Cooperation or dolphin ‘tug-of-war’? Comment on Kuczaj et al. and Eskelinen et al.

Two recent papers by Kuczaj et al. (Anim Cognit 18:543–550, 2015) and Eskelinen et al. (Anim Cognit 19:789–797, 2016) claim to have demonstrated that (i) bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) cooperated to solve a novel task and (ii) vocal signals were important for coordinating these cooperative efforts. Although it is likely that bottlenose dolphins may share communicative signals in order to achieve a common goal, we suggest that this has not been demonstrated in the aforementioned studies. Here, we discuss the two main problems that preclude any definitive conclusions being drawn on cooperative task success and vocal communication from these studies. The first lies in the experimental design. The ‘cooperative task’, involving an apparatus that requires two dolphins to pull in opposite directions in order to achieve a food reward, is not conducive to cooperation, but could instead reflect a competitive ‘tug-of-war’. It is therefore of questionable use in distinguishing competitive from cooperative interactions. Second, the suggestion that the occurrence of burst-pulsed signals in this task was indicative of cooperation is disputable, as (i) this study could not determine which dolphins were actually producing the signals and (ii) this sound type is more commonly associated with aggressive signalling in dolphins. We commend the authors for investigating this exciting and topical area in animal communication and cognition, but the question of whether dolphins cooperate and communicate to solve a cooperative task remains as yet unanswered.     

Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

ABSTRACT

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132(5), 692–731. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioural information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings (Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science, 17(11), 954–958. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x) This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, S., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2014). The role of awareness in attitude formation through evaluative conditioning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(2), 187–209. doi:10.1177/1088868314527832), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.     

Do people need self-esteem? Comment on Pyszczynski et al. (2004)

In spite of impressive empirical evidence consistent with aspects of terror management theory (TMT) reviewed by T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, and J. Schimel (2004), several fundamental assumptions of the theory remain untested or lack support. Specifically, Pyszczynski et al. (2004) have not demonstrated that (a) people need self-esteem, (b) pursuing self-esteem is an effective means for reducing anxiety, (c) pursuing self-esteem helps people achieve their important goals, (d) having or pursuing self-esteem is the only way to deal with anxiety to achieve important goals, or (e) death is the real issue driving the pursuit of self-esteem. The authors suggest there is a different paradigm for thinking about death, one in which awareness of one's mortality serves as a precious reminder of the limited time one has to accomplish one's most important goals. All of these questions can be addressed with empirical research.     

Is Psychoanalytic Education Effective? Comment on Damsa et al. (2010)

While a growing body of empirical data attests increasingly to the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment, what data do we have that attests to the effectiveness of psychoanalytic education? In this comment on Damsa et al. (2010), I briefly address that question and suggest that—if we are to truly generate passionate interest in psychoanalysis among psychiatric residents and other mental health professionals in training—perhaps we need to begin by researching the largely unresearched process of psychoanalytic education and supervision.     

Do psychosocial and study skill factors predict college outcomes? Comment on Robbins et al. (2004)

Evidence is cited in support of the claim that the results of the meta-analyses conducted by S. B. Robbins et al. (2004) are not generalizable to either baccalaureate-granting commuter institutions or certain demographically identified subgroups of students.     

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Arnold et al.’s Parenting Scale Across Race, Age, and Sex

We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to investigate the factor structure of several models of Arnold et al.’s Parenting Scale [Arnold et al. (1993). Psychological Assessment, 5, 137–144] across children from various age groups and races. Participants were parents of children (ages 2–16 years) presenting to four community-based pediatric practices for routine care. Parents completed questionnaires pertaining to various aspects of parenting and child behavior problems. Results indicated that a two-factor revision proposed by Reitman et al. [(2001). Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 30, 514–524] represented the data well and better than the original three-factor structure and other two-factor models. Results from multigroup CFA analyses indicated that this factor structure did not vary across child sex, child age, and parental race. Results of validity analyses indicated that scores on both factors were related to reports of children’s behavior and parental affect and cognitions. This study was the first to use multigroup CFA procedures to demonstrate that relationships between individual items and factors of the Parenting Scale are similar for parents of children across various age groups.     

On Vandervert et al. “Working Memory,Cerebellum, and Creativity”

Four measures of self-determination (SD) were correlated with two measures of trait creativity. In Study 1, subjects high on the Creative Personality Scale (Gough, 1979) and the Problem-Solving/Creativity scale (Marsh &; O'Neill, 1984) were found to strive for self-determined reasons, to strive toward greater SD, and to evidence higher SD in measures of both motivational orientation and self-concept. Study 2 replicated most of these findings and also showed that creative subjects perceived their parents to be more autonomy supportive. Results are interpreted in terms of a general disposition to be self-determining that may help attune creative people to deeper cognitive resources and capacities within themselves.     

More human than others? A critique of Cypryańska et al. (2017)

Cypryańska and colleagues offer a critique of existing work on the self-humanizing effect and present some empirical findings motivated by their critique. In this commentary, I question their overly restrictive understanding of self-humanizing and argue that the phenomenon does not stand or fall on a definition based on a strict analogy to the better-than-average effect. I argue that defining self-humanizing exclusively in these terms is inappropriate: It fails to recognize the relationship between self-humanizing and self-enhancement, as well as the primary role of trait valence in comparative self-ratings. Finally, I observe that Cypryańska et al.’s empirical findings are highly consistent with past work rather than offering the deep challenge that the authors suppose.     

French categorization norms for 70 semantic categories and comparison with Van Overschelde et al.’s (2004) English norms

The present methodological note provides categorization norms for 70 semantic categories collected from 200 participants. The categories were mainly derived from a French translation of the Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) inductor terms including a large set of semantic categories. Our study also extends recent French norms (Léger, Boumlak, & Tijus, 2008; Marchal & Nicolas, 2003) and tests their stability. These 70 categories constitute the widest French categorization norms to date and will be of use to studies in the fields of both linguistics and psycholinguistics. A cross-linguistic comparison, with both quantitative and qualitative results, is also performed, which should prove useful for bilingual and/or cross-linguistic studies. The norms collected for all 70 categories are available for download as supplemental materials from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Libet’s intention reports are invalid: A replication of Dominik et al. (2017)

In the “Libet experiment” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet’s intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet’s intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.     

Critique or Misrepresentation? A Reply to Timimi et al.

In rebuttal to Timimi et al., we show that their critique is not a form of reasonable scientific debate with informed, constructive criticism, but merely a misrepresentation of the existing scientific literature on ADHD apparently designed to convince the scientifically uninformed of its nonexistence and of the misuse of medications for its management. We show their argument to be based on faulty logic, selective citation, misreprensentation of individual studies, ignorance of the vast literature on ADHD, and innuendo that maligns the integrity of scientists studying the disorder. Our original International Consensus Statement on ADHD remains untarnished by this faux critique – indeed it was intended to refute just such unsupported and unsupportable criticism that often appears in the popular media.     

Comment on ‘Parkin et al. reconsidered’ by Rossmann

Summary This article considers the study reported by Rossmann (1983) in which a failure to replicate the findings of Parkin, Lewinsohn and Folkard (1982) is reported. It is argued that Rossmann's findings could be attributed to methodological differences and, as such, do not constitute a replication failure. Guidelines for further replication attempts are offered.     

Cognitive Conceptualism—Where Have All the Affects Gone? Additional Corrections for Barrett et al. (2007)

ABSTRACT— Barrett et al. (2007) claim that their approach to emotions covers more of the available evidence than does my affective neuroscience approach ( Panksepp, 2007b ). In fact, the weight of neurological evidence indicates that raw affect, as monitored by many behavioral tasks, is an aspect of the arousal of instinctual-emotional networks. This provides an empirical approach to understanding how primary-process emotional feelings are constituted by neural activities ( Panksepp, 2008 ). There is abundant evidence for the existence of a variety of primal emotions shared across mammalian species that are biologically ingrained tools for living and learning and that may allow higher brain regions to conceptualize what is really important in the world. Barrett et al., misrepresent my views; an accurate depiction of them can be found in this article and in Gallagher (2008) . Abundant cross-species evidence of basic affective systems exists to enrich cognitive-conceptual and attributional theories of human emotions.