ON THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH AGENDA IN EPISTEMIC CHANGE

The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology.     

Hindsight bias and causal reasoning: a minimalist approach

What factors contribute to hindsight bias, the phenomenon whereby the known outcome of an event appears obvious only after the fact? The Causal Model Theory (CMT) of hindsight bias (Nestler et al. in Soc Psychol 39:182–188, 2008a; in J Expl Psychol: Learn Mem Cog 34:1043–1054, 2008b; Pezzo in Mem 11:421–441, 2003; Wasserman et al. in Pers Soc Psychol Bull 17:30–35, 1991) posits that hindsight bias can occur when people have the opportunity to identify potential causal antecedents and evaluate whether they could have led to the outcome. Two experiments incorporating highly controlled minimalist scenarios supported the CMT. As predicted by the CMT, hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the actual outcome better than the alternative outcome, and reverse hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the alternative outcome better than the actual outcome. Moreover, we found new evidence that outcome knowledge alone was insufficient to elicit hindsight bias in the absence of a potential causal antecedent. Implications for future directions in hindsight bias research are discussed.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism?

Hume, like a number of more recent writers, claims that epistemological scepticism gives us reason to think that our beliefs are non-epistemically determined. Because some body of propositions that we believe are all unjustifiable, the argument goes, our beliefs in those propositions must be determined by non-truth-conducive considerations. I argue initially that scepticism does not by itself entail Humean naturalism. I then then develop an argument from scepticism to naturalism which has considerable promise. This more complex argument is built around two considerations: (i) if a subject accepts a local sceptical argument against one of his beliefs and still does not give it up, then we have very good, if not conclusive, reason to think that his belief is non-epistemically determined; (ii) it seems initially plausible that global scepticism can have no affect on the beliefs it targets, even if we were to accept it. Unfortunately, however, even this argument ultimately fails to establish any connection between scepticism and Humean naturalism.     

A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre

In Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown identifies a number of problems for the so-called knowledge view of justification. According to this (unorthodox) view, we cannot justifiably believe what we do not know. Most epistemologists reject this view on the grounds that false beliefs can be justified if, say, supported by the evidence or produced by reliable processes. We think this is a mistake and that many epistemologists are (mistakenly) classifying beliefs as justified because they have properties that indicate that something should be excused. Brown thinks that previous attempts to make this case have been unsuccessful. While the difficulties Brown points to are genuine, I think they show that attempts to explain a classificatory judgment haven't been successful. Still, I would argue that the classification is correct. We need a better explanation of this classificatory judgment. (The situation is similar to the one in which we correctly distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge but then embarrass ourselves trying to explain what this difference consists in.) I will try to clarify the justification-excuse distinction and explain why it's a mistake to insist that beliefs that violate epistemic norms might be justified. Just as it's possible for a rational agent to act without justification in spite of her best intentions (e.g., by using force or violence in trying to defend another from a merely apparent threat), it's possible that a rational thinker who follows the evidence and meets our expectations might nevertheless believe without sufficient justification. If our justified beliefs are supposed to guide us in deciding what to do, we probably should draw on discussions from morality and the law about the justification/excuse distinction to inform our understanding of the epistemic case.

     

The minimal A-theory

Timothy Williamson thinks that every object is a necessary, eternal existent. In defense of his view, Williamson appeals primarily to considerations from modal and tense logic. While I am uncertain about his modal claims, I think there are good metaphysical reasons to believe permanentism: the principle that everything always exists. B-theorists of time and change have long denied that objects change with respect to unqualified existence. But aside from Williamson, nearly all A-theorists defend temporaryism: the principle that there are temporary existents. I think A-theorists are better off without this added commitment, but I will not argue for that in any great detail here. Instead, I will contend that a very tempting argument for temporaryism is unsound. In the first half of the paper, I will develop the Moorean ??common sense?? argument for temporaryism and dispute its central premise, namely that temporaryism is the best generalization from our ordinary beliefs about creation, destruction, coming to be, and passing away. I will argue that given the pervasive vagueness in our ordinary beliefs and the background commitments of all A-theories, temporaryists cannot claim to have the common sense view because no party can accommodate most of our common sense beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I will propose a permanentist A-theory that explains all change over time as a species of property change. I call it the minimal A-theory, since it dispenses with the change in existence assumption. As we??ll see, the permanentist alternative performs well enough in explaining our ordinary beliefs, and it has better prospects for answering three objections commonly levied against A-theories.     

Accountably Other: Trust,Reciprocity and Exclusion in a Context of Situated Practice

The first part of this paper makes five points: First, the problem of Otherness is different and differently constructed in modern differentiated societies. Therefore, approaches to Otherness based on traditional notions of difference and boundary between societies and systems of shared belief will not suffice; Second, because solidarity can no longer be maintained through boundaries between ingroup and outgroup, social cohesion has to take a different form; Third, to the extent that Otherness is not a condition of demographic, or belief based, exclusion in modern societies, but rather something that happens to people otherwise available to one another in interaction, othering is a processthat occurs over the course of interaction, turn by turn, not a set of beliefs or a state of mind; Fourth, othering may be supported by accounts and narratives, and these may exist before the fact – or be articulated after the fact. But, over the course of an ongoing interaction, beliefs and narratives do not explain what goes wrong with practices; Fifth, practices require reciprocity and trust. Therefore, practices require a morestringent form of morality – not a less stringent form – and moresocial cohesion – not less – than traditional society.The second part of the paper illustrates these five points with an extended analysis of a cross-race interaction in which accounts are invoked, reciprocity breaks down, and participants are rendered as Accountable Others.     

Attributions of intergroup bias and outgroup homogeneity to ingroup and outgroup others

The research in this article explores the structure and content of attributed intergroup beliefs: to what extent do perceivers think others of their ingroup and their outgroup display intergroup evaluative bias and outgroup homogeneity? We report studies that address this question in ethnicity, gender, and nationality intergroup contexts. In all of these, we show that perceivers attribute to others more biased intergroup beliefs than they themselves espouse. Even when perceivers themselves do not show intergroup bias or outgroup homogeneity, they attribute such biases to others, both others from their ingroup and others from their outgroup. We argue that such attributed intergroup beliefs are fundamentally important to expectations concerning intergroup interaction. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inhibition of return spreads across 3-D space

Focusing attention to a location in 3–D space operates much the same as in 2–D space. Attending a location in 2–D space is followed by a selective inhibitory aftereffect known as inhibition of return (IOR). Here, we report the results of two 3–D reflexive cuing studies in which depth was defined by binocular disparity. As has been shown before, attentional cuing was specific for x–y–z locations. However, the present results show that IOR is not depth specific. After a specific location in x–y–z is cued, IOR occurs for the depth plane in front of and behind the cued location. The finding that IOR spreads across depth planes may be related to how inhibited locations are encoded in the superior colliculus. We argue that the functional role of a depth–blind IOR is to bias attention against going back to any part of a previously attended object.     

经验基础与知识确证

Whether empirical givenness has the reliability that foundationalists expect is a point about which some philosophers are highly skeptical. Sellars took the doctrine of givenness as a “myth,” denying the existence of immediate perceptual experience. The arguments in contemporary Western epistemology are concentrated on whether sensory experience has conceptual contents, and whether there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. In fact, once the elements of words and conceptions in empirical perception are affirmed, the logical relationship between perceptual experience and empirical belief is also affirmed. This relationship takes place through perceptual experience acting as evidence for beliefs. The real problem lies in how one should distinguish between the different relationships with perception of singular beliefs and of universal beliefs, and in how singular beliefs can provide justification for universal beliefs. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (Social Sciences in China), 2007, (1): 65–75     

Durability of peace education effects in the shadow of conflict

Value-oriented instructional programs, such as anti-racism, may often face societal barriers. A case in point are peace education programs in conflictual contexts. Close analysis of peace education programs in regions of conflict and tension suggest that they face formidable barriers that would appear to prevent the attainment of their goals of mutual legitimization, changed attitudes and empathy. However, positive research findings suggest otherwise. A possible solution of this contradiction is the distinction between strongly held and not easily changeable attitudes and beliefs, called “convictions” (Abelson, American Psychologist 43: 267–275 1988) and more regular attitudes. Possibly, the barriers facing peace education may pertain to convictions while the positive impact of peace education may pertain to less strongly held attitudes and beliefs. The present study examined the possible differential changes in more or less central beliefs when Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian youth participated in a year long, school-based peace education program. This study also examined the durability of the program’s effects on the 956 adolescent study participants divided into program and no-program controls. Findings showed that such a peace education program can effectively influence adolescents’ more peripheral beliefs but not the core beliefs that stand in the center of the groups’ collective narratives. However, peripheral beliefs that are more easily affected can as easily change back, apparently by the context of adverse social and political forces.     

Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

Usage frequencies of complement-taking verbs in Spanish and English: Data from Spanish monolinguals and Spanish—English bilinguals

Verb bias, or the tendency of a verb to appear with a certain type of complement, has been employed in psycholinguistic literature as a tool to test competing models of sentence processing. To date, the vast majority of sentence processing research involving verb bias has been conducted almost exclusively with monolingual speakers, and predominantly with monolingual English speakers, despite the fact that most of the world’s population is bilingual. To test the generality of competing theories of sentence comprehension, it is important to conduct cross-linguistic studies of sentence processing and to add bilingual data to theories of sentence comprehension. Given this, it is critical for the field to develop verb bias estimates from monolingual speakers of languages other than English and from bilingual populations. We begin to address these issues in two norming studies. Study 1 provides verb bias norming data for 135 Spanish verbs. A second aim of Study 1 was to determine whether verb bias estimates remain stable over time. In Study 2, we asked whether Spanish—English speakers are able to learn verb-specific information, such as verb bias, in their second language. The answer to this question is critical to conducting studies that examine when, during the course of sentence comprehension, bilingual speakers exploit verb information specific to the second language. To facilitate cross-linguistic work, we compared our verb bias results with those provided by monolingual English speakers in a previous norming study conducted by Garnsey, Lotocky, Pearlmutter, and Myers (1997). Our Spanish data demonstrated that individual verbs showed significant similarities in their verb bias across the 3 years of data collection. We also show that bilinguals are able to learn the biases of verbs in their second language, even when immersed in the first language environment. Appendixes A–C, containing the bilingual norms discussed in the article, may be downloaded from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Belief as emotion

It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter-evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.     

Clearing conceptual space for cognitivist motivational internalism

Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But succumbing to the first temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral beliefs and succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practicality intuition that cognitivist motivational internalism is suppose to capture. In this paper, I offer a way of defending cognitivist motivational internalism, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire.     

The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification

In at least some cases of justified perceptual belief, our perceptual experience itself, as opposed to beliefs about it, evidences and thereby justifies our belief. While the phenomenon is common, it is also mysterious. There are good reasons to think that perceptions cannot justify beliefs directly, and there is a significant challenge in explaining how they do. After explaining just how direct perceptual justification is mysterious, I considerMichael Huemer’s (Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 2001) and Bill Brewer’s (Perception and Reason, 1999) recent, but radically different, attempts to eliminate it. I argue that both are unsuccessful, though a consideration of their mistakes deepens our appreciation of the mystery.     

Spheres of Justice within Schools: Reflections and Evidence on the Distribution of Educational Goods

This article argues that there are distinct spheres of justice within education and examines a range of justice norms and distribution rules that characterize the daily life of schools and classrooms. Moving from the macro to micro level, we identify the following five areas: the right to education, the allocation of (or selection into) learning places, teaching–learning practices, teachers’ treatment of students, and student evaluations of grade distribution. We discuss the literature on the beliefs by students and teachers about the just distribution of educational goods in these five domains, and on the practices used in the actual allocation of these goods. In line with normative ‘spheres of justice’ arguments in social theory, we conclude that the ideals of social justice within schools vary strongly according to the particular resource to be distributed. Moreover, these ideals often do not correspond with the practices that actually guide resource distribution in education, which may go some way toward explaining explicit or latent conflicts in this sphere. Justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way – Michael Walzer (1983, p. 5)     

The Relationship between Parent-Child Conflict and Adolescent Antisocial Behavior: Confirming Shared Environmental Mediation

Prior studies have indicated that the relationship between parent-child conflict and adolescent antisocial behavior is at least partially shared environmental in origin. However, all available research on this topic (to our knowledge) relies exclusively on parent and/or adolescent informant-reports, both of which are subject to various forms of rater bias. As the presence of significant shared environmental effects has often been attributed to rater bias in the past (Baker et al. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 16:219–235, 2007; Bartels et al. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 42:1351–1359, 2003, Twin Research 7:162–175, 2004; Hewitt et al. Behavior Genetics 22:293–317, 1992), it would be important to confirm that findings of shared environmental mediation persist when even examining (presumably more objective) observer-ratings of these constructs. The current study thus examined the origins of the relationship between parent-child conflict and adolescent acting-out behavior, as measured using both observer-ratings and various informant-reports. Participants included 1,199 adopted and non-adopted adolescents in 610 families from the Sibling Interaction and Behavior Study (SIBS). Results indicated that parent-child conflict consistently predicts acting-out behavior in adopted adolescents, and moreover, that this association is equivalent to that in biologically-related adolescents. Most importantly, these findings did not vary across parent- and adolescent-reported or observer-ratings of parent-child conflict and acting-out behavior. Such findings argue strongly against rater bias as a primary explanation of shared environmental mediation of the association between parent-child conflict and adolescent antisocial behavior.     

后现代自由主义:罗蒂政治哲学批判

Richard Rorty’s philosophy has two basic commitments: one to postmodernism and the other to liberalism. However, these commitments generate tension. As a postmodernist, he sharply criticizes the Enlightenment; as a liberal, he forcefully defends it. His postmodernist liberalism actually explains liberalism using irrationalism. Translated by Xiang Yunhua from Jianghai Xuekan 江海学刊 (Jianghai Academic Journal), 2007, (1): 57–61     

Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument from Direction of Fit

An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is deficient, for only the “dominant” direction of fit of an attitude is responsible for its character and function. Further, it seems that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode, and so all beliefs seem to have a dominant thetic direction of fit, and to be motivationally inert. The main part of this paper, however, is devoted to explaining how it is that attitudes, like moral attitudes, can truly have two directions of fit in a way which enables them to be both cognitive and motivational. Reflection on the nature of beliefs suggests that the claim that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode should be qualified. The reasons beliefs provide draw their authority for the agent – their demanding nature – from the objects represented by these beliefs, and so, it is the beliefs’ content which determine their dominant direction of fit, as far as their role in practical reasoning is concerned. Thus, in the sense relevant to practical reasoning a belief with a normative content does have a dominant telic direction of fit. At the same time, in the sense relevant to its satisfaction conditions a moral belief has a dominant thetic direction of fit, which underlies its classification as a cognitive attitude. Cognitivists, then, can have it both ways.