Psychotherapy Supervision Since 1909: Some Friendly Observations About its First Century

Now a century old, psychotherapy supervision occupies a place of increasing prominence across all mental health disciplines and appears to generally be regarded as a (if not the) sine qua non for the teaching and learning of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy supervision has emerged as our “signature pedagogy.” In this paper, I take a look back at supervision’s last century and consider some (but by no means all) of the salient issues and themes that have defined its science and practice. The reviewed supervision issues and themes include the following: (1) the beginnings and evolution of supervision and supervision theory; (2) our evolving perspective about the supervision matrix; (3) methodological pluralism and diversity; (4) “good” and “bad” supervisor behaviors and the working alliance; (5) measurement; (6) effectiveness; (7) diversity; and (8) education. I use this “look back” to (1) give voice to where we have been and where we are now in psychotherapy supervision and (2) shine a light on some of what seems to lie ahead for supervision’s second century.     

Evolution of multi‐criteria analysis: a scientometric analysis

The field of multi‐criteria analysis has known very important developments during the last 20 years, if one considers the very large amount of activities that it has generated and continues to generate (papers in journals, a dedicated journal, books, meetings, applications, …). Even if multi‐criteria analysis has reached some maturity, its future is subject to questions and debate among its researchers: what is the evolution of the field? What is its structure? Is it integrating new topics? In order to answer such questions at least partially, we have studied multi‐criteria analysis literature by means of the method of associated words (scientometric analysis) and the software ‘Leximappe’. All the abstracts of the papers which are relative to multi‐criteria analysis and are included in the bibliographic ABI‐INFORM database from 1985 to 1996 have been analysed. In this paper, we will present some results of this study. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

Christian Initiation,Apprenticeship in Prayer

Abstract

I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is. Yet I confess too that I do know that I am saying this in time, that I have been talking about time for a long time, and that this long time would not be a long time if it were not for the fact that time has been passing all the while. How can I know this, when I do not know what time is? Is it that I do know what time is, but do not know how to put what I know into words? I am in a sorry state, for I do not even know what I do not know!     

Spirituality in Christian Transhumanism: Commentary on Cole-Turner,Green, and Cannon

Christian transhumanism is the growing movement in which Christians appropriate the transhumanist vision of human technological evolution in the twenty-first century for millennialist ends. In the April 2015 issue of Theology and Science, three Christian transhumanist theologians present their visions and arguments for why Christians should accept transhumanism. I draw upon the wisdom of age from the World War II generation. Their concerns about an erosion of trust that decreases quality of life guide my commentary on the theological papers. Identifying issues with vision, theology, values, character, messaging, and leadership, I present spirituality as potentially supporting future wisdom.     

To Live Is to Know,to Know Is to Change: Change in Personal Construct Psychology and Psychological Constructivism

This article deals with the subject of personal change. As such, one could be tempted to say that it deals with psychology as a whole: What else should psychology be concerned with? But this is not exactly how things are, as I will argue by answering a first question: Is psychology, as a discipline, mainly concerned with the study of human change? To a second question—whether personal construct theory (PCT) in particular is mainly concerned with the study of human change—I give an affirmative answer, after some necessary qualifications. I would like to dwell particularly on answering a third question: Can the way personal construct theory deals with change be regarded as centering around a peculiarity? I am convinced that the revolutionary and cutting-edge nature of PCT can be fully appreciated only by pinpointing and highlighting such a peculiarity. In discussing this, I find it convenient to answer a last question: Is the way PCT deals with change akin to the way other theories handle it? After having discussed personal change as it is treated in PCT, I give a bird's eye view of the contribution of personal construct psychology to the fields of psychology more concerned with change—namely, developmental and educational psychology. The last part of the article will focus on the role of change in clinical psychology, and on what Kelly pointed out as the focus of convenience of his theoretical construction: personal construct psychotherapy as a relational process aimed at favoring a personal change.     

Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers

Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative‐based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on the identification of fiction with the to‐be‐imagined. I formulate a very weak version of the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. My formulation is in terms of supervenience. But while this version is weak, it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction look, I am sorry to say, poor; the version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement such a theory.     

Darwin and the Fully Human Theory of Evolution

Among scientists today a matter that many had assumed was long laid to rest is moving from the background to the foreground in the minds of the broad-gauged and the discerning. It is that what we call evolution theory requires a massive updating, integrating, and streamlining if it is to meet the needs of the 21st century. On one hand here is a planet with threats to the survival of ourselves and all species everywhere on the rise. On the other hand are the sciences, to which we look for answers on how to meet the threats, in disarray. Evolution theory, for example, supposedly provides the grounding for all science. Yet behind an outdated and dangerously constricted assumption of unity, instead of any useful cohesion it offers a bewilderingly disparate and unfocused sprawl. How then are we to move toward the evolutionary gestalt or framework needed to pull together science into some new intelligibility? But of more immediate urgency, how are we to build an evolution theory that can provide the practical guidance-or road map to the future-to our species at a time of exponentially escalating confusion and need?     

Reply to Dews,and a plea for Schelling

The discussion is a response to Dews on the question of how Schelling's Freiheitsschrift should be interpreted. It falls into two halves, the first defending my interpretation, and the second expanding on the case that Dews makes for the unavoidability of metaphysics in the theory of human freedom, with which I am in full agreement. The main criticism that Dews makes of my reading is that the argument I attribute to Schelling concerning the metaphysical significance of evil rests on Kantian assumptions regarding the existence of pure practical reason, which Schelling rejects. I argue that, though certainly matters are more complicated than my earlier discussion made them seem, Schelling remains sufficiently close to Kant for the argument I attribute to avoid inconsistency. In the second half I raise what I claim to be a neglected but important question: Why is the legacy of classical German philosophy not regarded as significant for contemporary discussion of human freedom? My answer in brief is that the concept of freedom has undergone a profound contraction. In this context I also try to define more precisely what is distinctive of Schelling's view of human freedom.     

近五十年来台湾地区士林哲学之研究与前瞻

根据祁尔松（Etienne Gilson）的说法,中世纪哲学,尤其是十三世纪的思想,是基督宗教哲学。本文按其在台湾发展时所袭用的名词,称之为士林哲学。士林哲学之传入中国,虽然早在利玛窦时期（1550—1610）已经开始,但真正成为学术思想之主流之一,是最近五十年来在台湾地区的发展。20世纪初士林哲学初传入台湾时,当时的思想环境,对基督宗教哲学并不十分友善,这种种情况,与中世纪的思想家,面对信仰与神学之挑战相似。当时的思想家,融合各种不同的思想派系,对柏拉图与亚理斯多德的观念,重新诠释与批判,批判与诠释是创新的基础。所以,中世纪可说是哲学的第二春,而中世纪哲学之精华,即全盛期的士林哲学。十四世纪唯名论之后,士林哲学逐步式微,于十九世纪末再兴。本文认为,士林哲学在台湾发展之过程,与其在中世纪之盛行,及十九世纪末之再兴,背景虽异但有不少相似之处,而这些相似之处,正是士林哲学之基本思想与立场。本文对台湾士林哲学之发展,从四方面探讨：（1）回到形上学之根以面对新的挑战;（2）形上学基本立场与概念之说明;（3）反思与批判;（4）未来发展之方向。本文所参考之资料,一是已发表之学术文献;其二是与学者们之正式交谈——如学术演讲、座谈会等,及非正式之谈话、访问等。     

The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study

Editor's Introduction When Oxford University Press sent us the three enormous volumes of Irwin's The Development of Ethics, we had two thoughts: First, the book is very important and demands a review; second, since human sacrifice is abolished in North America, it will be very difficult to find a reviewer. We handed the volumes to several interested persons, who in the end returned the books saying the task was beyond them. Then, my wife, a lifetime worker at that center of communal thought, the United Nations, suggested that we form a team to review the book. We put an announcement out on the Web, asking for reviewers to do a chapter each, at 250 words a review. We got several hundred volunteers, and chose 82 to review the 96 chapters of Irwin (reviewers got the chapters in Portable Document Format [PDFs], kindly supplied by Oxford). We got 81 of 82 reviews, 75 before the deadline, six slightly later. For purposes of completeness, I filled in the sole missing review. Would that the students in my seminars were so punctual! I would like to thank Elyse Turr at Oxford University Press for the PDFs, and my 82 reviewers for their expertise and diligence. I am grateful to all the volunteers who showed an interest in this strange and perhaps unprecedented project, and who patiently endured the vetting process. Special thanks is due to Laura di Summa, who coordinated all the pieces of this incredible puzzle. Did we accomplish something, something new, by mobilizing 82 minds to review one book? I hope so, but I can now only say what they say on television: “America, it's up to you.”     

Doing Sociology in The Age of Globalization

The emergence of processes of globalization has gone hand in hand with a theoretical “crisis” in sociology. According to an increasing number of scholars, “global society” has transformed the “social” to such an extent that classical sociological theory and that of the nineteenth century no longer seem adequate for conceptualizing not only the “new society,” but (human) society as such. The very distinction between human and non-human society has gone lost. In this context, is it still possible to formulate a “theory of society” and what form should such a theory take?     

Mindfulness,learning and the brain

I have tried to sketch an approach to the complex phenomena that go by the name of ‘mindfulness’ that both does justice to this complexity and depth, and also offers a way of thinking about mindfulness in evolutionary, ecosocial and neural terms: terms that enable us to ask questions like: where did mindfulness come from? What kind of consciousness is it? What was it for, before it was co-opted by spiritual and therapeutic kinds of discourse and practice? And how do brains do it? In essence, I am suggesting that human brains seem to have developed, for good evolutionary reasons, a degree of facility with imaginative empathy and as-if identification; and that mindfulness capitalises on this to create what is probably a uniquely human form of learning—or rather unlearning.     

Jewish Blood: Reality and Metaphor in History,Religion, and Culture

Although Rodney Stark is best known for his work on religious economies, he has recently turned his attention to the social effects of monotheism. If we look carefully on the theoretical trajectory evident in this recent work, what we find is a social-evolutionary approach to religion that was prevalent in the 19th century, but long ago assumed by most academics to be discredited. Furthermore, as becomes increasingly evident going through this series, the particular social-evolutionary sequence that Stark constructs has been shaped by a vision of Protestant triumphalism, and a privileging of evangelical Protestantism, that also belongs to an earlier time. While it would easy to ignore Stark's work (and the last two books in this series do seem to have been ignored in academic circles), there are reasons (which include the popular appeal of his work and his treatment of Islam) for taking his work seriously.     

Love—A Higher Form of Human Energy in the Work of Teilhard de Chardin and Sorokin

Contemporary debates concerning a universal theory about the praxis of love in human society and culture can benefit greatly from the works of two twentieth‐century thinkers, the French paleontologist and religious writer Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and the Russian‐American sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin. Although from very different personal and disciplinary backgrounds, they share amazingly similar views on the power of love as transformative energy for transcending the individual self and for creating radically new, collaborative, and cooperative ways of acting that will transform whole societies, indeed the planet. Traditionally, ideas of love have been associated with religion, but these two thinkers advocate systematic scientific research on the production and application of “love‐energy” for the change of culture, social institutions, and human beings. The article is organized in five parts: (1) altruism, science and love: what is love energy? (2) Teilhard's understanding of the phenomenon of love; (3) Sorokin's approach to creative, altruistic love; (4) comparison of Teilhard's and Sorokin's ideas; and (5) performing works of love. As far as I am aware, this is the first article comparing the remarkable parallels as well as distinctive differences between Sorokin's and Teilhard's ideas on love as the highest form of human energy.     

Ideology, Social Ethos, and the Financial Crisis

The crisis of 2008?C2009 has been viewed primarily as a financial one, which has spilled over into the economy more generally. I want to argue that there is a much deeper crisis, of which the present one is a result. The deeper crisis is political: more specifically, it is a crisis in the ideology and social ethos of the American people. I refer to what has happened to the thinking of United States citizens since the Second World War, and the dangers that that transformation entails for world peace and cooperation??let alone the creation of an economic regime in which deep financial crises do not occur. Short of a change in the ideology of a many of its citizens, I do not believe the United States can succeed in preventing a repeat performance, perhaps many encores, which become increasingly severe.     

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

Diachronic agency and practical entitlement

As diachronic agents, we deliberate and decide in the present to perform future courses of action. Such future‐directed decisions normally enjoy a distinctive species of rational authority over subsequent thought and action. But what is the nature of this authority, and what underwrites its normative force? In this paper, I argue that our answer to this question must begin by situating future‐directed deciding within an intrapersonal model of cross‐temporal influence. The role of future‐directed deciding (and intending), then, is not to generate a novel decision‐based reason for action, but instead to preserve a certain positive normative status over time. I develop an entitlement approach to decisional authority, according to which an agent who rationally decides to ? enjoys a practical entitlement, rather than a reason‐based practical justification, to ? at the appointed time. This entitlement is underwritten, I argue, by the warrant‐preserving nature of the sequence taking an agent from deliberation to subsequent action.     

HAS PSYCHOLOGY A FUTURE?

I consider that psychologists have a duty to explore their own field, to create hypotheses about the behavior of animals, especially human, and to test these and look for possible causal relationships at the level of acting, thinking, perceiving humans m their environmental context Our agenda should be at this level, not one that depends on waiting for reductionist theories at some other level, be it neural, genetic, nuclear, or especially artificial To go about this work, a developmental approach, in a systems setting—the organism-environment system—holds great promise and has the dignity of successful precedents in other sciences
All of behavior—perceiving, acting, problem solving, communicating with others—should be our province The hallmarks of human behavior can and should be studied in all of these areas It IS their development that offers a road to understanding We should continue to look for theories of considerable generality, however elegant a model may be in a tiny realm If we tot find universal laws, we may still come up with unifying principles
Not so long ago, in another keynote address, George Miller told us that It was time to "give psychology away" (Miller, 1969) I am afraid that that is exactly what we are doing, though n the sense that Miller intended Let us keep psychology, recapture the old excitement, looking for the causes in behavior itself, and not giving up on the grand unified theory