Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?

Axiomathes - This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals,...     

Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?

It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism.     

Intentionality and meta-awareness of mind wandering: Are they one and the same,or distinct dimensions?

Researchers have recently demonstrated that mind-wandering episodes can vary on numerous dimensions, and it has been suggested that assessing these dimensions will play an important role in our understanding of mind wandering. One dimension that has received considerable attention in recent work is the intentionality of mind wandering. Although it has been claimed that indexing the intentionality of mind wandering will be necessary if researchers are to obtain a coherent understanding of the wandering mind, one concern is that this dimension might be redundant with another, longstanding, dimension: namely, meta-awareness. Thus, the utility of the argument for assessing intentionality rests upon a demonstration that this dimension is distinct from the meta-awareness dimension. To shed light on this issue, across two studies we compared and contrasted these dimensions to determine whether they are redundant or distinct. In both studies, we found support for the view that these dimensions are distinct.     

Is Negligence a First Cousin to Intentionality? Lay Conceptions of Negligence and Its Relationship to Intentionality

In three studies, we examined lay conceptions of negligence and how they are used when making judgments about actors' intentions, negligence, and blame. Study 1 examined the extent to which participants agreed about what constitutes negligence and accidents. After finding a high level of agreement between participants, Study 2 explored the features that defined participants' folk understanding of negligence. Additionally, we examined if definitions of negligence overlapped with key features of definitions of intentionality proposed in the literature. Study 2 suggested there were some key overlapping features and differences between negligence and intentionality. Finally, Study 3 examined how two key features of intentionality and negligence (knowledge and awareness) were related to attributions of negligence, accidental causation, blame, and desire to punish. The findings suggested that knowledge and awareness are positively related to judgments of negligence, blame, and desire to punish. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Passion or Perjury: Center or Circumference?

Are all transcendental claims a lost cause because they can have no objective empirical truth? Or does the transcendent still move among us as immanent, and, if so, how so? The question of ultimacy and the validity of the symbolic is considered through the views of Paul Ricoeur and Carl Jung.     

Lying: Knowledge or belief?

Philosophical Studies - A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon”...     

Gurus and Devotees: Guides or Gods? Pathology or Faith?

This research investigated whether individuals who were members of a religious group in which they participated in a guru-devotee relationship differ in particular psychological and developmental ways (the need to be mirrored, the need to idealize, and retrospective perceptions of styles of having been parented) from individuals who were members of other groups, religious or non-religious. One hundred and eight subjects were drawn from three groups: (a) a Hindu based guru-devotee group, (b) a Unitarian Universalist Church with a non-hierarchical polity, and (c) a non-religious group, a computer company. Subjects were men and women ranging in age from 23 to 83. Each completed the Goal Instability and Superiority Scales (GIS) the Parental Authority Questionnaire (PAQ) and a demographics questionnaire. Results demonstrated no statistically significant differences among the groups on the measures of idealizing, mirroring, and perceived styles of having been parented, thus challenging the conventionally held belief that guru-devotee involvement is indicative of pathology. Private practice in     

Theology: Reduction or Autonomy?

Issues of the nature and task of theology remain important to the science-theology dialogue. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the nature of theology in relation to the other sciences. In particular, I argue that the primary question remains one of autonomy and reduction. If theology is a genuine academic discipline, then it should be an autonomous field with its own subject matter and norms. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is the science of God, but I suggest that theology be more broadly understood as the science of meaning. If we recognize this, the modes of interaction between theology and the other sciences becomes clearer.     

Envy: One or many?

This paper reports conceptual and clinical research about envy. It consists of an examination and comparison of Klein's points of view of 1952, where the feeling of exclusion from the envious object is stressed, and of 1957, based on the split death instinct that is projected onto the envied object. These two approaches are contrasted with the point of view of the author, where envy is understood as the result of a particular kind of object relation, in which the subject registers an asymmetry with its peer, that he considers unfair, due to the biased action of an idealized omnipotent object, on whom the subject depends and that gives to the envied one, and deceives the envious one, leading to experiencing a compound of emotions: hatred, love, sense of unfairness, wish of revenge, helplessness and incapacity of the subject to provide for himself. The mental state just described emerges from clinical observations, and is illustrated with the passage from the Bible where Abel, the envied one, is killed by Cain, the envious one, showing their relationship with Jehovah, biased in his preferences, a situation designated by the author as 'Cain's complex'. In this paper some considerations are also made concerning the modalities of envy: penis envy in women, the relationship between envy and narcissism, the difference between envy and jealousy, and the interpretative handling of envy. To answer the question posed in the title, the conclusion is that envy presents a central nucleus with different elaborative branches.     

Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic?

I argue that, for all we know, there are perfectly ordinary actual entities that are temporal in the usual sense and yet never present, past, or future. This epistemic fact requires us to modify the theses of presentism and eternalism. More importantly, it generates three new and quite serious objections to presentism, which I formulate and partially evaluate in this paper.     

Medicine: business or profession?

As professionals, doctors have a contractual relationship with society that trains them and confers on them exclusive power to practice medical care. In the contract, power and responsibility should be balanced. When the power is conferred by society to a profession, the profession should take responsibility for society, including the provision of high quality services, and maintain high standard principled conduct and integrity.     

Ecology: Religious or Secular?

‘Ecology: religious or secular?’ addresses the issue of the relation between ecology and the idea of God. ‘Social’ interpretations of ecology seem to fit with traditional Christian models, such as stewardship, for grasping the relation between humanity and nature. ‘Deep’ interpretations of ecology, in which nature is understood to encompass humanity, appear, by contrast, less amenable to assimilation by Christianity. The choice – for so it is often presented – between ‘deep’ and ‘social’ forms of ecology is thus a test case for Christianity. Does the Christian theologian opt for ‘social’ ecology because it best addresses the issue of human embeddedness in nature or because it fits better with prior metaphysical commitments? This article argues that the only way such a dilemma can be addressed theologically is by thinking through at a fundamental level the character of God’s relation to the world. An enquiry in philosophical theology, through the consideration of the concept of divine simplicity, it is argued, suggests that Christianity is not condemned to ‘religious’ readings of ecology. That is, Christianity is not obliged to select evidence based on criteria derived from prior theological commitments (e.g. to the model of stewardship). Instead, beginning in the concept of God enables a truly ‘secular’ enquiry which acknowledges a wide range of evidence of our materiality. Indeed, such a ‘secular’ enquiry can only be established by reference to the idea of God.     

Holism: Revolution or reminder?

Conclusion Among the four propositions considered in this paper, we have found two which can contribute to a holistic environmental ethic: individuals acquire some of their value through participating in communities, including biotic communities, and wholes, including biotic communities, can have values which are not the sum of the values of the individuals composing them. However, accepting these propositions does not represent a revolutionary break distinguishing holism from traditional value theories or ethics. On the other hand, the holistic propositions we considered which would clearly differentiate holism from (at least some) traditional value theories and ethics are unacceptable. Consequently, if the propositions we have discussed fairly represent what goes under the name of holism, then rather than being a new kind of ethic, a viable ethical holism will make its contribution by emphasizing the communal elements of traditional ethics which have sometimes been neglected in glorifications of the individual. This would not be an inconsiderable contribution, philosophically, socially, or environmentally.     

Poverty: absolute or relative?

ABSTRACT In recent decades poverty has been defined as a relative rather than absolute notion. Those in poverty have been seen as poor relative to a level of income, or social condition, accepted as average or normal for a society. Poverty has been redefined as 'relative deprivation'. This paper argues, first, that the redefinition of poverty as relative to social norms is a radical departure from the traditional notion of poverty. Secondly, it considers whether such a redefinition gives support to the view that the claims of those in poverty (relative) may be considered as morally equivalent to the claims of those in poverty (absolute). The paper concludes by arguing that the notion of relative poverty is advanced to give support to social and economic policies whose primary aim is equality rather than the relief of poverty.