The death instinct and the mental dimension beyond the pleasure principle in the works of Spielrein and Freud

In ‘Destruction as Cause of Come‐into‐being’, Spielrein argues for the need of postulating the existence of a death instinct in mental functioning. The idea that she thus anticipated the concept of death instinct Freud introduced in 1920 is often found in psychoanalytic literature. But the specific meaning of Spielrein's hypothesis is seldom discussed, as well as the extent to which she anticipated Freud's concept. In fact, there are important differences between their views. Besides, a closer analysis of Spielrein's text reveals other ideas that come close to fundamental aspects of Freud's theories from 1920 onwards, particularly the assumption of a more primordial mental functioning than the one regulated by the pleasure principle. But also here there are important differences between the views sustained by both authors. With this in view, the objective of this paper is firstly to discuss some hypotheses formulated by Spielrein in her 1912 work in order to elucidate her concept of death instinct as well as her hypothesis of the existence of a more primitive mental functioning than the one governed by the pleasure principle. Next, the question of the possible similarities and differences with regard to Freud's concepts is also addressed.     

Life and death in Freudian metapsychology: A reappraisal of the second instinctual dualism1

In this paper we re‐examine the second instinctual dualism hypothesis introduced by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. We suggest that the life instinct hypothesis as something opposed to the death instinct does not seem to fit into this theory easily. On the other hand, death instinct turns out to be an internal necessity of Freudian metapsychological theory from the beginning of Freud ’s metapsychological writing. We shall argue, based on the ideas formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in later metapsychological texts, that Freud could not wholly justify the existence of an opposition and a symmetry between the two classes of instincts. Even though up to his last works Freud held on to this instinctual dualism, again and again his arguments lead to the idea that the life instincts should be regarded, ultimately, as death instincts.     

The four antinomies of the death instinct1

Matte Blanco examines four paradoxical positions that arise out of Freud's writings on the death instinct. He notes that death is not a content known to the unconscious. Furthermore, the absence of time and space in the unconscious means that the conditions necessary for any process such as instinct are similarly absent. Matte Blanco demonstrates the way in which the antinomies that he explores can be explained in terms of the logics that obtain in the unconscious, and he suggests that the concept of the death instinct is one of the most profound expressions of the relationship between the modes that underlie conscious and unconscious logic.     

“AFTER THE EVENT”: FREUD'S UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINS

This essay aims to revise Freud's theory of the uncanny by rereading his own essay of that name along with the key material Freud drew on in formulating his theory: E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story “The Sandman” (1816a) and Ernst Jentsch's essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906a). While arguing, initially, both that Jentsch's work is fundamentally misconstrued by Freud and that it offers a better account of what happens in Hoffmann's story, the essay moves beyond Jentsch's account to offer a more philosophically oriented theory of the uncanny, one more in line with Freud's ideas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a).     

On the reception of the concept of the death drive in Germany: expressing and resisting an ‘evil principle’?

With Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attempted ‘to describe and to account for the facts of daily observation in our field of study’ (1920, p. 7), in particular concerning destructive clinical phenomena that confront us in the analytic situation: traumatic neuroses, melancholic states, negative‐therapeutic reactions, masochism, repetition compulsion and so on. The author demonstrates in the first section how Freud's own resistance – later self‐diagnosed – to recognizing these unwelcome facts was expressed in the terminological and conceptual ambiguities of the death drive hypothesis then introduced, ambiguities that to some extent continue to impede the reception of its clinical usefulness to this day. As soon as Freud had demonstrated the connection with clinical practice more directly in The Ego and the Id (1923), some contemporaries adopted it as a helpful clinical concept, while others believed that they could (and must) refute it. The second part outlines its reception in the 1920s and 1930s, which was part of an international discussion that was, of course, initially conducted mainly in German. The beginnings of an important further development of the death drive hypothesis are described in a separate section because it originated from Melanie Klein's earliest experiences in analysing children in Berlin in the early to mid‐1920s. She referred at that time to an ‘evil principle’, and in 1932 published her view of the death drive hypothesis, which was further developed in subsequent decades by her and her followers in London. In this period, conditions changed dramatically: in Germany Freud's books (among others) were burnt, crimes against humanity were instigated and psychoanalysis ceased to exist in this country. Almost all the analysts who published on the death drive had to emigrate. From then on, entirely different discourses took place in the various regions. In Germany, the death drive hypothesis was (largely) disregarded or rejected for decades after the Holocaust. Frank demonstrates how the uncritical recourse in relevant works to this day to an article by Brun in 1953 that considered the death drive to have been comprehensively refuted on the basis of (apparently) comprehensive literature research can be understood as a symptom. Pursuing some reflections by Beland (1988) and Cycon (1995), the author expounds her thesis that in Germany the clinical usefulness of the death drive hypothesis could not be considered as long as destructive impulses were still an immediate social reality. According to the author's observations, in stating that there had been a ‘definite reaction formation against death drive hypotheses’, Brun had unintentionally made an accurate diagnosis. It was not until the realization of inevitable perpetrator identifications (‘Hitler in us’) in this country became (more widely) possible that a concern with the death drive hypothesis could also resume. In the final section, the author takes up one line of this development and traces how some German analysts in the 1980s came into contact with Kleinian developments that had since occurred and how these found and find their way into their analytic working. She closes by asking whether it might be appropriate to consider Melanie Klein's concept of an evil principle – along with the pleasure and reality principles – as a less ambiguous one for the phenomena under consideration.     

Notes on ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and Strachey’s translation as ‘instinct for mastery’

This short paper looks at Freud’s use of the term ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and its translation by Strachey as ‘instinct for mastery’ when Freud was describing the motives behind his grandson’s game with the wooden reel and string in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The word ‘Macht’ [power], which is contained in the word ‘Bemächtigung’ points to Freud’s difficult relationship with Alfred Adler, whose early theories on the aggressive drive and later theories on ‘striving for power’ were initially rejected by Freud. Looking at the changes in Freud’s reception of Adlerian terms, some of which he later integrated into his own theory, throws light on his choice of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ in 1920, when he was just beginning to introduce his thoughts on the death instinct. A slightly different translation of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’, one which takes these historical and theoretical aspects into account, could make these connections clearer for the English reader.     

Freud's philosophy of the uncanny

This paper is an attempt to uncover and bring to a coherent interpretation Freud's thoughts on the phenomenon of uncanniness. Starting out with the essay “The uncanny” the author wants to show that uncanniness plays an important rôle in the turn that Freud's thinking goes through at this time, and that the concept can serve as a springboard for a critical, phenomeno- logical reading of Freud's thoughts on the development of the ego. The analysis of the phenomenon of uncanniness itself tends to disrupt the coherence of Freud's earlier views and pushes him towards his later thinking. “Unheimlich” in German has the double meaning of uncanny and unhome-like, and what is not at home in itself in an uncanny sense, according to Freud, is precisely the human ego. Freud in “The uncanny” links the interpretation of uncanniness to compulsive repetition and thus makes the connection to trauma and birth anxiety discussed in later works such as “Beyond the pleasure principle” and “Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety”. The origin of our general sensitivity to the uncanny is thus, according to Freud, the loss of the mother suffered by the child as a kind of a priori traumatic experience, which is also the very event that makes the child into an ego. The understanding of traumatic neurosis and other forms of mental illness is consequently linked to an analysis of this primal uncanniness of life.     

Projective Identification on Different Levels

Freud's investigation of that which lies beyond the pleasure principle is, among other things, an attempt to understand how thoughts on matter, biology, psychology and mythology become linked, despite the fact that each of these systems are independent and self-sufficient, each one working according to its own logic. Free energy, that we may liken to a kind of noise, is bound and organized in a process where subjective meaning is created. During this process, a meaningful connection between inner and outer reality is established. However, subjectivity also creates problems, since the individual needs to find his or her own self-realization, his or her own path towards the grave. Self-realization contains an aggressive potential, which—reminiscent of the workings of the immune system—may be aimed at everything that is not-self; at the unfamiliar or that which causes discomfort; at that which blocks the path towards the individual's mastery of the world.     

The Aging Process as Forward Movement and the Case for Detours and Backward Steps

This article focuses on Pruyser's (Pastor Psychol 24:102-118, 1975) view presented in his article titled "Aging: Downward, Upward, or Forword?" that the later stages of aging are not a downward movement from a higher peak but the continuation of a forward movement, and that manifestations of gains as well as losses in older adulthood support this view. While expressing agreement with this view I draw on Sigmund Freud's discussion of the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud 1920/1959) to suggest that the later stages of the aging process may involve an increase in detours and backward movements. Suggesting that these detours and backward steps are potentially beneficial, I conclude that Freud provides guidelines for how we may view and evaluate the losses and gains that Pruyser identifies as characteristic of the later stages of the aging process.     

Conceptualizing splitting: On the different meanings of splitting and their implications for the understanding of the person and the analytic process

While “splitting” is a familiar concept, its meaning is not as self‐evident as is commonly assumed. In different contexts, it refers to different phenomena and is supported by different understandings of psychic dynamics. In this paper, the author presents four different conceptualizations of splitting, which capture the essential aspects of contemporary psychoanalytic discourse on the concept. There is a dissociative kind of splitting, which involves splitting off, in the face of trauma, whole personalities, which to some extent remain accessible to consciousness; there is a disavowal kind of splitting that splits off our awareness of disturbing realities or their meanings in our efforts to avoid the inner restraints imposed by repression; and there are two forms of splitting of the object into good and bad—one focusing on the splitting of representations of the object due to ego weakness and environmental determinants, and the other on the splitting of the mind itself in a primarily destructive act aimed at sparing the good from the destructiveness of our death instinct. All four conceptualizations have their origins in Freud's writing and then are further developed in the work of later analysts. The author argues that understanding the nature of these various conceptualizations of splitting can contribute to analytic theory and practice. It also sheds light on the essential nature of analytic approaches and how they offer different perspectives on the unity and disunity of man's basic nature.     

The non-symbolic level of psychical reality

Freud introduced the concept of psychical reality as a consequence of abandoning the theory of seduction, and although this meant a turning point in his theoretical thinking he never defined the concept concisely and systematically. Thus it is possible to delineate at least two meanings of psychical reality that run through Freud´s writings as well as the writings of contemporary analysts. On the one hand psychical reality encompasses the whole field of subjective experiences. On the other, it is understood more narrowly as a transformation of experiences in the unconscious.

Substituting the idea of different meanings ascribed to Freud´s concept this article proposes to differentiate between levels in the psyche with the main focus on the unconscious level of the dream and of phantasy and the real unconscious. Starting from the most superficial level of subjective reality the text moves to that of fantasy formation illustrated by primarily Freud´s text on `A child is being beaten´. Adding Laplanche´s translational model the article ends up at the deepest level represented by the late Lacan and his concept of the real Unconscious.

The paper concludes that the term real points to something exceeding symbolization and the imaginary—thus escaping comprehension—and yet is absolutely indispensable to the organization of unconscious processes.     

Das Unheimliche der Ambivalenz

This essay??s main concern consists of a critical survey of the coherences, alliances and associative entanglement between psychic ambivalences, encounters of the uncanny and the connections to the issues of death. References for the considerations presented here are Freuds??s seminal papers ??The antithetical meanings of primal words?? (1910), ??The uncanny?? (1919) and ??Beyond the pleasure principle?? (1920). The axis formed by these essays is being crisscrossed by the phenomen of the uncanny valley, an issue widely discussed within the cyber scene which may introduce a new perspective in order to extend the analysis of the concept and structure of ambivalences with new questions. This approach adverts to an inherent paradox which seems to be constitutive for ambivalence itself.     

War,revolution, and psychoanalysis: Freudian thought begins to grapple with social reality

Psychoanalytic theory and practice have been affected by external events as well as by internal development. Specifically, the period of the Great War and its aftermath was a turning point in the history of psychoanalysis. These experiences emphasized the inadequacy of the libido theory alone, accelerated Freud's impetus toward metapsychology, and encouraged the articulation of theories of innate destructive urges, of ego instincts, of the superego, and of social interaction. Discussionsof war neuroses, of aggression and the death instinct, of the reality principle, and of the mechanisms of social psychology undermined Freud's original biologism in favor of a social-scientific approach. Psychoanalytic theory began to take more account of social experience and was profoundly changed in the process.     

Revisiting the crisis in Freud's libido theory and Abraham's concept of the oral‐sadistic phase as a way out of it

The now available unabridged correspondence between Freud and Abraham leads to a re‐evaluation of the significance of Abraham's work. The author proposes the thesis that clinical observations by Karl Abraham of the ambivalence of object relations and the destructive‐sadistic aspects of orality have an important influence on the advancement of psychoanalytical theory. The phantasy problem of the Wolf Man and the question of the pathogenic relevance of early actual, or merely imagined traumata led Freud to doubt the validity of his theory. He attempted repeatedly to solve this problem using libido theory, but failed because of his problematic conception of oral erotics. The pathogenic effect of presymbolic traumatizations cannot be demonstrated scientifically because of the still underdeveloped brain in the early stage of the child's development. Consequently, the important empirical evidence of a scientific neurosis theory could not be provided. A revision of the theory of the instincts thus became necessary. With Abraham's clinical contributions and other pathologic evidence, Freud was, with some reservation, forced to modify his idea of oral erotics by ascribing to it a status of a merely constructed and fictive phase of oral organization. A solution was eventually facilitated via recognition of non‐erotic aggression and destruction, thereby opening libido theory to fundamental revisions. Driven by the desire to develop a scientific theory, Freud initially had, in his first theory of the instincts, assumed a strongly causal‐deterministic view on Psychic Function. His third revision of theory of the instincts, Beyond the Pleasure Principle including the death instinct hypothesis, considered the hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalytic theory, which had previously existed only implicitly in his theory. Further development of the death instinct hypothesis by Melanie Klein and her successors abandoned quantitative‐economic and causal‐deterministic principles, and instead focused on the practical utility of the psychoanalytic theory.     

Navigating Trauma in Joseph Conrad's Victory: A Voyage From Sigmund Freud to Philip M. Bromberg

In Victory, Joseph Conrad (1915/1924) revises his earlier treatment of trauma as a singular cataclysmic event in the life of a potentially heroic adult, usually male (as depicted in Heart of Darkness [1898], Lord Jim [1900], and Under Western Eyes [1911]), to a conception of trauma as the corrosive effect of a child's repeated exposures to emotionally invalidating caregivers. Abandoning a view of trauma that would accord with Freud's account of a single shocking incident, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Conrad adopts instead a view that parallels Philip Bromberg's account of trauma as a series of toxic childhood occurrences. Thus Conrad's novel Victory presciently anticipates the corrective vision of contemporary relational psychoanalytic theory, which has largely supplanted Freud's more dramatic narratives with a subtle and nuanced understanding of trauma as a long-term lack of validation in childhood that forecloses adult possibilities. In Victory's portraits of two characters whose lives are constricted by pathological dissociation, Conrad presents literary examples that confirm and illumine Bromberg's clinical and theoretical explications of this pervasive psychological phenomenon.     

Temporality and the Lyotardian Sublime: Kant between Husserl and Freud

ABSTRACT

While Lyotard's first book was an introduction to phenomenology, most of the work that follows can be said to openly challenge the limits of phenomenological analysis. This is particularly evident in the well-known writings on the Kantian sublime, which Lyotard reads as a “temporal crisis” that undoes the conscious knowing subject and escapes “experience” in the phenomenological sense. Nonetheless, if this allows him to relate the sublime to Freud's “unconscious affect,” this “crisis” only becomes visible in contrast to a figure of subjective temporalization the model of which, I argue, is broadly Husserlian. Approaching the sublime as a temporal crisis thus allows not only for a clearer view of the import of Lyotard's late work on the affect with regard to subjectivity, knowledge, and experience; it also reveals what that work continues to owe to a certain phenomenological analysis.     

The theme of love in Henrik Pontoppidan's Nattevagt (Night watch) and other short novels

The subject of love may not seem an appropriate topic of scientific discourse, for we prefer turning to poetry to learn something meaningful about love. Nonetheless, we find three texts on the subject in Freud's work, all of which underline an internal division in love. He discussed the contrast between the affectionate and sensual aspects of love, while Lacanian writers have supplemented by pointing to the division between pleasure and desire. This article illustrates these concepts with cases taken from the Danish author Henrik Pontoppidan, one of the most prominent Danish writers from the turn of the 19^th century. He is well-known for his novels and for his short novels. One of these, Nattevagt, from 1894, has been read by critics as a marital conflict between the painter Jørgen Hallager and his fragile wife Ursula Branth, who succumbs to the brutality of her husband. The author supplements this simple version of the story with aspects made visible through the idea of an internal division in sexuality, which Freud elaborated into his theory of the death drive around 1920. By way of introduction, a few words are said about Pontoppidan, focusing on the theme of love in his short novels. Following is a brief summary of the plot of Nattevagt. Finally a more detailed reading of the dialogue between the two protagonists, Jorgen and Ursula, opens the way for a psychoanalytic interpretation of the tragic outcome of their love.     

The emergence and unfolding of the psyche

This paper is a short exposition of Freud's concept of the sexual drive. My motivation for going back once more to the first introduction of sexuality understood as drive is the seeming lack of interest in the classical concept in much contemporary psychoanalytical thinking. To my mind, this prevents us from finding satisfactory solutions to such concepts as narcissism, sublimation and even the emergence and unfolding of the ego. Reading for example Winnicott's enchanting account of play, one gets the impression that Winnicott saw playing as something separate from instinctual satisfaction, from sexual fantasying and from physical sensation. Looking at this important activity in the life of young children from the point of view of drive theory, one might argue, that here we see one of the first expressions of sublimation. However, in order to fully understand this, I found it necessary to undertake a re-reading of Freud's theory of the sexual drive.     

Defense,dreams and rationality

Are some mental activities rational but unconscious? Psychopathological symptoms, it is said, have a sense — they are seen as “compromise-formations” which express the “intentions” of agents even though the agents are totally unaware of “bringing about” such symptoms. Philosophers, who often claim that such a conception is simply contradictory or incoherent, have shed little light on the puzzles and apparent paradoxes that surround the issue. It is argued here that Freud's two models of explanation — the mechanistic and the intentionalistic — each fail to provide a basis for an explanatory account of the phenomenon of unconscious defense. An examination of the problem of dream “composition” helps explain why Freud's dependence upon “rational homunculi” is inappropriate and misleading. Finally, an alternative model which depends neither upon Freud's version of mechanism nor upon his lavish anthropormorphism is suggested. Ladies and Gentlemen, — It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of the treament that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense.