Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity in Disfiguring Breast Cancer

In this paper, I explore the meaning of bodily integrity in disfiguring breast cancer. Bodily integrity is a normative principle precisely because it does not simply refer to actual physical or functional intactness. It rather indicates what should be regarded and respected as inviolable in vulnerable and damageable bodies. I will argue that this normative inviolability or wholeness can be based upon a person's embodied experience of wholeness. This phenomenological stance differs from the liberal view that identifies respect for integrity with respect for autonomy (resulting in an invalidation of bodily integrity's proper normative meaning), as well as from the view that bodily integrity is based upon ideologies of wholeness (which runs the risk of being disadvantageous to women). I propose that bodily integrity involves a process of identification between the experience of one's body as “Leib” and the experience of one's body as “Körper.” If identification fails or is not possible, one's integrity is threatened. This idea of bodily integrity can support breast cancer patients and survivors in making decisions about possible corrective interventions. To implement this idea in oncology care, empirical‐phenomenological research needs to establish how breast cancer patients express their embodied self‐experiences.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

Nishida,Agency, and the ‘Self-Contradictory’ Body

In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the ‘self-contradictory’ body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of ‘acting-intuition’. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that Nishida develops a rich and exceedingly current way of thinking through different facets of embodiment and interpersonal relatedness. I further argue that Nishida's work provides compelling reasons to foreground the mutually implicative, co-emergent nature of embodied self and world in our theorizing about the nature of self and experience.     

Das verkörperte Selbst und der Andere

Bodily experience and mentalization cannot be attributed to separate experiential fields, they are interrelated. Many twentieth and twenty-first century concepts of the embodied self in philosophy and psychosomatics have gone beyond dualistic models of mind and body. In accordance with these modern theories, a dialectical concept is presented that seems to be more adequate, highlighting two dialectical relationships. The first is between mentalization and bodily experience. On the one hand bodily experience always reaches beyond mentalization and on the other hand mentalization is constantly working on bodily experience and trying to represent it mentally. The second is between mentalization and intercorporeality. The embodied self is by no means a solipsistic self; rather, the mutual relatedness in a bodily encounter comes prior to all mentalization, which in turn remodels it into self-representations, e.g. the body image. These two dialectical relationships are important to take into account when trying to understand clinical phenomena, such as hypochondriasis, ideas of reference in schizophrenia or the psychological sequelae of Parkinson’s disease.     

On Becoming a British Psychoanalyst

This article describes a personal journey from social anthropology to psychoanalysis, first through training at the British Psychoanalytical Society from 1956 to 1964, then to becoming a Member and Training Analyst. I describe the development of a career involving the usual things a psychoanalyst is likely to do in addition to clinical practice: supervising students, participation in seminars and discussions with colleagues, teaching, writing, serving on various committees, being editor of a series of psychoanalytic books, and trips abroad to teach and to consult with colleagues about other points of view. This is the bare bones, but I also try to describe the development of some of my psychoanalytic views and attitudes, including a brief look at the British Society with an ex-anthropologist's eye.     

The phenomenology of self-presentation: describing the structures of intercorporeality with Erving Goffman

Self-presentation is a term that indicates conscious and unconscious strategies for controlling or managing how one is perceived by others in terms of both appearance and comportment. In this article, I will discuss the phenomenology of self-presentation with respect to the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty regarding the visibility of the body within intercorporeal relations through ‘behaviour’ and ‘expression.’ In doing so, I will turn to the work of the Canadian sociologist and social theorist Erving Goffman. Goffman’s account of self-presentation suggests why embodied subjects adopt certain styles of ordered bodily behaviour as determined by the broader social order, giving existential and social significance to the ontological structures of intercorporeal bodily communication. Following Goffman, I will suggest that the embodied subject is continuously—and constitutionally—engaged in implicit and explicit strategies to manage how the body is presented to others. In articulating self-presentation as a feature of intercorporeality, my aim in this article is to use Goffman’s insights to extend Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of bodily communication by demonstrating that bodily communication that is instantiated at the level of intercorporeality is always expressed through social life with its various historical, cultural and linguistic dimensions.     

Agentic and Communal Social Motives

People chart and navigate their social lives along two cardinal axes – agency and communion. The motives to approach communion (e.g., enhance closeness and cooperation), approach agency (e.g., gain status and control), avoid communion (e.g., limit vulnerabilities and obligations), and avoid agency (e.g., limit resentments and rivalries) can each be adaptive, depending on the person and situation. After reviewing common implicit and explicit measures of agentic and communal motives, I describe how these motives together shape (and are shaped by) diverse phenomena, such as individuals' involvements in mating and parenting and, concurrently, their testosterone and oxytocin levels. I also detail how normative models of development and maturation depict a shifting dynamic between communal and agentic motives over the lifespan: In childhood, secure attachments provide foundations for developing agency; in adulthood, the challenge becomes yoking agency (one's accumulated mental, physical, and social resources) to communal aims (nurturing others and prosocial endeavors).     

Family therapy and ultra-orthodox Jewish families: a structural approach

Most ultra-orthodox Jewish families live in tightly knit communities in which there is religious and cultural congruence between the structure of their communal organizations, their families, and the way individual members construe their world. Without excluding other family therapy models, this paper points to striking links between strictly orthodox Judaism and aspects of structural family therapy which suggest the latter may be particularly applicable to members of this ethnic minority. Therapeutic issues are illustrated with examples.     

Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the Philosophy of Action

Propositionalism in the philosophy of action is the popular view that intentional actions are bodily movements caused and rationalized by certain ‘internal’ propositional attitude states that constitute the agent's perspective. I attack propositionalism's background claim that the genuinely mental/cognitive dimension of human action resides solely in some range of ‘internal’ agency‐conferring representational states that causally trigger, and thus are always conceptually disentangle‐able from, bodily activity itself. My opposing claim, following Ryle, Wittgenstein, and others, is that mentality and intentionality can be constitutively implicated in bodily actions themselves, as exercises of a distinctive form of embodied practical understanding. I attempt to show this by attending to the fine‐grained contours of various skillful actions.     

Towards an interpersonal understanding of bodily experience

This paper attempts to understand the interpersonal nature of bodily experience. It explores the way the body symptoms we meet in the consulting room, and in everyday life, express and communicate disturbances in our relationships with others. The article seeks to understand how others that are close to us can really get under our skins. The work of the philosopher of the body, MerleauPonty, findings from contemporary developmental psychology, recent psycho-biological studies and psychoanalytic insights are all drawn upon as a way of offering an introduction to contemporary developments in thinking and research on the body.

The article explores the interdependence of body and environment. In particular, the body is always in an interpersonal context with others. Bodies are interdependent; communication is first and foremost bodily. Bodily behaviour and biological functions develop in the context of a relationship. The relationship with the other influences the formation of bodily processes and actions. Clinical examples are drawn upon to illustrate how interpersonal disturbances in development are expressed in bodily symptoms. The difference between a hysterical and psychosomatic body symptom is also briefly addressed.     

The body of the other: intercorporeality and the phenomenology of agoraphobia

How is our experience of the world affected by our experience of others? Such is the question I will be exploring in this paper. I will do so via the agoraphobic condition. In agoraphobia, we are rewarded with an enriched glimpse into the intersubjective formation of the world, and in particular to our embodied experience of that social space. I will be making two key claims. First, intersubjectivity is essentially an issue of intercorporeality, a point I shall explore with recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the prepersonal body. The implication of this claim is that evading or withdrawing from the other remains structurally impossible so long as we remain bodily subjects. Second, the necessary relation with others defines our thematic and affective experience of the world. Far from a formal connection with others, the corporeal basis of intersubjectivity means that our lived experience of the world is mediated via our bodily relations with others. In this way, intercorporeality reveals the body as being dynamically receptive to social interactions with others. Each of these claims is demonstrated via a phenomenological analysis of the agoraphobe’s interaction with others. From this analysis, I conclude that our experience of the world is affected by our experience of others precisely because we are in a bodily relation with others. Such a relation is not causally linked, as though first there were a body, then a world, and then a subject that provided a thematic and affective context to that experience. Instead, body, other, and world are each intertwined in a single unity and cannot be considered apart.     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood

In contrast to individualistic, cognitive-biological, and reductive psychologies, a pragmatic psychology of personhood takes the worldly activity of persons as its core subject matter. The pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood outlined herein offers theoretical frameworks for understanding the development and evolution of persons through their embodied coordination with objects and others in a world that is simultaneously biophysical and sociocultural. In both phylogenesis and ontogenesis, it is their active participation within coordinated, multi-perspectival sequences of interactive practices that constitutes human beings as psychological selves and communal agents who constantly transform the world and themselves. The constitution, emergence, and transformation of persons are accompanied and enabled by a holistic neurophysiological functioning that interacts constantly with, and owes much to, our history of interactivity within the world, especially our social participation with others and their actions and perspectives. A viable pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood demands the close study of our coordinated interactivity within sociocultural practices central to the life of communities and the communal agents who populate them.     

Multiplicity as a Form of Enactment Commentary on Paper by Graham Bass

In this commentary I address the functions of gender and of bodily state as a way of managing memory, affect, and interactions. I consider the status of alters as narrative or as historical truths. Graham Bass's case illuminates problems and potentials of touch and the inevitability of intersubjectively constructed enactments.     

It's the nature of the work: examining behavior-based sources of work-family conflict across occupations

The consequences of work-family conflict for both individuals and organizations have been well documented, and the various sources of such conflict have received substantial attention. However, the vast majority of extant research has focused on only time- and strain-based sources, largely neglecting behavior-based sources. Integrating two nationally representative databases, the authors examine 3 behavior-based antecedents of work-family conflict linked specifically to occupational work role requirements (interdependence, responsibility for others, and interpersonal conflict). Results from multilevel analysis indicate that significant variance in work-family conflict is attributable to the occupation in which someone works. Interdependence and responsibility for others predict work-family conflict, even after controlling for several time- and strain-based sources.     

Embodied Pedagogy: The Body and Teaching Theology

This essay is a reflection on my own experience of teaching undergraduates in light of research on proxemics (social and personal space) and kinesics (body language). I discuss ways to structure classroom space to encourage interaction and discussion, using Edward Hall's distinctions between three types of space (fixed feature, semi‐fixed feature, and informal). I explain the importance of body language in verbal communication and describe how I use my own body to illustrate and reinforce what I say in class. I then offer strategies to incorporate students' bodies in the learning process. I conclude by arguing that embodied pedagogy calls us to look beyond the classroom and to acknowledge the importance of our bodies in all aspects of our lives.     

UNTOLD STORIES AND THE POWER OF SILENCE IN THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF SOCIAL TRAUMA*

There are intergenerational secrets and unprocessed experiences that very often don’t have a voice or an image associated with them but loom in our minds nonetheless. What haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left within us by the secrets of others. This paper will look at the conflict that occurs when unspoken events and memories of one generation haunt the next one. It is my contention that the second-generation survivors of trauma can be deeply affected by something that did not directly happen to them. Utilizing my own personal narrative I will examine how being the daughter of a woman who escaped the Holocaust, and her silence about those events affected my personal development and later my work with patients. I will also explore the unspoken secret that a patient’s mother kept from her, paralleling the writer’s mother’s secret.     

Innovative ordinariness and ritual change in a Jerusalem Minyan

In this article, I present an ethnographic analysis of ritual change in the communal prayers of a Jerusalem congregation that promotes gender equality within the framework of Orthodox-oriented halakha. While scholars have examined how ritual change in Jewish communities develops through the reinterpretation and reutilization of religious texts, practices and objects, my fieldwork reveals how change is shaped by people’s habitus – their ways of being in the world. Communal prayers in this congregation exemplify what I call an “innovative ordinariness” of religious change. Members view and experience their communal rituals as “ordinary” due to their perception of their prayer hall as a familiar spatial and auditory environment. This ordinariness facilitates creative and innovative uses of religious practices. The data outlined here are based on field research during which I participated in the congregation’s services and communal activities, and held interviews and informal conversations with members. This case study depicts ways in which members of Israeli Orthodox society apply their cultural toolkit to create religious spaces that accommodate their gender-egalitarian values, beliefs and lifestyles and, at the same time, produce religiosity that is experienced and understood as legitimate. By doing so, I argue, they assign new meanings to traditional Orthodox categories.