If Folk Intuitions Vary,Then What?

We have recently presented evidence for cross‐cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address our concerns.     

If Counseling is Psychotherapy—What Then?

No counseling, other than the strictly information-giving forms of academic and vocational advisement, can actually be limited to the conscious, rational layers of personality. The deeper levels are reflected in all aspects of behavior, so that concepts of a dichotomy between “counseling” and “psychotherapy” have only the most restricted usefulness. If counseling is necessarily a form of psychotherapy, however specialized, present training methods for counselor candidates are seriously inadequate. Advanced psychological knowledge is needed by counselors, including study of abnormal psychology and diagnostics, as well as of the biological and sociological roots of behavior. Also needed are more rigorous selection methods for counselor candidates, inasmuch as their work unavoidably affects the deeper personality dynamics of their clients, as well as a requirement that those who will counsel others therapeutically should themselves have the experience of being counseled. In view of the increased rigor of this program, if it is undertaken the scale of compensation for counselors should also be considerably increased.     

Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?

The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A‐worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C‐worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non‐trivial truth‐values under physical determinism. I show that the possible‐worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity of (Q > R) is to be explained. If (P > (Q > R)) has a backtracking reading then the contingent facts that (Q > R) needs to be true in the closest P‐worlds are absent. If (P > (Q > R)) has a forwardtracking reading, then the laws required by (Q > R) to be true in the closest P‐worlds will be absent, because they are violated in those worlds. Solutions like lossy laws or denial of embedding won't work. The only approach to counterfactuals that explains the embedding is a pragmatic metalinguistic approach in which the whole idea that counterfactuals are about a modal reality, be it abstract or concrete, is given up.     

Can Models of God Compete?

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Kant Can’t Get No . . . Contradiction

Philosophia - According to Kant, the universalization of the maxim of false promising leads to a contradiction, namely, to everyone adopting the maxim of false promising which would in effect make...     

What Can Experiments Reveal About the Origins of Music?

ABSTRACT— The origins of music have intrigued scholars for thousands of years. In this article I discuss the role of experiments in discussions of these issues. I argue that potentially useful kinds of evidence are those that address the innateness and the specificity of different components of musical behavior. At present there is some evidence for innate influences on music, but little evidence for capacities that are clearly specific to music. Although future experiments could potentially alter this picture, there is currently little unambiguous support for the notion that music is an adaptation.     

Can Children with Autism Recover? If So, How?

Although Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are generally assumed to be lifelong, we review evidence that between 3% and 25% of children reportedly lose their ASD diagnosis and enter the normal range of cognitive, adaptive and social skills. Predictors of recovery include relatively high intelligence, receptive language, verbal and motor imitation, and motor development, but not overall symptom severity. Earlier age of diagnosis and treatment, and a diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified are also favorable signs. The presence of seizures, mental retardation and genetic syndromes are unfavorable signs, whereas head growth does not predict outcome. Controlled studies that report the most recovery came about after the use of behavioral techniques. Residual vulnerabilities affect higher-order communication and attention. Tics, depression and phobias are frequent residual co-morbidities after recovery. Possible mechanisms of recovery include: normalizing input by forcing attention outward or enriching the environment; promoting the reinforcement value of social stimuli; preventing interfering behaviors; mass practice of weak skills; reducing stress and stabilizing arousal. Improving nutrition and sleep quality is non-specifically beneficial.     

If We Produce Discrepancies,Then How? Testing a Computational Process Model of Positive Goal Revision

Within the self‐regulation literature on goals, both discrepancy reduction and discrepancy production are considered important theoretical and practical processes. Yet, discrepancy production has only been examined in a limited number of goal‐striving contexts, and the analytical strategies employed (e.g., difference scores) are difficult to interpret. This study extends discrepancy production research to multiple goal contexts where the goals are in conflict. Computational modeling and an organizational simulation were used to test a control theory explanation of discrepancy production. The occurrence of discrepancy production in the computational model and participants was assessed using hierarchical linear modeling. Comparing the data from the computational model with participants' data indicated a good fit. Implications of the findings and methods are discussed.     

Can There be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection?

I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as ‘There is no hippopotamus in S223’ and ‘Theatetus is not flying’) they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to ‘There are no unicorns’. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.     

Genetic Moral Enhancement? Yes. Holiness? No

As moral human beings, we deplore our violence and try to rein it in through moral suasion and post-hoc restraint. Could genetic engineering help? Moral enhancement through genetic engineering might predispose us to performing good acts, good deeds. However, good acts alone, theologically speaking, do not count as either morality or holiness. Becoming a good and holy person-in-community is a process of freely chosen character development. While re-creating ourselves genetically to eliminate aggressive acts is not insignificant, such interventions constitute a starting point, not the endpoint, of living a meaningful life in relation to God. Bernard Lonergan’s notion of moral agency requires moral conversion and religious conversion, neither of which could be achieved through gene expression alone. Conversion requires free and intentional participation in moral character development. Finally, we note that salvation according to Christianity is not earned, regardless of a person’s good acts or good moral character.     

Category-specific impairments? No. A critique of Sartori et al.

In this paper we examine the claim by Sartori, Miozzo, and Job (this issue) that their patient Michelangelo exhibits a category-specific deficit in naming living things. We conclude that their data are flawed in many respects and offer no reasonable basis for the conclusions they wish to draw. In addition their further claim that the data reported by Stewart, Parkin, and Hunkin (1992) are artefactual is not supported in any substantial way by examination of the findings.     

Attachment—Past and Present. But What About the Future?

This essay acknowledges the seminal contribution of the founders of attachment theory and research as a paradigm shift in understanding the importance of the socioemotional foundation of developmental processes. However, it is surprising that attachment theory has been treated as a closed system by its students with remarkable resistance to change and further development of theory and methodology. Especially three dimensions are identified that would help to advance attachment theory as a valid conception also for the future. The context specificity of evolutionary theorizing, the different socialization goals and parenting strategies across cultures and the new insights in infant development need to be taken into consideration in order to develop a valid theory of socioemotional development as the culturally informed solution of universal developmental tasks.

Living in Two Worlds. How ‘Jungian’ am I?

As a so‐called ‘Developmental Jungian’ the author of this paper was raised bilingual ‐ speaking both psychoanalytic and Jungian languages. Early on in her training an analysand brought a dream which seemed to capture an inherent tension regarding the analyst's role in the analytic relationship. The paper is a personal exploration of the potentially creative nature of this tension through focussing on the dream and the work with the dreamer.