The Reluctance to Expose Dangerous Lies1

Three studies examined a hypothesized inhibition against exposing a lie. In Experiment 1, 21 men and 27 women were placed in conditions in which their nonexposure of another's lie resulted either in the risk of an experimenter's data being contaminated (impersonal consequence), or in the risk of the subject contracting pinkeye (personal consequence). Each person was given the opportunity to expose the lie, first in a group setting, and later in a private setting. Eighty-three percent of the subjects in the impersonal condition and 77% of the subjects in the personal condition failed to expose the lie. Experiment 2 explored the phenomenon further by assessing whether subjects not in the presence of individuals other than the liar would be more likely to confront the lie. As in Experiment 1, it was found that most subjects did not reveal the lie, regardless of consequence condition of setting. In Experiment 3, it was anticipated that objective self-awareness would interact with consequence information to produce more exposing behavior in the personal-consequence condition, but not in the impersonal condition. Results generally confirmed the hypothesis; a significant interaction of Consequence x Self-Awareness Condition was found.     

Preference for rich,random tactile stimulation in woodlice (Porcellio scaber)

All living beings exhibit preferences for a variety of biologically significant stimuli. Interestingly, stimuli without biological significance, such as saccharine, are also able to induce preferences in vertebrates. Can invertebrates show preferences for biologically neutral cues as well – i.e. independently of any conditioning process? Experiment 1 aimed to determine the preference of woodlice (Porcellio scaber Latreille 1804) exposed to floor textures that differed in tactile cues, how they expressed their tactile preference, and whether they were able to inhibit that preference when a shelter of variable quality was available on the non-preferred floor texture. Experiment 2 provided additional information relative to the strength of woodlice's tactile preference as well as the way of measuring it. Experiment 3 complemented the previous one in attempting to determine woodlice's preference for regular versus random tactile cues. Taken together, the results suggest that (i) woodlice are able to process sensory information relative to biologically non-significant stimuli and (ii) that, because the motivation induced can interact with sheltering as a survival-related behavior, the processing of both types of motivation might depend on the same brain systems.     

Retrieval of Episodic Information From Memory: Comparisons Among 3- and 4-Year-Olds, 7- and 8-Year-Olds,and Adults

Young children's and adults' recall of episodic information was explored in 4 experiments. The task required participants to recall a target noun presented as the last item of a 4-noun string of related (either categorically or thematically) or unrelated words. Providing all 3 preceding nouns or a subset of them cued recall. Experiment 1 found that 7- and 8-year-old children's recall was better with pictures as opposed to text, and children showed performance equal to adults with thematically related pictorial stimuli. Using pictorial stimuli, Experiment 2 showed that the number of cues present at retrieval affected 7- and 8-year-olds' recall. Experiments 3 and 4 tested recall of episodic information in 3- and 4-year-olds using pictorial stimuli. The results suggested that young children also have access to episodic information in memory and the number of cues present at retrieval influenced recall. The findings are discussed in the context of children's memory for events.     

The role of motivation to avoid detection in reaction time-based concealed information detection

Do motivated liars lie more successfully? The motivational effort hypothesis predicts that higher motivation effectively diminishes the chance of being detected, whereas the motivational impairment hypothesis predicts that the higher the motivation to go undetected, the greater the chance of being detected. We manipulated motivation in two online reaction time-based Concealed Information Test studies in which participants tried to hide their identity. Detection of concealed identity information in Experiment 1 (n = 259) was successful and a small financial incentive to avoid detection did not impact upon validity. Despite a greater financial incentive and a manipulation check showing that motivation was increased, Experiment 2 (n = 233) did not impact upon the test's validity either. A financial incentive to avoid detection did not decrease the validity of concealed information detection.     

Lying about flying: The efficacy of the information protocol and model statement for detecting deceit

Due to time constraints, interviews aimed to detect deception in airport settings should be brief and veracity assessments should be made in real time. In two experiments carried out in the departure hall of an international airport, truth tellers were asked to report truthfully their forthcoming trip, whereas liars were asked to lie about the purpose of their trip. In Experiment 1, we examined five verbal cues that we thought had potential to discriminate truth tellers from liars in short airport interviews: elaboration in disclosing information, checkable details, how many people are aware of the trip, complications, and plausibility. In Experiment 2, we attempted to improve the interview protocol by adding a second interview phase in which we introduced an information protocol and model statement. All five cues differentiated truth tellers from liars in both experiments, but the information protocol and model statement did not enhance these differences.     

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.     

In the Eyes of Others: Monitoring for Relational Value Cues

It was hypothesized that monitoring the social environment for relational value (RV) cues both consumes and depletes self‐regulatory resources. Consistent with predictions, the results suggest that regulatory resources are depleted when people monitor for relational cues (Experiments 1 and 2), that the capacity to monitor for complex (vs. simple) forms of relational cues is negatively impacted by prior depletion of the self’s resources (Experiment 3), and that insofar as the self’s resources are depleted by recent acts of self‐regulation, people are less effective at monitoring for relational cues (Experiment 4). These findings suggest an integrative relationship between regulatory resources and people’s capacity to accurately monitor the social environment for cues that communicate their RV.     

What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?

Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features (e.g., requiring reasoning). We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible in a deterministic universe. Experiments 1 and 2 found that people's judgments about whether a behavior was compatible with determinism were not predicted by their judgments about whether that behavior relies on physical processes in the brain and body, is uniquely human, is unpredictable, or involves reasoning. Experiment 3, however, found that a distinction between what we call “active” and “passive” behaviors can explain people's judgments. Experiment 4 extended these findings, showing that we can measure this distinction in several ways and that it is robustly predicted by two different cues. Taken together, these results suggest that people carve up mentally guided behavior into two distinct types—understanding one type to be compatible with determinism, but another type to be fundamentally incompatible with determinism.     

Observation of another's action but not eye gaze triggers allocentric visual perspective

In the present paper, we investigated whether observation of bodily cues—that is, hand action and eye gaze—can modulate the onlooker's visual perspective taking. Participants were presented with scenes of an actor gazing at an object (or straight ahead) and grasping an object (or not) in a 2?×?2 factorial design and a control condition with no actor in the scene. In Experiment 1, two groups of subjects were explicitly required to judge the left/right location of the target from their own (egocentric group) or the actor's (allocentric group) point of view, whereas in Experiment 2 participants did not receive any instruction on the point of view to assume. In both experiments, allocentric coding (i.e., the actor's point of view) was triggered when the actor grasped the target, but not when he gazed towards it, or when he adopted a neutral posture. In Experiment 3, we demonstrate that the actor's gaze but not action affected participants' attention orienting. The different effects of others' grasping and eye gaze on observers' behaviour demonstrated that specific bodily cues convey distinctive information about other people's intentions.     

Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

Emotional expression and vocabulary learning in adults and children

A great deal of what we know about the world has not been learned via first-hand observation but thanks to others' testimony. A crucial issue is to know which kind of cues people use to evaluate information provided by others. In this context, recent studies in adults and children underline that informants' facial expressions could play an essential role. To test the importance of the other's emotions in vocabulary learning, we used two avatars expressing happiness, anger or neutral emotions when proposing different verbal labels for an unknown object. Experiment 1 revealed that adult participants were significantly more likely than chance to choose the label suggested by the avatar displaying a happy face over the label suggested by the avatar displaying an angry face. Experiment 2 extended these results by showing that both adults and children as young as 3 years old showed this effect. These data suggest that decision making concerning newly acquired information depends on informant's expressions of emotions, a finding that is consistent with the idea that behavioural intents have facial signatures that can be used to detect another's intention to cooperate.     

Landmark use by Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana): influence of disorientation and cue rotation on distance and direction estimates

Many species have been shown to encode multiple sources of information to orient. To examine what kinds of information animals use to locate a goal we manipulated cue rotation, cue availability, and inertial orientation when the food-storing Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) was searching for a hidden goal in a circular arena. Three groups of birds were used, each with a different goal–landmark distance. As the distance between the goal and the landmark increased, nutcrackers were less accurate in finding the correct direction to the goal than they were at estimating the distance (Experiment 1). To further examine what cues the birds were using to calculate direction, the featural cues within the environment were rotated by 90° and the birds were either oriented when searching (Experiments 2 and 3) or disoriented (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, all distinctive visual cues were removed (both internal and external to the environment), a novel point of entry was used and the birds were either oriented or disoriented. We found that disorienting the nutcrackers so that they could not use inertial cues did not influence the birds’ total search error. The birds relied heavily but not completely on cues within the environment, as rotating available cues caused them to systematically shift their search behavior. In addition, the birds also relied to some extent on Earth-based cues. These results show the flexible nature of cue use by the Clark’s nutcracker. Our study shows how multiple sources of spatial information may be important for extracting multiple bearings for navigation.     

Secondhand information and social judgment

This research investigates how secondhand impressions of other people differ from those based on firsthand information. It was hypothesized that secondhand impressions are often more extreme because secondhand accounts of another person's actions frequently fail to convey adequately the role of mitigating circumstances and situational constraints in producing that person's behavior. Experiments 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis by exposing “first generation” subjects to information about a target person, having them rate the target on several trait and attribution scales, and having them describe the target person's actions to a group of “second generation” subjects. As predicted, second generation subjects made more extreme ratings of the target than their first generation counterparts. Content analyses of the accounts transmitted by first generation subjects indicated that they did indeed underemphasize various situational qualifications of the target persons' behavior. Experiment 3 extended these findings by demonstrating that people's impressions of someone they have often heard about from a friend (but never met) are more extreme than their friends' more informed impressions.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Irrelevant incentive learning revisited: Associating flavors and exteroceptive cues with positive incentives

In “irrelevant incentive learning” information stored about an incentive when it is not desired is used later when the incentive is desired. In “habit learning” responses learned under one motive state continue to be made under a new motive state even though they produce goal events that are not appropriate to that motive state. Experiment 1 showed that both types of learning occur simultaneously whether flavor or texture cues are used and whether or not position is also a relevant cue. Thus, contrary to previous suggestions, irrelevant incentive learning is not limited to interoceptive cues, nor is habit learning limited to exteroceptive cues. In both Experiments 1 and 2 it was also shown that motivation affects what is learned as well as affecting current performance. This contrasts with views of motivation as solely a determinant of performance.     

The contribution of shape and surface information in the other-race face effect

Faces from another race are generally more difficult to recognize than faces from one's own race. However, faces provide multiple cues for recognition and it remains unknown what are the relative contribution of these cues to this “other-race effect”. In the current study, we used three-dimensional laser-scanned head models which allowed us to independently manipulate two prominent cues for face recognition: the facial shape morphology and the facial surface properties (texture and colour). In Experiment 1, Asian and Caucasian participants implicitly learned a set of Asian and Caucasian faces that had both shape and surface cues to facial identity. Their recognition of these encoded faces was then tested in an old/new recognition task. For these face stimuli, we found a robust other-race effect: Both groups were more accurate at recognizing own-race than other-race faces. Having established the other-race effect, in Experiment 2 we provided only shape cues for recognition and in Experiment 3 we provided only surface cues for recognition. Caucasian participants continued to show the other-race effect when only shape information was available, whereas Asian participants showed no effect. When only surface information was available, there was a weak pattern for the other-race effect in Asians. Performance was poor in this latter experiment, so this pattern needs to be interpreted with caution. Overall, these findings suggest that Asian and Caucasian participants rely differently on shape and surface cues to recognize own-race faces, and that they continue to use the same cues for other-race faces, which may be suboptimal for these faces.     

Seeing is believing: Utilization of subliminal symbols requires a visible relevant context

Sensory input that is not available for conscious report can still affect our behavior. Recent findings suggest that such subliminal information has the potency to influence behavior in a way that is dependent on the observer’s current intentions. Here, we investigate whether conscious observation of stimulus relevance provides an incentive for the utilization of nonconscious stimuli. We manipulated the predictive power of directional cues to selectively affect the incentive to utilize them for a subsequent target detection task. Central arrow cues rendered invisible by interocular suppression elicited a facilitatory cuing effect, but only when intermixed with visible arrow cues that were highly predictive with respect to (i.e., 80 % congruent with) the subsequent target location. When the visible cues were nonpredictive (50 % congruent), no subliminal cuing effect was found. An analysis of learning effects corroborates these findings; Cuing effects elicited by both visible and invisible cues increased over the course of the experiment, but only when intermixed visible cues were highly predictive. In a second experiment, we demonstrated that the intrinsic relevance of invisible cues (either 50 % or 100 % congruent) has no effect on the utilization of visible cues. We conclude that conscious perception is required to make statistical inferences about the relevance of symbolic cues. Once statistical information is extracted consciously, it affects subsequent nonconscious processing in a way that fits the current context. Accordingly, one of the possible functions of consciousness could be to extract general rules out of the conscious information, to provide guidelines for future behavior.     

Effectiveness of Consensus Information in Advertising: The Moderating Roles of Situational Factors and Individual Differences

Purpose

This study aims to investigate the influence of both individual consumer differences and the purchase decision context on the effectiveness of consensus information in advertising.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Three experiments explore the effectiveness of consensus information. In Experiment 1, gender serves as a moderator. Experiment 2 contains an examination of the susceptibility to interpersonal influence (SII) and purchase decision context as two potential moderators. Finally, Experiment 3 instead explores the need for cognitive closure (NFC) but again includes the purchase decision context as the two possible moderators.

Findings

In Experiment 1, female participants, but not male participants, generate higher purchase intentions for ads with consensus cues as opposed to those without them. With Experiment 2, this study demonstrates that the effectiveness of consensus cues increases for a group (vs. personal) purchase decision, but only for people with high susceptibility to individual influence. In Experiment 3, the effectiveness of consensus cues is relatively greater for a group (vs. personal) purchase decisions, but only for consumers with a high NFC.

Implications

Understanding what moderates the effectiveness of consensus information in advertising has the potential to help practitioners apply consensus information more effectively to improve their advertising returns.

Originality/Value

This study provides initial evidence about the impact of consensus information in advertising on purchase intentions, which is contingent on the situational context and individual differences.     

Knowing what to remember and forget: A developmental study of cue memory in intentional forgetting

These experiments are the first to investigate children’s encoding and use of information about a memory cue in Bjork’s (1972) intentional forgetting task. In Experiment 1, children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 and college students were given cues to either remember or forget after the presentation of each picture. Recall and recognition tests of pictures and cues followed. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the list of presentation pictures was altered for some children (Grades 3 and 4) and adolescents (Grades 8 and 9) so that remember and forget cues were associated with particular taxonomic categories. In Experiment 3, the testing component was modified so that children (Grades 2, 3, and 4) and college students were asked to recall only the cue associated with each picture. The results indicated that (1) children as young as second graders encode the cue associated with each picture, although to a lesser extent than do college students, (2) much improvement in intentional forgetting is still occurring during adolescence, (3) only adults adequately cluster their recall by cue, (4) associating remember and forget cues with items from different categories does not increase the differentiation between cues, and (5) eliminating picture recall and recognition has minimal effects on the magnitude of cue judgments. These results suggest that children’s difficulties on intentional forgetting tasks stem, at least in part, from their poorer encoding of information about whether an item should be remembered or forgotten.     

Children's Antisocial and Prosocial Lies to Familiar and Unfamiliar Adults

Although parents frequently instruct children not to lie, children often observe lie‐telling within the family environment. To date, no empirical research has examined children's spontaneous lie‐telling to different lie‐recipients. The current study examined children's spontaneous deceptive behaviour to parents and unfamiliar adults. In Experiment 1 (N = 98), children's (ages 6–9) antisocial lies to a parent or an unfamiliar adult were examined using a modified Temptation Resistance Paradigm. In Experiment 2, (N = 99) children's (ages 6–9) prosocial lies to a parent versus an unfamiliar adult were examined using the Disappointing Gift Paradigm. Results indicate that, across different types of lies, children are more likely to lie to an unfamiliar adult than to a parent. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.