论中国经典诠释的两个基型:直释与旁通--以《易经》的诠释为例

中国经典诠释传统有没有自己的特点?经作者研究之后,感觉到传统经学的实践中确实有直释与旁通两个基型, 可惜没有受到学者充分的注意。故本论文为了具体讨论起见,特别以《易经》的诠释为例,依以下各节:一、前言,二、对“中国经典诠释基型”的界定,三、《易》籍著作的诠释体式,四、直释型诠释的方法与问题,五、旁通型诠释的方法与问题,六、结论, 来论述。其中第四、五两节又各立细目,详细讨论诠释的方法与问题。中国经典的诠释体式是依字-句-章-篇-卷逐次解释而成立低层的训诂、章句、注、笺、解、疏、说、传,甚至更有不泥于文句。而依义理而成立高层的释义、通释、通义,乃至最高层的哲理诠释。其诠释可归纳成两个基型,即依各经本身在历代表现出日新乎高明的直释诠释与依异经互释在后代表现出富有乎博大的旁通诠释。在中国经典诠释传统中,此两型诠释之于经典正犹乾坤之于易,经典在诠释中表现其生生不息的生命力。     

Tarski ‐ a dilemma

Tarski's correspondence theory of truth (which he spells out in his semantic conception of truth) is open to two interpretations. This ambiguity in the theory has led philosophers to find support in it for metaphysical reali sm. In fact, Tarski's theory turns out to support a form of ontological relativism. In different passages Tarski himself gives support to each of these interpretations. The first interpretation leads to ontological relativism, while the second sacrifices the connection between language and the world. I clarify the dilemma that I see in having to choose between these two interpretations, explain how these interpretations have their source in different problems which occupied Tarski, and consider a possible solution to the dilemma. Finally, finding good reasons to claim that Tarski's theory is indeed a correspondence theory of truth, I argue in favour of the first interpretation with its relativistic implications.     

Propositions and same-saying: introduction

Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ??propositions??. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions??or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19?C21 2010?at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop.     

Reflections on research and learning from the patient: the art and science of what we do

Over three decades ago, John Bowlby argued for psychoanalysis to seek beyond its own parameters if it was to maintain its claim to be a science. Since then there has been a wealth of relevant research from various fields. While this has been instrumental in the development of my own work, this paper concerns learning from the patient. The paper begins with a premise: interpretative analytic work requires three‐dimensionality (self, other and object). Although interpretative work may be ingrained in our professional identity, this triangulation may or may not exist in our patients in any stable way. The paper continues with a brief developmental account of how early archetypally‐shaped shifts in the infant's field of interest establish the experiential components of three‐dimensionality. From there, observational and clinical material with a toddler and a young boy describe how early relational deficits hindered their capacities for three‐dimensionality. Yet both were able to engage with the therapist and to become active in the creation of three‐dimensionality within their own minds. Implied in this work are considerations for working with patients for whom interpretations do not work. Michael Fordham's comments on ‘working out of the self’ are linked with the art of what we do.     

The effect of depressed mood on the interpretation of ambiguity,with and without negative mood induction

Is there an effect of depressed mood on the interpretation of ambiguity? Are depressed individuals biased to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner? We used a cross-modal semantic priming task to look for evidence of a negative interpretative bias. Participants listened to ambiguous prime sentences (e.g., Joan was stunned by her final exam mark) and made lexical decisions to target words presented immediately after the sentence offset or after a delay of 1000 ms or 2000 ms. For the semantically related targets, the target was negatively related (distress), positively related (success), or neutrally related (grades) to the ambiguous prime. The experiment was conducted with and without a negative mood induction. The expectation was that depressed participants would be more likely to consider the negative interpretations of the ambiguous primes and would therefore experience larger priming effects for negatively related targets. Although there were large priming effects for all semantically related targets, there was no evidence of a negative interpretative bias.     

Historical Knowledge as Perspectival and Rational: Remarks on the Annales School's Idea of History

There is an obvious parallel between foundationalism, which ignores history in working out the conditions of knowledge, and radical relativism, which contends that by virtue of its own historical character there is no way to choose among different interpretations, all of which are "equally good." Might it not be, rather, that the recent historicist attack on the very idea of rationality is as damaging as foundationalist objections against the plurality of conceptual schemes or frameworks? Can philosophy maintain the traditional distinction between the form and content of knowledge, between rationality and historicity _ between doxa and episteme ?     

What's My Motivation? Video Games and Interpretative Performance

The interpretation of character motivations is a crucial part of the understanding of many narratives, including those found in video games. This interpretation can be complicated in video games by the player performing the role of a player‐character within the game narrative. Such performance finds the player making choices for the character and also interpreting the resulting character actions and their effect on the game's narrative. This can lead to interpretative difficulties for game narratives and their players: if a decision to act is made by the player, is it that the player's own imaginative reasons for acting warrant some narrative interpretations and exclude others? To answer this I argue that we need to investigate (a) the interactive ontology of video game narratives, (b) the notion of game playing as interpretative performance, and (c) the player‐character, an artifact through which performance is focused in narrative games. Doing so shows there to be at least two problems with the notion of the correct interpretation of narrative games. Neither of these problems entirely negates the normativity of game narratives, however, and so players are left with the problem of how they might decide which of the possible playings are warranted. I end by making some practical suggestions for the thoughtful and narratively interested game player.     

The translational metaphor in psychoanalysis

The translational metaphor in psychoanalysis refers to the traditional method of interpreting or restating the meaning of verbal and behavioral acts of a patient in other, presumably more accurate terms that specify the forces and conflicts underlying symptoms. The analyst translates the clinical phenomenology to explain its true meaning and origin. This model of analytic process has been challenged from different vantage points by authors presenting alternative conceptions of therapeutic action. Although the temptation to find and make interpretations of clinical material is difficult to resist, behaving in this way places the analyst in the position of a teacher or diagnostician, seeking a specific etiology, which has not proven fruitful. Despite its historical appeal, I argue that the translational model is a misleading and anachronistic version of what actually occurs in psychoanalysis. I emphasize instead the capacity of analysis to promote the emergence of new forms of representation, or figuration, from the unconscious, using the work of Lacan, Laplanche, and Modell to exemplify this reformulation, and provide clinical illustrations of how it looks in practice.     

Interpretation, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of mind

I suggest that a conflict between two philosophical models of the mind so far unremarked in discussions of psychoanalysis is at the heart of questions about its status as a science, the objectivity of psychoanalytic interpretations, and the nature of the unconscious. In philosophy one model is embodied in the tradition of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, among many others, which construes thought as prior to and independent of language. According to this tradition the mind is self-contained and mental contents or "ideas" are essentially subjective phenomena. It follows that knowledge of other minds and the material world is radically problematic. In the second and more contemporary model the phenomenon of meaning is dependent on interactions between minds, and between mind and the world. Since meaning is understood to be intrinsically social, so in an important sense is mind. I develop this second philosophic model, indicating its relevance for psychoanalysis. I also point out some of the contributions of psychoanalysis to philosophy of mind.     

A plea for a broader concept of Nachträglichkeit

The broader conceptualization of Nachtr?glichkeit proposed by the author can play an active part in the process of assigning new meaning retroactively (usually through interpretation)--and even giving a meaning, for the first time (usually through construction)--to what the analysand says and cannot say. It gives us a conceptual frame of unconscious psychic temporality with which to explore how psychoanalysis produces psychic change. Winnicott's "Fear of Breakdown" (1974) is paradigmatic of this broader conceptualization of Nachtr?glichkeit (see Faimberg 1998). A clinical example is presented (Kardiner 1977) to illustrate why the author believes that her proposal remains true to Freud's (1937) conception of psychic temporality and construction.     

Truth,Meaning, and Circularity

It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.     

Moral relativism and deontic logic

If a native of India asserts “Killing cattle is wrong” and a Nebraskan asserts “Killing cattle is not wrong”, and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral point of view from which it proceeds. The second branch which we call truth value relativism affirms that the two judgments are contradictory. Truth value relativism appears to be logically incoherent. How can contradictory judgments be fully correct? For though there will be a sense of correctness in which each judgment is correct — namely by that of being correct relative to the morality relative to which each was expressed — if contradictory, the judgments cannot both be true, and thus cannot both be correct in this most basic sense of correctness. We defend truth value relativism against this sort of charge of logical incoherence by showing it can be accommodated by the existing semantical metatheories of deontic logic. Having done this we go on to argue that truth value relativism is the best version of relativism.     

The Metasyntactic Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism

Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions have there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic interpretation, while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available, the metasyntactic interpretation, which grants that names have their bearers essentially and yields some account of a priori knowledge.     

On the need of fundaments in psychoanalytic thinking

The questions concerning the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge have been pressing from the beginning. Beside as a therapeutic practice, Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a science, maintaining that like other sciences psychoanalysis should have sound empirical and conceptual fundaments. Freud claimed that there is an inseparable bond (ein Junktim) between cure and acquiring knowledge in psychoanalysis. One of his aims in developing a metapsychology (analogously to metaphysics) was to explicate the conceptual structure of psychoanalytic knowledge. After Freud psychoanalysts have not reached a consensus in the questions concerning the foundations. What kind of foundations does psychoanalytic knowledge need? Are they to be found from the psychoanalytic practice and research on the couch, or rather from metapsychological constructions? In what way should psychoanalysis rely on external scientific research? The article addresses these questions, arguing that even though psychoanalytic work and knowledge do gain justification from various external sources, in the end psychoanalysis stands on its own foundations. It is further argued that especially under the prevailing plurality of theoretical and clinical approaches, psychoanalysis does not have – and does not need – a foundation that could not be further questioned. Thus a coherentist picture of psychoanalysis is defended.     

Commitment

Recently there has been a re-emphasis by both educators and counselors of the concept of commitment. Can this concept bear scrutiny or is it only a popular slogan? It is argued that this concept can find meaning only in a moral absolute. The author points out that relativism is itself a moral absolute. If then we take this concept seriously we are faced with certain difficulties. If this concept is valid for education and counseling then we must either re-examine the issue of religion in the schools or be content with engendering a moral vacuum. It is maintained that the former is the only valid alternative and the author argues for the moral absolute of loving one's neighbor as himself rather than the more prevalent moral absolute of relativism.     

‘Necessity’ and ‘provability’ in the later wittgenstein

I present a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic and mathematics. This interpretation, like others, emphasizes Wittgenstein's attempt to reconcile platonistic and constructivistic approaches. But, unlike other interpretations, mine explains that attempt in terms of Wittgenstein's position about the relations between our concepts of necessity and provability. If what I say here is correct, then we can rescue Wittgenstein from the charge of naive relativism. For his relativism extends only to provability, and not to necessity.     

Rules of clinical understanding in classical psychoanalysis and in self psychology: a comparison

This paper compares the rules that govern clinical understanding in classical psychoanalysis and in self psychology. The rules of understanding in the two systems are fundamentally different. Self psychology interprets causes and relies on interpretive rules similar to those used in allegory. Classical psychoanalysis investigates reasons and seeks to uncover the patient's own interpretive system. Self psychology refinds its own theory in the relation between elements disguised in the manifest content of patients' productions. Classical psychoanalysis seeks to open up manifest content. Where self psychology reiterates theory in its interpretations, classical interpretations move away from theoretical generalizations toward specific fantasy-memory constellations. Theory, in self psychology, organizes directly the content of interpretations; theory in classical psychoanalysis organizes a technique of exploration and furnishes general sequences according to which data can be understood. This paper also suggests that the differences in the rules of clinical understanding have potential consequences for psychoanalysis which manifest themselves in psychoanalytic training and in the capacity for self-analysis.     

Towards a common ground in psychoanalysis and family therapy: on knowing not to know

In this paper a common ground between psychoanalysis and family therapy is discussed in terms of postmodern theorizing in both disciplines. Recent systemic, narrative or social constructionist thinking in psychoanalysis and a psychoanalytic turn in family therapy offers the possibility of a shared epistemology. This is described in terms of a critical not-knowing stance which allows for the therapist's/analyst's contribution of meaning, interpretation and knowledge in therapeutic conversation. Here the holding of not knowing and knowing together provides a narrative container for personal meaning and thinking to develop. This 'knowing not to know' is what a postmodern psychoanalysis has in common with family therapy: both are ways of being with persons to help them develop and hold their own knowing. This therapeutic process is illustrated in a clinical vignette of narrative child family therapy.
For what one knows does not belong to oneself.
(Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past , p. 898)     

Ockham’s weak externalism

There is debate over whether the content of an intuitive cognition is determined externally or internally in Ockham’s theory. According to the most common view, which I call the Strong Externalist Interpretation (SE), intuitive content is wholly determined externally. Opposed to SE is the Strong Internalist Interpretation (SI), according to which the content of an intuition is wholly determined by internal features of a cognizer. The aim of this paper is to argue against those interpretations, and to argue for a third kind of interpretation which preserves interpretative advantages of SE and SI without falling into the difficulties that each faces. On this view, intuitive content is complex, and its complexity is analyzed into a mix of internalist and externalist elements.     

Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?1

The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty. It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so‐called “naturalist” readings of On Certainty, which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of “internal rationalism.”