Is the learn unit a fundamental measure of pedagogy?

We propose a measure of teaching, the learn unit, that explicitly describes the interaction between teachers and their students. The theoretical, educational research, and applied behavior analysis literatures all converge on the learn unit as a fundamental measure of teaching. The theoretical literature proposes the construct of the interlocking operant and embraces verbal behavior, social interaction, and translations of psychological constructs into complex theoretical respondent-operant interactions and behavior-behavior relations. Research findings in education and applied behavior analysis on engaged academic time, opportunity to respond, active student responding, teacher-student responding, student-teacher responding, tutor-tutee responding, tutee-tutor responding, and verbal episodes between individuals all support a measure of interlocking responses. More recently, research analyzing the components of both the students' and teachers' behavior suggests that the learn unit is the strongest predictor of effective teaching. Finally, we propose applications of the learn unit to other issues in pedagogy not yet researched and the relation of learn units to the verbal behavior of students.     

Is the History of our Universe Finite?

Modern cosmology indicates that our universe has a finite age. However, it is not understood whether the initial state before the Big Bang is finite in history or not. In this article, I show by simple arguments that the initial state must be finite in history if it is real. If the initial state is not real, a special transition is needed to specify the beginning of the real time. Moreover, if our universe is just one of the many universes, it can be shown that the history of the universe generator must also be finite.     

Wittgenstein’s reconsideration of the transcendental problem

The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant’s transcendental idealism and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on. Translated by Chen Xin and Zhang Qingxiong from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (10): 68–76     

Does quantity generate quality? Testing the fundamental principle of brainstorming

The purpose of this work is to test the chief principle of brainstorming, formulated as "quantity generates quality." The study is included within a broad program whose goal is to detect the strong and weak points of creative techniques. In a sample of 69 groups, containing between 3 and 8 members, the concurrence of two commonly accepted criteria was established as a quality rule: originality and utility or value. The results fully support the quantity-quality relation (r = .893): the more ideas produced to solve a problem, the better quality of the ideas. The importance of this finding, which supports Osborn's theory, is discussed, and the use of brainstorming is recommended to solve the many open problems faced by our society.     

Anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty: requisites of the fundamental fears?

Fears related to anxiety sensitivity (AS)-illness/injury sensitivity, fear of negative evaluation, and fear of pain-may have important theoretical associations with intolerance of uncertainty (IU). In separate investigations, AS and IU have been independently related to the same anxiety-related psychopathology. AS and IU seem to share a basis in fearing unknown, potentially harmful consequences; however, their inter-relationship remains uncertain. IU regarding a specific stimulus, a physical sensation for example, may result in a variety of interpretations and responses, including the catastrophic appraisals that characterize AS. The association between AS and IU was examined in a sample of 293 undergraduates. Results of confirmatory factor and correlation analyses suggest the two constructs are related, but nonetheless independent. It appears that IU may be a required component of catastrophic misappraisals while being an important construct related to fear and anxiety in its own right. Future research directions and potential applications are discussed.     

Do the laws of physics forbid the operation of time machines?

We address the question of whether it is possible to operate a time machine by manipulating matter and energy so as to manufacture closed timelike curves. This question has received a great deal of attention in the physics literature, with attempts to prove no-go theorems based on classical general relativity and various hybrid theories serving as steps along the way towards quantum gravity. Despite the effort put into these no-go theorems, there is no widely accepted definition of a time machine. We explain the conundrum that must be faced in providing a satisfactory definition and propose a resolution. Roughly, we require that all extensions of the time machine region contain closed timelike curves; the actions of the time machine operator are then sufficiently “potent” to guarantee that closed timelike curves appear. We then review no-go theorems based on classical general relativity, semi-classical quantum gravity, quantum field theory on curved spacetime, and Euclidean quantum gravity. Our verdict on the question of our title is that no result of sufficient generality to underwrite a confident “yes” has been proven. Our review of the no-go results does, however, highlight several foundational problems at the intersection of general relativity and quantum physics that lend substance to the search for an answer.     

On the problem of the meaning of life in ��Chinese Philosophy��

The goal of “(modern) Chinese Philosophy” established during the period of the May 4th Movement is to reestablish the meaning of life for Chinese people. However, because it takes the approach of interpreting Chinese thinking through a Western lens, thus forming a discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” which is only capable of manifesting Western culture, “Chinese Philosophy” is made logically impossible as the ideological source from which modern Chinese thinkers could construct the meaning of life. The ideological source of the still lasting traditional lifestyle is Yili Xue 义理学 (The Learning of Righteousness and Principles); whereas that of modern life, which was established as an imitation of the West, is Western culture. Neither of them takes “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. Therefore, “Chinese Philosophy” is excluded from the construction of the meaning of life, and falls into the dilemma of life meaning.     

Stop—reaction time and the internal clock

In astop-reaction-time (stop-RT) task, a subject is presented with a regular, isochronous sequence of brief signals separated by a constant time interval, orstimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). His/her task is to press a response key as fast as possible when the sequence stops. As the sequence unfolds, an internal representation of the SOA duration builds up. Stop-RT is assumed to be triggered when aninternal clock, operating as an “alarm clock,” reaches a time criterion. Criterion setting is contingent upon variability in the SOA’s internal representation. In Experiment 1A, stop-RT was measured for isochronous sequences of brief tones, light flashes, and also sequences of tones and flashes presented in regular alternation (tone-light-tone…). Stop-RT was a linear function of SOA duration (ranging from 250 to 1,000 msec), regardless of modality, supporting a “central-clock” hypothesis. On the other hand, taken together, the results of Experiments 1A, 1B, 2, and 3 suggest that no internal representation of thebimodal (tone-light) SOA of alternating sequences builds up. Indeed, an alternating sequence is physically equivalent to two interlaced isochronous subsequences, one auditory and one visual. So,two internal representations, one for the auditory (tone-tone) and one for the visual (light-light) SOA, could build up, andtwo time criteria running “in parallel” could thus support stop-RT. To provide a critical test of parallel timing, stop-RT was measured for bimodal 5∶3 polyrhythms formed by the superposition of auditory and visual isochronous sequences that haddifferent SOA durations (Experiment 4). Parallel timing accounted for a large proportion of variance in polyrhythmic stop-RT data. Overall findings can be accounted for by assuming a functional architecture of an internal clock in which pulses emitted by acentral pacemaker are available in parallel with twomodality-specific switch-accumulator “timing modules.”     

Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an ill-defined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science.

     

The problem with the Frege–Geach problem

I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.     

On the limits of advance preparation for a task switch: do people prepare all the task some of the time or some of the task all the time?

This study investigated the nature of advance preparation for a task switch, testing 2 key assumptions of R. De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage theory: (a) Task-switch preparation is all-or-none, and (b) preparation failures stem from nonutilization of available control capabilities. In 3 experiments, switch costs varied dramatically across individual stimulus-response (S-R) pairs of the tasks-virtually absent for 1 pair but large for others. These findings indicate that, across trials, task preparation was not all-or-none but, rather, consistently partial (full preparation for some S-R pairs but not others). In other words, people do not prepare all of the task some of the time, they prepare some of the task all of the time. Experiments 2 and 3 produced substantial switch costs even though time deadlines provided strong incentives for optimal advance preparation. Thus, there was no evidence that people have a latent capability to fully prepare for a task switch.     

Reichenbach’s cubical universe and the problem of the external world

This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention.     

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).     

Is the growth of subjective time in humans a linear or nonlinear function of real time?

The difficulties of deciding whether subjective time grows as a linear or nonlinear function of real time are discussed, and two experiments are presented to address this question. In Experiment 1, people received a 10-s standard duration and then had to judge what proportion other durations (ranging from 1 to 10 s) were of the standard. Counting was prevented by a concurrent task. The relation between judged and actual proportions was linear. In Experiment 2, people were required to average together three tone durations (mean duration 600 ms) and to judge whether subsequently presented comparisons were or were not the average. The spacing of the tone durations had no effect on judgements, suggesting a linear underlying time scale.     

Contemporary ‘people from hideouts’ and the problem of the lack of social involvement

Studies in East European Thought - The aim of this paper is to present Tischner’s concept of ‘people from hideouts’ in the context of contemporary problems of lack of social...     

How should the History of Education be Written? Some Reflections about the Nature of the Discipline from the Perspective of the Reception of our Work

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as historical pedagogy rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.     

Is the growth of subjective time in humans a linear or nonlinear function of real time?

The difficulties of deciding whether subjective time grows as a linear or nonlinear function of real time are discussed, and two experiments are presented to address this question. In Experiment 1, people received a 10-s standard duration and then had to judge what proportion other durations (ranging from 1 to 10 s) were of the standard. Counting was prevented by a concurrent task. The relation between judged and actual proportions was linear. In Experiment 2, people were required to average together three tone durations (mean duration 600 ms) and to judge whether subsequently presented comparisons were or were not the average. The spacing of the tone durations had no effect on judgements, suggesting a linear underlying time scale.