Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.     

Attention norms in Siegel’s The Rationality of Perception

Can we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these under‐explored questions in “Selection Effects”, a pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Her account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational epistemic norms that govern any other form of inference. Although Siegel’s account is explanatorily powerful, it cannot capture a core attention norm in cognitive science: one should balance between exploratory and exploitative attention. For central cases of exploratory attention such as mind‐wandering, child‐like, and creative thinking are non‐inferential. Siegel’s view classifies them as “normative freebies” that are not subject to epistemic evaluation. We’re therefore left with a disjunctive conclusion: either Siegel’s inferentialist theory of attention norms is incomplete or cognitive scientists are wrong about the norms that govern attention.     

A Response to the Contributors

Abstract

In my “response to the contributors” I emphasize that I was moved to write my book in response to the question “Why are so many well-trained colleagues, young and old, having so much difficulty developing satisfying analytic practices?” To answer that question I proposed to explore my experience successfully developing and maintaining an analytic practice.

In attempting to answer the question I inadvertently stumbled upon a revolutionary (with a “small r”) answer to the problem. I discovered, in my attitudes and in my way of working in a consultation and the early phase of an analytic collaboration, a new “concrete puzzle solution” to the problem of how to help a prospective, often reluctant collaborator give analysis a “try.”

My book emphasizes my view that courses on “analyzability” and differential diagnosis are based on psychiatric rather than psychoanalytic diagnostic schema and may interfere with candidates' ability to learn how to create analytic patients.

Since I was a candidate, courses on analyzability have always seemed to me to resemble an exclusive club, deciding whom to exclude and whom to admit, rather than a procedure based on sound clinical experience. Analytic experience has demonstrated that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis. To make matters worse, it is probable that an analyst whose mind is focused on the task of evaluating a prospective analysand contributes to creating an environment in which certain patients are experienced as sicker than they might otherwise be.

In spite of the fact that it is not possible in a consultation to predict accurately the outcome of an analysis, many experienced “senior” analysts believe an analyst can and should be evaluative and selective. In their discussions of the subject, they focus primarily on characteristics of the patient rather than the match.

In my book I emphasize that in a consultation there are advantages in focusing on the patient's responses to the idea of engaging in a trial of analysis. The issue of the match and the particular time in their lives are significant from my perspective. The analyst's gender, age, personality, and related state of mind may be as important in effecting the outcome of a trial as any feature of the patient's mind.

My book shifts the emphasis of the focus of inquiry in a consultation from the patient to the analytic couple. It offers a different way of teaching candidates to work with prospective collaborators.     

Recent Theological Interpretations of Evolution

Abstract

In this article I give special attention to recent responses particularly by Roman Catholic scholars to the question, “How should Christian theology take into serious consideration the scientific theory of biological evolution?” To do this I will explore a number of key areas where recent scholarship has made considerable progress in response to this question and at the same time raised new insights into additional questions.     

Did Darwin initially develop a theory of evolution in the biological sense of the word?

Abstract

Darwin’s physicalist orientation reacts to a long-standing vitalistic mode of thought of idealistic morphology and should be assessed by taking other 19th and 20th centuries biological schools of thought into account - trends that each emphasised different modes of explanation, such as mechanicism, physicalism, holism, neo-vitalism, organismic biology and pan-psychism.

Darwin’s acceptance of “universal laws of nature” is consonant with Leyll’s view of invariant natural laws (uniformitarianism), but at the same time, owing to their tendency towards change, living entities are considered to be without constant structures - an outcome of Darwin’s nominalist understanding of living entities. Nominalism provides a starting point both for modem historicism (with its emphasis on change) and for Darwin’s adherence to a nominalistic view of living entities. In the light of the fossil record, the issue of constancy and change is discussed with a focus on Gould’s claim that the basic theory of natural selection offers no statement about general progress and therefore does not supply a mechanism in terms of which an overall advance might be expected.

Darwin’s physicalistic orientation in 1859 made it problematic for him to claim that he has accounted for evolution in the truly biological sense of the word.     

Why being right is not enough: Predicting defensiveness in the face of group criticism

Criticism of a group can be a catalyst for reform and positive change. Despite this, group-directed criticisms can sometimes face high levels of defensiveness, and can do so even if the comments have objective merit. In this article I review research on group-directed criticism and formulate a model designed to predict when and why people will express defensiveness in the face of criticisms of their group. I argue that, when deciding how to respond to group criticism, people weigh up three independent sets of considerations: (1) attributions about the motives and agenda of the critic (“why would they say that?”), (2) questions about whether the critic had obeyed identity-related rules in the timing and delivery of their criticism (“was it appropriate for them to say that?”), and (3) questions about whether it is in the long-term interests of the individual and the group for them to express support for the criticisms (“strategically, what is the best way for me to respond?”). Practical implications of the model for promoting positive and open communication within and between groups are discussed.     

“Beyond Frontiers of Traditional Project Management”: The Concept of “Project Management Second Order (PM-2)” as an Approach of Evolutionary Management

Fundamental changes in sciences offer new perspectives for the management of complexity. Increased complexity in society, economics, and technology requires a new and suitable organization and management. What are the consequences and results for project management? That is the theme of this article. First of all it will given a short introduction to project management, which will be later called “traditional project management” or “project management 1st order (PM-1).” Then, the challenges by the fundamental changes in sciences and the increased complexity in society, economics, and technology will be discussed. It will state that traditional project management cannot solve these challenges. The widespread working-themes and results of the research program “Beyond Frontiers of Traditional Project Management” as an answer to these challenges will be presented at a glance. Subsequently, it will discuss some selected results of the research program:

• The principle-definition and foundation of “Evolution of 1st and 2nd Order.”

• The Evolution of 1st Order and the impact on Project Management methods and processes.

• Evolution of 2nd Order and the Grand Evolutionary Systems Theory (GEST) of E. Laszlo as also the impact on Project Management methods and processes.

• Management of crisis: turn a change to advantage or risk-assurance?

Thereafter, the concept of “Project Management Second Order (PM-2)” is presented as a highlighted result of the research program, as a new paradigm in project management, and as an answer to the challenges, described earlier will be explained in detail. Finally, a real example of transfer evolutionary and self-organizational management principles in a real project life will be demonstrated.     

Explaining and Explaining Away in Science and Religion

Abstract

There is no good reason to think that there is a necessary conflict between science and the existence of God, but is there still some way in which science might support atheism? The most plausible strategy for atheism is to argue that scientific explanations can remove the need for God in some cases via “explaining away.” This paper proposes a number of questions to help identify whether explaining away takes place in a given context, and explores several cases where explaining away might be thought to occur, with particular attention given to the most obvious case: the theory of evolution.     

Divine detritus: queer remainders from theological quests

ABSTRACT

This essay investigates how theologians should engage with the “leftovers,” or detritus, of the great theological quests by interrogating the process of doing and writing theology. Posing questions about theology’s purpose and systematic method, along with questions that examine both the object of theology and the subjectivity of the theologian, this essay directs its inquiry to uncovering the very foundations of theology today, which itself must be constructed out of divine detritus.     

Wittgenstein,mindreading and perception

Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.     

The effect of power on susceptibility to emotional contagion

Abstract

This study explored two questions: Do people tend to display and experience other people's emotions? If so, what impact does power have on people's susceptibility to emotional contagion? We speculated that the powerless should pay more attention to their superiors (than their superiors pay to them) and should thus be especially likely to “catch” their superion' emotions as well. College students, given the role of “teacher” (powerful person) or “learner” (powerless person), observed videotapes of another (fictitious) subject relating an emotional experience. They were asked what emotions they felt as they watched their partner describe the happiest and saddest event in his life. In addition, they were videotaped as they watched the tape. As predicted, clear evidence of emotional contagion was obtained in this controlled laboratory setting. However, a direct (rather than inverse) relation between power and emotional contagion was found. Powerful subjects were more likely to display their subordinate's feelings than subordinates were to display those of the powerful other. Several possible explanations for these unexpected results were proposed.     

Normality in medicine: an empirical elucidation

Introduction

Dementia diseases, especially Alzheimer’s disease (AD), are of considerable importance in terms of social policy and health economics. Moreover, against the background of the current Karlsruhe judgement on the legalisation of assisted suicide, there are also questions to be asked about medical humanities in AD.

Methodology

Relevant literature on complementary forms of therapy and prognosis was included and discussed.

Results

Creative sociotherapeutic approaches (art, music, dance) and validating psychotherapeutic approaches show promise for suitability and efficiency in the treatment of dementia, but in some cases still need to be scientifically tested. Biomarker-based early diagnosis of dementia diseases is increasingly becoming a subject of debate against the background of the Karlsruhe ruling.

Discussion

Needs-oriented and resource-enhancing approaches can make a significant contribution to improving the quality of life of people with dementia. The discussion on the issue of “assisted suicide” should include questions of the dignity and value of a life with dementia.

Outlook

The integrative dementia therapy model can be complemented by a religion- and spirituality-based approach. Appropriate forms of psychotherapy should be scientifically evaluated.

     

“In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification

Traditionally, the so-called exemplification or the relation between the particular and the universal has been one of the three central problems making up the classical problem of universals: (1) What is a particular? (2) What is a universal? (3) What is the relation between the particular and the universal? I used the expression “classical problem of universals” instead of “the problem of universals” since the classical formulation of the problem could be said to contain a questionable assumption, namely that substance should be the bearer “in” which are the entities of (other) categories. Under these circumstances, a neutral approach to the problem of universals could consist in reformulating the three problems of the classical problem as follows: (4) What is the fundamental bearer of categories? (5) What categories are there? (6) What is the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories? My purpose in this paper is to answer the latter three questions. In order to accomplish this task, I shall discuss the views of two leading figures in substance-ontology, Aristotle and Jonathan Lowe, and the views of two leading figures in fact-ontology, Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann. I shall answer the first question by claiming that the fundamental bearer of categories is facts; the second, by pointing out that it depends on the answer to the previous one; and the third, by showing that the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories is the one between facts and its constituents, not between a substance or particular and its accidents or properties. In this connection, I shall argue that the “in” of property exemplification should be categorially reconstructed in order for entities other than properties, say, particulars, relations, connectives, numbers, and even facts, to be “in” facts. This categorial reconstruction will also argued for with respect to the Principle of Exemplification.     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.     

SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a ) and Lynch (2009 ), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.     

Educating pain

Abstract

In times in which we ask ourselves how political cruelty and torments can be forgotten, Nietzsche’s pleadoyer for pain to serve the purpose of education, surprises. What might sound like a mere provocation, rather lies at the heart of the Nietzschean philosophy. As is pointed out, Nietzsche’s contention that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics, originates from his philosophy of pain as the main condition of all forms of creation. The title “educating (bilden) pain” expresses Nietzsche’s advocacy of an education towards pain as the dynamo of creation. In this paper I explore how Nietzsche’s notion of pain is linked to two concepts of Bildung. In the first part I investigate the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “creation”, and in the second part I link this to the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “education”. By these means, I try to answer the question: how far can pain, which is seen as the condition of creation, be linked to conditions of education.     

TO HAVE DONE (TRULY) WITH METAPHYSICS

One cannot consider the future of continental philosophy without accounting for its specific “hermeneutic situation.” It seems to us that the state of continental philosophy today returns us to metaphysics and to the possibility of truly having done with it. Continental philosophy, in reality, does not cease to live metaphysically, because by asserting the end of metaphysics, it still continues to think according to the topos of the here‐and‐now and the beyond: that which seeks the ruin of the heavens continues to obsess over the heavens; the cult of immanence can only understand itself in opposition to the other world, therefore in constant reference to it; insufficiently radical, the critique, in the words of Karl‐Otto Apel, is but an “inverted metaphysics.” Our inversions of the for and against (the sensible vs. the intelligible, the body vs. the soul, the empirical vs. the transcendental, and more recently, the multiple vs. the one) still belong to the landscape of metaphysics. How do we imagine what comes after metaphysics? Can philosophy think according to a topos other than the one of the world above and the world below? Can it respatialize itself in a new way? Put more precisely, can we accept what science tells us about the world and about humanity in any other way than as the deposing of the other world? Can science provide us with anything other than weapons against metaphysics; in other words, can science give us anything other than metaphysics? As a response to these questions, we imagine an alternative scenario tied to the (scientifically attested) fact of our animal origin. Our animal origin can be, for philosophy and more specifically for phenomenology, the chance for a new beginning. But it can do so only on the condition that it does not follow the current method of evolutionary psychology. If it is true that we can be metaphysicians while being reductionistic, because we thus preserve the “old schema,” then evolutionary psychology is today, in virtue of its very reductionism, one of the more metaphysical currents of thought. Conversely, if phenomenology decides to face the fact of evolution and to confront its estrangement, we think that it possesses all the resources to invent a new intellectual landscape.     

On the ethical analysis of value issues in public decision-making

Abstract

The nature, methodology, importance and implications of an ethical analysis of value issues pertaining to public decision-making is not evident. In this paper I would like to address these issues by posing the following questions:

• Why is it important to focus on values in any process of public decision-making?

• What is the nature of an ethical analysis of the value issues involved?

• What is the basis, if any, for ethical analysis that moves beyond relativism and subjectivity?

• What difference can such an ethical analysis make to public decision-making?

During the course of discussing these issues, the question “What is ethics?” will be addressed in passing, as well as the usual objections against ethics and the consideration of value issues in public decision-making, namely that

• values cannot be analysed and discussed objectively

• values and ethics are relative to people and cultures

• value and ethical questions cannot be settled in a rational manner

• ethics cannot provide answers

• arguments about value and ethical issues move in circles, taking us nowhere

• values and ethics are so intertwined with emotions and biases that one cannot take them seriously in any process of public decision-making.

     

Ethical Considerations in Psychotherapy Effectiveness Research: Choosing the Comparison Group

The primary purpose behind effectiveness research is to determine whether a treatment with demonstrated efficacy has utility when administered to the general population. The main questions these studies are meant to answer are these: Can the typical patient respond to treatment? Is the treatment acceptable to the typical patient? Can the treatment be administered safely and in its entirety in the typical treatment setting? Is the treatment under study significantly better than the community standard of care both from a cost and outcome perspective? Answering these questions is meant to provide sufficient information to providers and policymakers so that effective interventions can be adopted and become the new community standard.

For this research to make a meaningful impact on a provider and policymaker's decision to change the status quo, study interventions should be compared to the existing community standard of treatment, often referred to as treatment as usual (TAU). From an ethical perspective, this decision may not always be the safest choice. In some populations, TAU may mean no treatment at all, and in others TAU may be worse than withholding treatment. The effectiveness researcher is then caught between the pull to do no harm and the need for research to have an impact on change. The purpose of this article is to highlight certain conditions when TAU is ethically acceptable and to discuss alternatives when TAU may be an unethical treatment condition. For purposes of precision, we focus exclusively on psychotherapy effectiveness research rather than system-intervention research or medication-intervention research.