Exploratory Bi-factor Analysis: The Oblique Case

Bi-factor analysis is a form of confirmatory factor analysis originally introduced by Holzinger and Swineford (Psychometrika 47:41?C54, 1937). The bi-factor model has a general factor, a number of group factors, and an explicit bi-factor structure. Jennrich and Bentler (Psychometrika 76:537?C549, 2011) introduced an exploratory form of bi-factor analysis that does not require one to provide an explicit bi-factor structure a priori. They use exploratory factor analysis and a bifactor rotation criterion designed to produce a rotated loading matrix that has an approximate bi-factor structure. Among other things this can be used as an aid in finding an explicit bi-factor structure for use in a confirmatory bi-factor analysis. They considered only orthogonal rotation. The purpose of this paper is to consider oblique rotation and to compare it to orthogonal rotation. Because there are many more oblique rotations of an initial loading matrix than orthogonal rotations, one expects the oblique results to approximate a bi-factor structure better than orthogonal rotations and this is indeed the case. A surprising result arises when oblique bi-factor rotation methods are applied to ideal data.     

Patterns of Religious Coping among Bereaved College Students

Contemporary research has suggested that bereavement is a paramount issue in college populations, a group which has historically been underrepresented in grief research (Balk. in Death studies 25:67–84, 2001; Balk et al. in Death Studies 34:459–468, 2010). Indeed, there has been a call to generate new research on grief with specific populations and age groups (Center for the Advancement of Health. in Death Studies 28:568–575, 2004). Religion is often described as a primary way that individuals cope with bereavement in particular (Frantz et al. in Pastor Psychol 44(3):151–163, 1996) and has been shown to effect college student reactions to stress in general (Merrill et al. in Mental Health, Religion & Culture 12(5):501–511, 2009). The RCOPE (Pargament et al. in J Clin Psychol 56(4):519–543, 2000, J Health Psychol 9:713–730, 2004) is a frequently used measure of religious coping, but has not been evaluated with a bereaved undergraduate population. Given that emerging adulthood is a critical developmental phase of religious identity (Fowler. in New Directions for Child Development 3(52):27–45, 1991), the current study examined the factor structure of the RCOPE within a sample of bereaved college students. An exploratory factor analysis was performed, which approximated the factor structure proposed by Pargament et al. (J Clin Psychol 56(4):519–543, 2000). However, a high correlation between the positive and negative religious coping subscales (r = 0.71) detracted from the predictive utility of Pargament et al.′s (2000) two overarching subscales. Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation was used to identify two uncorrelated subscales (adaptive religious coping and maladaptive religious coping). This new two-factor, 39-item version of the RCOPE was found to demonstrate good internal consistency (α > 0.8) as well as convergent and discriminant validity. The interaction between religious coping strategies and core beliefs about the predictability of the world is explored, and directions for future research and clinical practice are suggested.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Alpha to Omega: A Neurological Analysis of Marital Conflict in a Pilot Study

Although the linkage between health and marriage has been noted (e.g., Hayward and Gorman in Demography 41:87–107. doi:10.1353/dem.2004.0005, 2004; Kaplan and Kronick in J Epidemiol Community Health 60:760–765. doi:10.1136/jech.2005.037606, 2006; Schoenborn in Marital status and health: United States, 1999–2002. Advance data from vital and health statistics. National Center for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, MD, 2004), understanding the connection between neurological and behavioral phenomena in marital relationships has yet to be tackled. This pilot study attempted to address this limitation by analyzing electrical brain activity during a conflict interaction between married couples. Results generally supported the work of Lazarus (Emotion and adaptation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991) and Harmon-Jones et al. (J Pers Soc Psychol 82:610–618. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.82.4.610, 2002); individuals that felt like they were in an action-possible situation revealed relatively higher left hemispheric activity in the frontal region of the brain.     

Lucky understanding without knowledge

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.     

Living with Gratitude: Spouse’s Gratitude on One’s Depression

Research has shown that gratitude makes people happier (McCullough and Tsang in Psychol Gratitude, Oxford University Press, pp 123–141, 2004; Wood et al. in Clin Psychol Rev 30(7):890–905, 2010), healthier (McCullough et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol, 86(2):295–309, 2004), more considerate (Bartlett and DeSteno in Psychol Sci 17(4):319–325, 2006), and better evaluated (Gordon et al. in Pers Individ Differ 50(3):339–343, 2011), enabling more stable relationships (Algoe et al. in Pers Relationsh 17(2):217–233, 2010; Algoe et al. in Emotion 8(3):425–429, 2008; Lambert et al. in Psychol Sci 21(4):574–580, 2010). However, no study has extended research beyond individual persons to investigate the impact of one’s gratitude on the mental well-being of those who surround her or him. Thus, we tested this possibility and found in Study 1 that within marriage, husbands’ depositional gratitude negatively correlated with their wives’ depressive emotion. The results of Study 2 validated Study 1 by showing that a wife’s depression would be relatively palliated if her husband was assigned to express appreciation to her and not share daily hassles. While a causal relationship was demonstrated as hypothesized, a difference between genders also emerged. We discuss in particular the latter in terms of its mechanism, limitations, and practical implications for marriage.     

Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.     

Rational intuition and understanding

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.     

Attachment,Infidelity, and Loneliness in College Students Involved in a Romantic Relationship: The Role of Relationship Satisfaction,Morbidity, and Prayer for Partner

This study examined the mediating effects of relationship satisfaction, prayer for a partner, and morbidity in the relationship between attachment and loneliness, infidelity and loneliness, and psychological morbidity and loneliness, in college students involved in a romantic relationship. Participants were students in an introductory course on family development. This study examined only students (n = 345) who were involved in a romantic relationship. The average age of participants was 19.46 (SD = 1.92) and 25 % were males. Short-form UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8), (Hays and DiMatteo in J Pers Assess 51:69–81, doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa5101_6, 1987); Relationship Satisfaction Scale (Funk and Rogge in J Fam Psychol 21:572–583, doi:10.1037/0893-3200.21.4.572, 2007); Rotterdam Symptom Checklist (De Haes et al. in Measuring the quality of life of cancer patients with the Rotterdam Symptom Checklist (RSCL): a manual, Northern Centre for Healthcare Research, Groningen, 1996); Prayer for Partner Scale, (Fincham et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 99:649–659, doi:10.1037/a0019628, 2010); Infidelity Scale, (Drigotas et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 77:509–524, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.509, 1999); and the Experiences in Close Relationship Scale-short form (Wei et al. in J Couns Psychol 52(4):602–614, doi:10.1037/0022-0167.52.4.602, 2005). Results showed that relationship satisfaction mediated the relationship between avoidance attachment and loneliness and between infidelity and loneliness. Physical morbidity mediated the relationship between anxious attachment and psychological morbidity. Psychological morbidity mediated the relationship between anxious attachment and physical morbidity. The present results expand the literature on attachment by presenting evidence that anxious and avoidant partners experience loneliness differently. Implications for couple’s therapy are addressed. Future research should replicate these results with older samples and married couples.     

Color and cognitive penetrability

Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the way we think of objects determines how we see them, thus threatening the role of perception in justifying beliefs. In this paper, I show that the psychological findings can be accounted for without admitting cognitive penetrability. An underestimated but key feature of the experiments is that observers had to judge colors in borderline cases, in conditions of reduced acuity, or on the basis of color-concepts instead of matching. Such judgments are sensitive to the form of bias that Tversky and Kahneman (Science 185:1124–1131, 1974) have termed ‘anchoring’. Adopting a suggestion from Raffman (Philos Rev 103(1):41–74, 1994), I argue that the way subjects in the experiments think of the objects could affect their color judgments without altering their color experiences.     

The relationship between intrinsic motivation and academic achievement for first generation Latino college students

Hispanic students are pursuing higher education more than in previous years and they often represent their family as the first member to attend college (Strage in Coll Stud J 33:198–205, 1999). Past educational research has studied the influence of intrinsic motivation on academic achievement in various ethnically diverse elementary, middle school and high school student populations (Areepattamannil in Soc Psychol Educ 15:367–386, 2012; Crumpton and Gregory in J Educ Psychol 104:42–53, 2011; Lepper et al. in J Educ Psychol 92:184–196, 2005). Despite the fact that many studies using college student samples have also shown the positive role of intrinsic motivation with achievement outcomes (Harackiewicz et al. in Educ Psychol 33:1–21, 1998; Simons et al. in Br J Educ Psychol 74:343–360, 2004; Vallerand and Bissonnette in J Pers 60:599–620, 1992), few studies focus on Latino samples. We expect that intrinsic motivation may play an important role in the academic achievement of Latino students, particularly first generation college students. The current review will examine self-determination theory, including intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation, as well as relevant research pertaining to the connection between intrinsic motivation and academic achievement. The relationship between intrinsic motivation and academic achievement for first generation Latino college students will be examined along with ways to increase intrinsic motivation and academic achievement in turn. Implications for future research will be discussed.     

Importing Logics

The novel notion of importing logics is introduced, subsuming as special cases several kinds of asymmetric combination mechanisms, like temporalization [8, 9], modalization [7] and exogenous enrichment [13, 5, 12, 4, 1]. The graph-theoretic approach proposed in [15] is used, but formulas are identified with irreducible paths in the signature multi-graph instead of equivalence classes of such paths, facilitating proofs involving inductions on formulas. Importing is proved to be strongly conservative. Conservative results follow as corollaries for temporalization, modalization and exogenous enrichment.     

Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability

Pereboom has formulated a Frankfurt-style counterexample in which an agent is alleged to be responsible despite the fact that there are only non-robust alternatives present (Pereboom, Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities, 2003; Phil Explor 12(2):109–118, 2009). I support Widerker’s objection to Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2 example (Widerker, J Phil 103(4):163–187, 2006) (which rests on the worry that the agent in this example is derivatively culpable as opposed to directly responsible) against Pereboom’s recent counterarguments to this objection (Pereboom 2009). Building on work by Moya (J Phil 104:475–486, 2007; Critica 43(128):3–26, 2011) and Widerker (Widerker 2006), I argue that there is good reason to measure the robustness of alternatives in terms of comparative, rather than non-comparative likelihood of exemption, where the important factor for blame is whether the agent is “doing her reasonable best” to avoid blameworthy behaviour. I maintain that an agent only ever appears responsible when alternatives are robust in this sense. In Pereboom’s examples, both Tax Evasion 2, and his more recent version, Tax Evasion 3 (Pereboom 2009), I maintain the robustness of the alternatives, so understood, is unclear. We can clear up any ambiguity by sharpening the examples, and the result is that the agent appears responsible when the alternatives are made clearly robust, and does not appear responsible when alternatives appear clearly non-robust. The comparative nature of our judgements about blame, I maintain helps to explain the continuing appeal of the “leeway-incompatibilist” viewpoint.     

Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

Inconsistency and scientific realism

I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (Philos Sci 54:327–350, 1987) and Smith (Stud Hist Philos Sci 19:429–445, 1988a, In: Fine A, Leplin J (eds) PSA1988, 1988b), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.     

Looking back or moving on: How regulatory modes affect nostalgia

Nostalgia is defined as the remembrance of prior experiences that are self-relevant, involve close others, and carry a predominantly positive affective tone (Wildschut et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 91:975–993, 2006). Given nostalgia’s palliative function for coping with negative affect and self-threats (Sedikides et al. in Curr Dir Psychol Sci 17:304–307, 2008), the present research explores a psychological construct related to greater experience of nostalgia: regulatory mode. According to regulatory mode theory (Kruglanski et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 79:793–815, 2000; Higgins et al. in Adv exp soc psychol 35:293–344, 2003), assessment is the aspect of self-regulation focused on evaluation, whereas locomotion is focused on goal progress. We hypothesized that emphasis of the assessment mode on evaluation would promote nostalgia, while emphasis of the locomotion mode on progress would prevent it. These predictions were corroborated in two studies that assessed regulatory modes as individual difference factors (Study 1) and induced them experimentally (Study 2). Implications of these findings for the self regulation process are considered.     

No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne in Australas J Philos 80(3):359–371 2002; A future for presentism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006; Braddon-Mitchell in Analysis 64(283):199–203 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 555–562, 1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?     

The free will of corporations (and other collectives)

Moderate holists like French (Collective and corporate responsibility, 1984), Copp (J Soc Philos, 38(3):369–388, 2007), Hess (The Background of Social Reality – A Survey, 2013), Isaacs (Moral responsibility in collective contexts, 2011) and List and Pettit (Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that corporations cannot qualify as moral agents because they lack free will. The concern is that corporations (and other highly organized collectives like colleges, governments, and the military) are effectively puppets, dancing on strings controlled by external forces. The article begins by briefly presenting a novel account of corporate moral agency and then demonstrates that, on this account, qualifying corporations (and similar entities in other fields) do possess free will. Such entities possess and act from their own “actional springs”, in Haji’s (Midwest Stud Philos, 30(1):292–308, 2006) phrase, and from their own reasons-responsive mechanisms. When they do so, they act freely and are morally responsible for what they do.     

Desire for control,perception of control: their impact on autonomous motivation and psychological adjustment

The purpose of the present research was to test the relevance of a theoretical framework based on the matches and the mismatches between desire for control and perception of control (Evans et al. in Br J Psychol 84(2):255–273, 1993), in order to predict autonomous motivation (Deci and Ryan in Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Plenum, New York, 1985, 2012), depression, and anxiety (Bradley in Handbook of psychology and diabetes: A guide to psychological measurement in diabetes research and practice. Harwood Academic Press, Chur, 1994; Bruchon-Schweitzer in Psychologie de la Santé: Modèles, concepts et méthodes. Dunod, Paris, 2002). Two prospective studies were run among undergraduate students. Results of Study 1 confirmed the relevance of Evans et al.’s (in Br J Psychol 84(2):255–273, 1993) theoretical framework. More specifically, four clusters reflecting different levels of desire for control and perception of control were found. Moreover, results revealed that profiles characterized by high scores on both desire for control and perception of control were more autonomously motivated than those characterized by the three other possible combinations. Results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1 and showed that participants combining a low desire for control and a high perception of control were the less depressed, followed by participants with high scores on both measures. No significant effects were found for anxiety.     

The Spiritual Well-Being of Elderly People: A Study of a French Sample

The aim of our research was to identify predictors of the spiritual well-being of elderly people. More specifically, we postulated that subjective well-being and its components would be predictors of spiritual well-being, and more so than age and health status. We invited 133 people aged 60–95 to complete a questionnaire that included the French adaptation (Velasco and Rioux in Revue Canadienne des Sciences du Comportement 41(2):102–128, 2009) of Paloutzian and Ellison’s (Loneliness: A sourcebook of current theory, research and therapy, Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1982) Spiritual Well-Being Scale, Ryff and Essex’s (Psychol Aging 7:507–517, 1992) Psychological Well-Being Scale (translated by Lapierre and Desrochers 1997), Salamon and Conte’s (Meas Eval Guid 15(3):194–200, 1982) Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale (validated by Rousseau and Dubé in 1993), and the French version (Blais et al. in Can J Behav Sci 21:210–223, 1989) of Diener et al. (J Pers Assess 49:71–75, 1985) Satisfaction with Life Scale. The results only partially confirm our hypothesis, because only satisfaction with life as a whole and two items in “Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale” make it possible to predict the spiritual well-being of elderly people. Moreover, neither health status nor age was found to be a significant predictor of spiritual well-being. This research helps understand better the links between the concept of spiritual well-being and that of subjective well-being of elderly people and could contribute to the development of a tool that could take into account the spiritual well-being of elderly people, whether they be believers, agnostic, or atheist.