Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

Branching space-time

Branching space-time is a simple blend of relativity and indeterminism. Postulates and definitions rigorously describe the causal order relation between possible point events. The key postulate is a version of everything has a causal origin; key defined terms include history and choice point. Some elementary but helpful facts are proved. Application is made to the status of causal contemporaries of indeterministic events, to how splitting of histories happens, to indeterminism without choice, and to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen distant correlations.     

Routes to action in reaction time tasks

Summary Two-choice tactile RTs are no faster than 8-choice tasks, implying the existence of a direct route. However, simple tactile RTs are much faster than choice tactile RTs (Leonard, 1959). In Experiment I we show that this is not due to subjects anticipating the stimulus in simple tactile RT tasks. Increasing probability of stimulus occurrence at a particular time led to equally decreased tactile RTs for simple and choice tasks.We suggest that an alternative route is available for simple RTs which is faster than the direct route available for choice tactile RTs. This route is faster because (a) the response can be specified in advance, and (b) the stimulus does not need to be identified. The subject needs merely to register that it has occurred. In Experiment II we show that simple RTs to a visual stimulus are decreased by a simultaneous uninformative tactile stimulus even when this is to the wrong finger. This confirms that exact stimulus identification is not necessary in the fast route. In Experiment III we show that a secondary task slows down simple tactile RTs to the same level as choice tactile RTs while the latter are hardly affected. This suggests that focussed attention is not needed for the direct route, but it is needed for the fast route. We propose that a useful distinction can be made between action largely controlled by external stimuli (the direct route) and action largely controlled by internal intentions of will (the fast route).     

Philosophie der Arrieregarde

Bulgarian philosophical life is particularly poor and fruitless. As well as in all communist countries the development of Bulgarian Marxism-Leninism was marked by some very sharp controversies between dogmatics and revisionists. Bulgarian Orthodoxes are particularly militant and intolerant and on the contrary, revisionists are in reality very moderate and rather conservative. Therefore the deviations are insignificant and the degree of the destalinization is very small.     

Kenneth Strike on Liberalism,Citizenship and the Private Interest in Schooling

After indicating a number of points of agreement with the argument 0eveloped by Kenneth Strike in his article Liberalism, Citizenship and the Private Interest in Schooling, this article identifies and explores a number of queries and criticisms which arise in relation to that argument. These queries and criticisms relate especially to the nature and extent of the expansiveness involved in Strike's conception of public or common educational influence, and to the implications and justification of the claim that private educational interests enjoy a greater salience and recognition on Strike's view of public or common educational influence than on some alternative views.     

On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

Leadership of antireligious propaganda in the Soviet Union

Re-emergent scientific atheism bears the marks of its historical origins in the efforts of Bon-Bruevi and Jaroslavskij. The disciples of the Lenin generation use their fathers somewhat as second-level classics.     

The relevance of Habermas' communicative turn

This paper points out the way in which educational and communicative action (Habermas) are to be related. It is shown that earlier attempts to put Habermas ideas to use have led to a dead end because they do not realize clearly that the new basic notion introduced by Habermas, namely communicative action, is the expression of a communicative turn. It is argued that Habermas' concept expresses a radical new attempt to grasp the intersubjective character of social action. Next implications of this communicative turn for the concept of education as a social praxis are indicated. Education can be conceived of as a praxis responding to the vulnerability of a communicative self.     

Quantum Mechanical Unbounded Operators and Constructive Mathematics – a Rejoinder to Bridges

As argued in Hellman (1993), the theorem of Pour-El and Richards (1983) can be seen by the classicist as limiting constructivist efforts to recover the mathematics for quantum mechanics. Although Bridges (1995) may be right that the constructivist would work with a different definition of closed operator, this does not affect my point that neither the classical unbounded operators standardly recognized in quantum mechanics nor their restrictions to constructive arguments are recognizable as objects by the constructivist. Constructive substitutes that may still be possible necessarily involve additional incompleteness in the mathematical representation of quantum phenomena. Concerning a second line of reasoning in Hellman (1993), its import is that constructivist practice is consistent with a liberal stance but not with a radical, verificationist philosophical position. Whether such a position is actually espoused by certain leading constructivists, they are invited to clarify.     

The Weight of Context: Headscarves in Holland

This paper explores the potential of a contextual approach to multicultural conflict. It reconstructs two cases that were hotly debated in the Netherlands—Islamic headscarves for police officers and for court officers—and asks whether a contextual approach reaches compromises and thus promotes social stability more easily than a deductive approach. The argument is that a deductive approach accepts standing interpretations of normative principles, whereas a contextual approach reinterprets these principles in the light of the circumstances and that, whether or not it promotes social stability, a contextual approach makes us attend to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights.     

The probabilistic import of illatives

It is not only overtly probabilistic illatives like makes it certain that but also apparently non-probabilistic ones like therefore that have probabilistic import. Illatives like therefore convey the meaning that the premise confers on the conclusion a probability not only greater than 0 but also greater than 1/2. But because they do not say whether that probability is equal to or less than 1, these illatives are appropriately called neutral.     

Mathematical modeling of the effects of ‘capability’ and ‘intent’ on the stability of a competitive international system

In international relations theory, there is a long history of Richardson-like modeling of the evolution of military capability. Usually, such models are deterministic and predictive and do not allow for the representation of the transition from competitive peace to shooting war. More recently, models have been developed which attempt to represent the evolution of relationship between nations. The relationship between nations, varying from friendship to hostility, is taken to be synonymous with the intent of nations towards each other, varying from good will to malice. Generally, these relationship models do not include capability though common sense would indicate that capability and mutual intent should profoundly influence each other. A model is presented here which combines these two fundamental attributes of international relations and attempts to represent the outbreak of war in the world system by the onset of deterministic chaos in the extended model.On leave 1994–95 at U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. 20451, U.S.A.     

An abstract setting for Henkin proofs

A general result is proved about the existence of maximally consistent theories satisfying prescribed closure conditions. The principle is then used to give streamlined proofs of completeness and omitting-types theorems, in which inductive Henkin-style constructions are replaced by a demonstration that a certain theory respects a certain class of inference rules.     

The relativity of perceptual knowledge

Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn in the ways Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I sketch and defend a more radical way of identifying relevant possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying I know and saying I promise: a claim of knowledge of some particular matter is relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised.     

Trying to Resolve the Two-Envelope Problem

After explaining the well-known two-envelope paradox by indicating the fallacy involved, we consider the two-envelope problem of evaluating the factual information provided to us in the form of the value contained by the envelope chosen first. We try to provide a synthesis of contributions from economy, psychology, logic, probability theory (in the form of Bayesian statistics), mathematical statistics (in the form of a decision-theoretic approach) and game theory. We conclude that the two-envelope problem does not allow a satisfactory solution. An interpretation is made for statistical science at large.     

The relationship between perceived surface-lightness and perceived illumination

Summary An attempt was made to specify the relationship between perceived surface lightness and perceived illumination under the stimulus conditions where different combinations of albedo and illuminance gave 10 approximately equal-luminance levels of a test field (TF) on three different (black-, gray- and white-appearing) backgrounds. Two types of category judgments for TF-lightness and overall illumination were made on the total of 94 TFs by 5 Ss. The results indicated that under the condition where achromatic surface colors appear, the perceptual scission which produces two different perceptual dimensions (lightness and perceived illumination) from one sort of stimulation (luminance) was clearly observed. The relation between the two judgments was consistent with the lightness-illumination invariance hypothesis: As lightness judgments (A) changed from darker to lighter, illumination judgments (I) shifted form brighter to dimmer, the sum of A and I being kept nearly invariant for a given luminance of the TF; the psychological relationship between lightness and illumination, A+I, changed as a linear function of the photometric combination of albedo and illuminance, log A+log I. It was also found that the albedo of the background was an important factor determining the extent of perceptual scission between lightness and illumination.     

Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours

In "Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality", Paul McNamara sets out a semantics for a deontic logic which contains the operator It is supererogatory that. As well as having a binary accessibility relation on worlds, that semantics contains a relative ordering relation, . For worlds u, v and w, we say that u w v when v is at least as good as u according to the standards of w. In this paper we axiomatize logics complete over three versions of the semantics. We call the strongest of these logics DWE for Doing Well Enough.     

Conditionals and theory change: Revisions,expansions, and additions

This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors's (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (additions) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of autoepistemic omniscience, or if autoepistemic modalities (Moore) are admitted, even more severe triviality results ensue. It is argued that additions cannot be philosophically construed as parasitic (Levi) on expansions. In conclusion I outline somed logical consequences of the fact that we must not expect monotonic revisions in languages including conditionals.I wish to thank Peter Gärdenfors for a number of helpful comments, André Fuhrmann and Wolfgang Spohn for extensive discussion of parts of this paper, and Winfred Klink for kindly checking my English.     

Happiness and virtue in Socrates' moral theory

Conclusion In Section IV above we start with texts whose prima facie import speaks so strongly for the Identity Thesis that any interpretation which stops short of it looks like a shabby, timorous, thesis-saving move. What else could Socrates mean when he declares with such conviction that no evil can come to a good man (T19), that his prosecutors could not harm him (T16(a)), that if a man has not been made more unjust he has not been harmed (T20), that all of happiness is in culture and justice (T16(a)), that living well is the same as living justly (T15)? But then doubts begin to creep in. Recalling that inflation of the quantifier is normal and innocuous in common speech (that job means everything to him, he'll do anything to get it, will stick at nothing) we ask if there is really no chance at all that no evil in T19, not harmed in T20 might be meant in the same way? The shift from no harm at T16(a) to no great harm at T16(b), once noticed, strengthens the doubt. It gets further impetus in T21(b) when to explain how all of happiness is in culture and justice he depicts a relation (that recurs more elaborately in T22) which, though still enormously strong, is not quite as strong as would be required by identity. The doubt seeps into T15 when we note that current usage did allow just that relation as a respectable use of the same.At that point we begin to wonder if resort to the Identity Thesis might not be just a first approximation to a subtler, more finely nuanced, doctrine which would give Socrates as sound a foundation for what we know he wants to maintain at all costs - the Sovereignty of Virtue - without obliterating the eudaemonic value of everything else in his world. We cast about for a credible model of such a relation of virtue to happiness and hit on that multicomponent pattern sketched on p. 9 above. We ascertain that this will afford a comprehensively coherent eudaemonist theory of rational action, while its rival would not, and will fit perfectly a flock of texts in Section V which the latter will not fit at all. Are we not entitled to conclude that this is our best guide to the true relation of virtue to happiness in Socrates' thought - the one for which he would have declared if he had formulated explicitly those two alternative theses and made a reasoned choice between them?The Socrates of this paper is the protagonist of Plato's earlier dialogues. I list these (by self-explanatory abbreviations), borrowed from T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory [1974] (hereafter PMT): Ap., Ch., Cr., Eud., Eu., G., HMa., HMi, Ion, La., Ly., Pr., R., I. I assume, but shall not argue here, that in this segment of his corpus, Plato aims to recreate the doctrines and arguments of his teacher in dramatic scenes, all of which (except for the Ap.) may be, and most of which undoubtedly are, fictional; I shall be referring these works, under this proviso, as Plato's Socratic dialogues. (I did not include the Menexenus in the above list, since the parody of a funeral oration in this dialogue is implicitly dissociated from Socrates.)     

Iconic memory — an artifact of perceptual reconstruction processes?

Summary Two experiments, using a partial vs. whole report procedure to isolate iconic from short-term memory loss, are reported. In the first experiment 10 Ss had to judge the difference between two line lengths in a display of three pairs of lines (in rows). Results showed no significant variation in d' with cue delay in spite of a medium overall performance, and in contrast to preliminary partial/whole report experiments. To counter the possibility that the short-term memory load was too small in this experiment, a second experiment was performed with displays containing nine instead of three pairs, i.e., three pairs per row. Equivalence of performance for all conditions was about the same as before. This was true for both hit- and false-alarm rates. The results are interpreted as evidence against the view of iconic memory as a high capacity store containing a lot of information. An alternative reconstructive theory is put forward to explain both conventional iconic loss and our results. According to this account, partial report measures processed material rather than reflecting an iconic store of uninterpreted sensory events. Some consequences of this model are discussed in the context of some weak effects in our data; and suggestions are put forward for further investigation of visual processing.The experiments to be reported here were made possible by grant Schu 421/1–2 of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. The main results of Experiment II have already been reported at the European Conference on Visual Perception at Nordwijkerhout, October 1979. I am indebted to Mrs. R. Ledebur, cand. phil, and Dipl.-Psych. G. Gros who collected the data. I also wish to thank Dr. A. Reeves (Dortmund) for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Dr. P. Wolff (Osnabrück) and two anonymous reviewers contributed valuable suggestions concerning the final draft