My body or my mind: The impact of state and trait objectification on women's cognitive resources

Objectification theory posits that as a result of pervasive sexual objectification of the female body in American culture, women are socialized to take an observers' perspective towards the self, resulting in self‐objectification. This tendency, combined with an objectifying context, is hypothesized to increase cognitive load, thereby impairing performance. Two experiments tested this hypothesis by investigating the joint impact of trait and state objectification on cognitive load among women. Results of the first experiment showed longer response latencies on a Letter Number Sequencing task, specifically among women high in trait self‐objectification (TSO), in a highly objectifying condition. The second experiment replicated results from the first while also exploring possible correlates of the effects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

More than meets the eye: Implicit perception in legally blind individuals

Legally blind participants (uncorrected vision of 20/200+) were able to identify a visual stimulus attribute (clock hand position) in the absence of consciously identifying its presence. Specifically, participants—with their corrective lenses removed—correctly guessed the hour-hand position above chance (8%) on a clockface shown on a computer screen. This occurred both when presented in a 1-clockface display (28%), as well as when shown a display containing 4 clockfaces (21%), in which only 1 face contained a hand. Even more striking, hand identification accuracy in the 4-clockface condition was comparable whether the clockface containing the hand was (21%) or was not (20%) correctly identified. That legally blind individuals are capable of identifying stimulus attributes without conscious awareness provides an additional vehicle for exploring implicit perception. Consistent with previous research, the visualsystem can apparently cope with degraded visual input through information available through a(n unconscious) secondary pathway via the superior colliculi.     

Wanting a body that's better than average: the effect of manipulated body norms on ideal body size perception

We examined the effect of body norms on ideal and current body size perception. In Study One, female participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: (1) a thinner body norm, (2) a heavier body norm, or (3) no body norm. Body norms were manipulated by indicating a bogus "population average," and current and ideal body size perception were subsequently measured using a body silhouettes measure. Women had a thinner ideal body size in the thinner norm condition than in the heavier norm condition. Study Two replicated these results, but in a sample of young men and with regards to muscularity rather than thinness. Men had a more muscular ideal body size in the more muscular norm condition than in the less muscular norm condition. Current body size perception was also influenced by body norms, but only for women and after controlling for BMI.     

More than just a pretty face and a hot body: multiple cues in mate-choice

Mate preferences have been well studied in social and evolutionary psychology. In two studies (N = 490), using two different measurement techniques, we examined mate preferences for the body and the face in the context of other traits. Results replicated prior research on mate preferences across the sex of the participant and mating duration but clarified the nature of preferences for physical attractiveness. Generally, physical attractiveness was a necessity in short-term mating and for men and traits like kindness were a necessity in long-term mating and for women. Men wanted a short-term mate who had a good body, likely because that body advertises fertility whereas both sexes wanted a mate with a nice face for a long-term mate, which is likely because the face is a cue based on structural properties related to health. Sex and mating-duration differences on preferences for attractive faces and bodies were robust to differences in measurement technique.     

More than just body weight: The role of body image in psychological and physical functioning

The current study examined BMI and body image dissatisfaction as predictors of physical and mental health-related quality of life (HRQL) and psychosocial functioning in a sample of 414 undergraduate students (mean age = 21.5, SD = 4.9; mean BMI = 23.6, SD = 5.2). In men and women, higher BMI was correlated with body image dissatisfaction and physical HRQL, but not with any measures of psychosocial functioning, whereas higher body image dissatisfaction was associated with poorer physical HRQL and psychosocial functioning. Furthermore, body image dissatisfaction was observed to mediate the relationship between BMI and physical HRQL in men and women. Interestingly, in this model, higher BMI predicted increased self-esteem. These findings suggest that body image dissatisfaction may be an important target for health interventions.     

Direct perception and the predictive mind

Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on the predictive approach, in the sense of being constructivist or inferential. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that perception is therefore indirect in a metaphysical or epistemological sense on the predictive approach. In the metaphysical case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect solutions to the metaphysical problem of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism, sense datum theory). In the epistemological case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect approaches to the justification of perceptual belief. In this paper, I demonstrate how proponents of the predictive approach have conflated these distinct notions of perceptual directness and indirectness, and I propose alternative strategies for developing the philosophical consequences of the approach.     

More than a feeling

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant's moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.     

Oliva Sabuco de Nantes and her Nueva Filosofia: a new philosophy of human nature and the interaction between mind and body

ABSTRACT

The main objective of the New Philosophy was to ‘improve the lives of people and nations in part by improving medical practice’. To this end, Oliva Sabuco sought to improve humankind's knowledge of the philosophical underpinnings of medicine while taking experiential practices into account. She suggested that a variety of procedures (pharmaceutical, emotional and therapeutic) should be adopted to maintain and restore harmony between the mind and body. Oliva Sabuco sought to promote health and prevent disease by expanding our knowledge of the interrelationship between mind and body; the ultimate goal was to understand the body's function and form in order to promote inner harmony and thus health. The influence of classical traditions in moral and natural philosophy, medicine, and cosmography is unmistakable in Oliva Sabuco's text, yet she synthesized these traditions, disagreed with fundamental aspects of them, and transformed them in a holistic philosophy of human nature that is part of a larger view of the cosmos and mankind's place in it.     

To pass or not to pass: More a question of body orientation than visual cues

This study investigated the influence of pitch body tilt on judging the possibility of passing under high obstacles in the presence of an illusory horizontal self-motion. Seated subjects tilted at various body orientations were asked to estimate the possibility of passing under a projected bar (i.e., a parking barrier), while imagining a forward whole-body displacement normal to gravity. This task was performed under two visual conditions, providing either no visual surroundings or a translational horizontal optic flow that stopped just before the barrier appeared. The results showed a main overestimation of the possibility of passing under the bar in both cases and most importantly revealed a strong influence of body orientation despite the visual specification of horizontal self-motion by optic flow (i.e., both visual conditions yielded a comparable body tilt effect). Specifically, the subjective passability was proportionally deviated towards the body tilt by 46% of its magnitude when facing a horizontal optic flow and 43% without visual surroundings. This suggests that the egocentric attraction exerted by body tilt when referring the subjective passability to horizontal self-motion still persists even when anchoring horizontally related visual cues are displayed. These findings are discussed in terms of interaction between spatial references. The link between the reliability of available sensory inputs and the weight attributed to each reference is also addressed.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

Contingent faculty: More than a tribe of nomads

In this essay I review the advantages and challenges of contingent faculty service from a perspective which crosses programs, but chiefly from within one academic institution, a church‐related but independent theological seminary. I anecdotally relate certain “value‐added” potentialities which accrue for students and instruction when an adjunct faculty's primary institutional connections are outside the academic environment. I cite benefits to the student, school, and instructor. See companion essays published in this issue of the journal by Hoon J. Lee, Adam Wirrig, Bradley Burroughs, and Kyle A. Schenkewitz.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.