The Lashley-Hull debate revisited

N. Weidman (1994) claimed that "Karl Lashley and Clark Hull had a long and unresolved controversy about the structure and function of the brain, its relationship to the mind, and the use of machine metaphors to explain intelligence" (p. 162). The record contained in published articles and unpublished correspondence indicates otherwise. The clash was explicitly about continuity versus noncontinuity in discrimination learning, stimulus generalization, and the development of quantitative and mathematical psychological theory and its relation to neurophysiological data. Weidman also contended that the subtext of the debate was whether heredity or environment was more important in determining intelligence and behavior. This is doubtful. It is more probable that the debate stemmed from Lashley's career-long opposition to connectionism.     

Sensory discrimination and intelligence: testing Spearman's other hypothesis

At the centenary of Spearman's seminal 1904 article, his general intelligence hypothesis remains one of the most influential in psychology. Less well known is the article's other hypothesis that there is "a correspondence between what may provisionally be called 'General Discrimination' and 'General Intelligence' which works out with great approximation to one or absoluteness" (Spearman, 1904, p. 284). Studies that do not find high correlations between psychometric intelligence and single sensory discrimination tests do not falsify this hypothesis. This study is the first directly to address Spearman's general intelligence-general sensory discrimination hypothesis. It attempts to replicate his findings with a similar sample of schoolchildren. In a well-fitting structural equation model of the data, general intelligence and general discrimination correlated .92. In a reanalysis of data published byActon and Schroeder (2001), general intelligence and general sensory ability correlated .68 in men and women. One hundred years after its conception, Spearman's other hypothesis achieves some confirmation. The association between general intelligence and general sensory ability remains to be replicated and explained.     

The role of affective assessment in intelligence testing

Based on the tenets of logical learning theory and the research in its support, it was predicted that subjects (87 seventh and eighth graders) would score higher on subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children which they had assessed positively than on those which they had negatively assessed. This superiority on liked over disliked subtests was also predicted to be greater for Black than for White subjects and for lower class, compared with middle class, subjects. Subjects performed significantly better on their liked than on their disliked subtests, p < .01, supporting the telic human image advanced by logical learning theory. No racial or social class differences in this effect were seen.     

Resolving the debate over birth order, family size, and intelligence

Hundreds of research articles have addressed the relationship between birth order and intelligence. Virtually all have used cross-sectional data, which are fundamentally flawed in the assessment of within-family (including birth order) processes. Although within-family models have been based on patterns in cross-sectional data, a number of equally plausible between-family explanations also exist. Within-family (preferably intact-family) data are prerequisite for separating within- and between-family causal processes. This observation reframes an old issue in a way that can be easily addressed by studying graphical patterns. Sibling data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth are evaluated, and the results are compared with those from other studies using within-family data. It appears that although low-IQ parents have been making large families, large families do not make low-IQ children in modern U.S. society. The apparent relation between birth order and intelligence has been a methodological illusion.     

The zone of potential development: implications for intelligence testing in the year 2000

The emphasis of this paper is the practice and interpretation of intelligence testing of educable retarded children. The current and future state of intelligence testing are in terms of three criteria: their predictive, diagnostic and remedial functions. In the first section we consider individual testing formats within a framework of Vygotsky's theory of potential development and the underlying assumptions of that theory concerning task analysis and transferring of training. In section two, we consider the social nature of the testing situation and the degree of contextual support provided for the learner. In the final section we consider Neisser's distinction between academic intelligence and everyday thinking with particular reference to the life adjustment of mildly retarded citizens     

A job half done: The road to intelligence testing in the year 2000

After a brief historical review of the development of the intelligence test and the study of individual differences, it is suggested that the major impediment to an understanding of human intelligence is the fragmented way it is studied. This fragmented approach is in contradiction to the very factors which make the intelligence test successful. An orientation is suggested which integrates the various aspects of the study of human intelligence. If this approach, or one like it, is adopted and applied until the year 2000 it is suggested that intelligence tests will have a very different appearance than they do today. They will be an integral, but indescriminable, part of a systematic theory of the acquisition of knowledge.     

Using interactive computing to expand intelligence testing: A critique and prospectus

Microcomputers can serve as automated testing stations for use in psychometric assessment. There are economic advantages in conducting aptitude and intelligence testing with such stations. It is possible to improve the quality of cognitive assessment by extending the range of cognitive abilities to be assessed? Two types of extension are considered; modifying and expanding testing procedures for psychological functions that are components of conventional tests, and the extension oof testing to psychological functions not generally assessed by conventional intelligence or aptitude tests. Computerized presentations will make relatively little difference in our ways of testing verbal comprehension. Computer controlled testing could well extend the ways in which we evaluate spatial-visual reasoning and memory. The impact of testing on the evaluation of reasoning is unclear. Computer-controlled item presentation makes it possible to conceive of tests of learning and attention, neither of which are evaluated in most psychometric programs today. The psychological nature of the abilities being assessed raises problems in assessment that are not addressed by the fact oof computer-control. Some research questions are identified that ought to be explored before testing is extended into these fields. Computer-controlled evaluation could be extended to the assessment of criterion performance, either in the normal working situation or in a simulation of the workplace. While evaluation of this sort does raise social questions, it clearly presents an opportunity to obtain validation data for psychological assessment studies.     

The debate over drug testing in the workplace: A novel opportunity for public scientific education

In several respects, American evidence law has an anti-scientific bias. A number of the admissibility and legal sufficiency rules in American evidence law reflect this bias. The assumption underlying the bias is that the typical citizen–-the potential juror–-is incapable of critically evaluating technical evidence. The results of national educational tests demonstrate that scientific illiteracy is widespread in the United States. However, the current controversy over drug testing presents forensic scientists with a unique opportunity to educate the average citizen about some of the rudiments of scientific proof. In the course of the debate, the scientific community can help familiarize the American public with such concepts as the limited nature of scientific findings, experimentation as the means of scientific validation, and the importance of proper test protocol. Perhaps more than any other scientific controversy, the debate over drug testing is of intense personal interest to the average citizen. This article pleads with the participants in the drug testing debate to capitalize on that interest and conduct their debate at a high level to aid the citizenry to develop a broader understanding of scientific evidence.     

The Iowa Child Welfare Research Station and the 1940 debate on intelligence: Carrying on the legacy of a concerned mother

During the late 1930s and early 1940s the nature-nurture issue regarding intelligence generated considerable controversy. The focus of attention for this debate was the Thirty-Ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, published in 1940. The Iowa Child Welfare Research Station played a prominent role in this debate. The Iowa researchers, led by George D. Stoddard and Beth L. Wellman, advocated an environmentalist position which challenged the more established hereditarian position held by Lewis M. Terman and his research associates. The Iowa position was closely related to the institutional context of the Child Welfare Research Station.     

Applying cognitive theory to the testing and teaching of intelligence

This article describes how cognitive theory can be applied to the testing and teaching of intelligence. The article is divided into three main parts. The first part describes how the study of intelligence, traditionally an area that has been viewed as under the purview of differential psychology, has come squarely into the purview of cognitive psychology. The second part describes how the testing and teaching of intelligence, which in the past have been largely atheoretical, have been transformed into theoretically based enterprises guided by the theories of cognitive psychology. The last part describes a particular theory of intelligence, the triarchic theory, and how it has been applied to the problems of testing and teaching intelligence. It is concluded that cognitive psychology has given the study of intelligence a ‘new lease on life’, and that the testing and teaching of intelligence can and should be viewed as a primary focus of application for the principles of cognitive psychology.     

The Dutch curve: The introduction and reception of intelligence testing in the Netherlands, 1908–1940

In the Netherlands, intelligence testing has been pragmatic and has not generated the heated controversies found in other cultures. Four historical reasons are presented for this paradoxical development. First, the Binet test was used mainly as a diagnostic instrument for professional judgments about admission to special education. Second, the eugenic use of IQ tests was moderated by the marginal position of eugenics in Dutch society. Third, the process of “pillarization” gave considerable power to denominational groups in Dutch society, and they strongly criticized deterministic ideas about the heredity of intelligence. Fourth, the educational scientist, cognitive psychologist, philosopher, and government adviser, Philip Kohnstamm, was very influential in Dutch science and politics. He rejected intelligence testing and its deterministic connotations in favor of the idea of the educability of cognitive capacities. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Attention and seeing objects: The identity-crowding debate

Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity-crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role of unconscious perception. Although unconscious perception plays an important role, it cannot support conscious object-seeing in identity-crowding. Nevertheless, unconscious perception assists in making successful judgments about unseen objects. Further, compelling conceptual evidence against seeing unattended objects places the burden of proof on Block. I argue that countability is necessary for seeing objects and sufficient for attention to them; thus, no unattended objects are seen.