounts. This prompted identity management strategies and counter-arguments by Leave supporters, such as providing alternative constructions of prejudice and racism; relating Brexit with “progressive” values; and presenting it as rational and economically sound. In our discussion, we draw attention to the “ideological creativity” that underpins these accounts and also reflect on the possibilities and constraints of developing alternative political narratives under conditions of political polarisation.     

Blameworthiness,desert, and luck

Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent's “moral responsibility.” Focusing on responsibility's “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action's results bear constitutively on how “blameworthy” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor's blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected—or unaffected—by an action's results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent's liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.     

PROBabilities from EXemplars (PROBEX): a “lazy” algorithm for probabilistic inference from generic knowledge

PROBEX (PROBabilities from EXemplars), a model of probabilistic inference and probability judgment based on generic knowledge is presented. Its properties are that: (a) it provides an exemplar model satisfying bounded rationality; (b) it is a “lazy” algorithm that presumes no pre‐computed abstractions; (c) it implements a hybrid‐representation, similarity‐graded probability. We investigate the ecological rationality of PROBEX and find that it compares favorably with Take‐The‐Best and multiple regression (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). PROBEX is fitted to the point estimates, decisions, and probability assessments by human participants. The best fit is obtained for a version that weights frequency heavily and retrieves only two exemplars. It is proposed that PROBEX implements speed and frugality in a psychologically plausible way.     

THE CASTRATION OF SIGNS: CONVERSING WITH AUGUSTINE ON CREATION, LANGUAGE AND TRUTH

This article takes as its starting point Nicholas Lash's use of the Buberian distinction between the basic words “I‐It” and “I‐You” to address the question of how the difference between God and creation is “displayed” within the world. Drawing on a rather different discourse—the semiotics developed by Augustine in the distinctions he makes between sign and thing, use and enjoyment—it seeks to explore the concrete shape that might be taken by practices that foster the speaking of the basic word “I‐You”, and which thereby manifest God's redemptive activity within the world, focusing specifically on practices of debate and argument. “What might a redeemed practice of debate look like?” is the question that this article seeks to answer.     

Living in the “space of reasons”: The “rationality debate” revisited

Two questions are central to the “rationality debate” in the philosophy of social science. First, should we acknowledge differences in basic norms of epistemic and agential rationality, or in the content of perceptual experience, as the “best explanation” of radical differences in belief and practice? Second, can genuine understanding be achieved between cultures and research traditions that so differ in their beliefs and practices? I survey a number of responses to these questions, and suggest that one of these, “dialogical optimism”, while attractive, is in need of further clarification. Such clarification may be forthcoming if we attend to recent work by John McDowell. McDowell claims that perceptual experience, as our primary mode of epistemic access to the world, must be located within what Sellars termed the “space of reasons” if we are to make sense of our conception of ourselves as thinking creatures. I develop a reading of this claim in terms of a fundamental duality in human perceptual experience, and use this conception of experience to illuminate the dialogical optimist strategy in the rationality debate.     

Attitude toward the Ten Commandments

Summary

This study investigated helping behavior on Election Day, 1972, at 20 polling places in southeastern Michigan. One experimenter, posing as a “campaign worker,” dropped his political literature as he attempted to give some to a subject approaching or exiting from the polls, while a second experimenter recorded the subject's behavior and then ascertained the subject's presidential preference and/or party affiliation. It was found that (a) subjects were more likely to help the “campaign worker” if he had the same political preference; (b) McGovern supporters were more likely to help than were Nixon supporters; and (c) neither sex of subject or campaign worker, nor whether the interaction took place before or after voting, was significantly related to the likelihood of helping behavior occurring.     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

The Goldilocks problem and extended cognition

According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), parts of the extrabodily world can constitute cognitive operations. I argue that the debate over HEC should be framed as a debate over the location and bounds of cognitive systems. The “Goldilocks problem” is how to demarcate these systems in a way that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive. I lay out a view of systems demarcation on which cognitive systems are sets of mechanisms for producing cognitive processes that are bounded by transducers and effectors: structures that turn physical stimuli into representations, and representations into physical effects. I show how the transducer–effector view can stop the problem of uncontrolled cognitive spreading that faces HEC, and illustrate its advantages relative to other views of system individuation. Finally, I argue that demarcating systems by transducers and effectors is not question-begging in the context of a debate over HEC.