Thinking about decisions: An integrative approach of person and task factors

Decisions vary. They may vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An important way that people vary is how much they think. Some prior research investigating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking more about the alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However, some research indicates that thinking more may also lead to focusing on irrelevant aspects of the decision and a less optimal outcome. We propose that this conflict in the literature exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the individual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1, we selected people who were especially high or low in need for cognition and had them complete a robust decision-making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study 2, we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies provide insight for understanding our central tenant that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but does not influence simple decisions. These findings show how the individual's thinking can interact with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice.     

The Role of Temporal and Spatial Information Cues in Locating Missing Persons

Prospective person memory refers to the search for a missing or wanted person. Performance on prospective person memory tasks has been found to be poor in field‐based experiments. Prior research suggests that the size of the search space may influence success on prospective person memory tasks. In the present research, we gave participants randomly assigned temporal and spatial cues about a mock missing person's whereabouts. Participants were offered a monetary reward for accurately reporting seeing the missing person. Participants who were told the missing person would appear in the building, where they were, had higher expectations of encountering the missing person and made more sightings than participants told the missing person would appear on the university campus. Expectations of encounter predicted participants' intent to look for the missing person, which predicted actual looking behavior, which ultimately predicted accurate sightings.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Perceived Consensus on Selective Reinforcement of Other People's Stated Opinions

Three studies tested whether perceived consensus affects selective reinforcement of other people's stated opinions on important social issues. Participants who perceived relatively high consensus for their opinions were more likely than participants who perceived low consensus to reward another person's agreeing statements more than the person's disagreeing statements about gun control (Study 1) and to prolong interrogating another student about abortion (Study 2). In Study 3, participants who were told they were in a two-thirds majority regarding gay scout troop leaders were more likely than participants who were told they were in a one-third minority to practice selective reinforcement. The results have implications for settings in which interrogators believe they can exercise power over the person who is being questioned.     

Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim.     

Look into my eyes: Gaze direction and person memory

The current research considered the effects of gaze direction on a fundamental aspect of social cogition: person memory. It was anticipated that a person's direction of gaze (i.e., direct or averted) would impact his or her subsequent memorability, such that recognition would be enhanced for targets previously displaying direct gaze. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with faces displaying either direct or averted gaze in a person‐classification (i.e., conceptual) task. Then, in a surprise memory test, they were required to report whether a presented face had been seen before. As expected, a recognition advantage was observed for targets displaying direct gaze during the initial classification task. This finding was replicated and extended in a second experiment in which participants initially reported the spatial location (i.e., perceptual task) of each face. We consider the implications of these findings for basic aspects of social‐cognitive functioning and person perception.     

Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control,the Person-Positivity Bias,and Unrealistic Optimism1

People typically attribute lower health risks to themselves than to others, a phenomenon referred to as unrealistic optimism. The present study tested the person positivity bias as a previously unexamined explanation of the phenomenon and analyzed the relationship between unrealistic optimism and expectations of control. High-school students estimated their own and one of three other persons’(the average student's, a randomly chosen student's, or their best same-sex friend's) chances of getting health problems. They also filled out questionnaires measuring locus of control and health-protective behavior. In contrast with the person positivity explanation, unrealistic optimism was not restricted to the “average other” condition. However, unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects with a more internal locus of control than in subjects with a rather external locus of control. An unpredicted effect of estimation order was observed: Unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects who estimated the comparison person's risks first than in subjects who started with own risks. This effect can be understood in terms of Codol's observation that people perceive others as more similar to themselves than they themselves are to others.     

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are emotions that can be experienced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a decision. Previous research suggests that both emotions are related to the process of counterfactual thinking. The present research extends this idea by combining it with ideas from regret and disappointment theory. The results show that regret is related to behavior-focused counterfactual thought in which the decision-maker's own actions are changed, whereas disappointment is related to situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of the situation are changed. In Study 1 participants (N= 130) were asked to recall an autobiographical episode of either a regretful or a disappointing event. When asked to undo this event, regret participants predominantly changed their own actions, whereas disappointment participants predominantly changed aspects of the situation. In Study 2 all participants (N= 50) read a scenario in which a person experiences a negative event. Participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing the person's actions reported more regret than disappointment, while participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing aspects of the situation reported more disappointment than regret. Study 3 (N= 140) replicated the findings from Study 2 with a different scenario, and a design in which regret and disappointment were measured between rather than within subjects. In the discussion we address the relation among counterfactual thinking, attributions and affective reactions to decision outcomes, and the implications for decision research.     

Not afraid to trust you: Trustworthiness moderates gaze cueing but not in highly anxious participants

Gaze cueing (i.e., the shifting of person B's attention by following person A's gaze) is closely linked with human interaction and learning. To make the most of this connection, researchers need to investigate possible moderators enhancing or reducing the extent of this attentional shifting. In this study we used a gaze cueing paradigm to demonstrate that the perceived trustworthiness of a cueing person constitutes such a moderator for female participants. Our results show a significant interaction between perceived trustworthiness and the response time trade-off between valid and invalid gaze cues [gaze cueing effect (GCE)], as manifested in greater following of a person's gaze if this person was trustworthy as opposed to the following of an untrustworthy person's gaze. An additional exploratory analysis showed potentially moderating influences of trait-anxiety on this interaction (p = .057). The affective background of the experiment (i.e., using positive or negative target stimuli) had no influence.     

Inferring Learners' Knowledge From Their Actions

Watching another person take actions to complete a goal and making inferences about that person's knowledge is a relatively natural task for people. This ability can be especially important in educational settings, where the inferences can be used for assessment, diagnosing misconceptions, and providing informative feedback. In this paper, we develop a general framework for automatically making such inferences based on observed actions; this framework is particularly relevant for inferring student knowledge in educational games and other interactive virtual environments. Our approach relies on modeling action planning: We formalize the problem as a Markov decision process in which one must choose what actions to take to complete a goal, where choices will be dependent on one's beliefs about how actions affect the environment. We use a variation of inverse reinforcement learning to infer these beliefs. Through two lab experiments, we show that this model can recover people's beliefs in a simple environment, with accuracy comparable to that of human observers. We then demonstrate that the model can be used to provide real‐time feedback and to model data from an existing educational game.     

Intuitive Conceptions of Dead Persons' Mentality: A Cross-Cultural Replication and More

Jesse Bering (2002) investigated how American university students in an interview task conceived of dead persons' mentality immediately after death. He found that different categories of mental states or capacities were conceived differently: psychobiological and perceptual states ceased, whereas emotional, desire, and epistemic states continued. Our Study 1 was a replication of Bering's experiment in a different cultural setting, in which the subjects were Chinese undergraduate students. A similar pattern of results was found. In Study 2, instead of being asked about a dead person's various mental states immediately following the death, participants were asked to judge a dead person's mental states after the person had been dead for 2 days. The overall pattern of participants' responses was not affected by this manipulation, but they did show an increase in attributions of certain mental states to dead agnostics. In addition, a more refined breakdown of responses revealed that individuals tended to judge that, upon death, visual and auditory perception continued, whereas olfactory and gustatory sensation ceased.     

Power and perceived influence: I caused your behavior,but I'm not responsible for it

There are numerous examples of powerful people denying responsibility for others' (mis)conduct in which they played—and acknowledge playing—a causal role. The current article seeks to explain this conundrum by examining the difference between, and powerful people's beliefs about, causality and responsibility. Research has shown power to have numerous psychological consequences. Some of these consequences, such as overconfidence, are likely to increase an individual's belief that he or she caused another person's behavior. However, others, such as decreased perspective‐taking, are likely to decrease an individual's belief that he or she was responsible for another person's behavior. In combination, these psychological consequences of power may lead powerful people to believe that they instigated another's behavior while simultaneously believing that the other person could have chosen to do otherwise. The dissociation between these two attributions may help to explain why people in positions of power often deny responsibility for others' behavior—unethical or otherwise—that they undeniably caused.     

Olfactory Comfort and Attachment Within Relationships

We replicated a previous study that found that men and women often smell their sexual partners' clothing when they are apart ( McBurney, Shoup, & Streeter, 2006 ). We found that women tend to perform this behavior across a broader range of relationships than do men. We asked 128 participants if they had ever intentionally smelled another person's clothing, slept with another person's clothing because of its smell, or given another person an article of their own clothing. The most common response was a romantic partner's clothing. However, women more often than men reported smelling the clothing of family members.     

Sign on the Dotted Line: The Informed Consent Process (ICP) as Induced Compliance1

We investigated the social implications of signing an informed consent form (ICF) on participant behavior. ICF research fails to consider that the decision to participate in research is a process that occurs in a social and cultural context. Understanding the meaning of giving consent in this social context is critical. In separate experiments, we found significantly greater agreement to return to complete a study and persistence at a task in participants who signed the ICF versus those who did not. Signing the ICF may be putting participants at risk of induced compliance with study protocols, rather than empowering them to withhold consent or withdraw. Future research should investigate the psychosocial factors affecting participants' decision making in the informed consent process.     

He is smarter when he looks smart in front of many versus a few others: Impact of audience size on target appraisals in a cross-cultural context

Will a person be seen as more superior if he or she receives an award in front of a large audience in comparison with a small audience? We predicted that this would hold true for East Asians, whose cultural logic of face asserts that a person's worth can only be conferred by collective others, but would not hold true for European Americans, whose cultural logic of dignity promotes the judgement of a person's worth based on their own perspective. This study found an audience-size effect for East Asians, in which participants gave higher appraisals to a target when they imagined the target's high performance to have been seen by 10 other people (vs. one other person) even when the target's performance level remained constant. In contrast, Westerners were not affected by the size of the audience witnessing the target's performance. In addition, perceived social reputation was found to mediate the audience-size effect; the participants imagining the target performing well in front of 10 others (vs. one other) perceived others as thinking more highly of the target; this in turn led participants to give higher appraisals to the target. As expected, this mediation effect was only found for East Asians.     

Social Beliefs and Visual Attention: How the Social Relevance of a Cue Influences Spatial Orienting

We are highly tuned to each other's visual attention. Perceiving the eye or hand movements of another person can influence the timing of a saccade or the reach of our own. However, the explanation for such spatial orienting in interpersonal contexts remains disputed. Is it due to the social appearance of the cue—a hand or an eye—or due to its social relevance—a cue that is connected to another person with attentional and intentional states? We developed an interpersonal version of the Posner spatial cueing paradigm. Participants saw a cue and detected a target at the same or a different location, while interacting with an unseen partner. Participants were led to believe that the cue was either connected to the gaze location of their partner or was generated randomly by a computer (Experiment 1), and that their partner had higher or lower social rank while engaged in the same or a different task (Experiment 2). We found that spatial cue‐target compatibility effects were greater when the cue related to a partner's gaze. This effect was amplified by the partner's social rank, but only when participants believed their partner was engaged in the same task. Taken together, this is strong evidence in support of the idea that spatial orienting is interpersonally attuned to the social relevance of the cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who this person is, and what this person is doing—and does not exclusively rely on the social appearance of the cue. Visual attention is not only guided by the physical salience of one's environment but also by the mental representation of its social relevance.     

The effects of collaboration and punishment on prospective memory performance in a group setting

Remembering to perform a delayed intention is termed prospective memory (PM). Often delayed intentions are shared by more than one person; however, there is a dearth of studies examining PM in social settings. We aimed to investigate whether the potential consequences of one's behavior across diverse group settings influence PM performance in event‐ and time‐based tasks. A total of 207 participants were randomly allocated to either an individual, collaborative, or collaborative plus penalty motivation condition and were tested in a 2‐ or 3‐person setting. For the time‐based PM task, participants responded less timely in the individual motivation condition, whereas there was no difference between the collaborative motivation conditions. No significant effects were found for motivation condition on the event‐based task or for group size on PM performance. Analyses of ongoing task performance revealed that participants' attention allocation policies change depending on how individuals prioritize the ongoing and PM tasks.     

Is the Lateralized Categorical Perception of Color a Situational Effect of Language on Color Perception?

This study investigated whether and how a person's varied series of lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors affect his or her perception of colors. In three experiments, Chinese participants were primed to categorize four graduated colors—specifically dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue—into green and blue; light color and dark color; and dark green, light green, light blue, and dark blue. The participants were then required to complete a visual search task. Reaction times in the visual search task indicated that different lateralized categorical perceptions (CPs) of color corresponded to the various priming situations. These results suggest that all of the lexical categories corresponding to different discriminatory characteristics of the same colors can influence people's perceptions of colors and that color perceptions can be influenced differently by distinct types of lexical categories depending on the context.