McAllister's aesthetics in science: A critical notice

In Beauty and Revolution in Science, James McAllister argues that a sophisticated rationalist image of science can accommodate two prominent features of actual scientific practice, namely, appeals to “aesthetic” criteria in theory choice, and the occurrence of scientific “revolutions”. The aesthetic criteria to which scientists appeal are, he maintains, inductively grounded in the empirical record of competing theories, and scientific revolutions involve changes in aestheic criteria bu continuity in empirical criteria of theory choice. I raise difficulties for McAllister's account concerning: (a) the nature and scope of “aesthetic” criteria in science; (b) the rationality of appeals to aestheic criteria in science; (c) the rationality of scientific revolutions.     

Chisholm's Legacy on Intentionality

Abstract: The problem of intentionality, or how mind and language can take things in the world as “intentional objects,” engaged Chisholm throughout his philosophical career. This essay reviews and discusses his seminal contributions on this problem, from his early work in “Sentences about Believing” and Perceiving during the 1950s to his last and most mature account in The First Person, published in 1981 . Chisholm's final view was that de se reference, or a subject's directly taking himself as an intentional object, is fundamental and primitive, and that all other forms of intentional reference, such as de re and de dicto, can be understood on the basis of de se intentionality. The essay ends with a discussion of the worry that this account might lead to what may be called “intentional solipsism,” the proposition that the self is the only genuine object of intentional reference.     

Revolutionen und Bohème. 1917–1918

This article analyzes the similarity of the revolutions of 1917–1918 with earlier revolutions in Russia and Germany. Several common characteristics are noted: “theatricality”, the connection of politics with Bohemianism, and politics’ concealed connection with art. The revolution presents a theatre stage on which representatives of the Boheme play their dreams (and nightmares) out in politics. Furthermore, the article investigates methodological pluralism, which constitutes the philosophical foundation of Bohemianism. Finally, the author distinguishes two types of Bohemian politicians: the first type, a “fantasist, dreamer, poet,” is represented by Kurt Eisner, whereas the other type, that of a “multi-souled artist” is represented by Fyodor Stepun.

     

CONCERNING THE MORAL DIMENSION OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN A COMMUNIST-FREE WORLD*

The socio-economic “pro-democracy” revolutions which are currently sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the name of glasnost and perestroika have virtually stunned all but the best informed in the Western World. The demand for reform throughout the so-called “Soviet block,” and the concomitant impatience with the progress of these changes in the economic and basic social fabric of these societies, have come to exhibit an urgency which few observers, if any, had been able to forecast a few short years ago. The declarations by some members of the U.S. Congress that these changes are indicative of the fact that the cold war has been won by the West, and that we are now witnessing the precipitous collapse of Marxist ideology, together with the widespread sentiment that there is “no going back” to the repressive Leninist-inspired regimes of Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhniev are all synergistic to the creation of a sentiment of optimism that indeed we have turned the corner in East-West relations. To a world which has lived under the long night of thermonuclear extinction for over four decades, the feeling accompanying the prospect of a possible end to the nightmare of Armageddon further enhances the euphoric sentiment.     

The Truthmaking Argument Against Dispositionalism

According to dispositionalism, de re modality is grounded in the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties. Those properties are able to serve as the ground of de re modal truths, it is said, because they bear a special relation to counterfactual conditionals, one of truthmaking. However, because dispositionalism purports to ground de re modality only on the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties, it had better be the case that they do not play that truthmaking role merely in virtue of their being embedded in some particular, extrinsic causal context. This paper examines a recent argument against dispositionalism that purports to show that the intrinsicality of that relation cannot be maintained, due to the ceteris paribus nature of the counterfactuals that dispositions make‐true. When two prominent responses are examined, both are found wanting: at best, they require unjustified special pleading, and at worst, they amount to little more than ad hoc conceptual trickery. 1     

The Dr. John Hall story: a case study in putative “Haunted People Syndrome”

ABSTRACT

Research suggests a “Haunted People Syndrome (HP-S)” defined by recurrent and systematic perceptions of anomalous subjective and objective anomalies. Such signs or symptoms are traditionally attributed to “spirits and the supernatural,” but these themes are hypothesised to morph to “surveillance and stalking” in reports of “group-(or gang) stalking,” We tested this premise with a quali-quantitative exercise that mapped group-stalking experiences from a published first-hand account to a Rasch measure of haunt-type anomalies. This comparison found significant agreement in the specific “signs or symptoms” of both phenomena. Meta-patterns likewise showed clear conceptual similarities between the phenomenology of haunts and group-stalking. Findings are consistent with the idea that both anomalous episodes involve the same, or similar, attentional or perceptual processes and thereby support the viability of the HP-S construct.     

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.     

Further Ado concerning Dasein's “Undifferentiated Mode”: Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday Dasein from the Possibility of Genuine Failure

In this paper, I argue against the interpretive view that locates an “undifferentiated mode” – a mode in which Dasein is neither authentic nor inauthentic – in Being and Time. Where Heidegger seems to be claiming that Dasein can exist in an “undifferentiated mode”, he is better understood as discussing a phenomenon I call indifferent inauthenticity. The average everyday “Indifferenz” which is often taken as an indication of an “undifferentiated mode”, that is, is better understood as a failure to distinguish between the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. Dasein's average everyday self-understanding is indifferent to this distinction, and I show that this is precisely what renders it inauthentic. Recognizing this distinction, however, is not enough to render Dasein authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility of a non-indifferent inauthenticity and what Heidegger calls the possibility of “genuine failure”. To read an “undifferentiated mode” into Being and Time is to misunderstand its methodological progression from Dasein's average everyday, inauthentic self-understanding to its authenticity – “to the thing itself”. A select few passages may at first seem to indicate otherwise. However, Being and Time – like both being in general and Dasein itself – cannot be properly understood “without further ado”.     

Deviance‐construction in Stalinist societies: A critical analysis

This study is concerned with the definition of deviance and the processes of constructing deviance in Stalinist societies. Deviances created by the state in these societies are analyzed, especially from functionalist and phenomenologist aspects and by applying Foucault's approach. Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago is used as a starting point for the analysis. In his work, Solzhenitsyn dwells at length on the “deviances” and the process of deviance construction in Stalinist Soviet Union. It is suggested that, in these societies, “total state deviance” fits in a desacralized, demodernized world view. Finally some consequences of this deviance image still at work are discussed.     

Freud’s “Project”, Distributed Systems,and Solipsism

Abstract

This paper discusses Freud’s model of the psychical apparatus in the “Project”, and concludes that it is a remarkably sophisticated work which even today is still highly relevant to neuropsychological theorising. Freud rejects the notion that what happens in the brain can be clearly localised in space and time. This anticipates the notion of a distributed system found in recent developments in computing (“neural networks”) and in Derrida’s conception of systems characterised by différance. Every part of such a system is constituted by its relation to the rest of the system. Although such systems are spatio-temporal, processes occurring in them cannot be pinpointed in space and time. Against the common charge that Freud has a passive hydraulic-reflex model of the psychical apparatus, the authors argue that Freud presents it as an open, complex, self-organising system. Ricoeur’s (1972) claim that the model of the psychical apparatus in the “Project” is essentially solipsistic, is accordingly rejected.

In conclusion the authors explain why they prefer the model in the “Project” to the more linear model found in Ch. VII of the Traumdeutung.     

“A GREATEST MIRACLE”: STANLEY CAVELL,MORAL PERFECTIONISM,AND THE ASCENT INTO THE ORDINARY

What to make of “the ordinary,”“the everyday,” and their common “eventfulness”? What to think of what Veena Das, in her recent book Life and Words, prefaced by Stanley Cavell, has called our need to “descent into the ordinary”? Is there a parallel figure of “ascent,” again, into the same “ordinary,” that we might we want to juxtapose with it and that resembles the motif of “change,” even “conversion,” that Cavell analyzes at some length in The Claim of Reason and throughout his oeuvre as a whole? And what could be our reasons for doing so? This essay will draw on Cavell's reading of Ibsen's work in the volume Cities of Words to spell out what such an “ascent” might mean.     

The hyphen as a segmentation cue in triconstituent compound processing: it's getting better all the time

Bertram, R., Kuperman, V., Baayen, R. H. & Hyönä, J. (2011). The hyphen as a segmentation cue in triconstituent compound processing: It’s getting better all the time. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 52, 530–544. Inserting a hyphen in Dutch and Finnish compounds is most often illegal given spelling conventions. However, the current two eye movement experiments on triconstituent Dutch compounds like voetbalbond“footballassociation” (Experiment 1) and triconstituent Finnish compounds like lentokenttätaksi“airporttaxi” (Experiment 2) show that inserting a hyphen at constituent boundaries does not have to be detrimental to compound processing. In fact, when hyphens were inserted at the major constituent boundary (voetbal‐bond“football‐association”; lentokenttä‐taksi“airport‐taxi”), processing of the first part (voetbal“football”; lentokenttä“airport”) turns out to be faster when it is followed by a hyphen than when it is legally concatenated. Inserting a hyphen caused a delay in later eye movement measures, which is probably due to the illegality of inserting hyphens in normally concatenated compounds. However, in both Dutch and Finnish we found a learning effect in the course of the experiment, such that by the end of the experiments hyphenated compounds are read faster than in the beginning of the experiment. By the end of the experiment, compounds with a hyphen at the major constituent boundary were actually processed equally fast as (Dutch) or even faster than (Finnish) their concatenated counterparts. In contrast, hyphenation at the minor constituent boundary (voet‐balbond“foot‐ballassociation”; lento‐kenttätaksi“air‐porttaxi”) was detrimental to compound processing speed throughout the experiment. The results imply that the hyphen may be an efficient segmentation cue and that spelling illegalities can be overcome easily, as long as they make sense.     

“Presence” and “Absence”: Kaleidoscopic Hide and Seek: Reply to Commentaries

In this reply I respond to Cambray’s introduction of the “self-organizing” and “emergent” qualities of telepathic communication, looking more closely at the relationship between dissociation and the emergence of telepathic phenomena. I highlight the creative aspect of such telepathic “intrusions,” viewing the clinician’s capacity for intuitive imagination as key to the emergence of telepathic material. In response to Eshel’s connection between the analyst’s “presence,” “absence,” and the patient’s unmet need for recognition, I examine the roles of co-construction and mutual dissociation in transference-countertransference enactments that generate uncanny phenomena. Verbal interpretation not always being the most viable mode of communication, “absence” can sometimes serve as a co-constructed, unconscious “solution” to the problem of multiple conflicting needs, holding a space for telepathic emergence to express the inexpressable.     

The asymmetry and temporal dynamics of incidental letter–location bindings in working memory

Verbal–spatial bindings are integral to routine cognitive operations (e.g., reading), yet the processes supporting them in working memory are little understood. Campo and colleagues [Campo, P., Poch, C., Parmentier, F. B. R., Moratti, S., Elsley, J. V., Castellanos, N., … Maestú, F. (2010). Oscillatory activity in prefrontal and posterior regions during implicit letter-location binding. Neuroimage, 49, 2807–2815] recently reported data suggesting obligatory letter–location binding when participants were directed to remember the letters in a display (of letters in locations), but no evidence for binding when instructed to remember the filled locations. The present study contrasted two explanations for this binding asymmetry. First, it may result from an obligatory dependence on “where” during the representation of “what” information, while “where” information may be held independently of its contents (the strong asymmetry hypothesis). Second, it may constitute a snapshot of a dynamic feature inhibition process that had partially completed by test: the asymmetrical inhibition hypothesis. Using Campo and colleagues’ task with a variable retention interval between display and test, we presented four consonants in distinct locations and contrasted performance between “remember letters” and “remember locations” instructions. Our data supported the strong asymmetry hypothesis through demonstrating binding in the verbal task, but not in the spatial task. Critically, when present, verbal–spatial bindings were remarkably stable, enduring for at least 15 seconds.     

Conceptual Constructs and Social Classes: A Review of Capitalizing Religion

Capitalizing Religion is a good addition to the growing number of works in the last decade that examine the intertwinings of religion, spirituality, and capitalism in the neoliberal present. Through an examination of scholarly discourses on modern religion and contemporary fiction and spirituality manuals, Martin demonstrates how, within the consumer capitalist present, the ideologies of individualism, consumption, quietism, and productivity shape conversations, habits, relationships, and fantasies. Martin tells us that the goal of social theory should be to account for how individuals and their choices are propelled by the material, historical, and structural forces that constitute them. He is a writer who has long been particularly attentive to the fact that “religion” is not some particular entity that exists “out there” that can be examined, but rather a bounded construct whose definition – through processes of inclusion and exclusion – performs works of distinction that benefit some interests, groups, and individuals to the detriment of others. Capitalizing Religion reminds us that the choices that many sociologists of religion make in dividing social formations into categories such as “religious,” “spiritual,” “institutional,” “individual,” or “paranormal” don’t just describe the world, but rather attempt to constitute it through taxonomies that are anything but natural and given.     

Aristotle,Plato and Bhagvad Gita on the “Soul”

This paper broadly aims at examining the idea of the “soul” or “atma” in ancient Greece and in India during the Axial Age. Against the backdrop of this general understanding, an attempt is made at comprehending the idea of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo in the light, on the one hand of Aristotle’s De Anima and on the other of Bhagavad Gita (or Gita in short). It is opined that Socrates’s views, in Phaedo, are closer in spirit to the Hindu ideas of “atma” in the Upanishads and the Gita than to the Greek ideas of the “soul”. An attempt has been made to provide a background for this paradoxical event.

     

Biomatrix: The web of life

Abstract

The interrelationship between all things on earth has long been accepted. It is known that we are part of a great, complex network of processes, sections of which extend to the small building blocks of our bodies. But how are the parts of this network connected together? Is there perhaps a simple overall pattern? We believe that there exists such a pattern which incorporates all living as well as lifeless matter on earth. We refer to this network as the “biomatrix” and define it as the “living network of all things on earth.”

There are units or elements composing the matrix. We call these doublets, within and around which essentially two types of processes, viz., endodynamic and exodynamic processes, take place. Endodynamic processes are those which are directed in purpose toward the components of the doublet in question. Exodynamic processes, on the other hand, are those which have purposes directed toward the greater doublets of which the doublet in question forms a part. All things, lifeless as well as living and organizational entities, from atoms to societies and the total ecosystem, can be thought of as doublets of the biomatrix.

The matrix is not a simple net, such as the fisherman's, in which all knots are the same and are placed alongside one another. The web of life on earth is complex. The connecting strands are processes, endodynamic or exodynamic, and the knots are the doublets. Although many doublets occur alongside one another, they also occur within one another in a “Chinese‐box hierarchy” fashion, viz., those of greater complexity generally enclosing the simpler ones.

A general scheme pertaining to the biomatrix is discussed and it is shown that for an optimally functioning system there must be a balance between the endodynamic and exodynamic processes relating to all doublets within the system.

It is hoped that our efforts will contribute to the evolution of a generally accepted systems framework for life on earth. It is important that such a framework be applicable to practical problems which confront us in everyday affairs.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

Architecture of the Unconscious

Finally, when Freud unveiled the predominant role of the unconscious in psychic processes, it turned out that our ego does not even rule its own house.

— Slavoj ?i?ek, How to Read Lacan

Get up off the pavement, brush the dirt up off my psyche …

— rapper Earl Sweatshirt, “Chum” In the Kitchen

Psychoanalysis is known primarily for its preoccupation with the “truth” that “speaks.” Following the critical tradition pioneered by Lacan and now ?i?ek, I would instead like to shift our attention to the “site[s]” where these pivotal experiments in truth take place—the environments we transform and the objects we fashion as we “learn to live with” the social plight we have inherited. Simply put, the aim of this paper is to explore the architecture of the unconscious. To develop this argument, I draw upon an array of genres and cultural artifacts, including personal memoir, cartoons, and hip hop lyricism.