Mental Health and Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach,edited by Arnold M. Rose

This paper presents a model of group analysis based on Aristotle's causal notions. Aristotle's concept of man as a social animal provides a philosophical rationale for an interpersonal treatment forum. His causal theory supplies an encompassing atheoretical model for examining, understanding, and changing “things which have in themselves the source of their changing or staying unchanged.”

Attention to the four causal foci is suggested as the basis for a full-ranging group analysis. Material cause examines: “what” makes a thing what it is. Efficient cause investigates “how” various behaviors and emotions are set in motion. Final cause searches out “where” behavior is aimed. Formal cause traces “why” behaviors take particular forms.

It is suggested that a “cause for pause,” in the ongoing group process, is the emergence of a powerful and specifiable trend, whether a transference, poignant interaction, or groupwide conflict. The “pause to cause” is examined in detail, as each causal foci is elaborated. A sequential analysis moving from “what > how > where > why” is suggested at three levels of possible intervention: individual, interpersonal, and group as a whole. In conclusion, the timing, advantages, and restrictions of such a causal approach are considered.     

Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation

According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by someone. It must have mineness built into it if it is to feel a particular way. The question I take up in this paper asks how mineness might have arisen out of processes of free energy minimisation, given that many systems that keep themselves alive lack mineness. The hypothesis I develop in this paper is that the life of an organism can be seen as an inferential process. Every living system embodies a probability distribution conditioned on a model of the sensory, physiological, and morphological states that are highly probably given the life it leads and the niche it inhabits. I argue for an ecological and enactive interpretation of free energy. I show how once the life of an organism reaches a certain level of complexity mineness emerges as an intrinsic part of the process of life itself.

     

A Century of Psychoanalysis: Critical Retrospect and Prospect

Abstract

The distinction between having mode and being mode would seem to be the basis of the Frommian clinical approach, which finds its main application in the “center-to-center” relatedness between analyst and patient. The analyst can understand the patient because he/she experiences what the patient experiences. The dialogue is based on emotional and conceptual responses and reactions which are reciprocally communicated; both identities come into play. Psychoanalytic treatment which is not inspired by biophilia can only compile an inventory of data upon data, imposing interpretations and reconstructions. Biophilia makes psychoanalysis an art because it is applied to living things. The psychoanalytic session can save itself from the having mode by addressing the patient's living memory, which represents the past relived in the present, according to the being mode. The author comments on a psychoanalytic session.     

Beyond the Tools of the Trade: Heidegger and the Intelligibility of Everyday Things

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self‐understandings (such as being a gardener, shoemaker, teacher, mother, musician, or philosopher). In this paper, I argue that while such practical self‐understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self‐understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self‐understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility‐constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self‐understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity.     

Celestial Aesthetics: Over Our Heads and/or in Our Heads

I am the daughter of earth and water,

And the nursling of the sky.

Percy Bysshe Shelley, “The Cloud,” 1820

Abstract Looking at the night sky, we may seem cosmic dwarfs, overwhelmed with a sense of otherness, abyss, lostness. But humans alone enjoy such celestial awe. We can move to a sense of the beholder's celestial ancestry and ongoing relatedness in “our cosmic habitat.” That account joins aesthetics with mathematics, finds dramatic interrelationships gathered under “the anthropic principle,” and considers meteorological aesthetics. The wonder is as much this Homo sapiens with mind enough to search the universe. What is out there is inseparably linked with what is down here. We are at home in the universe. The glory is both over our heads and in our heads.     

Learning to spell from reading: General knowledge about spelling patterns influences memory for specific words

Adults often learn to spell words during the course of reading for meaning, without intending to do so. We used an incidental learning task in order to study this process. Spellings that contained double n, r and t which are common doublets in French, were learned more readily by French university students than spellings that contained less common but still legal doublets. When recalling or recognizing the latter, the students sometimes made transposition errors, doubling a consonant that often doubles in French rather than the consonant that was originally doubled (e.g., tiddunar recalled as tidunnar). The results, found in three experiments using different nonwords and different types of instructions, show that people use general knowledge about the graphotactic patterns of their writing system together with word-specific knowledge to reconstruct spellings that they learn from reading. These processes contribute to failures and successes in memory for spellings, as in other domains.     

Quantum information in an evolutionary perspective

An approach to quantum phenomena is reviewed that deals with the possibility of their realistic interpretation in the sense that they represent manifestations of hermeneutic circles between quantum “objects” and their experimental boundary conditions. Quantum cybernetics provides an evolutionary perspective in that all higher‐level organizations like molecules, cells, living systems, etc., can be discussed under one and the same systemic viewpoint: a hermeneutic circularity between a “core” (or “nucleus") and a relevant “periphery” (or “environment") which constitutes the systems’ organization and information potential.

Generally, in realistic theories, an individual quantum system is analyzable into a local “particle‐like” nonlinearity of a generally nonlocal “wave‐like” mode of some sub‐quantum structure of the vacuum ("Dirac ether"). In this view, a “particle” can be considered as being “guided” along one specific route by the (generally nonlocal) configurations of superimposed waves, which spread along all possible paths of an experimental setup. Moreover, in the approach of Quantum Cybernetics, an additional focus is given on the fact that the energy and momentum of a particle also determine the wave behavior. Thus, “waves” and “particles” are mutually and self‐consistently defined, and Quantum Cybernetics puts particular emphasis on the circular relationship—mediated by plane waves—between a quantum system and its macroscopically defined boundary conditions.     

The Place of Earth in Lutheran Funeral Rites: Mapping the Current Terrain

Do funeral rites help Christians leave the earth or return to the earth? This article identifies the conceptual metaphors by which the funeral rites in Evangelical Lutheran Worship ¹ portray earth. All of the conceptual metaphors related to earth in the rites identified by this essay are at least compatible with an overarching image of journey, and most of the conceptual metaphors are directly structured by the journey image. While these conceptual metaphors can be understood as mapping a journey that seeks to abandon the earth for an otherworldly heaven, a number of tensions within the metaphors challenge this trajectory with an earthward goal of resting in the fruitful, living earth. The article concludes by briefly identifying some ecotheologically promising synergies between some of the biblical‐theological images and the emerging practices of conservation burial. ²      

Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?

There are some things that we think are intrinsically valuable, or valuable for their own sake. Is consciousness—subjective, qualitative experience—one of those things? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness is intrinsically valuable. According to a positive theorist, consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. The secondary purpose is to show why the neutral view is attractive and why certain arguments for the positive view do not work.

     

The Dr. John Hall story: a case study in putative “Haunted People Syndrome”

ABSTRACT

Research suggests a “Haunted People Syndrome (HP-S)” defined by recurrent and systematic perceptions of anomalous subjective and objective anomalies. Such signs or symptoms are traditionally attributed to “spirits and the supernatural,” but these themes are hypothesised to morph to “surveillance and stalking” in reports of “group-(or gang) stalking,” We tested this premise with a quali-quantitative exercise that mapped group-stalking experiences from a published first-hand account to a Rasch measure of haunt-type anomalies. This comparison found significant agreement in the specific “signs or symptoms” of both phenomena. Meta-patterns likewise showed clear conceptual similarities between the phenomenology of haunts and group-stalking. Findings are consistent with the idea that both anomalous episodes involve the same, or similar, attentional or perceptual processes and thereby support the viability of the HP-S construct.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

Teleology for the Perplexed: How Matter Began to Matter

Lacking a plausible model for the emergence of telos (purposive, representational, and evaluative relationships, as in life and consciousness) from simple material and energetic processes, the sciences operate as though all teleological relationships are physically epiphenomenal. Alternatively, in religion and the humanities it is assumed either that telos influences the material world from an outside or transcendental source or that it is a fundamental and ineffable property of things. We argue that a scientifically sound and intuitively plausible model for the physical emergence of teleological dynamics is now realizable. A methodology for formulating such a model and an exemplar case—the autocell—are presented. An autocell is an autocatalytic set of molecules that produce one another and also produce molecules that spontaneously accrete to form a hollow container, analogous to the way virus capsules form. The molecular capsules that result will spontaneously enclose some of the nearby molecules of the autocatalytic set, keeping them together so that when the autocell is broken open autocatalysis will resume. Autocells are thus self-reconstituting, self-reproducing, and minimally evolvable. They are not living and yet have necessary precursor attributes to telos, including individuality, functional interdependence of parts, end-directedness, a minimal form of representation, and a normative (evaluational) relationship to different environmental properties. The autocell thus serves as a missing link between inanimate (nonlife) and animate (living) phenomena. We conclude by discussing the challenges that a natural origin for telos poses for religious thought.     

ON WHAT THERE IS

Abstract: This paper programmatically outlines a case for “nominalism”. If brown and colored are so related logically that being colored is nothing over and above being brown, then whatever “exists”other than concreta is nothing over and above concreta. Possibilities of rain and “universals” like the shape, circularity (= the logical possibility of being so shaped), lack “existence” in another sense. (“There are things that don't exist” shows that ‘there are’ is used even more broadly than ‘there exist’.) The univocity of ‘exist’ is disproved by “A prime number between 6 and 10 exists” being analytic despite the invalidity of ontological arguments.     

From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent

There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.

     

On a Pedestal—Sport as an Arena for Admiration

ABSTRACT

In philosophical analyses of the value of sport, a relatively unheralded feature is the opportunity that sport offers for admiration. While we readily salute many of the things that people admire (the amazing catch, the sensational comeback), we do not sufficiently appreciate that admiration itself is a positive good that is beneficial to the admirer. At a time when much in the world around us seems distinctly unadmirable and when admiration itself is often dismissed as naïve, athletic achievements and the qualities that propel them present palpable counter-evidence to our darker conclusions. Shining a spotlight on sports’ displays of human beings doing difficult things can pay healthy dividends, as admiration fuels aspiration.

The paper proceeds in four stages. It first explains what admiration is and then identifies the kinds of things that sport distinctly offers, to admire. The heart of it demonstrates the value of athletic admiration, tracing how this contributes to a flourishing life in three principal ways: through the role-modeling that it offers, the action that it encourages and the feelings that it fosters. Finally, the paper considers four possible objections, which serves both to clarify and to fortify its central contention.     

What is a City?

Cities are mysteriously attractive. The more we get used to being citizens of the world, the more we feel the need to identify ourselves with a city. Moreover, this need seems in no way distressed by the fact that the urban landscape around us changes continuously: new buildings rise, new restaurants open, new stores, new parks, new infrastructures… Cities seem to vindicate Heraclitus’s dictum: you cannot step twice into the same river; you cannot walk twice through the same city. But, as with the river, we want and need to say that it is the same city we are walking through every day. It is always different, but numerically self-identical. How is that possible? What sort of mysterious thing is a city? The answer, I submit, is that cities aren’t things. They are processes. Like rivers, cities unfold in time just as they extend in space, by having different temporal parts for each time at which they exist. And walking though one part and then again through another is, literally, walking through the same whole.

     

New Concepts for a New Age: Information Service Organizations and Mental Information Work

Abstract

To describe and conceptualize new forms of work and organization a questionnaire survey in service organizations (n = 845), and a telephone survey among workers (n = 1168) were held. New concepts are introduced to identify the types of work and organization found, i.e. “Information Service Organization” (ISO) and “Mental Information Work” (MIW). ISOs are characterized by activities such as collecting, storing, and processing data; advising people; and informing people. They also make a lot of use of IT (computers, programs) and electronic network connections. Most ISOs appear to be traditional in terms of working hours and places of work. MIW is a form of knowledge work characterized by mental manipulations of information; IT is often used. Flexi-time is relatively frequent in MIW, but most people work on a fixed place of work.     

Impossible obligations and the non-identity problem

In a common example of the non-identity problem (NIP), a person (call her Wilma) deliberately conceives a child (call her Pebbles) who she knows will have incurable blindness but a life well worth living. Although Wilma’s decision seems wrong, it is difficult to say why. This paper develops and defends a version of the “indirect strategy” for solving the NIP. This strategy rests on the idea that it is wrong to deliberately make it impossible to fulfill an obligation; consequently, it is wrong for Wilma to create Pebbles because doing so makes it impossible to fulfill her obligation to protect her child from harms like blindness. A challenge for the indirect strategy is the well-known “rights waiver problem”: Since Pebbles’s very existence depends on Wilma’s having made herself unable to fulfill an obligation to Pebbles, Pebbles is likely to waive that obligation. I address this problem by recasting the indirect strategy in terms of a non-grievance evil. I argue that deliberately making it impossible to fulfill a moral obligation manifests a defective attitude toward morality—an attitude which sees moral obligations as things to be dodged whenever they are inconvenient. Next, I argue that acting on this attitude is a wrong-making feature that is independent of any wrong that might be done to Pebbles. I conclude that Wilma’s decision remains wrong even if Pebbles waives any objection to it.

     

Causation in the Phaedo

Abstract: In the Phaedo Socrates says that as a young man he thought it a great thing to know the causes of things; but finding existing accounts unsatisfying, he fell back on a method of his own, hypothesizing that Forms are causes. I argue that part of what this hypothesis says is that certain phenomena – the ones for which it postulates Forms as causes – are the result of processes whose object was to produce them. I then use this conclusion to explain how Socrates’ discussion of causality in the Phaedo might be supposed to contribute to his final argument for immortality.     

Morphic Fields

Formulation of a general model of evolution is presented which is based upon the recognition of the “biosocial” entity, that is the biosphere and human society, as a component‐system. It can be demonstrated that the interactions of the components (moleculas, cells, organisms, ecosystems in the biological realms and people, artifacts and ideas in the societies) have replicative organization. We suggest an explanation for the spontaneous emergence of replicative function and organization, a process called autogenesis. During autogenesis, hierarchical levels of replicative organization emerge and compartmentalization and convergence of replicative information occurs. Questions of the origin and evolution of life are discussed.

The replicative paradigm can also be applied to the processes of cultural evolution, in which complex replicative networks of people, ideas, and man‐made artifacts show all stages and phenomena of autogenesis. Finally, the present state of evolution of the whole global biosocial system is discussed.