Experiences,Seemings, and Perceptual Justification

Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of the speckled hen’. A more promising view holds that propositional seemings confer justification only when appropriately related to experiences. I offer advice for developing such an account.     

Cognitive penetrability,context, and aesthetics: Nanay and Danto on the Gallery of Indiscernibles

Nanay has recently argued, on the basis of the cognitive penetrability of experience, that the attribution of aesthetically relevant properties (ARPs) supervenes on perceptual experience. I argue that this claim is false as stated and cannot be salvaged. I provide a series of thought experiments as counterexamples, showing that the title of an artwork can influence its ARPs, its meaning or value, and the accurate attributions of ARPs while the character of the perceptual experience of the piece remains constant. I introduce the notions of context and appropriate context, and I argue that ARPs supervene on observable properties and appropriate contexts; there is no difference in ARPs without a difference in appropriate context or a difference in observable properties. Two paintings may share all of their observable properties and all of their context-relative perceptual properties but be ARP distinct, since each has a different appropriate context, and contexts are not usually determined or instantiated by perceptual properties.     

Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences ‘Vivid’ and Others ‘Faint’? Representationalism,Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology

One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.     

Imagery and overflow: We see more than we report

The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia (the condition of absent voluntary imagery) to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, it provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that aphantasics are incapable of generating this imagery. However, aphantasics perform equally well in this task; and so the no-overflow account fails to explain their performance. This means that proponents of this view are committed to an unsupported view of perception.     

Stained glass as a model for consciousness

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with the following two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one.     

Burge on Perceptual Entitlement

This article is concerned with the question of the nature of the epistemic liaison between experience and belief. The problem, often known as the problem of nondoxastic justification, is to see how a causal transition between experience and belief could assume a normative dimension, that is, how perceptual experience serves to justify beliefs about the world. Currently a number of theories have been proposed to resolve this problem. The article considers a particular solution offered by Tyler Burge which, among other things, introduces a new type of positive epistemic status or warrant, namely, entitlement. It contends that Burge's notion of entitlement cannot be of any help in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justification. Burge's account is compared and contrasted with other, similar, approaches to the problem of nondoxastic justification.     

Perceptual load affects change blindness in a real‐world interaction

Change blindness is the striking inability to detect seemingly obvious changes that occur between views of a scene. The current study assessed perceptual load as a factor that may affect change blindness for human faces. The study had participants (n = 103) interact with a researcher in a testing room that imposed low or high perceptual load. Midway through the conversation, the researcher was replaced by another person. Thirty‐nine percent of participants failed to detect the change. There was a significant effect of perceptual load, with greater change detection under low load (71%) than high load (52%). This research suggests that the perceptual load imposed by a task may have a significant effect on the likelihood of change blindness and ought to be considered in future research.     

不同注意条件下的知觉启动及其机制

采用快速命名方法探讨不同注意条件下的知觉启动效应及其机制。实验中呈现一系列颜色词,要求被试分别完成集中和分散注意任务,然后进行词命名和再认测验。在词命名任务中．实验1包括旧词、重组颜色词和新词,而在实验2中重组颜色词改为新颜色词。结果表明,在实验1中,只有在集中注意条件下,被试对旧词的命名时间明显短于重组颜色词．即表现出知觉启动效应。而在实验2的两种注意条件下,被试对旧词的命名时间均明显短于新颜色词。这提示,在不同注意条件下的学习会影响其后的颜色知觉启动,并且与词和颜色的联结捆绑有关。     

The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content

Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva Noë.     

注意瞬脱范式中的知觉负载对情绪面孔加工的影响

情绪性刺激的加工是否受注意影响目前尚存争论。基于许多操纵空间注意焦点的研究未能在注意资源的分配上进行精确的调节, 本实验将时间维度的注意瞬脱范式与负载理论相结合, 通过调节注意瞬脱中T1刺激物知觉负载水平的高低(箭头朝向相同与否), 观察被试在四种时间延迟条件下(延迟2, 延迟3, 延迟5, 延迟8)T2目标侦测任务恐惧和中性面孔的反应正确率, 从而对情绪性刺激的加工特征进行研究。实验发现：对恐惧面孔侦测的正确率在高知觉负载条件下显著降低, 而中性面孔则不受知觉负载水平影响, 并且这种高知觉负载对恐惧面孔加工的抑制作用仅发生在注意瞬脱中的短延迟条件下。说明在知觉加工资源和注意调节作用同时受限的情况下恐惧面孔的优势加工受到限制, 提示情绪性刺激的加工与中性刺激相比消耗的加工资源较少, 并依赖于注意的调控。     

Conceptual versus Perceptual Priming in Incomplete Picture Identification

This paper examined conceptual versus perceptual priming in identification of incomplete pictures by using a short-term priming paradigm, in which information that may be useful in identifying a fragmented target is presented just prior to the target’s presentation. The target was a picture that slowly and continuously became complete and the participants were required to press a key as soon as they knew what it was. Each target was preceded by a visual prime. The nature of this prime varied from very conceptual (e.g., the name of the picture’s category) to very perceptual (e.g., a similar-shaped pictorial prime from a different category). Primes also included those that combined perceptual and conceptual information (e.g., names or images of the target picture). Across three experiments, conceptual primes were effective while the purely perceptual primes were not. Accordingly, we conclude that pictures in this type of task are identified primarily by conceptual processing, with perceptual processing contributing relatively little.     

知觉流畅性对判断和决策的影响

流畅性是个体对加工信息难易程度的一种主观体验, 它分为知觉流畅性、概念流畅性、提取流畅性等。研究者通过操纵刺激与背景的颜色对比度、刺激的字体类型、清晰程度等因素来控制知觉流畅性, 发现知觉流畅性会影响一系列判断和决策任务, 如命题真实性、类别判断、偏好、熟悉性等。知觉流畅性既可以作为判断的直接线索也可以通过选择不同线索和认知策略来间接影响判断和决策。     

Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content

Sydney Shoemaker has given a sophisticated theory of phenomenal content, motivated by the transparency of experience and by the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). It centers on the idea that color experiences represent what he calls “appearance properties”. I consider the different sorts of appearance properties that Shoemaker has suggested might enter into phenomenal content – occurrent appearance properties, dispositional appearance properties, and higher-order dispositional appearance properties – and argue that none of them are plausibly represented by color experiences. I argue that Shoemaker's theory faces a dilemma – either it makes misperception too difficult, or it does not truly accommodate veridical spectrum inversion. I then examine some alternative Russellian theories of phenomenal content that might be consistent with Shoemaker's motivations, including a different sort of proposal recently suggested by Shoemaker (forthcoming). I argue that these views are also lacking, for similar reasons as the appearance property view. Finally, I conclude that in order for a representationalist theory to properly accommodate spectrum inversion without illusion, phenomenal content must include an indexical element. Such a view requires the adoption of a broadly Fregean theory of phenomenal content, according to which sameness of phenomenal character does not entail sameness in extension. What phenomenally identical experiences have in common is not what they represent, but how they represent.     

从知觉负载理论来理解选择性注意

知觉负载理论被认为解决了选择性注意研究的早选择和晚选择观点之争。当前任务对注意资源的耗用程度决定了与任务无关的干扰刺激得到多少加工,从而导致在低知觉负载下,注意资源自动溢出去加工干扰刺激（晚选择）,而在高知觉负载下,注意资源被当前任务耗尽而无法加工干扰刺激（早选择）。知觉负载理论提出后,研究者进行了一系列研究。一部分工作专注于知觉负载对选择性注意的调节作用;另外一些工作则关注其他认知过程如何影响注意资源的分配,其中知觉负载与工作记忆负载的关系是当前关注重点。     

Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.     

The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique

According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character mandates that the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience’s representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x; and (2) that the immediate objects of consciousness are not objects per se, but rather properties. This paper explores these assumptions, advancing the thesis that each is rejectable on phenomenological grounds.     

A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access

This paper proposes a new argument in favour of the claim that phenomenal consciousness overflows – that is, has a far higher capacity than – cognitive access. It shows that opponents of overflow implicate a necessary role for visual imagery in the change detection paradigm. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is no correlation between visual imagery abilities and performance in this paradigm. Since the use of imagery is not implicated in the performance strategy of subjects, we find a new argument for consciousness without access.     

“鸡尾酒会”环境中的知觉线索的去掩蔽作用

在有多人同时说话的嘈杂环境中,为什么具有正常听力的人能在一定的程度上听懂目标语句？研究这个著名的“鸡尾酒会”问题的一个新进展是将干扰言语的作用区分出了能量掩蔽和信息掩蔽两种成分。与发生在外周系统的能量掩蔽不同,信息掩蔽发生在心理层次并受到认知过程的调节。因此,主观空间分离、与目标语句节奏相关的视觉信号以及对目标语句某些特征的熟悉程度等知觉线索都具有去掩蔽作用。考察可减少信息掩蔽的知觉线索的交互作用及其高级认知调节是今后重要的研究内容     

知觉负载、注意定势与选择性注意

本研究采用Eriksen Flanker（侧抑制）范式,将当前任务区分为高、低知觉负载两种条件．并系统操纵边缘视野干扰项与中央靶子的不同加工层次关系,从而考察注意选择的知觉负载理论。实验一发现,高知觉负载情况下没有任何flanker冲突效应,而低知觉负载情况下既有知觉层次和反应层次的冲突效应,也有一致条件下的促进效应。实验二增加了一致条件试次的比例,从而操纵自上而下的注意定势,发现高、低知觉负载情况下都存在知觉冲突效应和一致条件下的促进效应。这些发现表明,对任务无关信息的加工既受到任务相关信息的知觉负载和剩余加工资源的分配的影响,也受到自上而下注意定势的影响;自下而上和自上而下过程相互作用,共同决定加工资源的分配和注意选择的认知阶段。     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.