Self-Transcendence: Integrating Ends and Means in Value Counseling

Pastoral counseling is distinguished from secular counseling by “limit experiences.” These are experiences that disclose the fullness of self-transcendence—for Christians, a personal relationship with God. But the radical drive of the human spirit for self-transcendence unifies every dimension of the developing person. This drive thus forms the basis of a fundamental continuity between pastoral and secular counseling in their directions and methods, despite clear differences in boundaries, categories, and languages.     

FORGIVING ENEMIES IN IRELAND

The Peace Process in Northern Ireland is about to reach another milestone: the Consultative Group on the Past is due to publish a report in the autumn of 2008 on “the best way to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland” and to support the building of “a shared future.” It is timely therefore to think again—and further—about what political expression forgiveness might find, using the concrete case of Northern Ireland today as grist for our conceptual mill. This essay opens with two preliminaries: an account of what forgiveness is and how it relates to resentment, punishment, repentance, and reconciliation; and a brief summary of the “Troubles.” It then proceeds to caution that reconciliation will have to be realized in the midst of persistent enmity; to explore what a Truth Commission might achieve, and the limits of it; to consider whether the discovery of fresh truth should issue in further judicial proceedings, and how far these will disturb the Peace Process; and to suggest that the British Government could erect public memorials to the dead on all sides. It concludes that in addition to Government action, there is need for the popular exercise of certain virtues—including grateful, hopeful patience, forgiveness‐as‐compassion, and public penitence.     

Nominalism and Idealism

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

The “Strange Acts of God:”The Hermeneutics of Concealment and Revelation in Luther and Shakespeare

Abstract: Martin Luther called himself “God's court‐jester”. He saw history as one of the “masks of God,” and he understood God as hiding Godself often behind the mask of the Devil. Luther developed a paradoxical theology, a theology of the cross, that is surprisingly compatible in certain respects with the paradoxical artistic vision of Shakespeare, especially in Hamlet, King Lear and Measure for Measure. Crucial motifs of Luther's theology—the hidden God, indirect revelation, revelation by concealment, revelation under the opposite, the “strange acts of God,” God's “rearward parts”(posteriora), and suffering (Anfechtungen and melancholy)—resonate with certain latent, even if at times blasphemeous, theological motifs and themes in Shakespeare. They also resonate with the experience of the Lutheran church in Hungary both in its past under communism and today in post‐communist Hungary.     

Patriotism in Early China

This paper considers the difference between the values attached to love of country in early China and in today’s world, through exploration of a series of concept clusters centered on “loyalty,” “glory,” “honor,” and “identity.” Using a wide array of sources, including legends about exemplary figures in antiquity, it assesses the extent to which patriotism or something like patriotism was a normative value in the distant past. It also outlines the appropriate limits of patriotism which the early thinkers insisted upon, thinking them useful guidelines for today.     

Can Multimodal and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy be Reconciled?

The purpose of this article is to determine whether two distinct modes of cognitive-behaviour therapy—Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Multimodal Therapy (MMT)—can be reconciled. This quest in the spirit of integrationism is pursued along three lines of inquiry: Do we talk about schools, approaches, or techniques? A reconciliation between MMT and REBT as systems seems not to be feasible, just because of the simple fact that MMT is not a new school with an idiosyncratic theory, whereas REBT is. However, REBT is also a congenial approach consisting of various eclectic techniques, as is MMT. It is explained how the A-B-C format and firing orders of the BASICI.D. modalities stem from an S-O-R model. Furthermore, the circular character of the various modalities (thinking, feeling, and behaving) is recognised both in MMT and in REBT. The techniques used in REBT and MMT overlap for 65–80%, according to a comparative perusal of Ellis's and Lazarus's presentations of preferred techniques. This means that MMT and REBT, as an approach with distinct techniques, “must” be very similar in practice. The conclusion is that philosophically Ellis and Lazarus see eye-to-eye and that MMT and REBT overlap a great deal. But a fusion is not yet at hand. At best the two can be described as two sides of one coin. “When you wake up in the morning, Pooh,” said Piglet at last, “what's the first thing you say to yourself?” “What's for breakfast?” said Pooh. “What do you say, Piglet?” “I say, I wonder what's going to happen exciting today?” said Piglet. Pooh nodded thoughtfully. “It's the same thing,” he said. “What's that?” the Unbeliever asked. “Wisdom from a Western Taoist,” I said. “It sounds like something from Winnie-the Pooh,” he said. “It is,” I said. From The Tao of Pooh Benjamin Hoff (1982)     

A Narrative Search for Respect

This article examines narratives of the self used by stigmatized people searching for respect on the streets of Oslo, Norway. The three narratives—“it was my own choice,” “I'm decent,” and “we're the same”—are embedded in conventional discourse. They are utilized in claims to be morally decent selves. Three different narratives—“I'm interesting,” “I'm smart,” and “I'm dangerous”—are embedded in the gangster discourse of a violent street subculture. They are utilized in order to appear as fascinating and competent. This ambivalent presentation of self challenges concepts such as “the code of the street” and “street culture.”     

Reality-Humanity (Self-Liberated from the Stave in the Wheels)

Adi Da argues that no solutions currently proposed are sufficient to righten the present unsustainable trajectory of life on Earth, because there is no integrated approach to the ordering of society and use of the planet. The presumption of separateness—manifesting collectively as separate “tribes” vying for control—characterizes human affairs, rather than the prior (“a priori”) unity of existence. The struggle for dominance is the “stave in the wheels” of the Earth-system's inherent capacity to self-correct. A new institution, “the Global Cooperative Forum,” is proposed—invoked by “everybody-all-at-once” (a global populace awakened as a single force, capable of cooperatively effecting global change).     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

“无”的领悟及中西形上学的一个向度——王弼与海德格尔的视域比较

在人们较多关注老子与海德格尔哲学比较的情况下,此文另辟王弼与海德格尔哲学的比较视角,围绕王弼与海德格尔的“无”概念,从他们关怀“无”的社会史背景、追问和开启“无”的不同方式以及他们在什么意义上把握和领悟“无”等方面,具体而微地展现了王弼和海德格尔“无”的多层面性及其各自内涵,并揭示了“无”在中西形而上学中的非主流性位置。     

Symmetry and asymmetry in interpersonal relations--with implications for the concept of projection

This paper first reviews evidence for some proposals about interpersonal relations These relations tend to be “symmetrical” or “asymmetrical”—i.e, involve similar or dissimilar characteristics for the two parties—depending on what the characteristics are. Certain characteristics (eg., love-hate) are—and are perceived to be—symmetrical, and others (eg, dominance-submission) asymmetrical The implications are then illustrated for the concept of projection A process of attributing to others characteristics that “explain” one's own would account for symmetrical projection for certain characteristics and asymmetrical projection for others This reformulation can provide a simpler and more unified account for cases that are traditionally treated separately as “supplementary” and “complementary” projection     

Recognizing Charles Rycroft

This article aims to outline, in brief, the life and work of Charles Rycroft. He had been one of the brilliant and fecund psychoanalysts of the second half of the Twentieth century, although his legacy has unfortunately often been neglected. The author suggests that this might have been because of his withdrawal from the British Psychoanalytic Society, which made him, in many ways, “invisible” to his own colleagues and that continues even today—more than ten years after his death—to preclude a real recognition of his personal and original clinical thinking and working style.     

Ein „now moment“ unter der Lupe

This paper is based on the publications of Daniel Stern’s Process of Change Study Group, which contain new hypotheses concerning the analytical process and how it works. The various stages in the system proposed by this group (“moving along”—”now moment”—”moment of meeting”) are illustrated by a case history with regard to relevant aspects of the transference and with special emphasis on the observed countertransference. The hypothesis used to explain the detailed “now moment” and “moment of meeting” is based on psychoanalytical considerations. This process is analyzed with reference to the concepts of “reparative regression” or “regression for the sake of recognition”, progression and regression, fulguration, and creativity, autonomy, and intimacy.     

The Scientific Self: Reclaiming Its Place in the History of Research Ethics

How can the history of research ethics be expanded beyond the standard narrative of codification—a story that does not reach back beyond World War II—without becoming so broad as to lose all distinctiveness? This article proposes a history of research ethics focused on the “scientific self,” that is, the role-specific identity of scientists as typically described in terms of skills, competencies, qualities, or dispositions. Drawing on three agenda-setting texts from nineteenth-century history, biology, and sociology, the article argues that the “revolutions” these books sought to unleash were, among other things, revolts against inherited conceptions of scientific selfhood. They tried to redefine the scientific self in their respective fields of inquiry by advocating particular catalogs of virtues or character traits. These ideals of selfhood, their contested nature notwithstanding, translated into practice in so far as they influenced hiring and selection policies and found their way into educational systems. The project of reclaiming the scientific self as an important subject of study in the history of research ethics is not an antiquarian pursuit, but related to an ethical question faced by scientists today: How are their scientific selves being shaped by funding schemes, research evaluation protocols, and academic hiring policies?     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Forcing materialism upon metaphysics: Three approaches to Adorno's method

Recent Adorno scholarship has been shaped by the idea that his critical theory cannot account coherently for its own method. Call this the Problem of Adornian Critical Theory (PACT). In this paper, I examine three recent approaches to Adorno—the “ethics of resistance” (associated with Gordon Finlayson and Brian O'Connor), “negative naturalism” (associated with Fabian Freyenhagen), and “inverse theology” (associated with Peter E. Gordon). Individually, I argue, all three approaches are subject to a key limitation that prevents them from being able to solve the PACT. But, by synthesising them, we can see how the scholarship already—effectively—possesses a solution to it. The synthesis that results is characterised in terms of “materialist metaphysics”—a position Adorno can clearly be read as articulating in the “Meditations on Metaphysics” chapter of Negative Dialectics.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

The re-emergence of emergence,and the causal role of synergy in emergent evolution

Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about how to define emergence but “reductionist” and “holistic” theorists hold very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their interactions, is essential for answering the “how” question in evolution—how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why” question—why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” In contrast, the “Synergism Hypothesis” focuses on the “economics”—the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences in evolutionary change. This paper also argues that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a larger universe of cooperative, synergistic effects in the natural world.