Religious intellectual humility,attitude change,and closeness following religious disagreement

Abstract

This study explored the role of intellectual humility (IH) in promoting attitude change and relationship closeness in the context of religious disagreement. Participants (N = 174) completed a preliminary survey that assessed their attitude on several contentious religious issues (e.g. gay marriage, abortion). Participants who disagreed about a contentious religious issue were then paired and engaged in a 10-min discussion. After the discussion, participants completed a series of questionnaires. The greatest degree of attitude change was seen in pairs with mutually high levels of IH, in which the participant self-reported high levels of IH and also perceived the discussion partner to have high levels of IH. Higher perceptions of the IH levels of the discussion partner predicted higher levels of closeness and trust. We discuss limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications.     

Order effects in belief updating with consistent and inconsistent evidence

The current study tests for the presence of differential order effects in evaluation tasks with consistent and inconsistent evidence as predicted by the Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) belief-adjustment model. The results, based on both between-subjects and within-subjects experiments, demonstrate that there were significant recency effects with inconsistent evidence as predicted, larger recency effects when the inconsistent evidence was farther apart in subjective value as predicted, and significant recency effects even when subjects were given training designed to both help them understand the task as completely as possible and to be better able to assess the pieces of evidence. By including a within-subjects design, we were able to demonstrate that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of evidence is the primary factor influencing the magnitude of the recency effect, regardless of whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent. This latter finding is unique and contrary to previous research and theory.     

The kinematics of belief and desire

Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section in a tentative model of pratical deliberation. This paper is one of a pair dedicated to Richard Jeffrey and prepared for a workshop held in his memory at the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. My thanks to the organisers of, and the participants in, this workshop and to two anonymous referees for their comments.     

Self-enhancement and belief perseverance

Belief perseverance—the tendency to make use of invalidated information—is one of social psychology’s most reliable phenomena. Virtually all of the explanations proffered for the effect, as well as the conditions that delimit it, involve the way people think about or explain the discredited feedback. But it seems reasonable to assume that the importance of the feedback for the actor’s self-image would also influence the tendency to persevere on invalidated feedback. From a self-enhancement perspective, one might ask: Why would people persist in negative self-beliefs, especially when the basis for those beliefs has been discredited? In the present study, actors and observers completed a word-identification task and were given bogus success or failure feedback. After success feedback was discredited, actors and observers persevered equally in beliefs about the actor’s abilities. However, following invalidation of failure feedback, actors provided significantly higher performance evaluations than observers, thus exhibiting less perseverance on the negative feedback. These results suggest that the motivation to maintain a relatively favorable self-image may attenuate perseverance when discredited feedback threatens an important aspect of the self-concept.     

Hypnosis and belief: A review of hypnotic delusions

Hypnosis can create temporary, but highly compelling alterations in belief. As such, it can be used to model many aspects of clinical delusions in the laboratory. This approach allows researchers to recreate features of delusions on demand and examine underlying processes with a high level of experimental control. This paper reviews studies that have used hypnosis to model delusions in this way. First, the paper reviews studies that have focused on reproducing the surface features of delusions, such as their high levels of subjective conviction and strong resistance to counter-evidence. Second, the paper reviews studies that have focused on modelling underlying processes of delusions, including anomalous experiences or cognitive deficits that underpin specific delusional beliefs. Finally, the paper evaluates this body of research as a whole. The paper discusses advantages and limitations of using hypnotic models to study delusions and suggests some directions for future research.     

Absolutely tasty: an examination of predicates of personal taste and faultless disagreement

Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste (PPT) have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism (also called realism or invariantism) due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on an account of faultless disagreement that improves upon a recent proposal due to Karl Schafer. In amending Schafer’s proposal, I put forward an empirically informed view of our beliefs regarding matters of personal taste, as well as an account of our assertions concerning such matters. I also argue that absolutists should take disagreement about these matters to be conative, rather than doxastic, in nature. The anticipated result is an independently compelling account of faultless disagreement about matters of personal taste that fits naturally with absolutism.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

The effects of strong belief structures on information-processing evaluations and choice

This study examined the influence of the strength of belief structures on selected aspects of the decision-making process. To examine these issues, a business-acquisition decision scenario was studied in an experiment. Subjects played the role of a CEO of an electronics firm and were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of six potential acquisition candidates and to rate various aspects of the associated decision process. We presented half the subjects with information that the belief structure of their organization was extreme, agreed upon, and clear. The other half was presented with information that there was disagreement about the belief structure and that it was more ambiguous and less extreme. The results clearly showed that the decision process is different for people who were presented with an agreed-upon, extreme, and tightly constructed belief structure when compared to those who received information reflecting a weak and loosely constructed belief structure. A strong belief structure resulted in less positive evaluations, information requested, and money allocated to explore incompatible acquisition candidates (and vice versa for a highly compatible candidate) when compared to subjects using a weak belief structure. In addition, subjects in the strong-belief condition reported that their decision process would be characterized by less doubt, less time, less difficulty, and less conflict compared to subjects in the weak-belief structure condition. Implications for both decision theory and practical decision processes are discussed.     

审美概念理解对审美感性水平影响的实验探索

通常认为审美理性对审美感性有消极影响。这至少对认知心理学和人工智能的研究与发展形成了一种障碍。本研究以审美概念理解作为审美理性活动的典型式,对二者的实际关系进行探索。实验对象分为A类普通被试和B类艺术专业被试。结果表明：无论是否通过专门的审美概念学习训练,实验组和对照组的审美概念理解与审美感性水平的发展都呈共同上升趋势：通过学习训练,审美概念理解程度有显著提高,且显著有助于AB两类被试审美感受总水平提高;审美概念理解的“合理性”（正确性与精确性）是对审美感性各因素影响的显著因子,而其“事实例举”对于审美感性中的审美感知、审美联想、审美情感等是显著因子。A类小学5年级被试的审美感知和审美情感、B类大学美术专业2年级被试的审美感知,实验前后无显著差异,这表明审美理性对审美感性所具有的积极影响,在一定条件下是有限的。     

Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.

幼儿心理理论愿望信念理解与情绪理解关系研究

考察了幼儿心理理论信念愿望理解与情绪理解的发展状况及相互关系.运用实验法对256名3~6岁儿童施测.结果表明:(1)幼儿心理理论愿望-信念理解与情绪理解的发展在3~6岁期间随年龄逐渐提高.4岁是基于信念的情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;4~5岁是幼儿情绪观点采择能力发展的关键年龄.(2)幼儿基于信念的情绪理解能力的发展晚于错误信念理解能力的发展.(3)幼儿心理理论的愿望-信念理解与情绪理解之间相关显著.     

The role of mechanism and covariation information in causal belief updating

The present study is aimed at identifying how prior causal beliefs and covariation information contribute to belief updating when evidence, either compatible or contradictory with those beliefs, is provided. Participants were presented with a cover story with which it was intended to activate or generate a causal belief. Variables related to the prior belief (the type of information, the strength of the cause-effect causal link, and how confident the participant was that the link existed) were assessed. Subsequently, participants were presented with covariational information and were asked to update their beliefs in light of the new evidence. Information reliability, prior belief's causal influence magnitude, and the cause-effect level of contingency portrayed by the new information--but not the type of the prior belief--are shown to directly determine belief updating.     

Personhood and future belief: two arguments for something like Reflection

This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.

审美概念理解对于创造性思维作业成绩的影响

本研究以小学3、5年级、初2、高2、大2年级学生共300人为被试（实验组156人;对照组154人）,对审美概念实验教学前后测验结果分析表明：审美概念理解程度对于创造性思维作业成绩有显著影响,各年级都存在这种效果;总的看女生显著高于男生。审美概念理解的7个因子（概念理解流畅、释义正确、释义精确、事实迁移长度、事实迁移宽度、类词迁移长度、类词迁移宽度等）与创造性思维的两类作业（图形、语言）、6个因子（流畅、独创、精致、灵活、标题抽象、抗封闭）之间均存在显著相关;其中“类词迁移宽度”、“释义精确”、“类词迁移长度”等三个因素对创造性思维作业总成绩影响显著。     

纳西族和汉族儿童情绪理解能力的发展

选取3～5岁的纳西族儿童107人,3～5岁的汉族儿童90人,使用情绪理解任务系统地考察了他们情绪理解的发展,同时还测量了两个民族儿童的错误信念理解和语言能力。结果表明,两个民族儿童情绪理解能力具有相似的发展规律,但完成各任务的成绩有显著差异,提示了两个民族儿童情绪理解能力发展的不同步性。研究还发现,心理理论社会知觉成分与认知成分随年龄的增长相互促进和相互制约,并且都与语言能力有关。     

中世纪二元对立型社会治理模式与基督教信念伦理

本文深入分析了欧洲中世纪二元对立型社会治理模式与基督教信念伦理的深层成因、基本特征、主要内容及其二者的内在关联性,指出了它们被近现代民主法治型社会治理模式和规范伦理取代的历史必然性。     

Children’s prior experiences of their successes and failures modulate belief alignment

ABSTRACT

An ability to flexibly learn from others while at other times relying upon one’s own judgements is an important adaptive human capacity. The present research investigated how others’ epistemic states and prior experience of their own independent ability in a given task modulate young children’s selective learning. In particular, we asked whether 4-year-old children’s judgement concerning the location of a hidden object is modulated both by an informant’s knowledge states and by the absence/presence of a prior experience with a particular task. We found that the children were more likely to align their judgement according to the informant’s verbal report when the informant was knowledgeable than when she was ignorant – but only when they had explicitly experienced their own incapability to accurately guess an object’s location. The findings suggest that 4-year-old children are able to combine their own experience with others’ input to make their judgement.     

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.