THE INSPIRATION OF GOD AND WOLFHART PANNENBERG'S “FIELD THEORY OF INFORMATION”

Abstract This paper will examine the implications of an extended “field theory of information,” suggested by Wolfhart Pannenberg, specifically in the Christian understanding of creation. The paper argues that the Holy Spirit created the world as field, a concept from physics, and the creation is directed by the logos utilizing information. Taking into account more recent developments of information theory, the essay further suggests that present creation has a causal impact upon the information utilized in creation. In order to adequately address Pannenberg's hypothesis that the logos utilizes information at creation the essay will also include an introductory examination of Pannenberg's Christology which shifts from a strict “from below” Christology, to a more open “third way” of doing Christology beyond “above” and “below.” The essay concludes with a brief section relating the implications of an extended “field theory of information” to creative inspiration, as well as parallels with human inspiration.     

The fundamental laws of physics can tell the truth

Nancy Cartwright's arguments in favour of phenomenological laws and against fundamental ones are discussed. Her criticisms of the standard covering‐law account are extended using Vyacheslav Stjopin's analysis of the structure of fundamental theories. It is argued that Cartwright's thesis (that the laws of physics lie) is too radical to accept. A model of theory change is presented which demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can, in fact, be confronted with experience.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

SHOULD A B‐THEORETIC ATHEIST FEAR DEATH?

This article discusses Robin Le Poidevin's proposal that a commitment to the B‐theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear of death. For the purposes of the article, I grant Le Poidevin's assertion that the B‐theory gives us a sense in which our lives are ‘eternally real’; but I deny that the B‐theorist is entitled to regard this as sufficient to furnish a reason to cease fearing death. This is because, according to the most prevalent B‐theoretic conception of our emotional attitudes, A‐theoretic (and not B‐theoretic) beliefs are sufficient to ground these attitudes. I discuss this B‐theoretic account of our emotions, which I call the Mellor–MacBeath model, and explain how it relates to the fear of death. I argue that, according to this model, the fear of death – in so far as it is a fear of one's personal annihilation – is warranted, and hence that, if Le Poidevin's proposal is to stand, then we must be given either a new B‐theoretic account of the connection between beliefs and emotions, or an account of why the fear of death is unlike other emotional attitudes.     

The Salience of Moral Character

In this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue‐based account of moral judgment but also a virtue‐based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.     

Is Age Special? Justice,Complete Lives and the Prudential Lifespan Account

This article explores the problem of justice between age‐groups. Specifically, it presents a challenge to a leading theory in this field, Norman Daniels' Prudential Lifespan Account. The challenge relates to a key assumption that underlies this theory, namely the assumption that all individuals live complete lives of equal length. Having identified the roles that this assumption plays, the article argues that the justifications Daniels offers for it are unsatisfactory and that this threatens the foundation of his position, undermining his claim that ‘the fact that we all age’ makes age a special problem of distributive justice. This shows that the problem of justice between age‐groups is not special in the way Daniels proposes; rather it involves the same irreducibly interpersonal distributive decisions as other problems of justice. The consequences of this argument are several‐fold. Most importantly, it shows that the Rawlsian account of justice to which Daniels hopes to attach his theory to requires significantly greater benefits to be conferred on those in earlier age‐groups relative to those in later age‐group, not a distribution similar to simultaneous equality as Daniels proposes.     

Philosophical Arguments Against the A‐Theory

According to the A‐theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A‐theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A‐theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A‐theory and show that there are plausible A‐theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the A‐theory, it is not obviously a philosophically suspect theory.     

In defense of psychological laws

It is argued that psychological explanations involve psychological generalizations that exhibit the same features as laws of physics. On the basis of the “systematic theory of lawhood”, characteristic features of laws of nature are elaborated. Investigating some examples of explanations taken from cognitive psychology shows that these features can also be identified in psychological generalizations. Particular attention is devoted to the notion of “ccteris‐paribus laws”. It is argued that laws of psychology are indeed ceteris‐paribus laws. However, this feature does not distinguish them from the laws of physics, because such laws are found in physics as well. Moreover, the laws invoked in psychological explanations are genuine laws of psychology; they are not laws of other disciplines that are brought to bear on psychological problems. The conclusion is that if there are laws of physics then laws of psychology exist as well.     

Autonomy in Action: Linking the Act of Looking to Memory Formation in Infancy via Dynamic Neural Fields

Looking is a fundamental exploratory behavior by which infants acquire knowledge about the world. In theories of infant habituation, however, looking as an exploratory behavior has been deemphasized relative to the reliable nature with which looking indexes active cognitive processing. We present a new theory that connects looking to the dynamics of memory formation and formally implement this theory in a Dynamic Neural Field model that learns autonomously as it actively looks and looks away from a stimulus. We situate this model in a habituation task and illustrate the mechanisms by which looking, encoding, working memory formation, and long‐term memory formation give rise to habituation across multiple stimulus and task contexts. We also illustrate how the act of looking and the temporal dynamics of learning affect each other. Finally, we test a new hypothesis about the sources of developmental differences in looking.     

Evolutionary policy contexts and policies in preparation for the twenty‐first century

The importance of preparing now for the next century is emphasized. The author's field and Kondratiev theories as a basis for long‐range policymaking over periods of dynamic, recon‐figurational change are briefly reviewed, and a number of assumptions relevant to this kind of policymaking are provided.. Equilibrium and nonequilibrium structures and thinking are contrasted. Limitations to control associated with limits to knowledge and knowability are discussed. The possibility is considered that continuation of present policies and practices may accelerate movement along a trajectory to nowhere. Problem solutions are considered within the context of what is meant by a civilized society, and some 15 characteristics of a civilized society are proposed. The theoretical basis for preparation for the Twenty‐First Century is advanced. Deficiencies in the present dominant politicoeconomic theories of Western Capitalistic Democracy and Marxism are discussed, and the need for a new set of “founding fathers” is proposed. The importance of developing and implementing a replacement theory of similar magnitude to present theories is emphasized, and the nature of this theory is briefly sketched. Some recommendations for guided paradigm change are offered.     

A physical critique of physical causation

The conserved quantities theory of causation (CQTC) attempts to use physics as the basis for an account of causation. However, a closer examination of the physics involved in CQTC reveals several critical failures. Some of the conserved quantities in physics cannot be used to distinguish causal interactions. Other conserved quantities cannot always be the properties of fields or particles. Finally, CQCT does not account for causal interactions that are static. I would like to thank Fred Kronz, Cory Juhl, Joshua Dever, and two anonymous referees for their many helpful suggestions and comments.     

中国古代心理思想中的感应观念

与主流心理学所采用的机械因果观念不同的是,中国古代心理思想所采用的是类似于现代物理学“场”概念的感应观念。其特征是：注重整体性、远距作用及象征意义。感应以关系为核心,具有主体间性、创造性、象征性。受感应观念影响,中国古代心理思想认为可以通过修养工夫恢复人心的本来状态,道家关心如何对来感者作出回应,儒家则重视以真诚的感唤起对方的应。在实践方面,人际交往之对等回报原则、与理想人格相感通的诠释途径、“德政”的治国理念、教学相长的教育方法、培养感性以承担责任的道德发展观,都体现了感应观念。感应观与因果观形成互补关系,可扩大心理学的视野,在异化的世界里恢复生命的意义感     

POLANYI ON TELEOLOGY: ARESPONSETO JOHN APCZYNSKI AND RICHARD GELWICK

Abstract. Michael Polanyi criticized the neo‐Darwinian synthesis on two grounds: that accidental hereditary changes bringing adaptive advantages cannot account for the rise of discontinuous new species, and that a Ideological ordering principle is needed to explain evolutionary advance. I commend the previous articles by John Apczynski and Richard Gelwick and also argue, more strongly than they, that Polanyi's critique of evolutionary theory is flawed. It relies on an inappropriate notion of progress and untenable analogies from the human process of scientific discovery and the fact that in physical systems minimal potential energy is most stable. Yet within a life of commitment to transcendent values humans can directly experience purpose and meaning, and in developing this notion Polanyi makes his greatest contribution to teleology.     

Reference-related inhibition produces enhanced position discrimination and fast repulsion near axes of symmetry

Models proposed to account for reference frame effects in spatial cognition often account for performance in some tasks well, but fail to generalize to other tasks. Here, we demonstrate that a new process account of spatial working memory--the dynamic field theory (DFT)--can bridge the gap between perceptual and memory processes in position discrimination and spatial recall, highlighting that the processes underlying spatial recall also operate in position discrimination. In six experiments, we tested two novel predictions of the DFT: first, that discrimination is enhanced near symmetry axes, especially when the perceptual salience of the axis is increased; and second, that performance far from a reference axis depends on the direction in which the second stimulus is presented. The DFT also predicts the magnitude of this direction-dependent modulation. These effects arise from reference-related inhibition in the theory. We discuss how the processes captured by the DFT relate to existing psychophysical models and operate across a diverse array of spatial tasks.     

Patterns of argumentation in Galileo's Discorsi

In this contribution I intend to reconstruct and evaluate one of Galileo's famous arguments given in the Discorsi against a well‐entrenched thesis of Aristotelian physics. It will be shown that Galileo's reduction‐to‐the‐absurd type of counterargument is, although seemingly cogent, after all fallacious. I ascribe Galileo's committing of this fallacy to his looking at the Aristotelian physics through the (Kuhnian type) paradigmatic “spectacles” of his own new physics.     

Do Subtle Linguistic Interventions Priming a Social Identity as a Voter Have Outsized Effects on Voter Turnout? Evidence From a New Replication Experiment

An ongoing debate in political psychology is about whether small wording differences have outsized behavioral effects. A leading example is whether subtle linguistic cues embedded in voter mobilization messages dramatically increase turnout. An initial study analyzing two small‐scale field experiments argued that describing someone as a voter (noun) instead of one who votes (verb) increases turnout rates 11 to 14 points because the noun activates a person's social identity as a voter. A subsequent study analyzing a large‐scale field experiment challenged this claim and found no effect. But questions about the initial claim's domain of applicability persist. The subsequent study may not have reproduced the conditions necessary for the psychological phenomenon to occur, specifically the electoral contexts were not competitive or important enough for the social identity to matter. To address the first of these critiques, as well as other potential explanations for different results between the first two studies, we conduct a large‐scale replication field experiment. We find no evidence that this minor wording change increases turnout levels. This research provides new evidence that the strategy of invoking the self does not appear to consistently increase turnout and calls into question whether subtle linguistic cues have outsized behavioral effects.     

Theory Reduction by Means of Functional Sub‐types

The paper sets out a new strategy for theory reduction by means of functional sub‐types. This strategy is intended to get around the multiple realization objection. We use Kim's argument for token identity (ontological reductionism) based on the causal exclusion problem as starting point. We then extend ontological reductionism to epistemological reductionism (theory reduction). We show how one can distinguish within any functional type between functional sub‐types. Each of these sub‐types is coextensive with one type of realizer. By this means, a conservative theory reduction is in principle possible, despite multiple realization. We link this account with Nagelian reduction, as well as with Kim's functional reduction.     

Pragmatic Unification, Observation and Realism in Astroparticle Physics

Astroparticle physics is a recent sub-discipline of physics that emerged from early cosmic ray studies, astrophysics, and particle physics. Its theoretical foundations range from quantum field theory to general relativity, but the underlying “standard models” of cosmology and particle physics are far from being unified. The paper explores the pragmatic strategies employed in astroparticle physics in order to unify a disunified research field, the concept of observation involved in these strategies, and their relations to scientific realism.