Sartre, dialectic, and the problem of overcoming bad faith

InBeing and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms a circle of relations between oneself and another. This circle moves between the relations of love and desire and results from the fact that both love and desire are attempts to capture the other who always remains out of reach. Sartre denies that there can be a dialectic of such relations with others: never can there be a motivated movement beyond the frustrations and failures of each of these attempts to relate to the other. The only way out of this circle is, therefore, according to Sartre, a radical conversion.Like the master in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind, each individual caught in this circle wants what cannot be attained: the assimilation or the negation of the freedom of the other. He is thus, like Hegel's master, impervious to any reasons that could count against what he is seeking; his failures cannot in any way motivate him to want what can be. From the point of view of such desires, any negative evaluation of these desires must seem arbitrary. Therefore, to the extent that Sartre's earlier writings indicate no other possibilities of human existence except those premised on such impossible demands, Sartre's negative evaluations concerning the bad faith of these individuals must seem arbitrary.My conclusion is not, however, simply negative since I argue that inSaint Genet Sartre presents Genet's life as a dialectical movement beyond failure to triumph. This is not a dialectic of bad faith. Rather it is a dialectic based on a very different desire from the desire for what cannot be. If Sartre thus develops another level, another fundamental desire, from which the level of bad faith can be judged to be wrong, then at least from this level the judgment is not a merely arbitrary one.For their many perceptive and helpful comments and suggestions, I am especially indebted and grateful to Dieter Turck and John Beverslius. A version of this paper is scheduled to be read at a workshop on Sartre during the 1975 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.     

The normativity of meaning and the hard problem of intentionality

This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms.     

The Precious Blood of Christ: faith,rituals and civic and religious meaning during the centuries of Mantuan devotion

This article explores the main meanings given to the presence of the relic of the Precious Blood of Christ in the city of Mantua, and also highlights the links with the Altdorf-Weingarten relic of the same, which derives from it. For centuries the presence of this relic has intertwined in several ways with events in Mantua and has shaped some of their most significant religious and cultural expressions. Above all, during the Middle Ages, the Precious Blood had a widespread impact, destined to expand all over Europe. However, we possess vague and scarcely defined evidence of this, as much of the evidence was removed, mostly in the name of rationalist critique, and diminished with the passing of time. Within a long-term perspective, the text which follows here aims to tackle some relevant problematic issues, from a historical and historico-anthropological viewpoint. It attempts both to strengthen understanding of the local and wider intertwining which characterised the development of such a relevant religious experience of our culture, and also to enter into contact with essential aspects of it.     

An approach to the problem of meaning: Semantic networks

An approach to the problem of meaning through the postulation of semantic networks is presented. Subjects generated them for ten concrete and ten abstract nouns with two different procedures. Comparisons were made between the semantic network and the set of associations given to each concept. Finally, both the concrete concepts' and the abstract concepts' networks were compared. It was suggested that a form of meaning is given by the semantic network of the concept, by a reconstructive memory process.     

Foster Care and the Helping Professions

This article combines a foster parent's and an educator's view of working with children in foster care placements. Counseling a child who has been removed from the home environment requires a real sensitivity to the internal devastation that may be taking place and the coping behaviors associated with that separation process.     

Conceptions of Man and the Helping Professions

The helping professions are defined and the argument is advanced that because they are dealing with existential affairs, practitioners must rely more on values than on science. An image of man is proposed and the implications of this image for the work of those in the helping profession indicated.     

Suffering and faith

It is hypothesized that, under the impact of suffering or loss, some Christians not only grieve for what has been lost but also experience feelings of separation from their God and mourn that loss also. This spiritual mourning may take different forms and may lead to different outcomes in ways more or less analogous to those described for mourning and variants thereof by various workers. Drawing upon such work, the author describes certain possible forms of spiritual mourning.The preparation of this paper was supported in part by Grant HD-03110 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and by Maternal and Child Health Training Grant No. MCT=000916A.     

Dialogue and faith

‘Dialogue’ between members of differing traditions is nowadays replacing polemics, debate, and monologue preaching of traditional missionary policy. Terms in which it can be conducted have not yet, however, been widely found. It will be illuminating to discover whether among diverse groups conversation in the terms propounded here could prove fruitful, or at least mutually intelligible. This will be a highly significant test of the theory, expecially in view of the possible importance of this activity for the world's future religious development.1 W. Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Mentor ed. New York 1964), p. 177.      

Dialogue and faith

‘Dialogue’ between members of differing traditions is nowadays replacing polemics, debate, and monologue preaching of traditional missionary policy. Terms in which it can be conducted have not yet, however, been widely found. It will be illuminating to discover whether among diverse groups conversation in the terms propounded here could prove fruitful, or at least mutually intelligible. This will be a highly significant test of the theory, expecially in view of the possible importance of this activity for the world's future religious development.¹     

Social Responsibility and the Mental Health Professions

Summary

While mental health professionals tend to primarily focus on their professional responsibilities toward the specific members of the public whom they serve, many are also concerned about positively impacting the broader society or culture in which they live and work. This notion of social responsibility is addressed in the ethics codes of both psychologists and social workers. This article reviews how this notion is addressed for these two mental health professions and also examines the changes that have occurred for psychologists between the 1992 and 2002 ethics codes. Finally, some general issues regarding the role of mental health professionals in changing society are considered.     

Literal meaning, conventional meaning and first meaning

Literal meaning is often identified with conventional meaning. In A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs Donald Davidson argues (1) that literal meaning is distinct from conventional meaning, and (2) that literal meaning is identical to what he calls first meaning. In this paper it is argued that Davidson has established (1) but not (2), that he has succeeded in showing that there is a distinction between literal meaning and conventional meaning but has failed to see that literal meaning and first meaning are also distinct. This failure is somewhat surprising, since it is through a consideration of Davidson's notion of radical interpretation that the distinction between literal meaning and first meaning becomes apparent.I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, and to Mark Mercer, Tom Patton and Gary Wedeking for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank David Checkland, who discussed A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs with me at length some years ago.