How psychological assessment taught me compassion and firmness

In this article, I reflect on 2 specific assessment experiences and how they helped me grow as a person and as a psychologist. I believe that practicing assessment creates opportunities for personal growth in assessors because (a) to truly understand difficult clients, we must find personal versions of their psychological dilemmas in ourselves, which we might otherwise never be called on to face, and (b) to be effective as assessors, we must say difficult things to clients in plain nonjudgmental language, which forces us to develop courage and wisdom.     

To Achieve Sustainability

Having passed the level of sustainability, we now face a depleted planet and the possible extinction of our species. With hunter-gatherer brains we have created a civilization we cannot handle. We must understand what's gone wrong, what's needed for sustainability, and the difficulties we will face achieving it. We need a holistic view of the world and a better understanding of the biosphere and ourselves. We must reorient our economy away from perpetual growth toward meeting needs of humanity within the limitations of the planet. Our conscious mind must take control over the unconscious, and we must become more than what we now are.     

Twenty-first century ethical challenges for psychology

Foreseeable social and technological changes will force us to reevaluate our thinking about ethically appropriate ways to fulfill our mission of using psychology to advance human health and welfare in the twenty-first century. Three categories of challenge related to societal and technological changes have become particularly evident. First, increasing patterns of delivering services over substantial distances by electronic means (i.e., telepsychology) demand consideration. Second, we must parse our ethical obligations to individuals, to groups, and to society at large as our influence working behind the scenes as "invisible" psychologists grows. Finally, as we witness the accelerating demise of psychiatry, we must take care not to follow a similar path. As we face new ethical challenges, we must continually ask ourselves where our responsibilities lie as individuals and as a profession. We must learn not to repeat the mistakes of the past and focus instead on optimizing the future for a science and practice of psychology focused on human health and welfare.     

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments.     

Environmental inversion effects in face perception

Visual processing is highly sensitive to stimulus orientation; for example, face perception is drastically worse when faces are oriented inverted vs. upright. However, stimulus orientation must be established in relation to a particular reference frame, and in most studies, several reference frames are conflated. Which reference frame(s) matter in the perception of faces? Here we describe a simple, novel method for dissociating effects of egocentric and environmental orientation on face processing. Participants performed one of two face-processing tasks (expression classification and recognition memory) as they lay horizontally, which served to disassociate the egocentric and environmental frames. We found large effects of egocentric orientation on performance and smaller but reliable effects of environmental orientation. In a follow-up control experiment, we ruled out the possibility that the latter could be explained by compensatory ocular counterroll. We argue that environmental orientation influences face processing, which is revealed when egocentric orientation is fixed.     

Checking ID‐cards for the sale of restricted goods: Age decisions bias face decisions

Matching unfamiliar faces is highly error‐prone, and most studies highlight the implications for real‐world ID‐checking. Here we study a particular instance of ID‐checking: proof of age for buying restricted goods such as alcohol. In this case, checkers must establish that an identity document is carried by its legitimate owner (i.e., that the ID photo matches the face of the bearer) and that the ID proves the bearer to be old enough to make the purchase. Across three experiments, using two common forms of photo‐ID (i.e., driving licenses, PASS+ cards) we show that observers produce very high error rates when age requirements are met, but faces mismatch. This bias away from detecting a face mismatch remained evident in experienced cashiers—though to a somewhat attenuated level. We discuss interactions between face matching and other tasks, and the practical consequences of a bias which favours those using photo‐ID with fraudulent intent.     

The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever “Get It”?

In order to update candidate evaluations voters must acquire information and determine whether that new information supports or opposes their candidate expectations. Normatively, new negative information about a preferred candidate should result in a downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies show exactly the opposite; voters become more supportive of a preferred candidate in the face of negatively valenced information. Motivated reasoning is advanced as the explanation, arguing that people are psychologically motivated to maintain and support existing evaluations. Yet it seems unlikely that voters do this ad infinitum. To do so would suggest continued motivated reasoning even in the face of extensive disconfirming information. In this study we consider whether motivated reasoning processes can be overcome simply by continuing to encounter information incongruent with expectations. If so, voters must reach a tipping point after which they begin more accurately updating their evaluations. We show experimental evidence that such an affective tipping point does in fact exist. We also show that as this tipping point is reached, anxiety increases, suggesting that the mechanism that generates the tipping point and leads to more accurate updating may be related to the theory of affective intelligence. The existence of a tipping point suggests that voters are not immune to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as motivated reasoners.     

Ethical dilemmas in context: Some preliminary questions

I have tried to build on O'Neill's thought-provoking paper by examining two influences that shape and define ethical dilemmas in the community: our personal agendas and the broader context. The first influence is the way in which our personal and professional values shape our agendas for community work. The way these agendas frame the choices for action are a force to be recognized separate from the question of who constitutes our community constituency. Our values may push us into proactive roles and we must face the way our actions make personal/political statements. The broader context of the community situation and the ways in which resource limitations frame the ethical question also need to be actively recognized. Otherwise there is a danger of making the psychologist the victim by posing the ethical dilemma as a question of how they alone should find a solution. The nature of our personal agenda must be clear before we ask “responsible to whom?” The broader context must be considered before we ask “responsible for what?”     

HOW TO DEFEAT BELIEF IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Abstract:  I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as defeatable, second, antiskeptics must explain our knowledge in the face of 'actual world' skepticism (like dreaming skepticism) as much as in the face of the usual sort (like brain-in-vat skepticism), and, finally, our justification for hinge propositions is basic (i.e. non-inferential).     

Ingroup and outgroup differences in face detection

Humans show improved recognition for faces from their own social group relative to faces from another social group. Yet before faces can be recognized, they must first be detected in the visual field. Here, we tested whether humans also show an ingroup bias at the earliest stage of face processing – the point at which the presence of a face is first detected. To this end, we measured viewers' ability to detect ingroup (Black and White) and outgroup faces (Asian, Black, and White) in everyday scenes. Ingroup faces were detected with greater speed and accuracy relative to outgroup faces (Experiment 1). Removing face hue impaired detection generally, but the ingroup detection advantage was undiminished (Experiment 2). This same pattern was replicated by a detection algorithm using face templates derived from human data (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that the established ingroup bias in face processing can extend to the early process of detection. This effect is ‘colour blind’, in the sense that group membership effects are independent of general effects of image hue. Moreover, it can be captured by tuning visual templates to reflect the statistics of observers' social experience. We conclude that group bias in face detection is both a visual and a social phenomenon.     

Face recognition and aging: Effects of target age and memory load

In the present study, we investigated age-related decline in face recognition memory and whether this decline is moderated by the age of the target faces and by the number of faces that the participant must learn (memory load). Thirty-two participants in each of three age groups (18-39 years, 60-75 years, and 76-96 years) completed a face recognition task. Signal detection analyses confirmed that face recognition accuracy declined with age. However, this finding was qualified by an interaction between participant age and target age, which revealed that the age-related decline in face recognition accuracy occurred only for young target faces. Increased memory load was associated with comparable performance decrements across all age groups. However, memory load appears not to be the cause of these decrements. Instead, they appear to be a product of recognition load (the number of stimuli presented in the recognition phase).     

The Mind of the Scenario Thinker

In the face of increasing uncertainty and changes, corporations must dynamically examine their business environment and activate the knowledge creation process in a future-oriented manner without getting hung up on analyzing their past (much like driving a car using only the rear-view mirror). In the previous article, we discussed the basics of scenario planning. We should not use this tool as a mere technique. Our knowledge of the world and the environment around us is important because it underlies our scenarios. When we look toward the future in an uncertain environment, we necessarily create knowledge proactively. Scenario planning and knowledge creation are commonplace when working on knowledge of innovations that shape the future. In this article we focus on the importance of having “scenario mind,” the philosophy underlying scenario planning. With any managerial tool, you cannot create real knowledge if you use only superficial know-how, like procedures described in manuals, to seek quick results. In the following sections, we discuss how scenario planning must be recognized as a “discipline of knowledge” to be embedded as a way of thinking and behavioral pattern of each individual or organization, not as a mere tool.     

Inconsistent Languages

The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.     

Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti-realism must be adopted. We go on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view.     

面孔认知的四个层面及FFA在其中的作用

面孔具有明显不同于其他刺激物的特点,面孔认知的目的也因此与其他物体认知的目的大相径庭。依据面孔认知的目的,本文将面孔认知划分为四个层面：将面孔区别于一般物体的第一层面,对面孔物理属性进行识别的第二层面,对面孔的生物属性进行识别的第三层面和对面孔的社会属性进行识别的第四层面。FFA是面孔加工的一个重要脑区,通过论述它对面孔认知各层面的作用,FFA在面孔加工中的作用被进一步明确。     

The Attractions and Delights of Goodness

What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we should reconsider Plato's objectivist theory of goodness as unity, or the One. This view is both consistent with and explains our most basic views both about goodness in general and human well-being in particular.     

The speed of individual face categorization

How fast does the human visual system discriminate individual faces? To address this question, we used a continuous-stimulation paradigm in which event-related potentials (ERPs) to a face stimulus are recorded with respect to another face stimulus, rather than to a preceding blank-screen baseline epoch. Following the shift between two face stimuli, posterior sites showed an early negative ERP deflection that started at 130 ms and peaked at 160 ms, the latency of the N170, an ERP component associated with discriminating faces from objects. The ERP we recorded was larger in amplitude when the preceding stimulus was perceived as a different individual face rather than the same individual face, although face pairs were of equal physical distance in the two conditions. These findings provide direct evidence that individual face discrimination in humans can take place as early as 130 ms following stimulus onset, during the same time window as face detection.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

论信息化生产方式的产生与马克思主义伦理的发展（下）

信息化生产方式的产生会给人类的伦理带来诸多新变动、新发展和新要求 ,因此 ,科学地分析信息化生产方式的产生对资本的益与忧 ,正确地看待信息化生产方式与马克思主义伦理发展的关系是我们必须面临的任务。