告别迷信愚昧 走向科学文明

迷信,是人类对自然界及自身缺乏正确认识的结果。它是人类认识过程和社会发展过程中的一个阶段,本身不足为怪。但在阶级社会就复杂化了,     

Modern civilization: Its demise Rubin Gotesky

This paper presented during the Physis: Inhabiting the Earth conference, Florence, Italy, October 28–31,1986 examines how new brain research, by radically expanding our knowledge of the physiological foundation for empirical social science, makes possible a new understanding of the nature of higher mind and the place of the human being in evolution. It reports research supporting a model of right, left and frontal brain interaction in forecasting. It also describes development of measures and methods indicating a primarily frontal brain guidance system for higher mind consisting of futures, systems, social, moral, and managerial sensitivities. Driving and shaping this guidance system, and thereby human cultural evolution, appears to be the function of our dialectical construction of the Image of the Future.     

Local knowledge and comparative scientific traditions

This article argues that all knowledge is inherently local and that localness provides the basis for comparison between indigenous scientific traditions or knowledge production systems. As collective bodies of knowledge, many of the significant differences between knowledge production systems lie in the work involved in creating assemblages from differing practices. Much of the work can be seen in the social strategies and technical devices employed in creating equivalences and connections whereby otherwise heterogeneous and isolated knowledges are enabled to move in space and time from the local site and moment of their production and application to other places and times. In this way contemporary technosciences are compared with the knowledge systems of the medieval mastermasons, the Anasazi, the Inca, the Australian Aborigines and the Pacific navigators.     

Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge

I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections.     

Durkheim's sociology of scientific knowledge

Durkheim's thinking on scientific knowledge reveals several contradictions, resulting from the relativist implications of his substantive theory of culture and the positivist assumptions of his metatheoretical definition of scientific methods in sociology. In his explanations of historical and cross-cultural differences in „truthful”︁ representations of reality, Durkheim suggests that logical and conceptual structures of knowledge are determined by social morphology, and that the validity of any truth-claim is limited to cultural contexts in which designated criteria of validation are normatively maintained. However, in epistemological works such as The Rules, Durkheim suggests that social factors are of little importance in constructing scientific knowledge, and that truths of science mirror external reality and so their validity transcends cultural boundaries.     

The threshold model of scientific change and the continuity of scientific knowledge

The continuity thesis of the Pozna school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued — using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example — that the continuity thesis does not hold.A distinction between a historical and a systematic point of view is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes the systematic point of view. However, looking at matters from the systematic point of view need not yield the original theory, looked at from the historical point of view. Applied to the case of Van der Waals/Boyle-Mariotte laws, it turns out that the latter law is not a true idealizing special case of the former, contrary to the continuity thesis.     

Commensurability, incommensurability, and cumulativity in scientific knowledge

Until the middle of the present century it was a commonly accepted opinion that theory change in science was the expression of cumulative progress consisting in the acquisition of new truths and the elimination of old errors. Logical empiricists developed this idea through a deductive model, saying that a theory T superseding a theory T must be able logically to explain whatever T explained and something more as well. Popper too shared this model, but stressed that T explains the old known facts in its own new way. The further pursual of this line quickly led to the thesis of the non-comparability or incommensurability of theories: if T and T are different, then the very concepts which have the same denomination in both actually have different meanings; in such a way any sentence whatever has different meanings in T and in T and cannot serve to compare them. owing to this, the deductive model was abandoned as a tool for understanding theory change and scientific progress, and other models were proposed by people such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Sneed and Stegmüller. The common feature of all these new positions may be seen in the claim that no possibility exists of interpreting theory change in terms of the cumulative acquisition of truth. It seems to us that the older and the newer positions are one-sided, and, in order to eliminate their respective shortcomings, we propose to interpret theory change in a new way.The starting point consists in recognizing that every scientific discipline singles out its specific domain of objects by selecting a few specific predicates for its discourse. Some of these predicates must be operational (that is, directly bound to testing operations) and they determine the objects of the theory concerned. In the case of a transition from T to T, we must consider whether or not the operational predicates remain unchanged, in the sense of being still related to the same operations. If they do not change in their relation to operations, then T and T are comparable (and may sometimes appear as compatible, sometimes as incompatible). If the operational predicates are not all identical in T and T, the two theories show a rather high degree of incommensurability, and this happens because they do not refer to the same objects. Theory change means in this case change of objects. But now we can see that even incommensurability is compatible with progress conceived as the accumulation of truth. Indeed, T and T remain true about their respective objects (T does not disprove T), and the global amount of truth acquired is increased.In other words, scientific progress does not consist in a purely logical relationship between theories, and moreover it is not linear. Yet it exists and may even be interpreted as an accumulation of truth, provided we do not forget that every scientific theory is true only about its own specific objects.It may be pointed out that the solution advocated here relies upon a limitation of the theory-ladeness of scientific concepts, which involves a reconsideration of their semantic status and a new approach to the question of theoretical concepts. First of all, the feature of being theoretical is attributed to a concept not absolutely, but relatively, yet in a sense different from Sneeds's: indeed every theory is basically characterized by its operational concepts, and the non-operational are said to be theoretical, this distinction clearly depending on every particular theory. For the operational concepts it happens that their mean-     

The development of scientific knowledge of the Earth

Investigation of children's knowledge of the Earth can reveal much about the origins, content and structure of scientific knowledge, and the processes of conceptual change and development. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992 , claim that children construct coherent mental models of a flat, flattened, or hollow Earth based on a framework theory and intuitive constraints of flatness and support. To examine this account, 62 children, aged 5–10 years, and 31 adults ranked 16 pictures according to how well they were thought to represent the Earth. Even young children showed scientific knowledge of the shape of the Earth. There was little or no evidence of naïve mental models, indicating that any intuitions or constraints must be very weak. Instead, before they acquire the scientific view, children's knowledge of the Earth appears to be incoherent and fragmented.     

Conventionalism,scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge*

In this paper the basic aim of the so‐called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ‘strong programme’ is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti‐realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ‘context of justification’ of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law‐discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ‘logic of scientific discovery’ are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti‐realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ‘strong programme’ appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science.     

When scientific knowledge becomes scientific discovery: the disappearance of classical conditioning before Pavlov

In the nineteenth century, scientific materials in experimental physiology changed dramatically. In this context, phenomena that had been widely accepted were lost, sometimes to be reintroduced later as "discoveries." I describe the loss of the phenomenon of classical conditioning, later rediscovered by Ivan Pavlov. In 1896, Austrian physiologist Alois Kreidl demonstrated experimentally that animals anticipate the occurrence of food that is cued by a variety of stimuli. Kreidl stated, moreover, that the fact that animals can be called to food had been widely known to science since the 1830s. I describe Kreidl's work and discuss several factors that may have led to the disappearance of conditioning prior to its rediscovery by Pavlov.     

Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.     

科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判

“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.     

Extrasensory perception,near-death experiences,and the limits of scientific knowledge

If mental state can influence the external world, or if alternate dimensions of reality are accessible only in certain mental states, then important aspects of the universe are unknowable with current scientific tools. Near-death studies suggest that both those conditions may occur. Thus the exploration of NDE-like phenomena requires a radically new scientific paradigm.     

Neo-tribalism,epistemic cultures,and the emotions of scientific knowledge construction

Maffesoli's (1996) metaphor of the neo-tribe is useful for analyzing the emotions and spatial dynamics of group life. However, the idea of neo-tribes is not explicitly designed for making sense of the work of scientists in laboratories. To supplement Maffesoli and further understand the group dynamics of scientific knowledge construction, we draw from Knorr-Cetina's (1999) concept of epistemic cultures to highlight the ritualistic character of lab science. By showing how Maffesoli and Knorr-Cetina can supplement one another, we create an encounter between the sociology of emotions and the sociology of science to demonstrate the centrality of emotions in laboratory life. In-depth interviews and on-site laboratory observations with physicists, earth scientists, biologists and chemists form the empirical basis of this study. Commenting on the ritualistic nature of scientific lab work, as well as the emotional experiences of scientists, we analyze the role of emotions in scientists' work. We introduce the concept of value-proxemic emotions to account for the role of specific emotions in binding members to the group. We also examine the emotional experience of the creation and maintenance of group and lab boundaries, which we conceptualize as inter- and intra- tribal cooperation and conflict. Our analysis suggests that emotions are a crucial component of knowledge construction and group life in laboratory work.     

Robert Boyle's epistemology: The interaction between scientific and religious knowledge 1

Boyle distinguished clearly between the areas which we would call scientific and theological. However, he felt that they overlapped seamlessly, and that the truths we discovered (or which were revealed to us) in one of these areas would be relevant to us in the other. In this paper I outline and discuss Boyle's views on the limitations of human knowing, Boyle's arguments in favour of accepting the revelations of the Christian faith, and his views on the kind of epistomological standing that scientific knowledge claims have. Given this background I then consider the relation between hypotheses, theories and facts in Boyle's work, and consider a particular case, that of Boyle's Law, as an exemplification of the claims made in the rest of the paper.     

Tribal morality and civilization

The present paper attempts to clarify the cognitive conditions which make it possible to define so‐called reality from five individual criteria and a confrontation to the paradigms of the community. Reality unfolds from potentially infinite reiteration, but can actually be caught only through finite operations. Our access to discoveries and increased knowledge depends upon abduction which enables us to probe the viability of unlikely hypotheses. Man becomes autonomous through using abduction; that is to say through interacting within the family and the constraints of social ecosystems which built his identity, and his conflictual access to the construction of reality.