The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: a Problem for Coherentism

The author argues that coherence views of justification, in spite of their crucial insight into the interpenetration of our beliefs, neglect a key constraint on justification: they are unable to accommodate the epistemic significance of experience. Epistemic justification is not just a function of our beliefs and their interrelations. Both, beliefs and experiences, are relevant to the justification of an empirical belief. Experience is not itself a form of belief or disposition to believe; it cannot be analyzed in doxastic terms. And, yet, nondoxastic experiences play a justificatory role, not merely a causal role. The positive epistemic status of a perceptual belief depends upon being appeared to in appropriate ways. It is important that, for an ordinary perceptual belief to be justified, one does not have to believe that one is appeared to in these ways. It is the experiences themselves, the ways of being appeared to, not our beliefs about them, that are required for justification.     

ON THE COHERENCE OF HIGHER‐ORDER BELIEFS

Let us by ‘first‐order beliefs’ mean beliefs about the world, such as the belief that it will rain tomorrow, and by ‘second‐order beliefs’ let us mean beliefs about the reliability of first‐order, belief‐forming processes. In formal epistemology, coherence has been studied, with much ingenuity and precision, for sets of first‐order beliefs. However, to the best of our knowledge, sets including second‐order beliefs have not yet received serious attention in that literature. In informal epistemology, by contrast, sets of the latter kind play an important role in some respectable coherence theories of knowledge and justification. In this paper, we extend the formal treatment of coherence to second‐order beliefs. Our main conclusion is that while extending the framework to second‐order beliefs sheds doubt on the generality of the notorious impossibility results for coherentism, another problem crops up that might be no less damaging to the coherentist project: facts of coherence turn out to be epistemically accessible only to agents who have a good deal of insight into matters external to their own belief states.     

The Role of Moral Beliefs,Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity

People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., about murder) versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., about abortion). The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change (Study 2) and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change (Study 3). We discuss the role that social relationships play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy.     

Health Promotion,Health Locus of Control,and Health Behavior: Two Field Experiments1

In spite of a sizable body of research on the effects of information promotions on health knowledge and health behavior, relatively little is known about how such efforts affect change (or why they do not). This paper addresses that problem by exploring the particular role that health locus of control (HLC) beliefs play in individual responses to health promotion efforts aimed at encouraging preventive health behaviors. Two field experiments are presented. The first experiment examined the extent to which HLC beliefs are related to differences in individual levels of health knowledge following the distribution of an informational booklet on health. Internals high on health value who received the information booklet demonstrated greater health knowledge three months later than did other subjects, although this difference was greater among men than among women. The second experiment explored how HLC beliefs interact with differently framed “control” messages to promote behavior change in breast self-examination (BSE). HLC beliefs interacted with the control language of the BSE promotional message and a neutral reminder to affect subsequent BSE practice. Together, these studies suggest a more influential role for health locus of control beliefs in shaping responses to health messages than has previously been documented in field settings.     

‘Tell me what I want to hear’: Motivated recall and attributions in media regarding asylum seekers

Within Australia, divisive debates regarding the processing of asylum seekers have delivered increasing polarisation rather than convergence on an evidence‐based, humane approach. In order to investigate the role of motivated reasoning (the idea that our judgment is based on our motivations) with respect to attributions of warmth and competence, 186 participants indicated the extent to which they accepted false beliefs regarding asylum seekers. They read an article rebutting such false beliefs and then reported their attitudes towards the author and the extent to which the author possessed warmth and competence traits. They then reported whether they agreed with the information in the article before completing a test of recall. Participants who disagreed with the article recalled less accurate information and rated authors significantly lower on warmth and competence. These findings suggest that motivated reasoning plays an important role in the way stereotypes are applied and in the way information is processed.     

Epistemological beliefs and approaches to learning: Their change through secondary school and their influence on academic performance

Background. In recent decades, two lines of research, phenomenographic and meta‐cognitive, have examined students' approaches and epistemological beliefs about learning. To date there has been very little research describing the change in epistemological beliefs in European secondary students, or analysing interrelationships between epistemological beliefs and approaches in order to explain their influence on academic performance. Aims. The first aim of this investigation is to analyse the change in epistemological beliefs and learning approaches in secondary students as they progress through their studies. The second aim is to examine the effects of epistemological beliefs on learning approaches, and learning approaches on academic performance. Sample. About 1,600 Spanish students, boys and girls, from several secondary schools took part in the study. They were between 12 and 20 years old and their average age was 14.79 years. Methods. Measures of epistemological beliefs (EQ: Epistemological Questionnaire), learning approaches (LPQ: Learning Process Questionnaire), and academic performance were obtained. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to examine the dimensionality of the EQ and LPQ questionnaires. In order to achieve our two aims, different statistical techniques were used: MANOVA and ANOVA for our first aim, and structural equation modelling for our second aim. Results. Throughout secondary education epistemological beliefs undergo change, becoming more realistic and complex, and deep‐approach scores decline significantly. It was shown that, as predicted, epistemological beliefs influenced academic achievement directly, and also indirectly via students' learning approaches. Conclusions. Our findings point to two conclusions. First, epistemological beliefs and learning approaches change as pupils advance in their studies. Second, the relationship between epistemological beliefs and academic achievement is mediated by approaches to learning.     

Intersubjectivity and Receptive Experience

Wilfrid Sellars's iconic exposé of the ‘myth of the given’ taught us that experience must present the world to us as normatively laden, in the sense that the contents of experience must license inferences, rule out and justify various beliefs, and rationalize actions. Somehow our beliefs must be governed by the objects as they present themselves to us. Often this requirement is cashed out using language that attributes agent‐like properties to objects: we are described as ‘accountable to’ objects, while objects ‘hold us’ to standards, and so forth. But such language is either deeply anti‐naturalistic or trades on a set of metaphors in need of a literal translation. We offer an explanation of how the material features of the world, as received in experience, can rationally constrain our beliefs and practices—one that makes no recourse to this imagery. In particular, we examine the structure of ostensive practices (that is, practices of directing one another's attention to objects and features of the world) and the distinctive role they play in making us jointly beholden to how things actually are.     

Irrational and Metacognitive Beliefs Mediate the Relationship Between Content Beliefs and GAD Symptoms: A Study on a Normal Population

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) and Metacognitive Therapy (MCT) models show both similarities and differences in conceptualizing anxiety. This work assumes that REBT’s irrational and MCT’s metacognitive beliefs play a mediation role while CBT’s disorder specific content beliefs act as triggers. This hypothesis is tested using a regression model in which metacognitive and irrational beliefs play a mediation role while content disorder beliefs are independent variables. This paper applied this model to generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), a psychiatric diagnosis in which anxiety is the major feature. In GAD, the specific content beliefs are negative problem orientation and intolerance of uncertainty. Therefore, 149 non clinical subjects completed 4 self-report questionnaires: the Negative Orientation to the Problems Questionnaire and the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale as measures for content cognitive beliefs, the Attitudes and Beliefs Scale for irrational beliefs, and the Metacognitive Questionnaire 30 Items Version for metacognitive beliefs. The generalized anxiety disorder questionnaire was chosen in order to measure anxiety as dependent variable. Regression analyses confirmed that irrational and metacognitive beliefs mediate the relation between cognitive content beliefs and GAD. We clinically interpret mediation as a second level regulation.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.     

Resource Bounded Belief Revision

The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

The Given Regained. Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience

The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that there is given element in experience which is independent of thought and which is possessed of a distinctive nonpropositional and nonconceptual content. Further, I will argue that this given element is indeed fit to play a significant evidential role in the justification of our beliefs about the world.     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

From Puddles to Potholes: The Role of Overvalued Beliefs in Emotional Problems

The bygone notion of a “fixed idea” has evolved into an appreciation for overvalued beliefs, automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs, and dysfunctional attitudes and the role they can play in the lives of many clients. Overvalued beliefs are common and can be destructive when they guide the client toward extreme emotional reactions, disruptive behavioral patterns or create negative views of self or others. Overvalued beliefs become problematic when they are not aligned with commonly accepted views of reality, they are rigidly maintained despite insufficient evidence, and they create maladaptive self-perpetuating patterns. A metaphor is used to explain how minor puddles can evolve into major potholes, creating lasting damage. The destructive power of puddles shares some similarities with the subtle influence of overvalued beliefs on a client’s emotional and interpersonal functioning. Psychotherapy can help clients to confront the misguided accuracy, limited utility, and exaggerated potency of their beliefs. Therapy can help clients to disengage from the directive power of their beliefs, learning to tolerate various thoughts without reacting at an emotional or behavioral level.     

Prospective Relations Between Dysfunctional Metacognitive Beliefs,Metacognitive Strategies,and Anxiety: Results From a Four-Wave Longitudinal Mediation Model

The metacognitive model of psychological disorders suggests that emotional disorders are related to maladaptive metacognitive strategies corresponding to underlying dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs. There is substantial empirical evidence supporting a role of metacognition in psychopathology, but fewer studies have evaluated the metacognitive model using longitudinal data and taken into consideration its differentiation between components and how they are hypothesized to be related to each other. Thus, more specific model evaluation is important as it relates to identifying mechanisms of disorder with a potential to provide clinical advances. In the present study, 868 participants took part in a 4-wave survey and reported on metacognitive beliefs and strategies and anxiety symptoms. Two longitudinal mediation models (forward and reversed causation) were run to test temporal precedence and bidirectional relations. The results indicated that metacognitive beliefs significantly predicted metacognitive strategies, which further predicted anxiety symptoms and mediated the indirect effect in the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and anxiety over time. The relationship between metacognitive beliefs and anxiety symptoms over time were bidirectional, but this relationship was not accounted for by metacognitive strategies. These findings largely support central predictions set forward by the metacognitive model and indicate that metacognitions play a preceding and maintaining role in anxiety.     

Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions

Personality approaches to politics are often criticized for not examining the effect that institutional role constraints have on individual beliefs and preferences. When leaders appear to change their stance when they change roles, it is assumed that roles have a determining influence. Modern personality theory and contemporary sociological role theory, however, view the effects of roles as interacting with agents’ personalities. In this article, we investigate this question by comparing personality profiles of three Turkish leaders (Özal, Demirel, and Gül) during their tenure as prime minister and during their subsequent time as president. For Gül, we perform an additional comparison during his time as foreign minister. The personality profiles are in the form of quantitative scores generated from machine‐coded content analysis of leaders’ words using the Leadership Trait Analysis method. We hypothesize that different leaders will be more susceptible to changing role contexts, depending on core personality traits, and that different traits are more likely to change with new roles. Overall, our results suggest that leaders’ traits are fairly resistant to changes across roles and that task orientation is the most likely trait to change as leaders adapt to different role demands and expectations. This study makes a contribution to our understanding of the interaction between personality and political contexts by offering specific theoretically derived hypotheses and by empirically and statistically examining a preliminary set of expectations that could be applied more broadly to other leaders.     

Dissolving an epistemological puzzle of time perception

Robin Le Poidevin (2007) claims that we do form perceptual beliefs regarding order and duration based on our perception of events, but neither order nor duration are by themselves objects of perception. Temporal properties are discernible only when one first perceives their bearers, and temporal relations are discernible only when one first perceives their relata. The epistemic issue remains as to whether or not our perceptual beliefs about order and duration are formed on the causal basis of an event’s objective order and duration. Le Poidevin raises this issue in the form of an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal properties. In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to which order and duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them, and such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, on my alternative account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails.     

The role of maladaptive beliefs in cognitive-behavioral therapy: Evidence from social anxiety disorder

Beliefs that are negatively biased, inaccurate, and rigid are thought to play a key role in the mood and anxiety disorders. Our goal in this study was to examine whether a change in maladaptive beliefs mediated the outcome of individual cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for social anxiety disorder (SAD). In a sample of 47 individuals with SAD receiving CBT, we measured maladaptive interpersonal beliefs as well as emotional and behavioral components of social anxiety, both at baseline and after treatment completion. We found that (a) maladaptive interpersonal beliefs were associated with social anxiety at baseline and treatment completion; (b) maladaptive interpersonal beliefs were significantly reduced from baseline to treatment completion; and (c) treatment-related reductions in maladaptive interpersonal beliefs fully accounted for reductions in social anxiety after CBT. These results extend the literature by providing support for cognitive models of mental disorders, broadly, and SAD, specifically.