Insights from sadness: A three-step model of the development of altruism as hedonism

Research into the effects of sad mood on prosocial action is reviewed and is used as a vehicle for examining the transformation of altruism from a punishing to a gratifying event. A three-step model of the socialization of altruism as a reinforcer is proposed. The model argues for (a) an initial stage (presocialization) in which altruism occurs rarely among young children because of its punishing function, (b) a second stage (awareness of norms) in which altruism functions as a mechanism for the receipt of positive sanctions, and (c) a final stage (internalization) in which, by adulthood, altruism has acquired a gratifying function through its status as a conditioned reinforcer. Evidence for the functional equivalence of self-gratification and adult altruism is also presented.     

Searching for the enriching sense of otherness: The psychoanalytic psychotherapist as a meaning-bearing other

Abstract

This paper is a theoretical and clinical examination of the patient's search for the otherness of the therapist as a prerequisite for change and development in relational psychoanalytic psychotherapy. A basic assumption is that being in a relationship as well as being a personal self, is to be understood, as being with a “meaning-bearing other”; that is, someone who allows for the possibility of meaningful thoughts and feelings, either through an actual communicative presence or as a consciously, prereflective, or unconsciously imagined communication partner. The term “meaning-bearing other” is used to differentiate distinct, although often synchronic, modes of relatedness. The need for intersubjective “depth”—that is, to discover the otherness of the other, and for oneself to be recognized as an experiencing subject—is regarded as a main motivational force. Winnicott's, as well as Sullivan's developmental approaches, Mitchell and Aron's views on psychoanalytic interaction, and Heidegger and Gadamer's phenomenology and hermeneutics are used as theoretical points of reference for the present discourse. The theoretical points of view are examined and discussed through excerpts from twice-a-week psychotherapy with a six-year old girl.     

The nature and scope of global ethics and the relevance of the Earth Charter

This article presents global ethics as critical reflection on the nature, justification and application of a global ethic. Much of the article focuses on the nature of a global ethic as the content of global ethics, e.g. whether it is thick or thin, is about universal values or transnational responsibilities, is a set of values justified by a particular thinker, values widely shared or values universally accepted. Global ethics itself as a process is also examined. In the last part the Earth Charter is examined as an example of a global ethic, and a case is made for regarding it, both in respect to its content and in respect to the senses in which it is and is not a global ethic, as an appropriate subject matter for global ethics.     

Avoiding Colonizer Positions in the Therapy Room: Some Ideas About the Challenges of Dealing with the Dialectic of Misery and Resources in Families

Some authors have argued that certain acts of family therapists—despite their best intentions—may represent a form of colonizing the family. When acting as a colonizer, a therapist is understood as becoming overly responsible for the family and focusing too strongly on change. In so doing, the therapist disrespects the family's pace, and neglects their own resources for change. This paper aims to highlight the need for therapists to be hypersensitive both to the resources of families entering therapy as well as to the impact of prevailing ideologies on their own positioning in the session. The kind of sensitivity advocated here is dialectical in the sense that every family is understood as having potentials promoting dynamism, happiness, and well-being as well as potentials contributing to stagnation, unhappiness, and misery. In this article, using illustrations from clinical practice, we present some ideas for resisting the tendency by the therapist to assume a colonizing position as a professional solver of problems for families. Our main aim here is to redirect the therapist toward connecting with the family's suffering, as well as with the resource repertoire it has developed for navigating and negotiating its way through life.     

The morality of weapons research

I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as ‘defensive’ weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.     

Conceptualizations of Fair Play: A Factorial Survey Study of Moral Judgments by Badminton Players

There is much discussion in sports on whether certain behavior should be considered Fair Play. This moral judgment on Fair Play is influenced by the conceptualization of the term Fair Play as either “respect for the rules” or “respect for the spirit of the game,” as well as by other determinants. To uncover the moral judgment of athletes and which conceptualization of Fair Play dominates in practice, a factorial survey approach is used. The act and the level of the match played a role in the judgment, as well as the gender of the athlete. Our results showed that both conceptualizations “respect for the rules” and “respect for the spirit of the game” were important in this judgment, with the spirit conceptualization being more dominant.     

The relationship of the inner and the outer in psychoanalysis

What is internal and what is external according to psychoanalytic theory? This is a surprisingly complicated question. The terminology is often ambiguous and inconsistent as, for instance, in the use of terms like ‘object’ and ‘other’. The relationship between internal and external in psychoanalysis is analysed from a philosophical, concept analytical, developmental psychological, methodological and trauma versus internal dynamics point of view. It is argued that psychoanalytical writing is influenced by the authors’ need to create their personal psychoanalytic theory and language. This is seen as one of the main reasons for the terminological variety and ambiguity in psychoanalytic writing. It is also argued that one particular reason for difficulties concerning the internal–external terminology is the existential anxiety awakened by the threat of the essential aloneness of man. The consciousness of this has a tendency to fade and lead to unclear terminology. The importance of the transitional world as a resting place from the hard reality of this essential aloneness is emphasized. The transitional world is also seen as a necessary part of psychoanalytical practice, as an aid in striving for the truth and reality, important goals of psychoanalysis.     

Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology

A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology called dialectical pluralism is proposed in this paper. It is argued that this approach provides an effective and efficient basis for scientific progress in psychology. Three primary components of dialectical pluralism are developed. First, drawing on Royce's constructive dialectics, it is contended that tension between competing theories should be sustained in the hope of producing evaluative or integrative solutions. Second, the unity-disunity debate in psychology is reframed as a continuum and it is argued that oscillating periods of convergent and divergent pluralism would provide a productive model for scientific progress. Finally, intercontextualism is discussed as the underlying philosophical foundation for dialectical pluralism. This alternative to both mainstream psychology's positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as competing positions that may be more contextualist in orientation, is expounded as the justification for this new conceptualization. In particular, the limits of a methodological unity based on positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as of a pragmatic pluralism based on contextualist foundations, are both addressed by intercontextualism. As a result, dialectical pluralism may provide a middle ground between these two distinctive factions within psychology, while alleviating the fragmentation of the discipline.     

Going Somewhere: An Ecological and Experimental Approach to Development of Mobility

This article formulates a framework for understanding mobility and how it develops. Research is summarized as a foundation for a theoretical framework. Studies are briefly described that deal with development of detection of a surface of support adequate for traversal, development of the ability to maintain equilib- rium during stance and bipedal locomotion, and development of guided locomo- tion on a path to a destination in a cluttered environment. The informational basis for perceiving essential behavioral supports is examined. The concept of affordance as it relates to and is constrained by developing exploratory and action systems is stressed as an essential part of the theoretical framework for develop- ment. Mobility development is seen as best approached within a functional systems theory with components, both perceptual and motor, coming together in the course of development to permit emergence of new skills, such as crawling and walking, in the service of going somewhere.     

Between private and public: Towards a conception of the transitional subject

Elaborating upon Winnicott’s seminal contributions on the transitional object, the author proposes a conception of a transitional subject in which the patient comes into being simultaneously between private and public, subjective creation and material life, me and not‐me. By anchoring subjective creation in the real world (including the body), the patient creates a basis for authentic psychesoma as well as for both personal and symbolic contributions to the world beyond omnipotence, including the world of other subjects. In this sense, intersubjective life is seen as predicated upon transitionality, with the patient seen as simultaneously coming into being as a distinctly personal subject and, in part, as a symbol. Clinical phenomenology is described and is interpreted with respect to the need within psychoanalysis itself for a third, and for a realm of meaning‐creation that lies beyond privacy, omnipotence, and the dyad.     

An analysis of the word-superiority effect

It is easier to decide which of two letters was presented tachistoscopically if the critical letter was in a word rather than in a scrambled word. We showed that this word-superiority effect holds just as strongly for pronounceable nonwords as for words, even when the critical letters are constant over all trials. This finding rules out word meaning and familiarity as variables accounting for the effect. In addition, it was found that the superiority of pronounceable stimuli holds for two-letter stimuli as well as four, and it is therefore concluded that the effect is not due to a memory limitation. An explanation of the effect in terms of the use of additional acoustic information is ruled out by showing that the effect was not diminished when the two possible words sounded exactly alike. An experiment using correctly and incorrectly spelled chemical formulas suggested that spelling regularities, regardless of pronounceability per se, account for the superiority effect. Finally, when decisions about two critical letters must be made on each trial, the correlation between being correct on one and on the other is higher for pronounceable stimuli under some conditions.     

The paradox of healing pain

Pain may be seen as a problem to be healed or as a means for healing. The secular biomedical view of pain is that it is to be avoided and alleviated; its only meaning is as a symptom of underlying disease. In contrast, there have been throughout history other views of suffering—as redemptive or as transformative, for example. This paper considers the disparity between these perspectives, examining the role of the emotions and the underlying neurobiological processes though which pain and suffering come to be experienced as meaningful, then analyzes interview material exploring how religion and religious beliefs help people cope with suffering or with pain. The experience of pain is subjective, enculturated experience; the meaning that pain or suffering holds within a given cultural context affects the experience of pain and suffering. In a context where pain and suffering are understood to be valuable, those experiences can be used for spiritual transformation and integrated within a meaningful identity. In contrast, in a context where pain and suffering are not understood to have value, that attitude can create more suffering, even in conditions meant to alleviate suffering, such as in biomedical situations.     

Revisiting the Notion of Hierarchy

The traditional definition of hierarchy in terms of power has rendered the image of the hierarchical therapist a fit subject for constructionist critiques. This essay uses an alternative definition of hierarchy, cast in temporal and developmental terms, as the basis for a revised understanding of the role of hierarchy in the therapeutic process. It is argued that when therapy is constructed as a “framing-developing hierarchy,” rather than as a “power hierarchy,” then constructionist aspirations to create a therapy that is nonjudgmental, nonpathologizing, and noncontrolling are realized.     

A Formal Recognition of Social Attachments: Expanding Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition

Axel Honneth draws a distinction between three types of recognition: (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem. In his The Struggle for Recognition, the recognition of cultural particularity is situated in the third sphere. It will here be argued that the logic of recognition of cultural identity also demands a non‐evaluative recognition, namely a respect for difference. Difference‐respect is formal because it is a recognition of the value of a particular culture not “for society” or “as such”, but for the social group involved. Yet, although it is formal, difference‐respect cannot be reduced to respect for personal autonomy and its preconditions, as Honneth wrongly suggests in Redistribution or Recognition? It is argued here that difference‐respect is oriented towards another dimension of the person, namely social attachments. This kind of respect entails a separate register of formal recognition with a corresponding concept of personal identity and a parallel category of social disrespect. What morally justifies difference‐respect from a recognition‐theoretic approach is the practical relation‐to‐self that thus becomes possible, namely self‐respect as a sense of belonging. The formal conception of the good life that Honneth articulates should include the insight that this sense of belonging is as much a necessary condition for the good life as is personal autonomy.     

The universe of our concerns: the human as person in the praxis of analysis

Since its inception, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists have used the reductionistic methods of science to explain both human development and analytic practice. The most recent iteration of this tendency uses attachment as the explanatory principle. This disposition has created theories that understand the human solely as an organism. While this is a satisfactory way to view human development, it is not appropriate for the practice of analysis. In this context, the human must be viewed as a person that is explicable in his/her own terms. Interpretation based on reductionism eliminates personhood. Humans appear as persons in 'the feeling of what happens' or of 'being there', and, on the basis of this experience, develop stories in which their personhood evolves. The psychoanalytic, philosophical and neuro-scientific basis for this view of the human as person is discussed, and its relevance for analytic practice is considered.     

孔子“忠恕”思想发微

“忠恕”在孔子儒学中具有方法论的重要意义,朱熹解释其意义说：“尽己之谓忠,推己之谓恕。”这就准确地指出了它在词性上既有形容词性又有动词性的特点,这也就意味着它的含义不会局限于道德一域,而是具有极丰富的内涵。具体说来,它同时具有个人道德修养、社会政治实践和知识论三个层次的含义。当然,这三者在“忠恕”中是一个以一贯之的混融整体,我们这样区分,纯粹是为了论述的方便。     

Constancy and illusion of apparent direction of rotary motion in depth: Tests of a theory

An explanation of apparent direction of rotary motion in depth derived from a general theory of perceptual constancy and illusion is proposed with experimental data in its support. Apparent direction of movement is conceived of as exhibiting-perceptual constancy or illusion as a function of apparent direction of orientation m depth for plane objects and apparent relative depth for three-dimensional objects. Apparent reversals of movement direction represent either regular fluctuations between constancy and illusion of direction as a function of valid and invalid stimuli for orientation, or irregular and random fluctuations in their absence. In three preliminary experiments, the apparent movement direction of plane ellipses was investigated as a function of surface pattern information for orientation, and in Experiment I apparent reversals during 20-revolution trials were studied. In Experiment II, apparent movement direction of 3D elliptical V shapes as a function of surface pattern information for relative depth was investigated. In addition to supporting the explanation proposed, the data offer a resolution of a conflict between different theories of apparent reversal of motion in depth.     

Investigation concerning the possibility of rational ethics

Ethical behavior such as self‐sacrifice and striving for juistice—the natural striving for a general prosperity for humans—is not mainly learned but is carried by a natural altruism from one generation to the next. It is based on group (rather than individual) altruism which has concentrated on protection of the aged (as preservers of knowledge) and the young (as preservers of future generations).

It is proposed that the strongest possible nature form of community is the “amorisation community"—in effect, one in which love produces more love. A case is presented for the creation of a world scientific and cultural transformation based on the ethics of the “amorisation community.”     

Satisfying the Demands of Reason: Hegel's Conceptualization of Experience

Hegel had taken the Kantian categories of thought to be merely formal, without content, since, he argued, Kant abstracted the conditions of thought from the world. The Kantian categories can, as such, only be understood subjectively and so are unable to secure a content for themselves. Hegel, following Fichte, tried to provide a content for the logical categories. In order to reinstate an objective status for logic and conceptuality he tries to affirm the unity of thought and being. The idea that this unity is established by reinstating a pre-Kantian metaphysics has in most of the recent Hegel literature been discredited. In the wake of this non-metaphysical Hegel there is a concern that the architectonic of concepts which is taken as the organizing principle of consciousness offers an account of experience which is too schematic. While Hegel disputes the intuition/concept distinction as it is played out in Kant and Fichte, he does nevertheless retain some residue of a notion of intuition in his theory of the Concept. This is central to understanding his notion of experience as it can't simply be equated with rule governed conceptuality. Satisfying the demands of reason for Hegel requires more than conceiving our experience solely as judgments. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.