What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

“What Are You?”: Racial Ambiguity,Stigma, and the Racial Formation Project

Using interview data from individuals who were frequently asked some version of the question “What are you?” in regards to their race, we apply a deviance perspective to frame these encounters as micro level racial formation projects. Racial formation projects are problematized when one’s race is not readily classifiable. These data suggest that when race is perceptibly ambiguous, stigma is assigned and normativity is enforced through discursive constraint and other means. Racially ambiguous individuals use many forms of resistance to navigate these encounters and make identity claims that either affirm or endanger the normative racial formation order.     

“A GREATEST MIRACLE”: STANLEY CAVELL,MORAL PERFECTIONISM,AND THE ASCENT INTO THE ORDINARY

What to make of “the ordinary,”“the everyday,” and their common “eventfulness”? What to think of what Veena Das, in her recent book Life and Words, prefaced by Stanley Cavell, has called our need to “descent into the ordinary”? Is there a parallel figure of “ascent,” again, into the same “ordinary,” that we might we want to juxtapose with it and that resembles the motif of “change,” even “conversion,” that Cavell analyzes at some length in The Claim of Reason and throughout his oeuvre as a whole? And what could be our reasons for doing so? This essay will draw on Cavell's reading of Ibsen's work in the volume Cities of Words to spell out what such an “ascent” might mean.     

Multiple-probe technique: a variation on the multiple baseline

Multiple-baseline and probe procedures are combined into a “multiple-probe” technique. The technique is designed to provide a thorough analysis of the relationship between an independent variable and the acquisition of a successive-approximation or chain sequence. It provides answers to the following questions: (1) What is the initial level of performance on each step in the training sequence? (2) What happens if sequential opportunities to perform each next step in the sequence are provided before training on that step? (3) What happens when training is applied? (4) What happens to the performance of remaining steps in the sequence as criterion is reached in the course of training each prior step? The technique features: (1) one initial probe of each step in the training sequence, (2) an additional probe of every step after criterion is reached on any training step, and (3) a series of “true” baseline sessions conducted just before the introduction of the independent variable to each training step. Intermittent probes also provide an alternative to continuous baseline measurement, when such measurement during extended multiple baselines (1) may prove reactive, (2) is impractical, and/or (3) a strong a priori assumption of stability can be made.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Strangers in Paradise: Trevor,Marley, and Me: Reggae Music and the Foreigner Other

The “immigrant” position calls forth a sense of “strangeness” as a constructed Other. What happens when the self is experienced as a limited, hybridized version of the self one might otherwise be, with opportunity to shape one’s identity? Intersubjectivity is conceptualized as a generative, developmental space in which the “I-ness of me” locates fertile ground for such a project. How do analyst and patient negotiate mutual experiences of alienation in a shared culture of origin, as they encounter experiences of foreignness in a foreign land? As with relational spaces, the construct, “immigrant” is positioned as a thing in itself—a transitional space—in which Otherness might be interrogated. The work of crossing boundaries at the meeting points of race and class is discussed, as two Jamaicans, embedded in the power of Reggae music, engage in psychoanalytic, and socio-political “talk.” Or, is it that we dance?     

“In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification

Traditionally, the so-called exemplification or the relation between the particular and the universal has been one of the three central problems making up the classical problem of universals: (1) What is a particular? (2) What is a universal? (3) What is the relation between the particular and the universal? I used the expression “classical problem of universals” instead of “the problem of universals” since the classical formulation of the problem could be said to contain a questionable assumption, namely that substance should be the bearer “in” which are the entities of (other) categories. Under these circumstances, a neutral approach to the problem of universals could consist in reformulating the three problems of the classical problem as follows: (4) What is the fundamental bearer of categories? (5) What categories are there? (6) What is the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories? My purpose in this paper is to answer the latter three questions. In order to accomplish this task, I shall discuss the views of two leading figures in substance-ontology, Aristotle and Jonathan Lowe, and the views of two leading figures in fact-ontology, Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann. I shall answer the first question by claiming that the fundamental bearer of categories is facts; the second, by pointing out that it depends on the answer to the previous one; and the third, by showing that the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories is the one between facts and its constituents, not between a substance or particular and its accidents or properties. In this connection, I shall argue that the “in” of property exemplification should be categorially reconstructed in order for entities other than properties, say, particulars, relations, connectives, numbers, and even facts, to be “in” facts. This categorial reconstruction will also argued for with respect to the Principle of Exemplification.     

Please May I Have a Bike? Better Yet, May I Have a Hug? An Examination of Children’s and Adolescents’ Happiness

Academic research on children’s and adolescents’ happiness has been slow to develop. This research provides an empirical investigation to answer the question, “What makes children and adolescents happy?” We explore this question in two studies with a total of 300 participants ages 8–18. Study 1 asks participants to answer the open-ended question, “What makes me happy?” There were five emergent themes—“people and pets,” “achievements,” “material things,” “hobbies,” and “sports”. Study 2 also asks participants to answer the question, “What makes me happy?”, but uses two different measures (a semi-structured thought listing task and a collage task). Using three different happiness measures, we found consistent age differences in what children perceive to make them happy.     

Towards a taxonomy of philosophical counselling

As sympathetic outsiders trying to understand and explain the field of philosophical counselling to other (perhaps not so sympathetic) outsiders, we find ourselves repeatedly asking and being asked two questions: “What is philosophical counselling?” and “What is its relationship to psychological counselling?” In seeking to develop satisfactory answers to these questions, we present a taxonomy of philosophical counselling. This fourfold taxonomy was developed by classifying the work of a range of recognised philosophical counsellors in terms of their declared ends. This taxonomy makes sense of the diversity of the field, while also recognising the underlying coherence. Moreover, the categories of the taxonomy align with existing forms of psychological counselling practice, and in this way the taxonomy enables us to pinpoint the relationship between psychological and philosophical counselling. We end with some consideration of what philosophical counsellors can learn from their colleagues in psychology, especially in relation to the role of empathy and the importance of empirical testing.     

What Does “Happiness” Prompt in Your Mind? Culture,Word Choice,and Experienced Happiness

What three words come to your mind in association with “happiness”? We analyzed the 1563 words reported by 521 Korean and American participants in this free association task. The most frequently endorsed word was “family” in Korea, whereas the most popular word among Americans was “smile.” The overall frequency of social words (e.g., relationships, social emotions) reported by Koreans was higher, and the most often mentioned relationship type differed between the two groups (family in Korea; friend in the US). Nonetheless, both in Korea and the US, individuals who mentioned more social words were significantly more satisfied with their lives. The amount of social support provision mediated the link between the number of reported social words and experienced happiness. Regardless of culture, a simple count of social words associated with happiness appears to offer a reasonably good clue for how happy the person actually is.     

Secularization and the Wider Gap in Values and Personal Religiosity Between the Religious and Nonreligious

Increasing proportions of religious nonaffiliation characterize most Western societies, although the periods over which these increases have occurred and the speed in which they happen do vary. Consequently, some nations now have larger unaffiliated groups and others much smaller ones. What is less well known is if, in areas where unaffiliated groups are larger, the religious “nones” have become more distinct from the actively religious in their attitudes and behavior. In contexts of advanced secularization, to what extent is the gap greater between the actively religious and the nonreligious when it comes to their views on family life and reproduction, for example? In regards to their levels of religiosity and spirituality in their private lives? Are the unaffiliated more liberal in their attitudes and less religious in their private life? This article sheds light on these questions by analyzing data from over 200 North American, European, and Oceanic country subregions included in the 2008 International Social Survey Programme. With hierarchical linear models, I find that, in areas where the unaffiliated form a larger proportion of the population, the differences between the actively religious and the unaffiliated in family values and personal religiosity tend to be greater.     

Secular Epiphanies: The Anatheistic Hermeneutics of Gerard Manley Hopkins

What might epiphany mean for a “secular” society? What does it mean after the death of God? This article explores the hermeneutics of immanent, planetary epiphanies in the work of Gerard Manley Hopkins. In the creative spaces between author, text, and reader new possibilities for becoming enter the world. As such we might be able to name these anatheistic epiphanies.     

#Me Too,I Was Interpellated

The #MeToo movement aims to dislodge events that occur on the sex/gender/power line from the “obviousness” of malignant supremacist patriarchy. Perhaps “what happened?” is not so obvious after all. Yet how does one FIX the meaning of a sexual event, inherently pregnant with enigma? The author borrows from textual analysis – translation, afterlife, sur-vival - to better understand the unstable nature of meaning, as it slides between different ideological structures. A few short cases, each undoing its former, demonstrate the problematic nature of attempting to FIX “What Happened?”.     

History’s Ethical Demand: Memory,Denial, and Responsibility in the Wake of the Holocaust

What does it mean to discover an unspoken Nazi past in one’s own family? In a moment defined by chance and circumstance, I discovered that my German grandfather had joined the Nazi Party. Using my family’s struggle with memory as a site of inquiry, I examine the process of remembering, its transmission, and dissociation, particularly as it relates to past and present perpetrator groups. What lurks in the silences that are passed down between generations? How does our collective response to history’s atrocities shape what we what we know and remember as individuals? How do we define the moral obligations of memory, or understand the power of dissociation more than seven decades after the Holocaust? When does complacency in the face of past or present injustice make us complicit? Any answer to these questions points to the complexity of memory and the ethical demands of history. Connections between collective crimes of the past and social injustices in the present are considered and different forms of historical awareness and personal responsibility are discussed. In the face of overt prejudice and racism, “history’s call” and the work of psychoanalysis are inherently related.     

Improving Independence of Elderly People by Introducing Smart Products: The Guide Me Localization Case

What are the potential benefits of introducing technological innovations when working on issues with a wider societal impact? Focusing on a specific care and housing corporation for elderly people, the Sustainable System Innovation process has been used to translate an innovation challenge on macro societal level: “How can we deal with the challenges that occur due to the aging of society?” to a concrete innovation challenge on microtechnological and user level: “How can a tracking device be designed for optimal use by elderly person and care giver?”     

The strategic performance of heterotopic experiences in higher education: Imagining spaces of potentiality for new South African identities

In an interview published in Esprit, Achille Mbembe asks “what is ‘today’, and what are we today? What are the lines of fragility, the lines of precariousness, the fissures in contemporary African life? And, possibly, how could what is, be no more, how could it give birth to something else?” As a response to this question of African identity, this article is twofold. Firstly, I aim to draw together an argument that recent and ongoing debates about decolonising knowledge (including Mbembe’s 2015 WISER lecture and open public conversations with the #RhodesMustFall [#RMF] student movement) can be read as part of the search for ways “to be otherwise”. In fact, higher education (HE) institutions should be, can be, and often are, crucial spaces of potentiality in this regard. An essential part of realising Mbembe’s vision of a new kind of human, therefore, would be to ensure that institutions in the contemporary HE landscape recognise, embrace and therefore (paradoxically) become what they are, namely “heterotopias”. Heterotopology is a metaphor Michel Foucault suggests in his 1967 lecture Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. Accepting that HE is a heterotopically discursive site, this article provides a brief, broad Foucaultian heterotopology of the contemporary HE landscape, with specific reference to the South African context. It focuses on Foucault’s three types of heterotopia (crisis, deviation and compensation) and his six principles of heterotopia. Secondly, it would be something of a performative contradiction if this article were merely to follow the conventions of a traditionally organised philosophical argument about an engaging metaphor (“heterotopia”). As an experimental “strategic performance”, the writing itself aims to produce a heterotopic reading experience, thereby joining in the heuristic excavation of experience, which is the task of the heterotopia. It draws disparate, clashing elements into a complex textual web, which should generate at least some feeling of disturbance or cognitive dissonance. In the article’s fissures and joints, readers should find points of entry for critical and creative thinking. As Johnson puts it in his analysis of Foucault’s metaphor, “heterotopias glitter and clash in their incongruous variety, illuminating a passage for our imagination”.     

Frankl, Newman and the Meaning of Suffering

How can we find meaning in the suffering in our lives? What alternatives does our tradition offer to those who reject the “abuse excuse” and the “feel-good” mentality? This article contrasts the “feel-good” therapeutic model with Viktor Frankl's logotherapy and John Henry Newman's theology of the cross.     

The psychology of practice and the practice of the three psychologies

The keynote speakers at the 2nd Asian Association for Social Psychology Meetings were asked to clarify the relationship among the three scholarly fields known as cultural psychology, indigenous psychology and cross‐cultural psychology. Are they three names for the same thing? If not are they complementary or antagonistic enterprises? Does one approach subsume the other(s) or make the other(s) possible? What follows is my own general view of the “three psychologies” issue. I suggest that cultural psychology and indigenous psychology are kindred approaches, which differ in significant ways from cross‐cultural psychology. A distinction is drawn between the study of “mentalities” (the proper unit of analysis for cultural and indigenous psychology) and the study of “mind” (a non‐cultural phenomenon). Cultural psychology is a type of interpretive analysis of social practice which asks, “what are the `goals, values and pictures of the world' with reference to which this behavior might be seen as rational?” The essay describes the assumption of rationality and the place of cultural critique in interpretive analysis. Is there any significant difference at all between cultural psychology and indigenous psychology? One aim of cultural psychology (“globalizing the local”) is premised on the view that “indigenous psychologies” may have relevance outside their points of origin. How open is the indigenous psychology movement to the idea that (e.g.) a psychology with a “Chinese soul” might illuminate the psychological functioning of members of non‐Chinese populations?     

Developmental stages,Piagetian stages in particular: A critical review

Developmental stages in general and Piaget's stages in particular have given rise to considerable controversy. Much of this controversy revolves around the responses that have been given to the following five central questions: (1) Do developmental stages exist? (2) If they exist, where are they? (3) What features define a developmental sequence as a sequence of developmental stages? (4) What psychological processes underlie developmental change? (5) Should we abandon the concept of developmental stages? The main goal of this paper is to present a critical review of such responses, while arguing for a strong conception of development and a “non-received” view of Piaget's theory. After an introduction section, we elaborate on each of the five questions. Finally, we present several reasons why this paper often appeals to Piaget's theory, and why his theory has been greatly misunderstood.     

Links Among Cognitive Empathy,Theory of Mind,and Affective Perspective Taking by Young Children

The authors investigated the development of the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components of empathy in preschoolers, specifically examining how cognitive empathy is linked to theory of mind and affective perspective taking. Participants were 158 children aged 4–6 years. They listened to narratives and then answered questions about the protagonists' emotions. The affective component was probed with the question, “How do you feel seeing the little girl/boy?”; the cognitive component with the question, “Why do you feel [emotion shared with the character]?”; and the behavioral one with the question, “What would you do if you were next to the little boy/girl [experiencing an emotional scenario]?” Results revealed a developmental sequence in the self-focused attribution of cognitive empathy, and a trend toward a developmental sequence for behavioral empathy, which underwent a slight linear increase between 4 and 6 years old. Affective empathy remained stable. More interestingly, they showed that cognitive empathy is linked to both theory of mind and affective perspective taking.