Naive optics: Predicting and perceiving reflections in mirrors

Undergraduate students predicted what would be made visible by a planar mirror. A paper-and-pencil task confirmed previous findings that when approaching a mirror from the side, participants expected to see their reflection in the mirror earlier than they actually would. This early response was found for all mirrors when the observer moved horizontally--even when the mirror was placed on the floor or the ceiling--but not when the observer moved vertically (in a lift). The data support the hypothesis that many people imagine the world in the mirror as rotated around the vertical axis. When participants had to judge manipulated mirror reflections according to their naturalness, a high degree of tolerance was found. In contrast to the prediction task, a rotation around the vertical axis was judged to be less natural than other distortions. The authors conclude that perceptual knowledge and predictive knowledge lead to different patterns of errors. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)     

People cannot locate the projection of an object on the surface of a mirror

People cannot veridically perceive reflections of objects as projections on the surface of mirrors. People tried to locate an object’s projection on a flat mirror. The observer stood at the opposite end of a long mirror to the experimenter. They were told to remember the location of the projection of the experimenter’s face. The experimenter then moved and the observer stuck a card onto the mirror at this remembered location. The actual location was midway along the mirror between the experimenter and the observer. However, cards were placed much too close to the experimenter. Repeated testing with feedback reduced, but did not eliminate, errors. Our perception of mirrors is dominated by what appears to be visible through the mirror, not what is projected onto its surface. In contrast, if the experimenter stuck a card onto the mirror then removed it, observers remembered this physically-specified location accurately.     

My face through the looking-glass: the effect of mirror reversal on reflection size estimation

People tend to grossly overestimate the size of their mirror-reflected face. Although this overestimation bias is robust, not much is known about its relationships to self-face perception. In two experiments, we investigated the overestimation bias as a function of the presentation of the own face (left–right reversed – as in a mirror – or nonreversed – as in a photograph), the identity of the seen face, and prior exposure to a real mirror. For this we developed a computerized task requiring size estimations of displayed faces. We replicated the observation that people overestimate the size of their mirror-reflected face and showed that the overestimation can be reduced following a brief mirror exposure. We also found that left–right reversal modulates the overestimation bias, depending on the perceived face’s identity. These data underline the enhanced familiarity of left–right reversed self-faces and the importance of size perception for understanding mirror reflection processing.     

Through the looking glass: how the relationship between an object and its reflection affects the perception of distance and size

This is the first study to test the extent to which reflections help locate objects in space and perceive their size. For planar mirrors, the relative size of a target and its reflection is informative about the absolute distance of the target in units of the distance between target and mirror surface. When the target is near the mirror, target and reflection are similar in size; as the target moves away from the mirror, the difference in size increases. Observers saw a pair of objects in front of a mirror and judged relative size and distance (separately). Other visual cues to size and distance were eliminated, except lateral offset, which was tested in experiment 3. Experiment 2 controlled for the presence of directional feedback. Results showed orderly psychophysical functions for both size and distance with steeper slopes for distance judgments. In experiments 4 and 5 stereograms were used. Even when binocular information was present, the additional cue provided by reflections increased the accuracy of size and distance judgments. The same pattern of results was observed in the absence of feedback.     

Mirrors, mirrors on the wall…the ubiquitous multiple reflection error

Participants decided when somebody, Janine, could see their face in a horizontal row of adjacent mirrors mounted flat on the same wall. They saw real mirrors and a shop-dummy representing Janine. Such coplanar mirrors reflect different, non-overlapping areas of a scene. However, almost everybody made an unexpected error: they claimed that Janine would see her face reflected in multiple mirrors simultaneously. They therefore responded as if each mirror showed similar information and thus grossly overestimated how much each mirror revealed. Further studies established that this multiple reflection error also occurred for vertical rows of mirrors and for different areas of a single, large mirror. The error was even common if the participant themselves sat in front of a set of covered-up mirrors and indicated where they would be able to see their own reflection. In the latter case, people often made multiple reflection errors despite having seen all the mirrors uncovered immediately before they responded. People's gross overestimation of how much of a scene a mirror reflects and their inability to learn to correct this false belief explains why, despite a lifetime's experience of mirrors, they incorrectly think they will see themselves in all nearby mirrors.     

Naïve predictions of motion and orientation in mirrors: From what we see to what we expect reflections to do

The study aimed to investigate naïve beliefs regarding the dynamic and static behavior of reflections. In the first three experiments, participants in the study made predictions about the correspondence between real and reflected movements or about the orientation of the reflection of a static object placed in front of a mirror. In Experiments 1 and 2, paper-and-pencil tasks were used and in Experiment 3 participants were asked to make their predictions while imagining that they were facing a mirror. Results revealed that a percentage of undergraduates (ranging from 25% to 35%) were unable to make correct predictions. We classified the errors into types and found that responses either conform to the belief that reflections do the same or that they do the opposite. This suggests an oversimplification of the geometry of mirror reflections in two directions: participants either generalize what they see when movements are parallel to the mirror or what they see when movements are orthogonal to the mirror. Findings from Experiment 4 confirmed that these two expectations fit in with what people perceive in mirrors. Findings from Experiment 5 confirmed that this is also in agreement with the relationship perceived when looking at similar movements and orientations “outside” mirrors.     

The tendency to overestimate what is visible in a planar mirror amongst adults and children

Adults hold several mistaken beliefs about simple mechanical and optical phenomena. In particular, many adults believe that they would be able to see their own image in a mirror before they are in front of it. Similarly, they expect objects to become visible in mirrors before they actually do. This overestimation of what is visible is known as the early error (Bertamini, Spooner, & Hecht, 2003). It has been suggested that incorrect models about mechanics, and therefore erroneous beliefs, develop over time, as evidenced by good performance in young children (Kaiser, McCloskey, & Proffitt, 1986). With respect to knowledge about what is visible in mirrors we report the first developmental data. We confirmed an effect for prospective University students but found no evidence of any early error in children between the age of 5 and 11. This erroneous belief about mirrors develops during the later school years when people develop a system of beliefs based on experience.     

The relationship perceived between the real body and the mirror image

We analyse here people's perception of their reflections in mirrors placed in different positions. In two experiments, participants looked at their mirror image, in a third experiment they looked at another person's image. In both cases they were asked to answer a series of questions about how the virtual body appeared relative to the real body, focusing on different aspects. In experiment 1, they were asked to decide whether the reflections were identical, similar, different, or opposite in terms of the global relationship, orientation, and lateralisation (left right arm). In experiment 2 they were instructed to make simple gestures and to evaluate if the gestures in the reflection were identical, opposite, similar, or different from theirs. Results show that 'identity' was preferred when the mirror was in front, and 'opposition' was preferred when the mirror was below. When opposition was experienced, it was attributed mainly to the exocentric frame of reference. Egocentric left-right reversal was not a common experience, although it was reported more frequently when the mirror was in front. The different roles of the exocentric and egocentric frames of reference were further tested in experiment 3, in which the condition of an observer looking at another person's reflection was studied. Contrary to the emphasis on the egocentric frame of reference in the literature on the 'mirror question', results presented in this paper demonstrate the importance of the exocentric frame of reference in influencing how observers react to their reflections.     

Overestimation of the projected size of objects on the surface of mirrors and windows

Four experiments investigated judgments of the size of projections of objects on the glass surface of mirrors and windows. The authors tested different ways of explaining the task to overcome the difficulty that people had in understanding what the projection was, and they varied the distance of the observer and the object to the mirror or window and varied the size of the mirror. The authors compared estimations of projected size with estimations of the physical size of the object that produced the projection. For both mirrors and windows, observers accurately judged the physical size of objects but greatly overestimated the projected size of the same objects. Indeed, judgments of projected size were more similar to physical than to projected size. People were also questioned verbally about their knowledge of projected size relative to physical size. The errors produced for these conceptual questions were similar to those found in the perceptual estimation tasks. Together, these results suggest that projections of objects on mirrors and windows are treated in the same way and that observers cannot perceive such projections as distal objects.     

Self-esteem,anxiety, and the avoidance of self-focused attention

The present study was designed to provide converging support for the hypothesis that individuals with low self-esteem (low SEs) find self-focused attention more anxiety provoking, relative to people with high self-esteem (high SEs). Subjects were premeasured for their self-esteem and given a brief opportunity to “practice” two tasks that they believed they would be required to perform in a later part of the experiment. One task was practiced in front of a self-focusing stimulus—a large mirror (mirror task)—whereas the other was not (no-mirror task). Subjects evaluated the tasks after they had practiced each one. Consistent with the notion that self-focused attention is more anxiety provoking for individuals with lower self-esteem, it was observed that: (1) relative to high SEs, lowmedium SEs rated the mirror, but not the no-mirror, task as less enjoyable, and (b) low-medium, but not high, SEs preferred to avoid the mirror task for the alleged upcoming part of the experiment. Subjects high in dispositional private selfconsciousness also wanted to avoid the mirror task, particularly if they were also low in self-esteem. Contrary to prediction, success-failure feedback from a previous task had no effect on subjects' task preferences. Theoretical explanations and implications are discussed.     

Piagetian stage IV search errors with an object that is directly accessible both visually and manually

Previous work has shown that infants make the Piagetian stage IV error when the object is covered by a transparent occluder. However, it is not clear whether this happens because nine-month-old infants' failure to understand the identity of hidden objects extends to visible objects, or whether they are puzzled by object relationships involving transparency. Nine-month-old infants were presented with one of three different stage IV tasks in which the object was visible and uncovered at the second location. Stage IV errors were obtained with the object visible, but only when a covered place was provided at the first location. It is concluded that this result is stronger evidence that the stage IV error is not simply a hidden-object phenomenon, and that it may be best explained by taking account of infants' functional place knowledge, as well as their knowledge of object identity.     

Does size rescaling require central attention?

The goal of the present experiment was to determine if object size rescaling in the shape-matching task requires central resources. Two polygons were presented side by side as the second task in a psychological refractory period paradigm. The polygons could be the same as each other or mirror images of each other and the size ratio between the two polygons was varied. In the first task, subjects were required to make a speeded response to the pitch of a tone. The polygon task followed at varying SOAs and the subjects then made a speeded same/mirror image judgement on the polygons. The size ratio effect was additive with SOA indicating that size rescaling is capacity demanding and that it requires central attention.     

Investigating Individual Differences in a Serial Choice Reaction Time Task: Use of Auditory Feedback and Analysis of Responses Surrounding Errors

Subjects (N = 78) performed a visual four-choice reaction time (RT) task, either with or without immediate trial-by-trial feedback, in which RT (but not accuracy) was indicated by the pitch of an auditory tone. For each feedback condition, half of the subjects (the high AH4 group) scored more than 50% on the AH4 test of fluid intelligence (Heim, 1968), whereas the remaining half (the low AH4 group) scored less than 50%. It was predicted that if low AH4 subjects were slow because they were poor at monitoring RT, they would benefit more from feedback than high AH4 subjects would. This was not supported by the data: There was some beneficial effect of feedback on RT, but only for the high AH4 group. A second possibility was that individual differences would be apparent in processes such as detecting errors and controlling RT from trial to trial. From analyses of error rates, RT distributions, and particularly sequences of responses before and after errors, there was no evidence of qualitative differences in performance between the high and low AH4 groups. It is concluded that individual differences in this task are largely determined by information-processing rate rather than by factors such as the ability to detect errors or to monitor and control RT.     

Conscious error perception: The impact of response interference from a secondary task

An erroneous response is not always accompanied by the conscious perception of the error being made. We examined whether increased response interference on a manual task improved the conscious perception of erroneous eye movements on a concurrent oculomotor task. In the first experiment, we examined whether a correlate of response interference, increased task difficulty alone, could improve perception of errors. We found no effect of task difficulty on self-monitoring. Results from a second experiment suggested that participants’ ability to monitor their eye movements improved with increased response interference, but post hoc analyses indicated that this was due to a decrease in corrective behaviors. Experiment 3 required participants to report directly on whether they had made an eye movement error, and we found that response interference perturbed, rather than improved, participants’ ability to report on their errors. Together, these findings contribute to models of error monitoring, revealing little support for the view that general increases in response interference or task difficulty are signals that contribute to the conscious detection of errors.     

Orientation of letters and errors in their recognition

Subjects named alphabetic characters that had been rotated, reflected, or inverted. Inversions induce more errors than mirror reflections and reflections induce more than rotations. In a significant number of mistakes a transformed character was assumed to be normally oriented, but in most a transformed character was confused with the mirror image of the original. The data suggest the existence of an “orientation set” in which the identiflcation of ambiguous characters depends largely on their anticipated orientation. The individuality of the data for the different orientations suggests that different transformations are compensated for in part by different mechanisms.     

Defensive copers show a deficit in passive avoidance learning on Newman's go/no-go task: implications for self-deception and socialization

The present study investigated whether passive avoidance learning was retarded by defensive coping strategies designed to minimize exposure to negatively valenced stimuli. High-anxious individuals, low-anxious individuals, and defensive copers completed a computerized go/no-go task, in which they learned when to press or not to press a button, in response to contingent positive and negative feedback. The duration that feedback remained onscreen was self-regulated. Defensive copers showed preferential reflection away from negative feedback, committed more passive-avoidance errors, and were characterized by impaired learning, overall. Further, the ratio of reflection on negative feedback to reflection on positive feedback directly mediated both passive-avoidance errors and overall learning. Defensive coping strategies, therefore, appear to interfere with passive avoidance learning, thereby fostering perseverative, dysfunctional action patterns by reducing knowledge gained from previous mistakes. Implications for the learning of effective socialization strategies, and for psychopathy-which is commonly characterized by similar passive-avoidance deficits-are subsequently considered.     

The Enhancing Effect of Overconfidence on Subsequent Learning Performance: Potential Mediation Effects of Dissatisfaction and Effort

Three studies were conducted to investigate whether individuals whose performance on a learning task fell short of their previous overconfident self‐assessment would apply more effort on a subsequent task to resolve their dissatisfaction and thereby achieve better subsequent performance than individuals who made accurate or underconfident self‐assessments. Specifically, Study 1 and Study 2 used overestimation, and Study 3 used overplacement to predict subsequent performance by measuring students' self‐assessments before the first task, their level of dissatisfaction with their actual performance on that task, the effort they applied in learning, and their performance on the subsequent task. Furthermore, Study 3 divided the participants randomly into a false feedback group (the control group) and a real feedback group (the experimental group). The results showed that when controlling for prior performance, participants who were more overconfident tended to express greater dissatisfaction and increase more effort to achieve their desired outcomes when they perceived a gap between their desired performance and their actual performance. Notably, they achieved better subsequent performance, whereas those in the control group who were overconfident neither applied more effort in subsequent learning nor increased their subsequent performance when they received “unbiased feedback.” The implications of these findings for education are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional responses to objective and normative performance feedback

The effect of objective and normative feedback on emotional responses to tasks was assessed in kindergarten age and 2nd- and 4th-grade children. Children completed a task on which they received objective (few errors vs. many errors) and normative (superior vs. inferior to same-aged peers) feedback. After receiving the feedback they were asked to rate the intensity of their emotional responses (global affect, good, bad, proud, and embarrassed), and their competency on the task. Both objective and normative feedback affected most emotional responses. The effect of the evaluation feedback generally did not vary as a function of the child's grade. Girls' comptency ratings were more affected by normative feedback than boys', but boys were more embarrassed following objective failure than girls.     

Immediate and delayed effects of victim suffering on the attacker's aggression

On the first day of a two-day experiment, male undergraduates were either angered or not, and they were given either high, low, or no metered pain feedback after each shock they supposedly delivered to their previous evaluator for his errors on a learning task. After the learning task the subjects made a number of ratings, including how much they had enjoyed this first session. On the second day, all subjects were simply required to administer shocks to a different person for his mistakes on the same learning task. The angered subjects were more punitive on both days toward both learners than the nonangered men. On the first day the angered men also increased the intensity of the shocks they delivered over trial blocks. Most interestingly, the angered men showed more enjoyment of the first session of the experiment as their victim's pain increased, and this enjoyment rating was related to the angered subjects' level of aggression on the second day of the experiment when they punished an “innocent” victim. The results were interpreted as consistent with the hypothesized reinforcement process which essentially states that signs and/or knowledge of the victim's suffering can reinforce impulsive or angry aggressive behavior.