Fear, anger, and risk

Drawing on an appraisal-tendency framework (J. S. Lerner & D. Keltner, 2000), the authors predicted and found that fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception. Whereas fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices, angry people expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices. These opposing patterns emerged for naturally occurring and experimentally induced fear and anger. Moreover, estimates of angry people more closely resembled those of happy people than those of fearful people. Consistent with predictions, appraisal tendencies accounted for these effects: Appraisals of certainty and control moderated and (in the case of control) mediated the emotion effects. As a complement to studies that link affective valence to judgment outcomes, the present studies highlight multiple benefits of studying specific emotions.     

Physician decision making and cardiac risk: effects of knowledge, risk perception, risk tolerance, and fuzzy processing

Despite training, professionals sometimes make serious errors in risky decision making. The authors investigated judgments and decisions for 9 hypothetical patients at 3 levels of cardiac risk, comparing student and physician groups varying in domain-specific knowledge. Decisions were examined regarding whether they deviated from guidelines, how risk perceptions and risk tolerances determined decisions, and how the latter differed for knowledge groups. More knowledgeable professionals were better at discriminating levels of risk according to external correspondence criteria but committed similar errors in disjunctive probability judgments, violating internal coherence criteria. Also, higher knowledge groups relied on fewer dimensions of information than did lower knowledge groups. Consistent with fuzzy-trace theory, experts achieved better discrimination by processing less information and made sharper all-or-none distinctions among decision categories.     

Rules, risk and self-disclosure

The notions of rules and risk are inextricably involved with self-disclosure in counselling and in personal relationships. A hundred single British male under-graduates were asked to rate 120 self-referent items in terms of whether, if that item were true of them, they would like or dislike that aspect of themselves; and then to assess the degree of risk that might be entailed in disclosing it to a close male friend, a close female friend, a male acquaintance, and a female acquaintance. The characteristics most positively valued included happiness, health, heterosexuality, agood' job, and getting on well with others (including parents). In general, subjects anticipated greater risk in disclosing negative than positive characteristics, though there were some exceptions. The degree of friendship with the recipient of the disclosure appeared to lessen the anticipated risk of disclosure, while the sex of the disclosee generally made only a marginal difference. The findings are discussed in terms both of students' self-esteem and also of their relevance to counselling. Additionally, the social exchange implications of positive and negative self-disclosure are considered.     

Insurance, risk, and magical thinking

The possession of an insurance policy may not only affect the severity of a potential loss but also its perceived probability. Intuitively, people may feel that if they are insured nothing bad is likely to happen, but if they do not have insurance they are at greater peril. In Experiment 1, respondents who were reminded of their medical insurance felt they were less likely to suffer health problems in the future compared to people who were not reminded of their medical insurance. In Experiment 2a, participants who were unable to purchase travel insurance judged the probability of travel-related calamities higher compared to those who were insured. These results were replicated in Experiment 3a in a simulation of car accident insurance. The findings are explained in terms of intuitive magical thinking, specifically, the negative affective consequences of "tempting fate" and the sense of safety afforded by the notion of "being covered."     

Narcissism,confidence, and risk attitude

The present research addresses whether narcissists are more overconfident than others and whether this overconfidence leads to deficits in decision making. In Study 1, narcissism predicted overconfidence. This was attributable to narcissists' greater confidence despite no greater accuracy. In Study 2, participants were offered fair bets on their answers. Narcissists lost significantly more points in this betting task than non‐narcissists, due both to their greater overconfidence and greater willingness to bet. Finally, in Study 3, narcissists' predictions of future performance were based on performance expectations rather than actual performance. This research extends the literature on betting on knowledge to the important personality dimension of narcissism. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Objective risk, subjective risk, and colorectal cancer screening among a clinic sample

Among cancers, colorectal (CRC) is the third most incident and the second most lethal. Although screening for the disease has been shown to be effective in reducing morbidity and mortality, screening rates remain low. Risk of disease has been shown to increase screening uptake, but different types of risk may influence intent to screen, screening in a timely manner, or participating in screening at all. A cross-sectional design was used to select a diverse sample of CRC asymptomatic patients 50 or more years of age (N=104) visiting one of three Midwestern medical clinics. Results showed a positive relationship between receipt of CRC screening and planning to screen for CRC in the future. Objective risk factors (personal/family history and having a primary care physician) were associated with CRC screening uptake and screening within the time intervals recommended by professional screening guidelines, but subjective risk did not obtain significance for screening participation. Both objective (primary care physician) and subjective risk (long-term comparative risk, knowledge) were associated with future plans to screen. Findings suggest that CRC screening behaviors may be differentially influenced by type of risk.     

Stress,coping resources,and injury risk

Over the last two and a half decades, researchers have tried to determine if psychological variables predispose or buffer athletes from injury. They have found that sport participants who experience many recent stressors, and who do not have the resources and skills to cope with the stress, seem most at risk for injury. This article reviews that research as well as efforts to identify mechanisms that might explain why the stress-injury relationship occurs and interventions that will hopefully reduce the injury risk. Because the multicomponent stress-injury model of Andersen and Williams (1988) helped provide the impetus and theoretical base for much of that research, it serves as the foundation for organizing and summarizing the findings. Although the research has focused largely on sport injuries, the findings have relevance for understanding and potentially preventing many accidents and injuries that occur outside the realm of sport participation.     

Trust,risk, and the social contract

The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.     

Psychopathy, antisocial personality, and suicide risk

H. Cleckley (1976) maintained that psychopaths are relatively immune to suicide, but substantial evidence exists for a relationship between antisocial deviance and suicidal acts. This study was the first to explicitly examine suicidal history among psychopathic individuals as defined by R. D. Hare's (1991) Psychopathy Checklist--Revised (PCL-R). Male prison inmates (N = 313) were assessed using the PCL-R and DSM-III-R and DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, 1994) for antisocial personality disorder (APD), and they completed A. Tellegen's (1982) Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). Presence or absence of prior suicide attempts was coded from structured interview and prison file records. Suicide history was significantly related to PCL-R Factor 2 (which reflects chronic antisocial deviance) and to APD diagnosis but was unrelated to PCL-R Factor 1, which encompasses affective and interpersonal features of psychopathy. Higher order MPQ dimensions of Negative Emotionality and low Constraint were found to account for the relationship between history of suicidal attempts and antisocial deviance, indicating that temperament traits may represent a common vulnerability for both.     

Infertility,epistemic risk,and disease definitions

I explore the role that values and interests, especially ideological interests, play in managing and balancing epistemic risks in medicine. I will focus in particular on how diseases are identified and operationalized. Before we can do biomedical research on a condition, it needs to be identified as a medical condition, and it needs to be operationalized in a way that lets us identify sufferers, measure progress, and so forth. I will argue that each time we do this, we engage in epistemic risk balancing that inevitably draws upon values and interests, often including social and ideological values. My main interest here is in the conceptualization of infertility as a disease. Infertility is a rich test case for exploring the interplay between interests and epistemic risk management. There is no uncontested or standardized definition of infertility. The various definitions of it are internally ambiguous and tension-ridden, and in spectacular contradiction with one another. Many interest groups who are invested in framing infertility as a pressing problem deserving of social and medical redress are quick to insist that it is a legitimate ‘disease,’ but they cannot agree on which disease it is, what its symptoms or diagnostic markers are, or even what its basic ontology is. I suggest that there are political explanations for this epistemic mess. Indeed, I contend that there are good scientific and ethical reasons to reduce away the category of ‘infertility,’ especially understood as a scientific or medical category; I argue that we should excise the concept from our research and clinical practices.

     

Self-esteem, self-serving cognitions, and health risk behavior

The current article reviews prospective and experimental research on the relation between self-esteem and perceptions of vulnerability. These studies demonstrate that individuals with high self-esteem who engage in risk behavior often utilize a variety of self-serving cognitive strategies that protect them from fully acknowledging their vulnerability to the potential negative consequences of their behavior; e.g., they minimize their estimates of personal risk and overestimate the prevalence of the risk behavior among their peers. The article also provides data on an additional self-serving cognitive strategy employed by adolescents with high self-esteem--alteration of perceptions of others' reactions to their own risk behavior. Finally, the article reviews the emerging literature on the relation between these cognitive strategies and maladaptive health behavior, and proposes that whether these strategies are maladaptive depends on the nature of the threat and the availability of opportunities to engage in compensatory self-enhancement.     

Metacognition, risk behavior, and risk outcomes: the role of perceived intelligence and perceived knowledge.

The present study explores 2 key variables in social metacognition: perceived intelligence and perceived levels of knowledge about a specific content domain. The former represents a judgment of one's knowledge at an abstract level, whereas the latter represents a judgment of one's knowledge in a specific content domain. Data from interviews of approximately 8,411 female adolescents from a national sample were analyzed in a 2-wave panel design with a year between assessments. Higher levels of perceived intelligence at Wave 1 were associated with a lower probability of the occurrence of a pregnancy over the ensuing year independent of actual IQ, self-esteem, and academic aspirations. Higher levels of perceived knowledge about the accurate use of birth control were associated with a higher probability of the occurrence of a pregnancy independent of actual knowledge about accurate use, perceived intelligence, self-esteem, and academic aspirations.     

Suicide and violence risk in law enforcement: practical guidelines for risk assessment, prevention, and intervention.

Research and anecdotal reports indicate that suicide and violence risk may be higher among members of law enforcement than those in other occupational categories. This article examines the phenomenon of suicide and violence risk within this population, and law enforcement cultural variables that may contribute to elevated risk. Suicide and violence risk factors and clues unique to law enforcement are described, as are intervention approaches which may be helpful to managing and reducing risk.     

Dread risk, September 11, and fatal traffic accidents

Abstract— People tend to fear dread risks, that is, low-probability, high-consequence events, such as the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. If Americans avoided the dread risk of flying after the attack and instead drove some of the unflown miles, one would expect an increase in traffic fatalities. This hypothesis was tested by analyzing data from the U.S. Department of Transportation for the 3 months following September 11. The analysis suggests that the number of Americans who lost their lives on the road by avoiding the risk of flying was higher than the total number of passengers killed on the four fatal flights. I conclude that informing the public about psychological research concerning dread risks could possibly save lives.     

Propositional epistemic luck,epistemic risk,and epistemic justification

If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk.