生活哲学:一种哲学观

哲学观问题日益引起学者们的关注。本文从分析生活概念入手,尝试性地提出一种哲学观——生活哲学观,此种哲学观认为,哲学是人生活的一种形式,其功能在于保持人的生成意识。     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题.20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注.现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论.目前的研究主要集中于克里克的"视觉意识".但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的"二元论"将对于意识的研究大有裨益.     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题。20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注。现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论。目前的研究主要集中于克里克的“视觉意识”。但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的“二元论”将对于意识的研究大有裨益。     

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.     

抗击虚无主义:俄罗斯宗教哲学的主要维度

随着意识形态的谈化,追忆“白银时代”,已经成为当代俄罗斯思想界一个比较普遍的现象,不仅如此,白银时期的宗教哲学早在20世纪初期就已经引起了西方学者的广泛关注。其原因在于这场精神文化的复兴运动虽然传承了俄罗斯东正教的文化传统,但它所思考与试图解决的问题域限却是整个西方文化语境所面临的困境:即近代科学理性发展带来的危机,以及与此相伴随的宗教与哲学中基本价值的混乱与瓦解,“虚无主义”已经无可避免到来。另一个原因在于苏联社会主义国家解体之后,原有共产主义信念的丧失导致当代的俄罗斯人处于空前的信仰缺失状态。因此如何…     

A New Paradigm of Life and Consciousness

The facts of life, like facts of physical nature, are not subject to material premises applicable to physical nature. Like matter, life is a universal field of forces interacting, reacting, and seeking equilibrium, but the forces involved are vital energies of sensation, impulse, feeling, emotion, will, and aspiration characteristic of conscious or subconscious living beings. Universal principles govern the consequences of these interactions, although the appropriate methods for study differ. They explain the correspondence between inner subjective, psychological forces, and external results and are the basis for the capacity of conscious individuals to make life respond by their inner intentions.     

Keewaydinoquay,Woman-of-the-Northwest-Wind: The Life and Philosophy of a Native American Teacher

This article is a short biography of a Native American teacher and shaman, Keewaydinoquay, Woman-of-the-Northwest-Wind. Her life events illustrate how she lives out her philosophy of harmony with nature. The purpose of this article is to increase multicultural awareness through a model of wisdom and balance.     

Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.     

分析哲学的兴趣:在哲学与生活之间--从批判理论和生活世界的视角对罗素和维特根斯坦的一个批评解读

分析哲学是有其人文和社会的兴趣与关怀的。本文试图从批判理论的视角．运用哲学与生活世界相关联的解释学方法,分别解读了分析哲学创始人之一的罗素的逻辑分析哲学与他作为一个哲学家的社会批判兴趣之间的关系,以及前期维特根斯坦的逻辑语言分析哲学和后期的日常语言分析哲学与维特根斯坦所属的生活世界的关系。指出分析哲学由于没有建立在对现代性的科学一形而上学思维方式和生活方式的足够反思基础上,所以它对形而上学的批判兴趣最终仍然导致了一种非批判的形而上学。     

White Habits,Anti-Racism,and Philosophy as a Way of Life

This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intelligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white complicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white.     

作为一种生活方式的哲学

在古希腊,哲学首先是一种活动,而不是静态的知识;是对智慧的爱,而不是智慧本身;是一种生活方式,而不是一个在学院被教授的学问;是提升精神的一个方法,它意味着个体存在方式的根本改变和转换。因此,在古希腊,哲学家不仅是指那些创造了哲学理论体系的人,而且包括那些实践某种哲学观念的人。此种哲学观从中世纪开始发生了根本的转换,哲学成为了一种纯粹抽象的、理论的活动,这种状况直到今天仍然没有完全改变。     

Reality and Philosophy: Reflections on Cora Diamond's Work

The publication of Cora Diamond's important 2002 “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” (in Philosophy and Animal Life) stimulated the writing of this essay. “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” attempted to show that there are experiences of reality (recounted especially in literature like John Coetzee's novels and Ted Hughes' poetry) in relation to which philosophical concepts and words encounter difficulty. The experiences resist conceptualization. By examining several of Diamond's earlier writings, I try to show that the difficulty of philosophical conceptualization of reality is due to the fact that reality does not exist external to experience. Reality being internal to experience means that reality contains an unfixed set of possibilities. Being experiential, reality is historical. The historical dimension of reality – such as the reality of animal life suffering – makes the words through we describe this reality too weak, i.e. they are not powerful enough to capture reality, hence the difficulty. Consequently, as I argue, for Diamond, the weakness of words means that words are never complete concepts. The meaning of them seems always still to come since reality seems always to have a surplus of possibilities. I suggest that because of this always still “to come” aspect of the meaning of words, we might characterise Diamond's thought as a messianism.