Emotion Beliefs and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Social Anxiety Disorder

Despite strong support for the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for social anxiety disorder (SAD), little is known about mechanisms of change in treatment. Within the context of a randomized controlled trial of CBT, this study examined patients' beliefs about the fixed versus malleable nature of anxiety—their ‘implicit theories’—as a key variable in CBT for SAD. Compared to waitlist (n = 29; 58% female), CBT (n = 24; 52% female) led to significantly lower levels of fixed beliefs about anxiety (M_baseline = 11.70 vs. M_Post = 7.08, d = 1.27). These implicit beliefs indirectly explained CBT-related changes in social anxiety symptoms (κ² = .28, [95% CI = 0.12, 0.46]). Implicit beliefs also uniquely predicted treatment outcomes when controlling for baseline social anxiety and other kinds of maladaptive beliefs (perceived social costs, perceived social self-efficacy, and maladaptive interpersonal beliefs). Finally, implicit beliefs continued to predict social anxiety symptoms at 12 months post-treatment. These findings suggest that changes in patients' beliefs about their emotions may play an important role in CBT for SAD.     

Power and perceived influence: I caused your behavior,but I'm not responsible for it

There are numerous examples of powerful people denying responsibility for others' (mis)conduct in which they played—and acknowledge playing—a causal role. The current article seeks to explain this conundrum by examining the difference between, and powerful people's beliefs about, causality and responsibility. Research has shown power to have numerous psychological consequences. Some of these consequences, such as overconfidence, are likely to increase an individual's belief that he or she caused another person's behavior. However, others, such as decreased perspective‐taking, are likely to decrease an individual's belief that he or she was responsible for another person's behavior. In combination, these psychological consequences of power may lead powerful people to believe that they instigated another's behavior while simultaneously believing that the other person could have chosen to do otherwise. The dissociation between these two attributions may help to explain why people in positions of power often deny responsibility for others' behavior—unethical or otherwise—that they undeniably caused.     

Coping with examinations: Exploring relationships between students' coping strategies,implicit theories of ability,and perceived control

Background Relatively little is known about the contribution of students' beliefs regarding the nature of academic ability (i.e. their implicit theories) on strategies used to deal with examinations. Aims This study applied Dweck's socio‐cognitive model of achievement motivation to better understand how students cope with examinations. It was expected that students' implicit theories of academic ability would be related to their use of particular coping strategies to deal with exam‐related stress. Additionally, it was predicted that perceived control over exams acts as a mediator between implicit theories of ability and coping. Sample Four hundred and ten undergraduate students (263 males, 147 females), aged from 17 to 26 years old (M = 19.73, SD = 1.46) were volunteers for the present study. Methods Students completed measures of coping, implicit theories of academic ability, and perception of control over academic examinations during regular classes in the first term of the university year. Results Multiple regression analyses revealed that incremental beliefs of ability significantly and positively predicted active coping, planning, venting of emotions, seeking social support for emotional and instrumental reasons, whereas entity beliefs positively predicted behavioural disengagement and negatively predicted active coping and acceptance. In addition, analyses revealed that entity beliefs of ability were related to coping strategies through students' perception of control over academic examinations. Conclusions These results confirm that exam‐related coping varies as a function of students' beliefs about the nature of academic ability and their perceptions of control when approaching examinations.     

Psychometric properties of a French version of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale

IntroductionInspired by Carol Dweck's work on naive theories of intelligence, the implicit theory of emotions refers to beliefs regarding the general functioning of emotions, specifically, their controllability. Some individuals view emotions as uncontrollable (entity theory), while others think that emotions can be modulated (incremental theory). These beliefs guide the emotional regulation strategies that individuals use and influence subjective well-being.ObjectiveThe present study explores the psychometric properties of the French version of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale developed by Tamir et al. (2007).MethodOne hundred seventy-seven participants aged 18 to 72 years old (M = 34 years old) completed the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale in conjunction with two other questionnaires: subjective well-being and emotional regulation strategies.ResultsFactor analyses identified a one-dimensional structure; the internal reliability (alpha = .81) and test-retest reliability indices (r = .69) were satisfactory. The study replicated the main results of contemporary international studies concerning the mediating role of cognitive reappraisal and further documents the pivotal role of positive reappraisal in the association between implicit theories and well-being.ConclusionThe discussion highlights clinical and theoretical interests and the usefulness of the Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale.     

Beliefs about emotion: implications for avoidance-based emotion regulation and psychological health

People’s beliefs about their ability to control their emotions predict a range of important psychological outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether these beliefs are playing a causal role, and if so, why this might be. In the current research, we tested whether avoidance-based emotion regulation explains the link between beliefs and psychological outcomes. In Study 1 (N?=?112), a perceived lack of control over emotions predicted poorer psychological health outcomes (increased self-reported avoidance, lower well-being, and higher levels of clinical symptoms), and avoidance strategies indirectly explained these links between emotion beliefs and psychological health. In Study 2 (N?=?101), we experimentally manipulated participants’ emotion beliefs by leading participants to believe that they struggled (low regulatory self-efficacy) or did not struggle (high regulatory self-efficacy) with controlling their emotions. Participants in the low regulatory self-efficacy condition reported increased intentions to engage in avoidance strategies over the next month and were more likely to avoid seeking psychological help. When asked if they would participate in follow-up studies, these participants were also more likely to display avoidance-based emotion regulation. These findings provide initial evidence for the causal role of emotion beliefs in avoidance-based emotion regulation, and document their impact on psychological health-related outcomes.     

Emotion differentiation and its relation with emotional well-being in adolescents

Emotion differentiation (ED) refers to the precision with which people can identify and distinguish their emotions and has been associated with well-being in adults. This study investigated ED and its relation with emotional well-being (i.e. depressive symptoms, positivity and negativity intensity and propensity, implicit theories of emotions) in adolescents. We used an experience sampling method with 72 participants (M_age?=?14.00, 71% girls) to assess adolescents’ positive and negative emotions at different time points over the course of two weekends and a baseline questionnaire to assess emotional well-being. Differentiating negative emotions was related to less negativity intensity and propensity, and to the belief that emotions are malleable. Differentiating positive emotions was not related to any of the assessed well-being variables. Together, these results suggest that a detailed awareness of one’s negative emotional states is an important dimension of well-being, also in adolescence.     

Introspection,mindreading, and the transparency of belief

This paper explores the nature of self‐knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self‐knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self‐knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for acquiring knowledge of beliefs that is non‐inferential in nature. The paper argues that this account is preferable to some of the most common empirically motivated theories of self‐knowledge of beliefs and explains the origin of the widely discussed phenomenon that our own beliefs are often transparent to us in that we can determine whether we believe that p simply by settling whether p is the case.     

Testing the bidirectional relationship between belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and psychological distress: A five-wave longitudinal study

Previous studies have primarily focused on understanding why people believe conspiracy theories, especially during societal crises (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic). The investigation of how such conspiracy beliefs would influence people's mental well-being has just begun recently. The present research aims to address this crucial question by testing the relationships between psychological distress and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs with a five-wave longitudinal study. On the one hand, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs could be more appealing to people with heightened distress, as these theories apparently help people to make sense of the uncertainty and life-threatening disease outbreak. On the other hand, conspiracy theories could be a source of existential threat and thus, would induce rather than reduce psychological distress. We tested these possibilities empirically by a series of cross-lagged model analyses. Using the random intercept cross-lagged panel model analysis, we only found a between-person association but not a cross-lagged within-person relationship between the two. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was predicted by being more politically conservative. These findings were further corroborated by the supplementary latent growth curve analyses. Overall, our findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs may not induce or reduce psychological distress in the context of COVID-19.     

Emotion Beliefs,Emotion Regulation,and Emotional Experiences in Daily Life

One potential factor that could influence how individuals with at least moderate symptoms of depression cope with upsetting events in their daily lives is the beliefs that these individuals hold about whether emotions are malleable or fixed. The current study adopted an experience sampling approach to examine how the beliefs about emotion’s malleability related to daily positive and negative affect and daily emotion regulation efforts among individuals with at least moderate symptoms of depression (N = 84). Results demonstrated that individuals having at least moderate symptoms of depression who held more malleable beliefs about emotions reported decreased negative affect both overall during the day and specifically in response to daily upsetting events. Additionally, these individuals who held more malleable beliefs about their emotions also reported more daily use of cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotions in response to upsetting daily events. Results from the current study extend previous work examining the relationship between emotion malleability beliefs, emotional experiences, and emotion regulation to examine these relationships in people who are moderately depressed as they navigate the emotional landscape of their daily lives.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

Promoting a Brand's Emotion Benefits: The Influence of Emotion Categorization Processes on Consumer Evaluations

Research in psychology has demonstrated that people have a shared knowledge of emotion categories. Building on this research and our understanding of categorization processes, this article proposes a mechanism by which consumers utilize information about a brand's “emotion benefits” in forming attitudes. The results of 2 experimental studies show that (a) consumers’ processing of a brand's emotion benefit information is consistent with categorization processes such that emotion category congruity effects are large in basic—versus subordinate—level conditions, (b) associating a brand with certain emotions can influence brand and ad attitudes without necessarily eliciting emotions during exposure to advertising, (c) emotion category congruity “works” through attitude‐toward‐the‐ad and emotion benefit beliefs in influencing brand attitudes, and (d) subjective product category knowledge moderates the strength of these effects. Taken together, these results explicate the process by which a knowledge‐based consideration of a brand's emotional benefits can influence consumers’ beliefs about the brand and brand attitudes.     

L’auto-efficacité émotionnelle : un facteur à considérer pour expliquer la santé psychologique au travail

In recent years, psychological health problems at work (PHW) are rising and affect a considerable number of workers (Gilbert et al., 2011). The PHW refers to two separate but complementary states: psychological well-being (serenity, commitment and social harmony) and psychological distress in the workplace (anxiety, withdrawal and irritability) (Gilbert et al., 2011). Knowing that negative relationships have been studied between emotional self-efficacy (ESE) and various phenomena of psychological distress in the workplace, the aim is to verify how the ESE influences the PHW. The ESE is defined by people's belief in respect of seven emotional skills: the perception of emotions and that of others, the use of emotions, understanding emotions and that of others as well as the management of its emotions and that of others (Deschênes et al., 2011). A quote was used correlational with a sample 149 students older workers averaged 32.06 years (SD = 8.27). The scales of ESE (α = .91) Deschênes et al. (2011) and Gilbert et al. (2011) on well-being (α = .92) and psychological distress in the workplace (α = .94) are used to measure the concepts being studied. Results of regression analyzes confirm the research hypotheses.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Examining the indirect effects of religious orientations on well‐being through personal locus of control

Religiosity often positively correlates with well‐being. Some orientations towards religion may, however, adversely affect well‐being by decreasing perceptions of personal locus of control—a critical antecedent of mental health. We examined this possibility in a New Zealand‐based national sample of religiously identified adults (N = 1486). As predicted, fundamentalism had a negative indirect effect on life satisfaction, but a positive indirect effect on psychological distress. Conversely, people's intrinsic religious orientation had a positive indirect effect on life satisfaction, but a negative indirect effect on psychological distress. Notably, all four indirect effects were transmitted through personal, but not God, locus of control. These results highlight the diversity of religious orientations and show that religious orientations that deemphasize people's personal locus of control have negative consequences for well‐being.     

The relationship between beliefs about emotions and quality of life in irritable bowel syndrome

Suppression of undesirable emotions, as well as beliefs about the unacceptability of experiencing and expressing emotions, have both been shown to be related to poorer health-related outcomes in several clinical groups. Potential models through which these variables relate have yet to be tested in those with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and are therefore examined in the current article. Online questionnaires were administered to people with IBS (n = 84) to test a mediation model in which beliefs about the unacceptability of emotions are associated with greater emotional suppression, which in turn relates to increased affective distress and consequently poorer quality of life. An alternate model to test the direction of effect along with two further models using support-seeking as mediators of the same predictor and outcome were also tested. Emotional suppression and affective distress (in that particular order) mediate the relationship between beliefs about emotions and quality of life IBS. The models using support-seeking as mediators of the relationship between beliefs about emotions and the two outcomes were not supported. These findings suggest a role for emotional processing in medically unexplained symptoms and imply the need to address such beliefs about emotions in psychological therapies.     

Culture,Emotion, and Well-being: Good Feelings in Japan and the United States

We tested the hypothesis that “good feelings”—the central element of subjective well-being—are associated with interdependence and interpersonal engagement of the self in Japan, but with independence and interpersonal disengagement of the self in the United States. Japanese and American college students (total N = 913) reported how frequently they experienced various emotional states in daily life. In support of the hypothesis, the reported frequency of general positive emotions (e.g. calm, elated) was most closely associated with the reported frequency of interpersonally engaged positive emotions (e.g. friendly feelings) in Japan, but with the reported frequency of interpersonally disengaged positive emotions (e.g. pride) in the United States. Further, for Americans the reported frequency of experience was considerably higher for positive emotions than for negative emotions, but for Japanese it was higher for engaged emotions than for disengaged emotions. Implications for cultural constructions of emotion in general and subjective well-being in particular are discussed.     

Positive and negative intergroup contact predict Black and White Americans' judgments about police violence against Black Americans

We examined whether past positive and negative interracial contact predict people's views of interracial police violence. White (N = 207) and Black (N = 116) Americans reported on their past intergroup experiences before viewing information about one of two true events involving the death of a Black man at the hands of a White police officer. For White Americans, negative contact predicted a reluctance to blame the officer and a willingness to believe that people's responses to the events involved “playing the race card.” For Black Americans, positive contact predicted marginally less officer blame and lower beliefs that the victim was racially profiled. This suggests the potential for a vicious cycle, whereby past contact experiences color perceptions of intergroup conflict in the present.     

A Four-Factor Model of Perceived Control: Avoiding, Coping, Obtaining, and Savoring

ABSTRACT This study provides evidence that people evaluate their control over events and over feelings separately with respect to both positive and negative experiences Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that subjects made separate self-evaluations of control regarding their ability to (a) avoid negative outcomes, (b) cope with negative outcomes, (c) obtain positive outcomes, and (d) savor positive outcomes In addition, beliefs about avoiding and obtaining were more highly correlated (r = 50) than were beliefs about coping and savoring (r= 27) It is argued that coping and savoring involve different sets of cognitive and behavioral skills Multiple regression analyses generally indicated that beliefs about avoiding and coping related more strongly to measures of subjective distress, whereas beliefs about obtaining and strongly related more strongly to measures of subjective well-being These four control beliefs are discussed in relation to other conceptual models of control, and ways in which savoring may promote perceived control are described     

Weight-based discrimination,body dissatisfaction and emotional eating: The role of perceived social consensus

Objective: Discrimination can have a negative impact on psychological well-being, attitudes and behaviour. This research evaluates the impact of experiences of weight-based discrimination upon emotional eating and body dissatisfaction, and also explores whether people's beliefs about an ingroup's social consensus concerning how favourably overweight people are regarded can moderate the relationship between experiences of discrimination and negative eating and weight-related cognitions and behaviours.

Research methods and procedures: 197 undergraduate students completed measures about their experiences of weight-based discrimination, emotional eating and body dissatisfaction. Participants also reported their beliefs concerning an ingroup's attitude towards overweight people.

Results: Recollections of weight-based discrimination significantly contributed to emotional eating and body dissatisfaction. However, the relationships between experiencing discrimination and body dissatisfaction and emotional eating were weakest amongst participants who believed that the ingroup held a positive attitude towards overweight people.

Discussion: Beliefs about ingroup social consensus concerning overweight people can influence the relationships between weight-based discrimination and emotional eating and body dissatisfaction. Changing group perceptions to perceive it to be unacceptable to discriminate against overweight people may help to protect victims of discrimination against the negative consequences of weight-based stigma.     

Preschool girls' distress and mothers' sensitivity in Japan and Germany

Cultures differ in their beliefs about emotions and related emotional expressions. Cultures with an interdependent model of self prefer more socially engaged emotions, and cultures with an independent model of self perceive socially disengaged emotions as more important. Such differences in individual emotional expression can be seen as outcomes of different socialization practices in children's development of emotions. Mothers' sensitivity was assumed to promote culturally valued ways of children's emotional expressions. The present cross-cultural study aimed to test distress reactions of young children in Japan and Germany in self-focused and other-focused conditions. German and Japanese preschool girls (N = 50) were observed in two distress conditions. Distress was evoked by the child's own failure (self-focused distress) and by the experience of another person's distress (other-focused distress). The mothers were present in the failure condition. The girls' intensity of distress expression was coded before and directly after the emotion-eliciting event (immediate expression) as well as at the end of each situation (change of expression over time). Mothers' sensitivity was coded during the failure condition. No cultural differences occurred for girls' intensity of immediate distress expression but for the change of expression over time in both situations in the expected culture-specific way. Furthermore, maternal sensitivity was also related to the daughter's change of distress expressions in a culture-specific way. These results point to effects of universal and culture-specific emotion socialization.