A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and Laudan's conceptions applied

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice ‘pathologies’ – inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions – are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules.     

Quantification Theory in *8 of Principia Mathematica and the Empty Domain

The second printing of Principia Mathematica in 1925 offered Russell an occasion to assess some criticisms of the Principia and make some suggestions for possible improvements. In Appendix A, Russell offered *8 as a new quantification theory to replace *9 of the original text. As Russell explained in the new introduction to the second edition, the system of *8 sets out quantification theory without free variables. Unfortunately, the system has not been well understood. This paper shows that Russell successfully antedates Quine's system of quantification theory without free variables. It is shown as well, that as with Quine's system, a slight modification yields a quantification theory inclusive of the empty domain.     

Darwin's lost theory and its implications for the 21st century

This paper reports the reconstruction of the long ignored “second half” or human level completion for Darwin's theory of evolution. Pursuing the striking contradictions between what has been attributed to Darwin by his neo‐Darwinian and sociobiological heirs and what he actually said, in ignored sections of The Descent of Man and Darwin's long unpublished notebooks it uncovers a three‐level theory of the moral agent that foreshadows the emergence of 20th century social science and the late 20th century rise of the fields of systems science and humanistic psychology. Implications for a joint venture of natural science and social science in the completion of the humanistic and action‐oriented theory of evolution called for by the species‐threatening challenges of the 21st century are considered.     

Towards an Understanding of the Ontological Conditions issuing from Original Sin

The aim of this paper is to explore in the light of recent scientific discoveries, coupled with a return to biblical orthodoxy, the question of the Fall (Augustine and Paul, Gen. 3, Rom. 7), and the apparent intergenerational conditions of original sin. This is the human condition – East of Eden. Invoking Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection from random mutation as a means of repudiating the existence of original sin can no longer be sustained, scientifically; the biology of horizontal gene transfer (HGT), transgenerational epigenetics (TGE), accelerated evolution (AE) and biological plasticity (BP) has rendered Darwinism grounded in a Naturalistic methodology an inadequate explanation. If humanity is ‘born this way’ – mired in sin – have we condemned ourselves and our children to this status? How does this affect the relationship between biology and free will, between a form of predestination and decision‐making? Therefore, this paper is towards an understanding of the ontology of the original, or first, sin, and is a biblical and scientific exploration of postlapsarian humanity's self‐willed state, ‘East of Eden.’     

B.F. Skinner:

Skinner's non-intuitive discovery in the 1930s that response probability can be a function of not only temporal contiguity but also past consequences sparked fifty years of reaction ranging from high praise to scathing criticism and misunderstanding. Failures to distinguish between the work of Skinner and Pavlov and Watson account for some of the misunderstandings. Other criticisms stem from basic value differences. Whereas Skinner's scientific interest is in behavior per se, other psychologist are curious about inner processes. While Skinners' truth criterion is pragmatic, other psychologists hold correspondence theories of truth. Whereas Skinner is convinced that hypothetical constructs hinder scientific discovery, other psychologists are equally certain that they are essential. Skinner's eschewal of hypothetical constructs, however, has not prevented him form addressing complex behavior, as is widely believed. To the contrary, Skinner has formulated enough unexplored theories on the origin and maintenance of verbal behavior, concept development, problem solving, and creativity to keep theoreticians and empiricists occupied for decades.     

The fundamental laws of physics can tell the truth

Nancy Cartwright's arguments in favour of phenomenological laws and against fundamental ones are discussed. Her criticisms of the standard covering‐law account are extended using Vyacheslav Stjopin's analysis of the structure of fundamental theories. It is argued that Cartwright's thesis (that the laws of physics lie) is too radical to accept. A model of theory change is presented which demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can, in fact, be confronted with experience.     

Creativity,Problem Solving,and Solution Set Sightedness: Radically Reformulating BVSR

Too often, psychological debates become polarized into dichotomous positions. Such polarization may have occurred with respect to Campbell's (1960) blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity. To resolve this unnecessary controversy, BVSR was radically reformulated with respect to creative problem solving. The reformulation began by defining (a) potential solution sets consisting of k possible solutions each described by their respective probability and utility values, (b) a set sightedness metric that gauges the extent to which the probabilities correspond to the utilities, and (c) a solution creativity index based on the joint improbability and utility of each solution. These definitions are then applied to representative cases in which simultaneous or sequential generate‐and‐test procedures scrutinize solution sets of variable size and with representative patterns of probabilities and utilities. The principal features of BVSR theory were then derived, including the implications of superfluity and backtracking. Critically, it was formally demonstrated that the most creative solutions must emerge from solution sets that score extremely low in sightedness. Although this preliminary revision has ample room for further development, the demonstration proves that BVSR's explanatory value does not depend on any specious association with Darwin's theory of evolution.     

The Darwin–Gray Exchange

After the publication of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, the controversy over the issues of design, teleology and divine intervention in nature were renewed. This paper looks at Darwin's correspondence with Harvard botanist Asa Gray from 1860–1863 and investigates how Darwin rejected notions of design due to his immersion in William Paley's categories. Gray, in contrast, was able to move past Paley's influence and find consistency in affirming both evolutionary theory and natural theology.     

REJOINDER: Picasso's Guernica Creativity as a Darwinian Process: Definitions,Clarifications, Misconceptions,and Applications

The author responds to four commentaries on Simonton (this issue). The response deals with two sets of issues. First are criticisms of the Darwinian theory of creativity, especially as applied to Picasso's sketches for the Guernica. These criticisms range from the presumed role of associative processes to the essential nature of any Darwinian model. The second set of issues pertains to diverse methodological objections with respect to measurement and data analysis. The author responds to each and every point. The author concludes not only that Picasso's creative process is best described as Darwinian, but also that the Darwinian theory of creativity has been notably strengthened by the current exchange.     

Becoming Transdisciplinary: The Emergence of the Transdisciplinary Individual

This article develops the idea of becoming a transdisciplinary individual, and begins by tracing the origins and contemporary currents of transdisciplinarity (from 1972 to present day). Using Nicolescu's earlier concept of a transdisciplinary attitude as an intellectual springboard, this article explores the traits of individuals involved in transdisciplinary projects. Emergent from the literature are four overarching dimensions of understanding what is entailed in becoming and being a transdisciplinary individual: (a) an appreciation of an array of skills, characteristics, and personality traits aligned with a transdisciplinary attitude; (b) acceptance of the idea that transdisciplinary individuals are intellectual risk takers and institutional transgressors; (c) insights into the nuances of transdisciplinary practice and attendant virtues; (d) a respect for the role of creative inquiry, cultural diversity, and cultural relativism. More research is needed on the subjective and embodied experiences of transdisciplinary participants; that is, how they become transdisciplinary individuals.     

On some early objections to Bohm's theory

Recent literature on Bohm's alternative to mainstream quantum mechanics may create the misleading impression that, except for perfunctory dismissals, the theory was ignored by the physics community in the years immediately following its proposal. As a matter of fact, Einstein, Pauli, and Heisenberg all published criticisms of Bohm's theory, explaining their reasons for not accepting the theory. These criticisms will be discussed and evaluated in this article.     

Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg

In this discussion I respond to some of the criticisms raised by Béatrice Longuenesse and Hannah Ginsborg to my account of Kant's aesthetic theory presents in Kant's Theory of Taste.     

Turing's Analysis of Computation and Theories of Cognitive Architecture

Turing's analysis of computation is a fundamental part of the background of cognitive science. In this paper it is argued that a re-interpretation of Turing's work is required to underpin theorizing about cognitive architecture. It is claimed that the symbol systems view of the mind, which is the conventional way of understanding how Turing's work impacts on cognitive science, is deeply flawed. There is an alternative interpretation that is more faithful to Turing's original insights, avoids the criticisms made of the symbol systems approach and is compatible with the growing interest in agent-environment interaction. It is argued that this interpretation should form the basis for theories of cognitive architecture.     

The theory of justice from a hermeneutic perspective

In this article, I argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics of historical tradition does not imply a conservative stance on ethical and political issues. My essay seeks to show that Gadamer's philosophy leaves ample room for normative criticism, objectivity, and theories of justice at odds with conventional common sense. I critically examine Walzer's Spheres of Justice, reading it as an attempt to obtain a normative account of justice based on a hermeneutical framework of interpretation. I make several criticisms of Walzer's method and results, which I use to develop my own critical model for interpreting, criticizing, and revising traditional understandings, and common sense meanings. My conclusion is that we need to extend Gadamer's philosophy, in order to identify the ways that established traditions of understanding and common sense can result from, or produce, inconsistency, irrationality, hermeneutical incoherence, and meaningless deprivations or suffering. This essay thus seeks to develop an influential continental philosophy in a direction that makes fruitful contact with Anglo-American theories of justice, and normativity.     

Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology

This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism.I am grateful to Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman for their criticisms of previous drafts of this paper.     

Evolution by Natural Selection: Darwin's Gift to Science and Religion

The argument-from-design, based on biological evidence, was elaborated by William Paley in his Natural Theology (1802). It was revived in the 1990s by several authors, with a new moniker, the theory of intelligent design. In The Origin of Species (1859), Darwin advanced a scientific explanation of the design of organisms: evolution by natural selection. Organisms are pervaded by imperfections, dysfunctions, cruelties, and even sadism. The theory of evolution accounts for these mishaps, by natural selection, so that they need not be attributed to God's explicit design. The theory of evolution by natural selection is Darwin's gift to religion, in addition to its centrality in biology.     

THE TRAINING ANALYSIS AT A TIME WHEN THEORY IS IN SHORT SUPPLY1

The author discusses the risks confronting the training analysis when original theoretical production is lacking. In his view, little progress has been made since Freud's time in establishing a general science of the psyche based on Freud's interpretive method. What has been transmitted is stated to be not Freud's method of discovery but the knowledge thereby produced, which has been handed down in the form of doctrines, defined as theory presented as psychic fact. Hence analyses tend to apply theories rather than to discover unconsciouses. Some of today's most common interpretational aberrations are described, and the author shows the powerful suggestive effect on patients of using doctrines as metaphors of psychic life. Where such a training analysis is reinforced by a like form of theoretical teaching and supervision, candidates may uncritically assimilate the relevant theory. The author uses his concept of the reality‐providing circuit to show how belief in a doctrine imparted by the training analysis makes that doctrine appear as the ideological basis of psychoanalytic knowledge. He finally notes that, theories being essentially heuristic instruments and not bodies of acquired information, the consequence of the current dearth of theories, which have degenerated into doctrines, is that the training analysis itself has come to constitute the theory of training in many institutes.     

Two concepts of adaptation: Darwin's and psychology's

The paper takes issue with the traditional view of Darwin's influence on psychology; namely, that it is he who passed on to psychology the concept of individual adaptation. Three arguments are presented: a) that Darwin, qua scientist, was only interested in species adaptation, an entirely different concept from that of individual adaptation, b) that Darwin's writings on individual adaptation are so unexceptional that it is inconceivable that psychologists should have been influenced by them, and c) that the two concepts are logically incompatible since species adaptation presupposes a strict hereditary determinism, while individual adaptation conceives of the organism either as free and undetermined or else as determined by the environment.