On the Outskirts of the Canon: The Myth of the Lone Female Philosopher,and What to Do about It

Women philosophers of the past, because they tended not to engage with each other much, are often perceived as isolated from ongoing philosophical dialogues. This has led—directly and indirectly—to their exclusion from courses in the history of philosophy. This article explores three ways in which we could solve this problem. The first is to create a course in early modern philosophy that focuses solely or mostly on female philosophers, using conceptual and thematic ties such as a concern for education and a focus on ethics and politics. The second is to introduce women authors as dialoguing with the usual canonical suspects: Cavendish with Hobbes, Elisabeth of Bohemia with Descartes, Masham and Astell with Locke, Conway with Leibniz, and so on. The article argues that both methods have significant shortcomings, and it suggests a third, consisting in widening the traditional approach to structuring courses in early modern philosophy.     

Business Ethics without Philosophers? Evidence for and Implications of the Shift From Applied Philosophers to Business Scholars on the Editorial Boards of Business Ethics Journals

This article considers the relationship between business ethics and philosophy, specifically in relation to the field and persons working in it. The starting point is a grammatical one: business ethics by the rules of grammar belongs to ethics. In terms of academic disciplines, it belongs to applied ethics, which belongs to ethics, which belongs to practical philosophy, which belongs to philosophy. However, in the field of business ethics today one will seldom meet colleagues from philosophy; instead, they will come from business, applying business studies perspectives, approaches, and increasingly quantitative methods. This article provides empirical evidence that today the three top journals with “business ethics” in their titles (and “awarded” a high impact factor) are mostly run (in terms of their editorial boards) by business scholars with PhDs in business. The article compares the three journals today with their inaugural issues and finds that at their inception all three were run by a majority of philosophers. The article discusses six possible explanations for this shift and provides suggestions for how to bring business ethics back to philosophers (and vice versa).     

Modelling Beyond Application: Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Modern Science

In recent years, philosophers of science have begun to realize that the clear separation of the creation of models in academia and the application of models outside science is not possible. When these philosophers address hybrid contexts in which science is entwined with policy, business, and other realms of society, these often practically oriented realms no longer represent ‘the surroundings’ of science but rather are considered an essential part of it. I argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the judgement of a theory or model conducted by scientists in such hybrid contexts may contain two parts: one is truth supportive and the other is utility oriented. In relation to the debate on science and values, the article seeks to reinforce the argument in modern philosophy of science that the boundaries between epistemic and non-epistemic values are blurred. The article stresses that non-epistemic values may be also understood as values that contribute to the instrumental success of a theory or model and—in this way—influence scientific practice in the hybrid contexts.     

BEYOND SECULARISM? TOWARDS A POST‐SECULAR POLITICAL THEOLOGY

In this article I analyse some of the reasons for a recent, resurgent interest in religion and theology by political philosophers and relate this interest to an inherent instability in modernity itself. In the first part I describe the landscape of current political philosophy with a particular emphasis on radical philosophers. In the second part I describe how the liberal distinction between religion and politics generates a theological instability due to the effective disappearance of the social embodiment of religion within modernity. In the third part I draw some conclusions regarding the challenges the new post‐secular condition presents to theology.     

Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: a Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching

Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test‐based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, and is illustrated by Community of Philosophical Inquiry. The third, doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth‐value and making judgment, is related to such philosophers as Foucault, and is illustrated by philosophical debate. The analysis shows that although the classical methods applied by the great philosophers appear to be missing from classroom exercises, they do, in fact, remain at the heart of the matter.     

Two conceptions of subjective experience

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.     

Ontological Parsimony,Erosion, and Conservatism

This article presents a novel argument against a common principle of parsimony in philosophy. First, it identifies a widely employed principle of positive ontological parsimony, according to which we should, ceteris paribus, prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. Next, it shows how this principle is used as part of a strategy by which to argue for antirealist positions in many subfields of philosophy: the ockhamistic antirealist strategy. Third, it argues that this principle commits its adherents to an implausible epistemological thesis—the Eroding Ontology Thesis—according to which evidence for the existence of some entity is at least prima facie evidence against the existence of all other entities. Antirealists might decide to adopt a related position, ontological conservatism, according to which we should simply resist changing our ontology, but the article shows that it is independently unjustified. Therefore, it concludes, philosophers have good reason to cease employing one very common antirealist strategy.     

TELEOLOGY PAST AND PRESENT

Abstract. Current teleology in Western biology, philosophy, and theology draws on resources from four main Western philosophers. (1) Plato's Timaeus shows how to interpret the universe as the handiwork of a purposive Creator who subordinates secondary, necessary, causes to primary, intelligent, causes. (2) Aristotle's Physics sets forth purpose as implicit in the nature of things. Purposes of different sorts inhere in different types of being, and everything has a natural function. Living things grow to actualize the potentials of the goal whose principle they bear within themselves. (3) Kant's Critique of Judgment denies that purpose is anything that human beings can know, strictly speaking. Nevertheless, purpose is a concept we must use to make sense of biological systems. (4) Hegel's Philosophy of Nature articulates organic systems as dialectically including and transcending mechanical and chemical systems. Teleological themes persist, in different ways, in contemporary discussions; I consider two lines of criticism of traditional teleology—by Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould—and one line that continues traditional teleology in an updated way—by Holmes Rolston, III.     

Normative Philosophy of Science: Responding to Special-Interest Science

This article shows why it is important to do normative or practical philosophy of science, especially philosophy of science that criticizes and evaluates contemporary use of scientific methods to analyze welfare-affecting societal problems. The article (1) introduces the scientific, ethical, and social problem of environmental injustice—disproportionate environmental and pollution threats that are responsible for roughly 40% of all preventable disease and death. Next it (2) explains that many deadly threats (like pollution) continue in part because of “special-interest science”, methodologically flawed science that is done to promote corporate profits, rather than truth, then (3) argues that philosophers of science should use normative or practical philosophy of science to critique and expose special-interest science. To illustrate special-interest science, the article (4) provides two case studies, on diesel-particulate-matter pollution and on organophophate-pesticide pollution, and (5) shows how diesel and pesticide polluters use special-interest science. For instance, they often ignore observational data, illegitimately demand statistically significant evidence of harm from observational data, use small sample sizes, do the wrong tests, or demand certainty—rather than a preponderance of evidence—to justify a conclusion about pollution harm. They also use flawed normative arguments to defend both diesel and pesticide pollution. The article (6) concludes that, given the epistemic, scientific, human-welfare toll of special-interest science, philosophers of science need to do normative or practical philosophy of science that exposes these scientific flaws.     

From the Exclusion of Women to the Transformation of Philosophy: Reclamation and its Possibilities

In the mid‐1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical efforts toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This article explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. It argues that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as philosophers. The fourth type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history.     

A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection

Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ‘Meno's Paradox’—the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with great clarity, and analysed in a way that casts it in a new light. We present three treatments of the puzzle in Indian philosophy, as a way of refining and sharpening our understanding of the paradox, before turning to the most radical of the Indian philosophers to tackle it. The Indian philosophers who are optimistic that the paradox can be resolved appeal to the existence of prior beliefs, and to the resources embedded in language to explain how we can investigate, and so move from ignorance to knowledge. Highlighting this structural feature of inquiry, however, allows the pessimist philosopher to demonstrate that the paradox stands. The incoherence of inquiry is rooted in the very idea of aiming our desires at the unknown. Asking questions and giving answers rests on referential intentions targeting objects in a region of epistemic darkness, and so our ‘inquiry sceptic’ also finds structurally similar forms of incoherence in the pragmatics of interrogative discourse.     

Emerging Technologies and the Future of Philosophy

This article examines how a class of emerging technologies—specifically, radical cognitive enhancements and artificial intelligence—has the potential to influence the future of philosophy. The article argues that progress in philosophy has been impeded, in part, by two specific constraints imposed on us by the natural architecture of our cognitive systems. Both of these constraints, though, could in principle be overcome by certain cognitive technologies currently being researched and/or developed. It surveys a number of these technologies, and then looks at a particular metaphilosophical stance (called “inflationism”) that advocates amplifying the abilities of philosophers rather than reducing the ambitions of philosophy, given the apparent “teleological gap” between philosophy's ultimate goal (i.e., “the truth”) and the limited capacities of our evolved mental machinery.     

Plato and Socrates: From an Educator of Childhood to a Childlike Educator?

This paper deals with two forms of education—Platonic and Socratic. The former educates childhood to transform it into what it ought to be. The latter does not form childhood, but makes education childlike. To unfold the philosophical and pedagogical dimensions of this opposition, the first part of the paper highlights the way in which philosophy is presented indirectly in some of Plato’s dialogues, beginning with a characterisation that Socrates makes of himself in the dialogue Phaedrus. The second part details Plato’s condemnation of writing in the Phaedrus, and draws on the critique by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze to establish what is at stake in this condemnation. In the third part, the pedagogical and political implications of this condemnation are reviewed, and Plato is placed in a surprising position in relation to his own teacher, Socrates. Finally, through a comparison between childhood and philosophy, the educational value of putting childhood and philosophy together is questioned. Through a number of questions, the paper ends problematising the pedagogical, political and philosophical value of placing the practice of philosophy in the realm of childhood citizenship education. It also recovers the value of philosophy—as a form of questioning and unlearning what we know and affirming the value of not knowing—in a childlike education.     

Batman in the Classroom: Academic Philosophy and “… and Philosophy”

Though the interaction of philosophy with pop culture has so far mostly taken the form of books for nonphilosophers that use various shows and movies as sources of examples to illustrate “traditional” philosophical issues, this article contends that serious engagement with the informal philosophical discussions expressed in popular entertainments constitutes a kind of “ethnophilosophy” and should be considered an important part of the discipline. Our disciplinary responsibility for maintaining and considering the history of philosophy ought to include even the philosophical conversations that occur outside the academy; however unlike “proper” philosophy this material may be, it nonetheless represents engagement—sometimes substantial engagement—with the same issues that concern those of us who are considered “professional” philosophers, and thus is legitimately of interest to us.     

The Problem of Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Religion

Despite the growth in research in philosophy of religion over the past several decades, recent years have seen a number of critical studies of this subfield in an effort to redirect the methods and topics of inquiry. This article argues that in addition to problems of religious parochialism described by critics such as Wesley Wildman, the subfield is facing a problem of relevance. In responding to this problem, it suggests that philosophers of religion should do three things: first, be critically self‐aware about their aims of inquiry; second, investigate concepts used by other philosophers, scientists, and religious studies scholars to identify and dispel confusion about religions; and third, following the model of applied ethics, work to clarify concepts and advance arguments of contemporary practical urgency.     

International argument: regarding the history of the development of international philosophical communication in the nineteenth century

This article examines the internationalization of scientific and scholarly communication in the period before World War I, taking philosophy as an example. In the first part of the article, several general trends in internationalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are examined. This includes the importance of international experience for Russia’s policies today towards science and education. The main part of this article is devoted to the concept of the “international argument” and provides an analysis of three types of appeal to the international community: the pragmatic, the reputational, and the communicative. The increasing importance of international communication during this period is shown on the basis of examples drawn from German philosophical discussions that took place between the first third and the end of the nineteenth century (the case of Friedrich Eduard Beneke and Hermann Ebbinghaus). The last part of the article examines the impact on German science and philosophy of the cessation of international communication during World War I.     

Automatic actions: Agency,intentionality, and responsibility

This article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, that is unconsciously and without a proximal intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinizes several mechanisms of automatic behavior, how they work, and whether the resulting behavior is an action. These mechanisms include actions caused by distal implementation intentions, four types of habit and habitualization, mimicry, and semantically induced automatic behavior (which is later disregarded because of its lack of clarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic behaviors resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and to be intentional; and even the behavior resulting from the remaining mechanism (naturally acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into question.     

Truth,relativism and western conceptions of indian philosophy

We (relatively few) Western analytic philosophers who also work on classical Indian philosophy commonly encounter puzzlement or suspicion from our colleagues in Western philosophy because of our Indian interests. The ubiquity of these attitudes is itself revealing of Western conceptions of Indian philosophy, though their origins lie in cultural history often unknown to those who hold them. In the first part of this paper I relate a small but significant slice of that history before going on to distinguish and illustrate three different Western conceptions of Indian philosophy associated with three different approaches to India: the magisterial, the exoticist and the curatorial. I argue that none of these three approaches gives us an adequate conception of Indian philosophy: the magisterial approach is overly dismissive, the exoticist approach misrepresents the analytical achievements of Indian philosophy, and the curatorial approach fails to take seriously Indian philosophy's concern with truth. I advocate instead a different Western approach to Indian philosophy, an approach suggested by the Indian philosophers’ own discussions of the problem of truth.     

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.     

The Poor Lady Immured

This essay offers cautionary considerations on what has come to be called “public philosophy.” A conception of philosophy is set forth using Socrates as the paradigm of relentless philosophical questioning. The essay then outlines three types of public philosophy: a philosophy situated in a public setting, a philosophy whose content is modified for a varied public, and a philosophy that functions as normative consensus. The most important of these three is the philosophy modified for the public. The discussion notes examples of public philosophy from the history of philosophy, and examines the contribution of eighteenth‐century philosophers (such as David Hume) to a version of public philosophy. The risks of public philosophy are noted—in particular, that a modified philosophy may substitute the inculcation of belief over the modeling of philosophy. The essay concludes by noting that the university classroom remains an important but forgotten venue of public philosophy.