共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Jacob Busch 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):55-65
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought
to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that
theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the
argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists
are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for
theory choice.
相似文献
Jacob BuschEmail: |
2.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
3.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
4.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
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Igor DouvenEmail: |
5.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):209-242
In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives
are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication
of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work,
I lay out these objections and respond to them.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
6.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
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Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
7.
The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part II 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Byeong-uk Yi 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2006,35(3):239-288
In this sequel to “The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I”, I continue to present an account of logic and language that
acknowledges limitations of singular constructions of natural languages and recognizes plural constructions as their peers.
To this end, I present a non-reductive account of plural constructions that results from the conception of plurals as devices
for talking about the many. In this paper, I give an informal semantics of plurals, formulate a formal characterization of
truth for the regimented languages that results from augmenting elementary languages with refinements of basic plural constructions
of natural languages, and account for the logic of plural constructions by characterizing the logic of those regimented languages.
相似文献
Byeong-uk YiEmail: |
8.
Joseph Shieber 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):169-181
In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss
the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion
KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion,
from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the
AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in
fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I
claim that the argument therefore fails.
相似文献
Joseph ShieberEmail: |
9.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
10.
Leo Iacono 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):423-436
In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing
names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution
of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that
the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent
with Millianism.
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Leo IaconoEmail: |
11.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
12.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
13.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
14.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
相似文献
Peter AlwardEmail: |
15.
Angela M. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):31-39
In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate
way from that person’s “character,” and defends a novel “two-tiered” account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief
comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account.
相似文献
Angela M. SmithEmail: |
16.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
17.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
相似文献
Per SandinEmail: |
18.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
19.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
20.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |