Exploring the effects of similarity on mapping spatial relations

Solving a map task requires transferring information acquired in one spatial context to another context, an ability that marks an important step in cognitive development. This study investigated how preschoolers’ mapping performance was affected by the extent of similarity between spaces. Whereas prior work examined effects of similarity in tasks involving matching individual objects, our tasks required considering spatial relations among objects. We found that the accuracy of mapping between two spaces with somewhat different perceptual features was higher than the accuracy of mapping between spaces with identical features. Yet, a further increase in differences between the two spaces had a detrimental effect on mapping. The results suggest that some degree of similarity between spaces is beneficial to children’s ability to transfer relational information. However, when the spaces have the same surface features, it may draw children’s attention to individual objects and inhibit their ability to focus on common relations across contexts.     

加法运算中数学知识和语义知识的整合

采用语义启动数字匹配任务及其变式, 探讨在中文背景下“和效应”和语义系统的类比一致性及其产生机制。结果发现, 中国学生对“和”目标数字的反应时显著长于对中性目标数字, 表明“和效应”是人类的一种强烈的认知倾向; 人类通过类比映射方式整合数学知识和语义知识; 影响语义加工的因素同样影响数学认知。研究还发现, 被试对中性目标数字的抑制难度受语义匹配任务性质的影响, 在完成类别不一致的探测词匹配任务时, 拒绝中性目标数字的反应时显著长, “和效应”消失, 表明“和效应”不仅源自于对“和”目标数字的激活, 也源自于对中性目标数字的抑制。     

注意觉察系统：实现多任务环境下的人机交互

注意觉察系统是以认知心理学和认知工效学为理论基础设计的、能在多任务环境下帮助用户管理任务中断及转移的新型人机交互系统。本文概述了注意觉察系统的三大功能体系,研究现状,并对这种系统的未来发展趋势作了展望。     

Value systems for developmental cognitive robotics: A survey

This paper surveys value systems for developmental cognitive robotics. A value system permits a biological brain to increase the likelihood of neural responses to selected external phenomena. Many machine learning algorithms capture the essence of this learning process. However, computational value systems aim not only to support learning, but also autonomous attention focus to direct learning. This combination of unsupervised attention focus and learning aims to address the grand challenge of autonomous mental development for machines. This survey examines existing value systems for developmental cognitive robotics in this context. We examine the definitions of value used—including recent pioneering work in intrinsic motivation as value—as well as initialisation strategies for innate values, update strategies for acquired value and the data structures used for storing value. We examine the extent to which existing value systems support attention focus, learning and prediction in an unsupervised setting. The types of robots and applications in which these value systems are used are also examined, as well as the ways that these applications are evaluated. Finally, we study the strengths and limitations of current value systems for developmental cognitive robots and conclude with a set of research challenges for this field.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Substantive and procedural norms in normative multiagent systems

Procedural norms are instrumental norms addressed to agents playing a role in the normative system, for example to motivate these role playing agents to recognize violations or to apply sanctions. Procedural norms have first been discussed in law, where they address legal practitioners such as legislators, lawyers and policemen, but they are discussed now too in normative multiagent systems to motivate software agents. Procedural norms aim to achieve the social order specified using regulative norms like obligations and permissions, and constitutive norms like counts-as obligations. In this paper we formalize procedural, regulative and constitutive norms using input/output logic enriched with an agent ontology and an abstraction hierarchy. We show how our formalization explains Castelfranchi's notion of mutual empowerment, stating that not only the agents playing a role in a normative system are empowered by the normative system, but the normative system itself is also empowered by the agents playing a role in it. In our terminology, the agents are not only institutionally empowered, but they are also delegated normative goals from the system. Together, institutional empowerment and normative goal delegation constitute a mechanism which we call delegation of power, where agents acting on behalf of the normative system become in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts.     

Reasoning under Scarcity

Practical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role that an agent's context can play in so-called ‘failures’ of rationality. In this paper, I use recent cognitive science research investigating the effects of resource-scarcity on decision-making and cognitive function to argue that context plays an important role in determining which norms should structure an agent's deliberation. This evidence undermines the view that the norms of ‘ideal’ rationality are necessary and universal requirements on deliberation. They are a solution to the problems faced by cognitively limited agents in a context of moderate scarcity. In a context of severe scarcity, the problems faced by cognitively limited agents are different and require deliberation structured by different norms. Agents reason rationally when they use the norms best suited to their context and cognitive capacities.     

Cognitive mapping approach analyzing societal decision‐making

Cognitive mapping (CM) approach is reviewed, and the method is applied in analyzing an important case of societal decision‐making. It is shown that CM is an effective way of representing argumentation, consequences, and the linkage between the concepts. The method integrates causal modelling and rational choice theory with parts of cognitive psychology. CM allows for a systematic arguing of issues. The decision‐making problem described here concerns building a new nuclear power plant in Finland. There occurred strong proponents representing mainly the industry and technocratic and engineering experts, and an equally strong resistance represented by ordinary citizens, parliamentarians, and experts. The argumentation went ten years pro and cons before the parliament in 1993 decided against building the proposed nuclear power plant. It gives an ideal case to study the argumentation and contradictions there in as a whole by developing and applying a cognitive mapping approach.     

抑制控制在类比映射发展中的作用:认知负荷的影响

本研究采用负启动范式,设置不同的认知负荷任务,探究抑制控制在儿童和成人类比映射中的作用。实验一中,31名7岁儿童、33名10岁儿童和34名成人完成高认知负荷的相对大小类比映射的负启动任务。结果表明,所有群体均出现负启动效应,且负启动效应随年龄增长而减小。实验二中,30名7岁儿童、30名10岁儿童和32名成人完成低认知负荷的相对大小类比映射的负启动任务。结果表明,所有群体均出现负启动效应,但负启动效应无显著年龄差异。本研究的结果揭示了抑制控制和认知负荷在类比映射发展中的重要作用。     

Discovery in complex adaptive systems

The distinction between ontological ground-truth phenomena and epistemic measurements of those phenomena is discussed and analyzed in the context of complex cognitive systems research. A common style of computational simulation is identified as a Dissect-the-Simulation motif. In this style, a model of cognition is designed and when it generally mimics some cognitive behavior, its own ontic processes (which are fully accessible because it is a simulation) are proposed as potential ontic processes inside actual human cognition. I propose here a second style of modeling, which might be called Measure-the-Simulation. In this style, simulated versions of coarse-grained epistemic measurements are performed on the model with the intent of discovering how those epistemic measurements themselves may transform the actual ontic data, and thus induce a variety of mis-categorizations of phenomena. When our epistemic measurements are better understood, such mis-categorizations can perhaps be avoided. As a proof of concept, Conway’s Game of Life is analyzed and measured with two different types of coarse-grained epistemic measures. Dramatic differences are identified in how a binary coarse-graining, versus a graded coarse-graining, transforms the discovery process for activity patterns on the lattice of this cellular automaton.     

杏仁复合体损毁对大鼠空间认知能力的影响

杏仁复合体损毁大鼠Ｍｏｒｒｉｓ迷宫作业学习成绩显著低于控制组,记忆成绩较显著低于控制组。其搜索目标时主要采用与控制组的图式策略相异的趋向式策略。策略差异提示：杏仁复合体参与大鼠空间认知的辅助加工。     

The enactive computational basis of cognition and the explanatory cognitive basis for computing

The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.     

The Power of 2: How an Apparently Irregular Numeration System Facilitates Mental Arithmetic

Mangarevan traditionally contained two numeration systems: a general one, which was highly regular, decimal, and extraordinarily extensive; and a specific one, which was restricted to specific objects, based on diverging counting units, and interspersed with binary steps. While most of these characteristics are shared by numeration systems in related languages in Oceania, the binary steps are unique. To account for these characteristics, this article draws on—and tries to integrate—insights from anthropology, archeology, linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science more generally. The analysis of mental arithmetic with these systems reveals that both types of systems entailed cognitive advantages and served important functions in the cultural context of their application. How these findings speak to more general questions revolving around the theoretical models and evolutionary trajectory of numerical cognition will be discussed in the 6 .     

What's in a flag? Subliminal exposure to New Zealand national symbols and the automatic activation of egalitarian versus dominance values

Three experiments tested whether the subliminal presentation of national symbols automatically elicited societally prescribed normative values in the New Zealand (NZ) context using a lexical decision task. Consistent with research in the United States, the presentation of the NZ flag (Study 1), but not another consensually validated NZ national symbol (The Silver Fern, Study 2), increased the cognitive accessibility of egalitarian value concepts. The NZ flag did not, however, activate values in a comparable sample of foreign nationals (Study 3). National flags, it seems, automatically activate normative values for ingroup members, and this effect is not limited to nations with a high frequency of flag-display behavior such as the United States.     

Intuitive mapping between nonsymbolic quantity and observed action across development

Adults’ concurrent processing of numerical and action information yields bidirectional interference effects consistent with a cognitive link between these two systems of representation. This link is in place early in life: infants create expectations of congruency across numerical and action-related stimuli (i.e., a small [large] hand aperture associated with a smaller [larger] numerosity). Although these studies point to a developmental continuity of this mapping, little is known about the later development and thus how experience shapes such relationships. We explored how number–action intuitions develop across early and later childhood using the same methodology as in adults. We asked 3-, 6-, and 8-year-old children, as well as adults, to relate the magnitude of an observed action (a static hand shape, open vs. closed, in Experiment 1; a dynamic hand movement, opening vs. closing, in Experiment 2) to either a small or large nonsymbolic quantity (numerosity in Experiment 1 and numerosity and/or object size in Experiment 2). From 6 years of age, children started performing in a systematic congruent way in some conditions, but only 8-year-olds (added in Experiment 2) and adults performed reliably above chance in this task. We provide initial evidence that early intuitions guiding infants’ mapping between magnitude across nonsymbolic number and observed action are used in an explicit way only from late childhood, with a mapping between action and size possibly being the most intuitive. An initial coarse mapping between number and action is likely modulated with extensive experience with grasping and related actions directed to both arrays and individual objects.     

Are Asian cultures really less ageist than Western ones? It depends on the questions asked

Ageism is an increasing concern in ageing populations such as Asia and Europe. A prevalent assumption in psychology is that Eastern cultures may be less prone to ageism because of norms and values that honour and respect elders. Yet, evidence for this culture hypothesis is inconclusive. The current study examines this issue by comparing attitudes towards older people in an Eastern and Western samples of 184 young people from the UK and 249 from Taiwan. Attitudes to old age were measured both as meta‐perceptions (the perceived normative context) and personal attitudes in regard to the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of ageism. Consistent with the culture hypothesis, meta‐perceptions about competence and admiration were more positive in Taiwan than in the UK, yet other meta‐perceptions were more negative pointing to the existence of old age subtypes. Personal attitudes about older people in regard to the affective and behavioural, but not the cognitive component, were more negative in Taiwan than in the UK. Thus, cultural differences in ageism are more nuanced than suggested by previous research. The importance of distinguishing between the normative context and personal attitudes as well as the different components of ageism is highlighted by the present findings.     

Older but wilier: In-group accountability and the development of subjective group dynamics

To test social and cognitive variables that may affect the development of subjective group dynamics, the authors had 224 children between the ages of 5 and 12 years evaluate an in-group and an out-group and normative and deviant in-group members under conditions of high or low accountability to in-group peers. In-group bias and relative favorability to normative versus deviant in-group members (differential evaluation) increased when children were accountable to peers and as a function of perceptions of peer group acceptance of these members (differential inclusion). These effects were significantly larger among older children. Multiple classification ability was unrelated to judgments of group members. This study shows that the development of subjective group dynamics involves an increase in sensitivity to the normative aspects of the intergroup context.     

Cognitive maps and the energy‐culture interaction

This analysis considers the link between energy alternatives and cultural attitudes through the postulation of individual and collective energy‐related cognitive maps. The relationship between energy and society is described through the systems approach of General Evolution Theory. The need for cognitive maps is assessed in relation to contemporary global socio‐cultural dynamics. The concept of such maps is explicated and its implication for energy policy formulation is suggested. Finally, the first phase of a research agenda for mapping society's energy‐related cognitive maps through a systems history perspective is presented and discussed.     

Professional Autonomy in the Health Care System

Professional autonomy interferes at a structural level with the variousaspects of the health care system. The health care systems that can bedistinguished all feature a specific design of professional autonomy,but experience their own governance problems. Empirical health caresystems in the West are a nationally coloured blend of ideal type healthcare systems. From a normative perspective, the optimal health caresystem should consist of elements of all the ideal types. A workableoptimum taking national values into account could be attained bygovernance structures that also introduce elements from other ideal typesystems. Thus a normative approach to medical practice guaranteeing anessential degree of professional autonomy for a relationship of trustbetween the patient and the physician, could be combined with anefficient and equitable allocation of health care resources.