Organicism and Reductionism in Cancer Research: Towards a Systemic Approach

In recent cancer research, strong and apparently conflicting epistemological stances have been advocated by different research teams in a mist of an ever‐growing body of knowledge ignited by ever‐more perplexing and non‐conclusive experimental facts: in the past few years, an ‘organicist’ approach investigating cancer development at the tissue level has challenged the established and so‐called ‘reductionist’ approach focusing on disentangling the genetic and molecular circuitry of carcinogenesis. This article reviews the ways in which ‘organicism’ and ‘reductionism’ are used and opposed in this context, with an aim at clarifying the debate. Methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of both approaches are discussed. We argue that the ‘organicist/reductionist’ opposition in the present case of carcinogenesis is more a matter of diverging heuristics than a claim about theoretical or ontological (ir)reducibility. As a matter of fact, except for the downward causation claim, which we question, we argue that the organicist arguments are compatible with the reductionist approach. Moreover, we speculate that both approaches, which currently focus on specific entities i.e., genes versus tissues, will need to shift their conceptual frameworks to studying complex arrays of relationships potentially ranging over several levels of entities, as is the case with ‘systems biology’.     

Cross‐sectional and longitudinal relations between mother‐child talk about conflict and children's social understanding

We examined the relations between the ways 48 mothers and their 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds talked about a conflict depicted in a picture book and their children's current and subsequent level of social understanding. We distinguished explanatory talk, which directed attention to the actions that generated the conflict, from non‐explanatory talk, which discussed the conflict in terms of, for example, making up or saying sorry. Controlling for child age and overall talk by mother, explanatory talk was positively associated with contemporaneous social understanding. Social understanding at time one was also positively associated with social understanding 30 months later. These data suggest that dialogue about conflict may be helpful for 3‐ to 5‐year old children's understanding of the mental world, to the extent that it facilitates their understanding of particular social situations.     

Race and IQ: Molecular genetics as deus ex machina

During the last hundred years, the debate over the meaning of race has retained a highly consistent core, despite evolution of the technical details. Non-Europeans, and in particular, Africans, are assigned the role of deviants and outcasts, whose claim on our common humanity remains in doubt. Each time the technical facade of these racialist arguments is destroyed, the latest jargon and half-truths from the margins of science are used to rebuild them around the same core belief in Black inferiority. Because race is in part a genetic concept, the advent of molecular DNA technology has opened an important new chapter in this story. Unfortunately, the article by D. Rowe (2005, this issue, see record 2005-00117-007) begins from mistaken premises and merely restates the racialist view using the terminology of molecular genetics. No technology--even the awe-inspiring tools now available to DNA science--can overcome the handicap of fundamental conceptual errors. Race is not a concept that emerged from within modern genetics; rather, it was imposed by history, and its meaning is inseparable from that cultural origin. By ignoring its cultural meaning the reductionist narrative about race fails--both in the narrow terms of science and as a contribution to the broader social discourse.     

Sex differences in early verbal and non‐verbal cognitive development

The present study of over 3000 2‐year‐old twin pairs used a sex‐limitation model to examine genetic and environmental origins of sex differences in verbal and non‐verbal cognitive ability. Girls scored significantly higher on both measures (p<0.0001), although gender only accounted for approximately 3% of the variance in verbal ability and 1% of the variance in non‐verbal cognitive ability. For the verbal measure boys showed greater heritability than girls. Also the twin‐pair correlation is significantly lower for opposite‐sex twins than for non‐identical same‐sex twins. This indicates that individual differences in verbal ability include some sex‐specific factors. Non‐verbal cognitive ability did not differ in aetiology for boys and girls. We conclude that genetic and environmental influences differ for girls and boys for early verbal but not non‐verbal development.     

A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism

In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non‐analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non‐analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire‐based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire‐based account of practical reasons is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the reduction fails.     

A note on statistical power in multi‐site randomized trials with multiple treatments at each site

We derive the statistical power functions in multi‐site randomized trials with multiple treatments at each site, using multi‐level modelling. An F statistic is used to test multiple parameters in the multi‐level model instead of the Wald chi square test as suggested in the current literature. The F statistic is shown to be more conservative than the Wald statistic in testing any overall treatment effect among the multiple study conditions. In addition, we improvise an easy way to estimate the non‐centrality parameters for the means comparison t‐tests and the F test, using Helmert contrast coding in the multi‐level model. The variance of treatment means, which is difficult to fathom but necessary for power analysis, is decomposed into intuitive simple effect sizes in the contrast tests. The method is exemplified by a multi‐site evaluation study of the behavioural interventions for cannabis dependence.     

Ability,Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence

Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of the Past with a principle that does not generate this difficulty. I develop such an account and defend it from objections. I also explore some of the account's implications, including whether the account is consistent with presentism.     

EXPLAINING EMERGENCE: TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF LEVELS

The vitalism/reductionism debate in the life sciences shows that the idea of emergence as something principally unexplainable will often be falsified by the development of science. Nevertheless, the concept of emergence keeps reappearing in various sciences, and cannot easily be dispensed with in an evolutionary world-view. We argue that what is needed is an ontological non reductionist theory of levels of reality which includes a concept of emergence, and which can support an evolutionary account of the origin of levels. Classical explication of emergence as “the creation of new properties” is discussed critically, and specific distinctions between various kinds of emergence is introduced for the purpose of developing an ontology of levels, framed in a materialistic and evolutionary perspective. A concept of the relation between levels as being inclusive is suggested, permitting the “local” existence of different ontologies. We identify, as a working hypothesis, four primary levels and explicate their nonhomomorphic interlevel relations. Explainability of emergence in relation to determinism and predictability is considered. Recent research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems represents a revival of the scientific study of emergence, and we argue that these recent developments can be seen as a step toward a final “devitalisation” of emergence.     

Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: Theory and practice

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.     

Levels of Reality

Philosophers and non‐philosophers have been attracted to the idea that the world incorporates levels of being: higher‐level items – ordinary objects, artifacts, human beings – depend on, but are not in any sense reducible to, items at lower levels. I argue that the motivation for levels stems from an implicit acceptance of a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from ways we describe the world. Abandonment of the Picture Theory opens the way to a ‘no levels’ conception of reality, a conception that honors anti‐reductionist sentiments and preserves the status of the special sciences without the ontological baggage.     

Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.     

Normativity,naturalism and perspectivity

Abstract

Normative links have been considered a problem for reductionist theories of mind, primarily because of lack of isomorphism between intentional and non‐intentional conceptual schemes. The paper suggests a more radical tension between normative rationality and scientific naturalism. Normative explanations involve the recognition that agents are also subjects of experience. The distinctive form of intelligibility they bestow requires engagement with such subjectivity.     

It is for you,or it is for me: How relationship dependence affects gift image consistency in romantic relationships

Recently, consumer behavior research has been focusing on decision‐making in relationships. This research considers an important context, romantic gift giving, in which givers choose gifts that are perceptually consistent with both their own self‐image and the recipients' self‐image. Based on interdependence theory, we investigate how the relationship dependence between romantic couples can affect gift image consistency. According to the results, the giver's level of dependence plays a positive role in the consistency between the recipient's self‐image and the gift image (gift‐recipient consistency) and plays a negative role in the consistency between the giver's self‐image and the gift image (gift‐giver consistency). The mutuality of dependence could strengthen or weaken the effect of the giver's level of dependence on gift image consistency, and this effect is carried through the giver's relationship power.     

Adult attachment dimensions and recollections of childhood family context: associations with dispositional optimism and pessimism

The present study tested the theoretically inferred but not yet empirically tested association between dispositional optimism–pessimism and attachment security among 423 Finnish women and men. A second‐order latent variable representing a generalized representation of attachment insecurity in close relationships that included two latent constructs, the one representing romantic adult attachment dimensions and the other representing recollections of attachment‐related childhood family relationship, was associated with greater pessimism; the adult attachment dimension of high anxiety had unique and additional explanatory power, not accounted for by the generalized representation of attachment‐related insecurity. The model explained 48% of the variance in pessimism. The results clearly emphasize that additional studies are needed to clarify the role of interpersonal processes in dispositional optimism–pessimism. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ON THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN FREEDOM

Abstract. The age–old dilemma of free will and determinism is attacked by proving that both sides are flawed with contingencies, that the notion of eternal law is a theologically tainted projection rather than a reality of the real world that is understood to be evolutionary. Determinism is dissolved into conditionalism. This excludes materialistic scientific explanation of the deterministic style. As it brings forth freedom, evolutionary reality transcends essentially the explanatory possibilities of statistically structured natural laws. The dilemma of determinism and free will based on a logic of contradiction is replaced by an ontology of polarity.     

What Is “I”?

Two responses to the nature-nurture-will issue are set forth in this essay. A devil's-advocate defense of the reductionist position is built on the thesis that the nature of a person is entirely a reflection of genetic and environmental influences; thus, eventually all thought, emotions, and actions would be explained by physicochemical effects of genes and environmental influences. The second position is based on subjective, though non-scientific, truth revealed experientially. This produces a paradox: objectively I am part of a determinism, but subjectively I can have a revelation that there is a Creator who has made me creative and given me a spirit. Subjective truth cannot be explained by science.