What Makes the Political Personal? Openness,Personal Political Salience,and Activism

ABSTRACT People who attach personal meaning to social and political events or are high in Personal Political Salience (PPS) are more likely to engage in political activism ( Duncan & Stewart, 2007 ). Although research suggests that PPS is consequential for activism, we know little about its origins or, more generally, about indirect effects of personality on activism. In this study we examined the possibility that the personality trait of Openness to Experience may be one source of PPS and an indirect predictor of activism. In addition, we proposed that Openness would also be directly related to political activism in young adults but not in middle‐aged and older adults. Analyses confirmed these predictions in cross‐sectional and over‐time data from six samples. We argue that Openness may predispose some individuals both to find personal meaning in distant political events and to engage in social activism in their youth.     

The Family and Political Justice – The Case for Political Liberalisms

This paper examines two central arguments raised byfeminist theorists against the coherence andconsistency of political liberalisms, a recentrecasting of liberal theories of justice. They arguethat due to political liberalisms' uncritical relianceon a political/personal distinction, they permit theinstitution of the family to take sexist and illiberalforms thus undermining its own aims and politicalproject. Political liberalisms' tolerance of a widerange of family forms result in two fatalinconsistences. Firstly, it retards or completelyprevents women from developing the necessary politicalsense of self required for citizenship, and secondly,it prevents children from acquiring the requisitepolitical virtues and sense of justice necessary forthe viability and long-term stability of such asociety. In the paper, I argue that despite theirinitial appeal these feminist criticisms are notcompelling. Firstly, they misunderstand what politicalliberalisms mean by unjust family forms, secondly,they trade on a misunderstanding of thepolitical/personal distinction and, finally, they makequestionable empirical claims about the effects of theilliberal family on a viable political conception ofjustice.     

Same Game, Different Rules? Gender Differences in Political Participation

We investigate gender gaps in political participation with 2004 ISSP data for 18 advanced Western democracies (N: 20,359) using linear and logistic regression models. Controlling for socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes reveals that women are more likely than men to have voted and engaged in ‘private’ activism, while men are more likely to have engaged in direct contact, collective types of actions and be (more active) members of political parties. Our analysis indicates that demographic and attitudinal characteristics influence participation differently among men and among women, as well as across types of participation. These results highlight the need to move toward a view of women engaging in differing types of participation and based on different characteristics.     

Conservatives are happier than liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction

Political conservatives are happier than liberals. We proposed that this happiness gap is accounted for by specific attitude and personality differences associated with positive adjustment and mental health. In contrast, a predominant social psychological explanation of the gap is that conservatives, who are described as fearful, defensive, and low in self-esteem, will rationalize away social inequalities in order to justify the status quo (system justification). In four studies, conservatives expressed greater personal agency (e.g., personal control, responsibility), more positive outlook (e.g., optimism, self-worth), more transcendent moral beliefs (e.g., greater religiosity, greater moral clarity, less tolerance of transgressions), and a generalized belief in fairness, and these differences accounted for the happiness gap. These patterns are consistent with the positive adjustment explanation.     

Religious Right,Religious Left,Both, or Neither? Understanding Religio‐Political Identification

In this article we analyze the effects of religious, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables on religious Americans’ propensity to identify with religio‐political movements. Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey collected by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), we sort nonsecular Americans into four categories: religious right, religious left, both religious right and religious left, or neither religious right nor the religious left. We estimate a multinomial logit model in which we depict religio‐political identification as a function of religious affiliation, worship attendance, religious embeddedness, religious convictions, political attitudes, and socioeconomic and demographic controls. We find that a wide range of religious, political, and socioeconomic/demographic variables affect individuals’ identification with the religious right and/or religious left. Our empirical results also permit us to analyze the seeming paradox of identifying with both the religious right and the religious left. We find that individuals who identify with both movements come from the ranks of the highly religious, those who believe that being moral requires one to believe in God, Tea Party supporters, strong partisans, those with lower education and income, older individuals, and blacks and Hispanics.     

Value Inquiry—Political Values

Editorial

Value Inquiry—Political Values     

Political Tolerance and Religion: An Age-Period-Cohort Analysis, 1984–2014

Using data from the 1984–2014 General Social Survey, we employ cross classified random effects models to examine age-period-cohort changes in political tolerance by religion, incorporating religious belief, belonging, and behavior into the analyses. The results show large cohort and period based changes in political tolerance of the various religious traditions. The results also suggest that the primary driver of changes over time in political tolerance is best attributed to period effects, not cohort replacement, although there is some evidence of a cohort effect among Roman Catholics. Finally, our results demonstrate that aggregate data analyses can lead to noticeably different results and thus can mask substantial differences between groups.     

Editorial ‘Political Normativity. Critical Essays on the Autonomy of the Political’

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -     

Romance,Sexual Attraction,and Women’s Political Ambition: Initial Findings from Two Experiments

This study develops and begins to test the hypothesis that considerations of romance and sexual attractiveness may impede women’s expression of political ambition (in the sense of either interest in holding public office or willingness to disclose such interest). As this is a very new area of research, and as the subject is difficult to test, this study does not draw firm conclusions, but the initial data results suggest at least some support for the hypothesis. It does seem from these two experiments that politics makes one less popular as a date or mate choice, and that women who hypothetically hold office would be less likely to reveal that fact to a potential sexual or romantic partner. Further research is needed to both develop the measurements for this exciting new area of study and confirm these initial results.     

Political Affiliation,Spirituality, and Religiosity: Links to Emerging Adults’ Life Satisfaction and Optimism

The goal of this study was to extend the existing literature regarding the intersection between belief systems shaping psychological processes and subjective well-being among emerging adults. A nationwide sample of 3966 college students reported on their political affiliation, spirituality, and religiosity in relation to their subjective well-being. Multivariate analyses demonstrated that politically conservative participants were significantly more optimistic and satisfied with life than their liberal counterparts and Republican emerging adults reported significantly higher life satisfaction than Democrats. Republican emerging adults also reported significantly higher rates of religiosity and spirituality than Democratic and Independent politically affiliated emerging adults. Our findings corroborate and expand upon existing literature regarding belief systems and political identity as determinants of subjective well-being in emerging adults.     

Can power be self‐legitimating? Political realism in Hobbes,Weber, and Williams

Political realists seek to provide an alternative to accounts of political legitimacy that are based on moral standards. In this endeavor, they face the challenge of how to interpret the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating. In this paper, we argue that work by Bernard Williams sheds light on the possible answers to this challenge. While Williams aligns himself with the realist tradition, his account of legitimacy contains an implicit critique of political realism. This is evident, we show, in his rejections of the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because he conflates legitimacy and political order, eliminating space for criticizing power. Weber's view, however, offers a non‐moralist standard of legitimacy that has critical purchase. This critical purchase emerges from the demands made on rulers to uphold the values that underlie their legitimation, combined with the ethic of responsibility. The resulting grounds for criticism are thus consistent with the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating—the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism. By showing that Williams's partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained only on realist grounds, our analysis clarifies the limits of political realism.     

The Political Egalitarian’s Dilemma

Political egalitarianism is at the core of most normative conceptions of democratic legitimacy. It finds its minimal expression in the “one person one vote” formula. In the literature on deliberative democracy, political equality is typically interpreted in a more demanding sense, but different interpretations of what political equality requires can be identified. In this paper I shall argue that the attempt to specify political equality in deliberative democracy is affected by a dilemma. I shall illustrate the political egalitarian’s dilemma by a hypothetical choice between two informational bases for political equality: Rawlsian primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The political egalitarian’s dilemma reveals a clash between the requirement of ensuring equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting substantive judgments to deliberative evaluation. As such, the dilemma is a variant of the procedure vs. substance dilemma that is well-known in democratic theory. While it has sometimes been argued that deliberative democracy solves the tension between procedure and substance, the political egalitarian’s dilemma shows that this tension continues within deliberative democracy.

What Is Realistic Political Philosophy?

In the study of politics, Cambridge is sometimes associated with a school of political philosophical “realism.” This article discusses what realism in political philosophy might mean, by examining first what might count as “unrealistic” political philosophy (looking at Sidgwick and Rawls), and then some recent attempts to identify a more realistic philosophical approach to politics. It argues that realistic political philosophy tends to emerge as a thin account of politics that falls between the stools of either more philosophical (i.e., more idealistic) or less philosophical (i.e., more historical) accounts. It illustrates this in relation to Sidgwick and also Hobbes, who is often held up as the quintessential realist in the history of political philosophy.     

Mozi’s Ideal Political Philosophy

The main purpose of this article is to show that the essence of Mozi’s political theory, namely that a civil state is in its best or ideal condition when each citizen exercises universal care (jian ai 兼愛), is more defensible than it is usually thought to be. Doing this will require an exposition of the main features of his theory and occasionally reference arguments and considerations outside of Mozi’s text. We interpret the disagreement between Mozi and his alleged Confucian opponents as a disagreement about the nature of political obligation: Confucians regard political service as a kind of noncontractual role obligation, while Mozi regards it as an obligation derivable from universal and impartial moral principles.     

Older and Younger Adults�� Attitudes Toward Feminism: The Influence of Religiosity, Political Orientation, Gender, Education, and Family

The present study explored attitudes toward feminism in 245 U.S. college students and their older relatives. Participants completed a scale of attitudes towards feminism, political orientation, a religiosity measure, and a demographic questionnaire. Results indicated that older adults were more conservative than younger adults on their attitudes towards feminism, religiosity, and political orientation measures. In the young adult sample, attitudes towards feminism were predicted by gender and political orientation, compared to older adults in which religiosity and political orientation were the best predictors. When exploring generational influence, older adults?? attitudes and demographic information were not associated with younger adults?? attitudes towards feminism and the women??s movement. In contrast, young adults?? political views were associated with older adults?? attitudes towards feminism.