Teaching knowledge as conversation: A philosophical hermeneutical approach to education

This article argues that educational thinking and practices based on knowledge as conversation understood from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics will make schools more democratic institutions and education generally more sensitive to variously constructed social realities.     

Fechner as a pioneering theorist of unconscious cognition

Fechner remains virtually unknown for his psychological research on the unconscious. However, he was one of the most prominent theorists of unconscious cognition of the 19th century, in the context of the rise of scientific investigations on the unconscious in German psychology. In line with the models previously developed by Leibniz and Herbart, Fechner proposes an explanative system of unconscious phenomena based on a modular conception of the mind and on the idea of a functional dissociation between representational and attentional activity. For Fechner, the unconscious is a state of consciousness resulting from the isolation of representational activity from the rest of psychical life. Unconscious mental phenomena are unattended mental states that behave autonomously while remaining able to act on consciousness. This paper aims to revisit Fechner's contribution to the history of the unconscious, but also the theoretical significance of the Fechnerian unconscious vis-à-vis current research on the cognitive unconscious.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

Kierkegaard and the hermeneutical circle

Such is the criticism commonly passed upon Socrates in our age, which boasts of its positivity much as if a polytheist were to speak with scorn of the negativity of a monotheist, for the polytheist has many gods, the monotheist only one. So our philosophers have many thoughts, all valid to a certain extent; Socrates had only one, which was absolute.     

Managing strain in a classical analysis: re-establishing the therapeutic relationship or interpreting unconscious wishes

The therapeutic relationship frequently comes under a strain during the course of an analysis. At these times, the analysand perceives and reacts to the analyst as if the analyst were a critical or seductive archaic object. When this occurs, the analyst has the choice of interpreting the unconscious source of the analysand's non-therapeutic reactions or of interacting with the analysand in a manner which re-establishes and potentially strengthens the therapeutic relationship. Interpretations during the early phases of an analysis are unlikely to mitigate the strain until the therapeutic relationship has become stronger and until considerable reality testing has promoted a context which allows the analysand to understand and to tolerate her or his unconscious wishes.     

Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood

Abstract: In this article I critically discuss a claim made by several writers in philosophy and the social sciences that for an individual to count as a person, a single personality, or the subject of a life, the experiences of the subject in question must take a narrative form. I argue that narrativity is a misleading and, in some ways of understanding it, implausible condition of what it is that adds unity to personhood and personality. I pursue this critique by considering canonical accounts of narrativity in philosophy and literary studies. I consider those connections between events that must hold for the sequence to be considered a narrative: causal, teleological, and thematic connections. I argue that for each of these, the condition that experiential sequences (for a given subject) must have this structure is empty: any life sequence that is reflected upon in an interpretive spirit can meet it. What the condition of narrativity amounts to, then, is the more basic requirement that the person must be able to look upon the factors and events of her life with a certain interpretive reflection, whether or not those factors and events have any particular narrative unity in a traditional sense.     

Children's spirituality with particular reference to a Norwegian context: some hermeneutical reflections

Spirituality has become an issue in many domains of the Norwegian society, but this is not reflected in public education. This paper discusses why this is so, and suggests some hermeneutical approaches to understanding spirituality that can include pre‐school children's spirituality, with particular reference to a Norwegian context. Central to this discussion is a case study of children in ‘sacred space’, and an understanding of spirituality as cultural learning. Education in schools as well as in kindergartens is dominated by a secular outlook on life as ‘default’, or a cultural and collective forgetfulness. Children's spirituality challenges adults to explore and rearticulate what is forgotten, in terms of nurturing what it is to be human, of caring for what is really important, and of cultivating hope – in Norway as well as in other countries.     

Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Political Psychology

The idea of narrative has become increasingly appropriated in empirical research in both psychology and politics, yet there is a notable absence of integrative frameworks that specify a conceptual and methodological approach to narrative research in political psychology. An integrative conceptual framework is proposed and anchored in four principles of a narrative approach: (1) the mutual constitution of language and thought, (2) the need for personal coherence through narrative identity development, (3) the need for collective solidarity through shared meaning, and (4) the mediational property of narrative in social activity and practice. Theory and empirical research related to these principles are reviewed. We argue that a narrative framework has the potential to enhance the relevance and amplify the voice of political psychology within and beyond the academy and to offer new knowledge on the complex and dynamic relationship between context and mind.     

Speaking the other's language: imitation as a gateway to relationship

Imitation offers a gateway to relationship. This paper seeks to explore that capacity by describing the therapeutic approach of ‘Intensive Interaction’. The research literature on imitation contains relatively little about imitation used in an intervention capacity, concentrating instead on the emergence of imitative abilities during infant and child development. The paper therefore describes the case of a young man with severe autism, for whom Intensive Interaction was successful in bringing him into interpersonal engagement with others. The author provides an account as to why imitation should be so effective in this regard. Overall, the paper aims to stimulate questions about how imitation can best be conceived and studied. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.