Attention support in digital environments. Nine questions to be addressed

Research in attention aware systems, i.e. systems that support users in their attentional choices, promises to address many of the problems related to information overload, cyber collaboration, and mobility, by providing features helping users in coping with attentional limitations. However, the design of attention aware systems necessitates a deep understanding of human attentional processes, of the knowledge a system needs to support those processes, and of the manner in which such knowledge may be acquired. Because the conceptualization of such systems requires understanding users' cognitive states in terms of their past interactions with the environment, the interactivist framework may provide a strong basis for analyzing attention aware systems.This paper briefly introduces the services that attention aware systems may provide, suggests how attention may be modeled within the interactivist framework, and proposes nine questions that may be answered within such framework to gain the knowledge necessary for the creation of attention aware systems.     

Judging relationships between events: how do we do it?

A decade ago, Allan (1993) concluded that associative models provided the best account of data generated in tasks that require human observers to judge the relationship between binary events. In the intervening years, new data have been reported that provide evidence for higher-order processes. Some have argued that these new data pose a serious threat to the viability of the associative account. The purpose of the present paper is to review this evidence and to assess the severity of this threat.     

Graphical language games: interactional constraints on representational form

The emergence of shared symbol systems is considered to be a pivotal moment in human evolution and human development. These changes are normally explained by reference to changes in people's internal cognitive processes. We present 2 experiments which provide evidence that changes in the external, collaborative processes that people use to communicate can also affect the structure and organization of symbol systems independently of cognitive change. We propose that mutual-modifiability-opportunities for people to edit or manipulate each other's contributions-is a key constraint on the emergence of complex symbol systems. We discuss the implications for models of language development and the origins of compositionality.     

Cognitive processes,school achievement,and comprehension of ambiguous sentences

Previous research has identified three distinct forms of linguistic ambiguity: lexical, surface structural, and deep structural. Cummins and Das (1978) studied these forms of ambiguity in the context of Das, Kirby and Jarman's (1979) model of simultaneous and successive processing, and demonstrated that comprehension of lexical ambiguity depended upon simultaneous processing, while that of surface and deep structural ambiguity depended upon successive processing. The present study investigated the relationship between these cognitive and linguistic processes in a group of older children. The subjects' level of English achievement was also considered. The results showed that comprehension of all three forms of ambiguity was strongly related to level of English achievement, though deep structure ambiguities best descriminated the English achievement groups. Results also showed that perception of all types of ambiguity was related to both simultaneous and successive processing. Subjects with high successive processing scores had an additional advantage in perceiving deep structure ambiguities. These results suggest the need for an elaboration of the Cummins and Das cognitive process model of liguistic processes, demonstrating that a variety of task variables can alter the cognitive processes required in performance of linguistic tasks.This study was supported by an Australian Research Grants Committee grant to J. B. Biggs and the author.     

Spatial cognition: evidence from visual neglect

Recent work on human attention and representational systems has benefited from a growing interplay between research on normal attention and neuropsychological disorders such as visual neglect. Research over the past 30 years has convincingly shown that, far from being a unitary condition, neglect is a protean disorder whose symptoms can selectively affect different sensory modalities, cognitive processes, spatial domains and coordinate systems. These clinical findings, together with those of functional neuroimaging, have increased knowledge about the anatomical and functional architecture of normal subsystems involved in spatial cognition. We provide a selective overview of how recent investigations of visual neglect are beginning to elucidate the underlying structure of spatial processes and mental representations.     

Evolution and learning: An epistemological perspective

The deep formal and conceptual link existing between artificial life and artificial intelligence can be highlighted using conceptual tools derived by Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Starting from the observation that the structure itself of an organism embodies knowledge about the environment which it is adapted to, it is possible to regard evolution as a learning process. This process is subject to the same rules indicated by Popper for the growth of scientific knowledge: causal conjectures (mutations) and successive refutations (extinction). In the field of machine learning such a paradigm is represented by genetic algorithms that, simulating biological processes, emulate cognitive processes. From a practical viewpoint, that perspective allows to identify the two different kinds of learning considered by artificial intelligence, knowledge acquisition and skill improvement, and to get a different view of the problem of heuristic knowledge in learning systems. From a theoretical point of view, these considerations can shade a new light on an old epistemological problem: why do we live in a learnable world?     

Meaning structures and mental representations

This paper argues for a distinction between meaning structure and mental representation, and presents the outlines of a theoretical model of their interrelationship. Meaning structures are defined as structures in the human mind/brain which develop as the combined result of genetic predispositions and individual experience, and lead to relatively stable patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, behaving, etc. Mental representation is defined as the aspect of mental processes which involves imagining and thinking of things that are not perceptually present. It is suggested that the mind includes a central network of meaning structures (CNMS) for the storage of information, and a number of other subsystems (e.g., perceptual systems, behavioral systems, and a verbal system) for the processing of externally and internally generated information. Against the dual-coding theory, it is argued that there is one code for the long-term storage of information, but several codes for the processing of information. Mental representations are seen as products of activation that is spread from the CNMS to more peripheral systems. The spread of activation from the CNMS to perceptual systems results in mental imagery; when activation spreads to the verbal system the result is conceptual thinking; and when activation spreads to behavioral systems it produces intentions. It is argued that this conceptual model can help to solve some basic theoretical problems that have plagued cognitive psychology.     

嗅知觉及其与情绪系统的交互

在人类的各种感觉通道中, 嗅觉尤其和情绪有着千丝万缕的联系。两者在种系发生进程中存在一定的亲缘关系, 在解剖结构上也高度重叠。气味天然带有情绪效价, 不管是在意识上还是意识下层面, 非社会性和社会性嗅觉信息都能对情绪产生影响, 反之情绪也能对嗅知觉产生作用。已有的神经影像研究显示嗅觉和情绪系统加工均涉及杏仁核、海马、脑岛以及眶额皮层等区域。与此同时, 非社会性和社会性嗅觉信息的编码和它们对情绪系统的作用方式也不尽相同。     

Cognitive neuroscience: origins and promise

Both Freud and Wundt had hoped to base psychology on an understanding of the neural basis of mental events. Their efforts were unsuccessful because the structure and function of the human brain was not available for empirical study at the physiological level. Over the last part of this century, there has been amazing growth and vitality in the field of human brain function. In this paper, we trace critical developments in the fields of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and brain imaging related to the development of cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive Neuroscience has established that the decomposition of mental events can be united with an understanding of the mental and emotional computations carried out by the human brain. Cognitive neuroscience has the capability of influencing psychology in diverse areas from how children develop to how adults age; from how humans learn to how we imagine; from volitional control to psychopathologies.     

个体早期情绪唤起与自我决定及主观活力的关系

以量表测量法初步探索早期情绪唤起与成年后自我决定水平及主观活力之间的关系,试图寻找情绪对人格组织的核心作用的证据。研究发现：①个体在早期父母行为调控中的某些基本情绪的唤起可以有效预测其成年后的自我决定和主观活力水平。②个体早期抵触情绪唤起对其成年后的自我决定和主观活力具有消极作用,而非负性情绪唤起则具有积极作用。研究结果支持基本情绪理论关于情绪处于人格结构的核心地位的观点。     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

A Network Perspective on the Processes of Empowered Organizations

Organizational empowerment is a multi-faceted concept that involves processes occurring both within and between organizations that facilitate achievement of their goals. This paper takes a closer look at three interorganizational processes that lead to empowered organizations: building alliances, getting the word out, and capturing others’ attention. These processes are located within the broader nomological network of empowerment and organizational empowerment, and are linked to particular patterns of interorganizational relationships that facilitate organizations’ ability to engage in them. A new network-based measure, γ-centrality, is introduced to capture the particular network structure associated with each process to be assessed. It is demonstrated first in a hypothetical organizational network, then applied to take a closer look at organizational empowerment in the context of a coordinating council composed of human service agencies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of relationships between these processes, and the potential for unintended consequences in the empowerment of organizations.     

Suppression in retrieval practice,part-set cueing,and negative priming memory: The hydrogen model

A number of phenomena in memory have been explained using appeals to active suppression processes, including retrieval practice, part-set cueing, and the negative priming that is observed with associative interference. However, more formal attempts to capture such processes have been absent. This paper outlines the hydrogen model of memory retrieval, which aims to be a simple model with the modest goal of trying to explore what influence suppression would have on memory retrieval. This model contains a single activation component and a single suppression component in which suppression comes into play only after retrieval interference has been detected. This model was created to explore the plausibility and viability of ideas about the operation of suppression during memory retrieval. For hydrogen, the degree of suppression recruited is proportional to the amount of interference experienced. Overall, the pattern of human data was captured by the suppression model.     

The Self and the Phenomenal

As is widely appreciated and easily demonstrated, the notion that we are essentially experiential (or conscious) beings has a good deal of appeal; what is less obvious, and more controversial, is whether it is possible to devise a viable account of the self along such lines within the confines of a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework. There are many avenues to explore, but here I confine myself to outlining the case for one particular approach. I suggest that we should think of ourselves (or our essential cores) as being composed of experience‐producing systems, and that such systems belong to the same self when they have the capacity to contribute to unified streams of consciousness. The viability of this proposal rests in turn on a particular conception of the structure of consciousness, both at and over time; this conception is defended in the first part of the paper     

Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology

The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems.     

Numerosity discrimination in deep neural networks: Initial competence,developmental refinement and experience statistics

Both humans and non‐human animals exhibit sensitivity to the approximate number of items in a visual array, as indexed by their performance in numerosity discrimination tasks, and even neonates can detect changes in numerosity. These findings are often interpreted as evidence for an innate ‘number sense’. However, recent simulation work has challenged this view by showing that human‐like sensitivity to numerosity can emerge in deep neural networks that build an internal model of the sensory data. This emergentist perspective posits a central role for experience in shaping our number sense and might explain why numerical acuity progressively increases over the course of development. Here we substantiate this hypothesis by introducing a progressive unsupervised deep learning algorithm, which allows us to model the development of numerical acuity through experience. We also investigate how the statistical distribution of numerical and non‐numerical features in natural environments affects the emergence of numerosity representations in the computational model. Our simulations show that deep networks can exhibit numerosity sensitivity prior to any training, as well as a progressive developmental refinement that is modulated by the statistical structure of the learning environment. To validate our simulations, we offer a refinement to the quantitative characterization of the developmental patterns observed in human children. Overall, our findings suggest that it may not be necessary to assume that animals are endowed with a dedicated system for processing numerosity, since domain‐general learning mechanisms can capture key characteristics others have attributed to an evolutionarily specialized number system.     

Culture and attention: Recent empirical findings and new directions in cultural psychology

Over the past 3 decades, cultural psychologists have empirically investigated the influence of cultural meaning systems on human psychology. Under the rubric of holistic versus analytic thought, researchers have demonstrated that there are substantial cultural variations in social cognition, and that such variations are observable even in so‐called fundamental psychological processes, such as attention. The aim of this paper is to review 3 major themes in culture and attention: (1) culture and attention to nonsocial scenes, (2) culture and attention to social scenes, and (3) culture and aesthetics. The paper also discusses 4 major strands of research that could be considered important candidates to further advance the understanding of culture and attention: (1) research on “culture ? human psychological processes,” where we investigate how culture influences modes of attention; (2) research on “human psychology ? cultural processes,” where we investigate how those who hold a specific mode of attention create cultural products and tangible representations of culturally shared meanings; (3) research on cultural neuroscience, where we investigate underlying mechanisms and processes of specific modes of attention; and (4) research on cultural transmission processes, where we investigate how specific modes of attention is taught by adults and internalized by children.     

Passion,vitality and life satisfaction for physically active old adults

In Arabic world, few studies are interested in psychological factors influencing the physically active old adults. The specific goals of the present research are the following: (i) test the factor structure and invariance tests for gender and physical activities for the Arabic version of the passion scale; (ii) test a model that describes a mediator role of subjective vitality in the relationships between passion and life satisfaction (iii) test the presence of differences for gender, physical activity practice, education level and age on passion. Two studies were conducted with 551 physically active Egyptian old adult (n = 354; n = 197). Passion, Subjective vitality and Life Satisfaction scales were administered. Passion scale composed of two subscales (harmonious and obsessive). Strong support for the complete invariance between groups. Subjective vitality was a mediator in the relationships between harmonious passion and life satisfaction. Education level and age had an effect on passion subscales.     

Creative Cognitive Processes in Higher Education

This paper explores whether or not students in higher education settings are using creative cognitive processes, how these processes are related to deep approaches to learning, and in what types of settings and students these processes are most prevalent. Data collected from 8,724 students at 17 institutions participating in the 2010 National Survey of Student Engagement suggests that first‐year and senior students employ several different creative cognitive processes in their everyday activities. Results from exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses suggest two distinct types of processes: deliberate creative processes and intuitive cognitive processes. Additional analyses indicate significant positive relationships between both types of creative processes and deep approaches to learning, as well as statistically significant differences in the use of creative processes based on gender, enrollment type, and type of institution. Potential reasons for and implications of these findings are discussed.