Referring to Natural Kind Thingamajigs,and What They Are: A Reply to Needham

Natural kind terms appear to behave like singular terms. If they were genuine singular terms, appearing in true sentences, that would be some reason to believe that there are entities to which the terms refer, the natural kinds. Paul Needham has attacked my arguments that natural kind terms are singular, referring expressions. While conceding the correctness of some of his criticisms, I defend and expand on the underlying view in this paper. I also briefly sketch an account of what natural kinds in fact are—natural complexes of sparse (natural) universals.     

Authority and Natural Kind Essence

If natural kinds have microstructural essences they have them independently of rules for the application of kind terms. This suggests that what those rules are should make no difference to the essences being discoverable. I present two thought-experiments that suggest otherwise, however. Each shows an authority’s application of rules creates the appearance of there being kind essences; absent those rules, the appearance vanishes. This suggests natural kind essences are not independent of authority-sanctioned rules.     

Empty Natural Kind Terms and Dry-Earth

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms.     

The Curious Role of Natural Kind Terms

The semantics of natural kind terms has recently been seen as a problem of reference. Kripke and Putnam have suggested that their meaning begins with rigid designation, with any further implications emerging after empirical study. I part ways with this approach and instead offer an account that focuses on the contribution that these terms make to the inferential roles of different sorts of sentences. I note that natural kind terms play an odd array of grammatical roles, both as subject and as parts of predicates, and explain why this dual role contributes something pragmatically significant to explanations of natural phenomena.     

Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms

Philosophical Studies -     

Temporal Externalsm,Natural Kind Terms,and Scientifically Ignorant Communities

Abstract

Temporal externalism (TE) is the thesis (defended by Jackman (1999)) that the contents of some of an indvidual's thoughts and utterances at time t may be determined by linguistic developments subsequent to t. TE has received little discussion so far, Brown (2000) and Stoneham (2002) being exceptions. I defend TE by arguing that it solves several related problems concerning the extension of natural kind terms in scientifically ignorant communities. Gary Ebbs (2000) argues that no theory can reconcile our ordinary, practical judgments of sameness of extension over time with the claim that linguistic usage determines word extensions. I argue that Ebbs shows at most that no theory other than TE can effect this reconciliation. Furthermore, while Ebbs' argument undermines Jessica Brown's solutions to two closely related problems about natural kind term extensions (Brown 1998), TE can solve both problems without difficulty. Some criticisms of TE are briefly addressed as well.     

Escape from Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms

Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle.     

Reference and Natural Kind Termas: The Real Essence of Locke's View

J. L. Mackie's famous claim that Locke 'anticipates' Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference (CTR) rests, I suggest, upon a pair of important misunderstandings. Contra Mackie, as well as the more recent accounts of Paul Guyer and Michael Ayers, Lockean Real Essences consist of those features of an entity from which all of its experienceable properties can be logically deduced; thus a substantival Real Essence consists of features of a Real Constitution plus logically necessary objective connections between them and features of some particular Nominal Essence. Furthermore, what Locke actually anticipates is the most significant contemporary challenge to the CTR: the qua -problem.     

Kind of Borrowed,Kind of Blue

In late 2014, the jazz combo Mostly Other People Do the Killing released Blue—an album that is a note‐for‐note remake of Miles Davis's 1959 landmark album Kind of Blue. This is a thought experiment made concrete, raising metaphysical puzzles familiar from discussion of indiscernible counterparts. It is an actual album, rather than merely a concept, and so poses the aesthetic puzzle of why one would ever actually listen to it.     

Rigidity and Kind

Philosophical Studies -     

三大语系高僧:慈心悲愿,善待生命

2013年1月16日至17日,来自全国佛教三大语系、四大名山的高僧大德和专家学者相聚成都,举办以"慈心悲愿,善待生命"为主题的佛教生命观研讨会,针对一段时间以来在少数藏区发生的自焚事件,彰显佛教慈悲为怀、珍爱生命、善待众生的本怀,引导广大佛教徒坚持正信,阐扬正见,持戒守法,以大慈大悲之心,珍惜人身,善待生命。与会大德高僧针对"自焚是非暴力的最高形式"、"自焚是菩萨行"、"自焚能成佛"、"自焚可以为上师增加寿命"     

Constitution and Kind Membership

Philosophical Studies -