Human factors of transitions in automated driving: A general framework and literature survey

The topic of transitions in automated driving is becoming important now that cars are automated to ever greater extents. This paper proposes a theoretical framework to support and align human factors research on transitions in automated driving. Driving states are defined based on the allocation of primary driving tasks (i.e., lateral control, longitudinal control, and monitoring) between the driver and the automation. A transition in automated driving is defined as the process during which the human-automation system changes from one driving state to another, with transitions of monitoring activity and transitions of control being among the possibilities. Based on ‘Is the transition required?’, ‘Who initiates the transition?’, and ‘Who is in control after the transition?’, we define six types of control transitions between the driver and automation: (1) Optional Driver-Initiated Driver-in-Control, (2) Mandatory Driver-Initiated Driver-in-Control, (3) Optional Driver-Initiated Automation-in-Control, (4) Mandatory Driver-Initiated Automation-in-Control, (5) Automation-Initiated Driver-in-Control, and (6) Automation-Initiated Automation-in-Control. Use cases per transition type are introduced. Finally, we interpret previous experimental studies on transitions using our framework and identify areas for future research. We conclude that our framework of driving states and transitions is an important complement to the levels of automation proposed by transportation agencies, because it describes what the driver and automation are doing, rather than should be doing, at a moment of time.     

INCORPORATING THE BUDDHA’S THREEFOLD TRAINING WITH MANAGEMENT SCIENCE THEORIES

ABSTRACT

The acceleration of the evolution of economic culture through scientific development affords the opportunity to re-examine cross-domain dialogue and research in Buddhism and other disciplines. The concepts of threefold training in Buddhism (i.e. precepts, samadhi, and wisdom) were used as data items to generate data values and thereby convey the semantic nature of these terms. A systems analysis approach that can adequately incorporate hermeneutics into management science was employed to present the research topic. This study illustrates the relationship between a management activity (i.e. its effectiveness and efficiency, and the mechanism used) and a Buddhist activity (i.e. threefold training). This relationship was used to establish a body- and mind-transcending system comprising two subsystems: a service subsystem that adopts the perspective of management science by emphasising the ‘way of things’ and a submission subsystem that adopts a Buddhist perspective by stressing the ‘way of people’. The main finding of this study is that the two subsystems are characterised by identical Buddhist concepts.     

Rules all the way down: Consumer behaviour from the standpoint of the ‘ONE behavioural’ research programme

This article sets out a unified behavioural research programme that integrates compatible elements of old, new and evolutionary behavioural approaches to economics as an alternative to the dominant unified approach to economics based on rational choice theory and a Walrasian view of market coordination. However, the proposed programme can also be viewed as a general framework for interdisciplinary research on consumer behaviour. It employs the view of scientific research programmes proposed by Lakatos, setting out groups of ‘hard-core’ propositions and their associated ‘do’ and ‘do not’ rules for the conduct of researchers. The unifying theme is that evolution in the economy (and in human systems more generally) entails the creation, adoption and abandonment of rules for dealing effectively with open-ended choice problems that are bedevilled by infinite regress problems and cognitive challenges that people seek to address via personal repertoires of hierarchically related rules. To anticipate behaviour, researchers need to develop knowledge of these rules (including heuristics and routines), their functionality and the processes by which they get changed or prove difficult to change even where they cause problems.     

The Logicality of Language: A new take on Triviality, “Ungrammaticality”, and Logical Form*

Recent work in formal semantics suggests that the language system includes not only a structure building device, as standardly assumed, but also a natural deductive system which can determine when expressions have trivial truth‐conditions (e.g., are logically true/false) and mark them as unacceptable. This hypothesis, called the ‘logicality of language’, accounts for many acceptability patterns, including systematic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. To deal with apparent counter‐examples consisting of acceptable tautologies and contradictions, the logicality of language is often paired with an additional assumption according to which logical forms are radically underspecified: i.e., the language system can see functional terms but is ‘blind’ to open class terms to the extent that different tokens of the same term are treated as if independent. This conception of logical form has profound implications: it suggests an extreme version of the modularity of language, and can only be paired with non‐classical—indeed quite exotic—kinds of deductive systems. The aim of this paper is to show that we can pair the logicality of language with a different and ultimately more traditional account of logical form. This framework accounts for the basic acceptability patterns which motivated the logicality of language, can explain why some tautologies and contradictions are acceptable, and makes better predictions in key cases. As a result, we can pursue versions of the logicality of language in frameworks compatible with the view that the language system is not radically modular vis‐á‐vis its open class terms and employs a deductive system that is basically classical.     

Drawing the boundary between subject and object: Comments on the mind-brain problem

Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes ‘objectivity’, especially in identifying it with what a ‘machine’ can do. I approach the problem in the light of two cognate circumstances: (a) the ‘measurement problem’ in quantum physics, and (b) the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of ‘machines’. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are ‘objective’; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called ‘complex’. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or ‘self-references’ which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object.     

The Structure of Frege's Thoughts

Fregean thoughts (i.e. the senses of assertoric sentences) are structured entities because they are composed of simpler senses that are somehow ordered and interconnected. The constituent senses form a unity because some of them are ‘saturated’ and some ‘unsaturated’. This paper shows that Frege's explanation of the structure of thoughts, which is based on the ‘saturated/unsaturated’ distinction, is by no means sufficient because it permits what I call ‘wild analyses’, which have certain unwelcome consequences. Wild analyses are made possible because any ‘unsaturated’ sense that is a mode of presentation of a concept together with any ‘saturated’ sense forms a thought. The reason is that any concept can be applied to any object (which is presented by a ‘saturated’ sense). This stems from the fact that Frege was willing to admit only total functions. It is also briefly suggested what should be done to block wild analyses.     

多重整合的社会心理服务体系：政策逻辑、建构策略与基本内核

根据社会心理服务体系建设提出的政策逻辑, 分析了社会心理服务体系建设的目标、服务对象和服务内容等。社会心理服务体系建构的策略应该采取研究视角、学科体系和研究取向等的多重整合, 包括个体、情境和社会视角的整合, 基础学科和应用学科的整合, 学术研究和社会实践的整合。社会心理学是社会心理服务体系的核心, 整合心理学的社会心理学和社会学的社会心理学才能更好地理解社会治理的机制和过程。社会心理服务体系建设是在建构影响社会发展的心理环境。社会心理服务体系的建构需要社会发展的视角, 应该探索社会发展心理学的路径来承担整合学科体系和社会治理实践的任务。     

Deviant interdisciplinarity as philosophical practice: prolegomena to deep intellectual history

Philosophy may relate to interdisciplinarity in two distinct ways On the one hand, philosophy may play an auxiliary role in the process of interdisciplinarity, typically through conceptual analysis, in the understanding that the disciplines themselves are the main epistemic players. This version of the relationship I characterise as ‘normal’ because it captures the more common pattern of the relationship, which in turn reflects an acceptance of the division of organized inquiry into disciplines. On the other hand, philosophy may be itself the site for the production of interdisciplinary knowledge, understood as a kind of second-order understanding of reality that transcends the sort of knowledge that the disciplines provide, left to their own devices. This is my own position, which I dub ‘deviant’ and to which most of this article is devoted. I begin by relating the two types of interdisciplinarity to the organization of inquiry, especially their respective attitudes to the history of science. Underlying the two types are contrasting notions of what constitutes the ‘efficient’ pursuit of knowledge. This difference is further explored in terms of the organization of the university. The normal/deviant distinction was already marked in the institution’s medieval origins in terms of the difference between Doctors and Masters, respectively, an artefact of which remains in the postgraduate/undergraduate degree distinction. In the context of the history of the university, the prospects for deviant interdisciplinarity were greatest from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth century—the period called ‘early modern’ in the philosophy curriculum. Towards the end of that period, due to Kant and the generation of idealists who followed him, philosophy was briefly the privileged site for deviant interdisciplinarity. After Hegel’s death, the mantle of deviant interdisciplinarity increasingly passed to some version of ‘biology’. I explore the ‘Natur-’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaft’ versions of that post-philosophical vision, which continue to co-exist within today’s biological science. I then briefly examine the chequered reputation of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, someone who exemplified the promise and perils of deviant interdisciplinarity over the past 200 years. I conclude with an Epilogue that considers contemporary efforts to engage philosophy in interdisciplinary work, invoking William James as an exemplar.     

Some differences between phonetic and auditory modes of perception

When third-formant transitions are appropriately incorporated into an acoustic syllable, they provide critical support for the phonetic percepts we call [d] and [g], but when presented in isolation they are perceived as time-varying ‘chirps’. In the present experiment, both modes of perception were made available simultaneously by presenting the third-format transitions to one ear and the remainder of the acoustic syllable to the other. On the speech side of this duplex percept, where the transitions supported the perception of stop-vowel syllables, perception was categorical and influenced by the presence of a preposed [al] or [ar]. On the nonspeech side, where the same transitions were heard as ‘chirps’, perception was continuous and free of influence from the preposed syllables. As both differences occurred under conditions in which the acoustic input was constant, we should suppose that they reflect the different properties of auditory and phonetic modes of perception.     

A Piagetian perspective on mathematical construction

In this paper, we offer a Piagetian perspective on the construction of the logico-mathematical schemas which embody our knowledge of logic and mathematics. Logico-mathematical entities are tied to the subject's activities, yet are so constructed by reflective abstraction that they result from sensorimotor experience only via the construction of intermediate schemas of increasing abstraction. The ‘axiom set’ does not exhaust the cognitive structure (schema network) which the mathematician thus acquires. We thus view ‘truth’ not as something to be defined within the closed ‘world’ of a formal system but rather in terms of the schema network within which the formal system is embedded. We differ from Piaget in that we see mathematical knowledge as based on social processes of mutual verification which provide an external drive to any ‘necessary dynamic’ of reflective abstraction within the individual. From this perspective, we argue that axiom schemas tied to a preferred interpretation may provide a necessary intermediate stage of reflective abstraction en route to acquisition of the ability to use formal systems in abstracto.     

An analysis of information visualisation

Philosophers have relied on visual metaphors to analyse ideas and explain their theories at least since Plato. Descartes is famous for his system of axes, and Wittgenstein for his first design of truth table diagrams. Today, visualisation is a form of ‘computer-aided seeing’ information in data. Hence, information is the fundamental ‘currency’ exchanged through a visualisation pipeline. In this article, we examine the types of information that may occur at different stages of a general visualization pipeline. We do so from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. The quantitative analysis is developed on the basis of Shannon’s information theory. The qualitative analysis is developed on the basis of Floridi’s taxonomy in the philosophy of information. We then discuss in detail how the condition of the ‘data processing inequality’ can be broken in a visualisation pipeline. This theoretic finding underlines the usefulness and importance of visualisation in dealing with the increasing problem of data deluge. We show that the subject of visualisation should be studied using both qualitative and quantitative approaches, preferably in an interdisciplinary synergy between information theory and the philosophy of information.     

Organicism and Reductionism in Cancer Research: Towards a Systemic Approach

In recent cancer research, strong and apparently conflicting epistemological stances have been advocated by different research teams in a mist of an ever‐growing body of knowledge ignited by ever‐more perplexing and non‐conclusive experimental facts: in the past few years, an ‘organicist’ approach investigating cancer development at the tissue level has challenged the established and so‐called ‘reductionist’ approach focusing on disentangling the genetic and molecular circuitry of carcinogenesis. This article reviews the ways in which ‘organicism’ and ‘reductionism’ are used and opposed in this context, with an aim at clarifying the debate. Methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of both approaches are discussed. We argue that the ‘organicist/reductionist’ opposition in the present case of carcinogenesis is more a matter of diverging heuristics than a claim about theoretical or ontological (ir)reducibility. As a matter of fact, except for the downward causation claim, which we question, we argue that the organicist arguments are compatible with the reductionist approach. Moreover, we speculate that both approaches, which currently focus on specific entities i.e., genes versus tissues, will need to shift their conceptual frameworks to studying complex arrays of relationships potentially ranging over several levels of entities, as is the case with ‘systems biology’.     

A dynamic systems approach to the feeling toned complex

A review of Jung’s writing on the ‘feeling‐toned complex’ shows that he considered it to comprise independent, split‐off, psychic elements. Modern advances in scientific thinking and technology, namely Dynamic Systems Theory and neuro‐imaging, allow us to better define and explore this psychic phenomenon. Considering the constellation of the complex as a hierarchy of dynamic systems allows for a prediction of the timing of brain activity. This has been confirmed by two independent studies using fMRI and QEEG while administering the Word Association Experiment, the tool Jung used to investigate brain/psychic functioning over a century ago. Using as a framework the stages of the constellation of a complex viewed as a hierarchy of dynamic systems, I review the neuro‐imaging studies reported by Petchkovsky et al. (2013, 2017) and Escamilla et al. (2018), concluding that quantitative theoretical predictions and experimental results are in agreement within an order of magnitude. The change in attention caused by the constellation of the complex can also be conceived as the switching from a default neuro‐network, a startle response activating executive functioning in the frontal cortex of either the ego‐complex or an autonomous complex.     

Marxist‐Leninist scientific atheism 1

The main object of Marxist‐Leninist ‘scientific atheism’ consists in the discovery and assimilation of ‘scientific’ data and its use in the ‘atheistic’ destruction of religion and all its appurtenances. The first task is to show — using the data mainly of the natural sciences — the non‐existence of the object of religion, i.e. God. Second, it is necessary to explain how a theory without an object came to be and continues to show signs of vitality, i.e. to find the causes or ‘roots’ of religion: and this in terms of historical materialism.     

Reverse-engineering ‘esotericism': how to prepare a complex cultural concept for the cognitive science of religion

The article introduces a framework for preparing complex cultural concepts for the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and applies it to the field of Western esotericism. The research process (‘reverse engineering') rests on a building block approach that, after problematic categories have been deconstructed, seeks to reconstruct new scholarly objects in generic terms that can be operationalized in interdisciplinary contexts like CSR. A four-step research process is delineated, illustrated by a short discussion of previous work on ‘Gnosticism,' ‘magic,' and ‘religion,' before applying it to ‘esotericism.' It is suggested that the implicit scholarly objects of esotericism scholarship can be reconstituted in generic terms as concerned with processes of creating and disseminating ‘special knowledge.' Five definitional clusters are identified in the literature; these provide a basis for formulating research programs on the psychological and cognitive level, drawing on metarepresentational processes, event cognition, and psychological dispositions for altering experience.     

Differential consequences of trait inferences: a direct test of the trait-referent hypothesis

The hypothesis was investigated that when trait inferences refer to abstract behaviour labels (i.e. ‘conceited’) they act as a general interpretation frame and lead to assimilation in subsequent judgments of an ambiguous target, whereas when they refer to specific actor—trait links (i.e. ‘Peter is conceited’) the activated information is likely to be used as a scale anchor and contrast effects are more likely. Compared to previous studies investigating the consequences of trait inferences, this ‘trait-referent’ hypothesis was tested in a relatively direct way. Target judgments of participants instructed that trait-implying sentences described a ‘behaviour’ showed assimilation, whereas judgments of participants instructed that these sentences described a ‘person’ showed contrast.     

‘As in a Mirror’: Jonathan Edwards,Self-Love and Enlarging to Receive Another

Through a robust deployment of visual metaphors, Jonathan Edwards’s theology utilizes notions of vision to articulate his doctrine of God, creation, anthropology, redemption and ultimately glorification. Focusing on anthropology, this article attends to how human beings are constituted through sight, and reconstituted (i.e. regenerated) as they are contemplated in the Son and as they are given a vision of the Father in the Son by the Spirit of illumination. Put differently, Edwards’s anthropology is ordered around its teleology of becoming like God only if one can ‘see him as he is’ (1 Jn 3:2), which is anticipated by faith in this present age and ‘through a mirror dimly’ (1 Jn 13:12). After mooring his anthropology to broader theological concerns, the article narrows to consider how Edwards’s idiosyncratic personalism is developed around the notion of a ‘reflective self’ that can enlarge to internalize an ‘other’. Clarifying this notion is a brief comparison of a similar construction in Thomas Aquinas, showing how Edwards’s theory of loving neighbor as oneself is a unique contribution to questions concerning personhood, self-love and neighbor-love.     

Archetypes and Spirits: A Jungian Analysis of Puerto Rican Espiritismo

In this paper a comparison is made between Jung's approach to healing with a traditional healing system practised in Puerto Rico, called ‘Espiritismo’. Jungian psychology and ‘Espiritismo’ have several strong similarities in their conception of the therapeutic process, similarities which suggest that the healing process itself has generic properties which can be found in several therapeutic systems. In addition, by analysing Jung's development as a healer, it is possible to draw parallels between his development as a psychotherapist and the process of becoming a spiritist healer. In both healing systems, a transpersonal dimension is recognized as an integral element in the healing process. In ‘Espiritismo’, the suffering individual has to confront the spirit world; in analytical psychotherapy the patient has to confront the collective unconscious. This parallel was explicitly recognized by Jung in his autobiography when he compared the collective unconscious with the land of the dead. For Jung, knowledge of the figures of the unconscious enormously facilitates the individuation process; in ‘Espiritismo’ it is necessary to know the spirit world and to establish a relationship with the spirits. In Jungian psychology, healing is a process of ‘exorcizing’ some types of complexes or integrating others to consciousness. On the other hand, spiritist healers ‘exorcize’ ignorant spirits in order to heal a client or help him/her to identify spirit guides. In both systems, healing is essentially a process of establishing a dialogue with a transpersonal dimension (archetypes or spirits). Healing in ‘Espiritismo’ and Jungian psychology is a process of transcending the limited perspective of the ego (the ‘material world’) in order to experience a much broader reality (spiritual world or collective unconscious). Both systems emphasize the need to work with resources beyond the boundaries of the ego and to connect with forces that belong to a different reality.     

Class,mass and mereology

LeSniewski’s systems of Ontology and Mereology, considered from a purely formal point of view, possessstriking algebraic parallels, ascan be seen in their respective relations to Boolean algebra. But there are alsoimportant divergences, above all that general Mereology is silent, where Ontology is not, on the existenceof ‘atoms’ (individuals). By employing plural terms, LeSniewski sought to accommodate talk of (distributive)classes, without according these an autonomous ontological status. His logic also – like predicate logic– has no place for mass predication in its raw state. It is argued that reference both to pluralities and tomasses is ineliminable, and that one must therefore separate the grammatical distinction singular/pluralfrom the ontological distinction individual/class/mass. A kind of language, modelled on kiniewski’s, issuggested which enables these distinctions to be held apart and at the same time, building on the work ofRichard Sharvy, allows us to express the most important relationships between individuals, classes andmasses.