Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

ABSTRACT— Added to the already tremendous diversity of subdisciplines of psychological science is the psychology of science. Although research on the psychology of science began in 1874, the field has seen a substantial expansion of activity in recent years. One particular subset of this research literature has special importance: namely, inquiries into the psychology of doing great science. These investigations may be assigned into four groups: cognitive, differential, developmental, and social. Each of these deal with critical questions that can, if answered, contribute directly to the improvement of psychology as a science. Potential applications include (a) the identification of scientific talent in psychology, (b) the education of future investigators in psychological science, and (c) the evaluation of psychology's progress as a scientific endeavor.     

Can Science Be Objective? Longino's Science as Social Knowledge

In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this “contextual empiricism” reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.     

Science without reduction∗

This paper examines the challenge that psychoanalytic theory cannot be refuted. It does so by considering the theory in its orthodox Freudian form, and in the main branches into which it can be divided — the theory of Instincts, of Development, of Psychic Structure, of Mental Economics or Defence, and of Symptom Formation. The essential character of the generalizations and concepts of these branches will just be indicated; and we shall ask of each branch whether it is possible to refute it. A considerable amount of scientific enquiry has been done into the concepts and generalizations of psychoanalysis. Relevant examples of these enquiries will be noted; and the question asked whether these scientific studies have in fact done anything to refute or support the various branches of psychoanalytic theory. The general upshot will be that the challenge is both important and a mistake.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.     

New Worlds,New Civilizations? From Science Fiction to Science Fact

ABSTRACT

Although long predicted on theoretical grounds, prior to the 1990s there was no observational evidence of worlds orbiting distant stars; however, the development of new technologies has enabled the discovery of thousands of these exoplanets. The diversity of these worlds exceeds scientific expectations and rivals foreshadowing by the most creative science fiction writers. Extrapolations based on statistical arguments and our understanding of how planetary systems form suggest exoplanets may outnumber the roughly 10 million quadrillion stars in the observable Universe. There are compelling reasons to expect conditions conducive to life on many of these worlds, but the existence of extraterrestrial life remains an open question. Although galaxy-spanning civilizations envisioned in science fiction remain unlikely, future contact with extraterrestrial species is not implausible, and in any case, the likelihood of having a human presence on Mars within the next few decades lends urgency to global, cross-cultural religious and ethical discussions.     

Consciousness and Science: an Advaita-Vedantic Perspective on the Theology – Science Dialogue

In modern science, the synthesis of “nature/mind” in observation, experiment, and explanation, especially in physics and biology increasingly reveal a “non-linear” totality in which subject, object, and situation have become inseparable. This raises the interesting ontological question of the true nature of reality. Western science as seen in its evolution from Socratic Greece has tried to understand the world by “objectifying” it, resulting in dualistic dilemmas. Indian “Science,” as seen in its evolution from the Vedic times (1500—500 BCE) has tried to understand the world by “subjectifying” our consciousness of reality. Within the Hindu tradition, the Advaita-Vedanta school of philosophy offers possibilities for resolving not only the Cartesian dilemma but also a solution to the nature of difference in a non-dualistic totality. We also present the Advaita-Vedanta principle of superimposition as a useful approach to modern physical and social science, which have been increasingly forced to reject the absolute reductionism and dualism of classical differences between subject and object.     

Science Literacy in School and Home Contexts: Kindergarteners’ Science Achievement and Motivation

We examined science learning and motivation outcomes as a function of children's participation in the classroom and classroom-plus-home components of the Scientific Literacy Project (SLP). The sample was comprised of kindergarten children in 4 low income, neighboring schools. Children in Schools 1 and 2 (n = 120) participated in the SLP science activities. Of these children, 79 participated in the classroom component of the SLP whereas 41 participated in both the classroom and home components. A comparison group of children in schools 3 and 4 (n = 74) participated in regular science activities. We identified science learning, achievement, and motivational benefits for the SLP groups. Additional benefits for children who participated in both the classroom and home components of the SLP were greater gains in general science knowledge, higher levels of positive self-competence beliefs for science, perceived family support for learning science, and independence for learning science.     

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.     

What Is an Immature Science?

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity.     

(Math, Science, ?)

In science as in mathematics, it is popular to know little and resent much about category theory. Less well known is how common it is to know little and like much about set theory. The set theory of almost all scientists, and even the average mathematician, is fundamentally different from the formal set theory that is contrasted against category theory. The latter two are often opposed by saying one emphasizes Substance, the other Form. However, in all known systems of mathematics throughout history, mathematicians have moved fluidly between ideas conceived of as thing-like, property-like, and process-like. On the other hand one way to advance science is to better distinguish between thing, property, and process. All this constitutes a distracting background for those interested in, or distressed by, the possible application of category theory to science, and to mathematics as well.     

Demonstrating “Reasonable Fear” at Trial: Is it Science or Junk Science?

This paper explores how scientific knowledge is used in a criminal case. I examine materials from an admissibility hearing in a murder trial and discuss the dynamics of contesting expert scientific opinion and evidence. The research finds that a purported form of “science” in the relevant scientific community is filtered through, tested by, and subjected to legal standards, conceptions, and procedures for determining admissibility. The paper details how the opposing lawyers, the expert witness, and the judge vie to contingently work out what will count in court as appropriate scientific authority, methods and evidence, and as a scientifically valid and legally admissible account of “reasonable fear.” When science becomes enmeshed in legal controversies, science does not trump law. Rather, it is the court’s canons of proper procedure and measures of substantive adequacy that take precedence.

What Counts as Science? Families’ Perceptions of Science in a Natural History Museum

ABSTRACT

Natural history museums open their doors to millions of family visitors each year and are considered to have a valuable role to play in engaging these families with science. Yet little is known about whether or in what way families perceive such institutions to be connected with science. The current study set out to explore such perceptions via interviews with family visitors to a large natural history museum. Analyses reflected that families’ perceptions of the museum and of their own engagement with science were intertwined with their definitions and impressions of science. For these families, perceptions of the museum as fun, interesting, and educational at times counteracted impressions of it as a science-y institution. Moreover, some families also did not consider natural history to count as science, which further contributed to a reluctance to categorize the museum as science-y. Although such perceptions may challenge how natural history museums would like to portray themselves, they also represent an opportunity to broaden visitors’ definitions and images of science.     

Can Psychoanalysis be a Science?

This essay proposes to examine a limited number of critical assessments regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis with reference to intents and purposes, claims and disclaimers, contrasting views of what constitutes a science and the nature of scientific thinking and how these might apply to psychoanalysis epistemologically. It assumes a certain degree of familiarity with criticisms that have been leveled against psychoanalysis from those who insist on absolutist testing for what some call true science, particularly on the part of those who are not practitioners of the art. It wonders about the concern with scientizing by those who actually practice it, or value it in some way or another. It suggests an open minded approach without premature or even warranted closure on the subject of human beings and of ways of getting to know them, let alone understanding them and perhaps being of help to them.     

“Science” and indigenous cultures

Abstract

This article assesses the expert‐oriented approach of the social sciences and helping professions. This primarily Western mentality emphasizes the mastery of the intricacies of scientific method and helping in order to be called ‘professional’ or ‘expert.’ Drawing upon the author's experiences in Alaska, this essay questions the relevance of scientific findings to indigenous peoples. Without discounting “Science” completely, the author examines alternative modes‐of‐being‐with‐others in a communal way, rather than as “objects” in a scientific study. Bringing attention to the reaffirmation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the recent World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and the United Nations Declaration of 1993 as The International Year for the World's Indigenous Peoples, this essay ends with a call to consciousness.     

Should Psychoanalysis Become a Science?

I wish to formulate in broad outline an approach to the conceptualization of psychoanalysis that is divested from theory. This view sees the core of psychoanalysis as a humanistic practice, first and foremost guided by the individuality of the dyadic encounter, rather than as a science. I will not argue for any particular view of psychoanalysis. Instead I marshal a series of considerations from the humanities, to frame a conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a clinically based interpretive discipline having a unique mission. Finally, I will present a futuristic hypothetical scenario whose aim is to show why psychoanalysis will remain a viable enterprise basically as conceived by Freud.     

Is Homeopathy a Science?—Continuity and Clash of Concepts of Science within Holistic Medicine

The question of whether homeopathy is a science is currently discussed almost exclusively against the background of the modern concept of natural science. This approach, however, fails to notice that homeopathy—in terms of history of science—rests on different roots that can essentially be traced back to two most influential traditions of science: on the one hand, principles and notions of Aristotelism which determined 2,000 years of Western history of science and, on the other hand, the modern concept of natural science that has been dominating the history of medicine for less than 200 years. While Aristotle’s “science of the living” still included ontologic and teleologic dimensions for the sake of comprehending nature in a uniform way, the interest of modern natural science was reduced to functional and causal explanations of all phenomena for the purpose of commanding nature. In order to prevent further ecological catastrophes as well as to regain lost dimensions of our lives, the one-sidedness and theory-loadedness of our modern natural–scientific view of life should henceforth be counterbalanced by lifeworld–practical Aristotelic categories. In this way, the ground would be ready to conceive the scientific character of homeopathy—in a broader, Aristotelian sense.