对论证的论证所做的反论证——柯亨对“帕累托论证”的批判

为了论证差别原则中不平等的正当性,约翰·罗尔斯和布莱恩·巴里进行了帕累托论证。G.A.柯亨在《拯救正义与平等》中,对这一辩护提出了三个方面的质疑。他提出帕累托不可比选项,揭露其帕累托论证的内在逻辑矛盾,并指出该论证的两难困境,以期推翻帕累托论证。柯亨的反论证目的在于批判人与人之间深层的不平等。本文在最后通过追溯柯亨语境中的"与社会主义的机会平等相融的不平等",考察他对"不平等"的看法。     

我们需要什么样的社会福利改进——论帕累托改进的伦理约束

帕累托改进是主流经济哲学和政治哲学有关社会福利改进的判定工具,具有维护个人自由、一致同意、增量改革等直觉意义上的优点。一些学者认为,帕累托改进有利于既得利益,但这只是维持最初的分配方案并导致使阶级固化的长期演进结果。分析表明,帕累托改进存在着多种可能的演进方向,要避免阶级固化的逻辑,就应当坚持矫正正义,给利益受损者以更多的份额,从而使社会向较为平等的方向演进。人们所持有的伦理观念,对于帕累托改进和社会福利演进有着重要而长远的影响。     

论同意对人之尊严的尊重

由于同意同时蕴含作为尊严之根据的自律或自治的两个必要条件——自由与约束或管理,因此,人们可以根据康德的思想确认其蕴含对人之尊严的尊重。在存在着第三方压力的同意情境中,即使非法的、具有足够控制力或影响力的第三方威胁可能造成同意无效,但同意接受者是否能根据这样的同意表征而行动、其在这种情境中可能或应当做什么却取决于更多的因素,其中最重要的因素仍然是对于同意方之尊严的尊重。只有诉诸实际同意,才可能因同意者之自治得以可能而有了对其尊严的尊重。因此,用来证成帕累托改进的可能不符合实际同意的推定同意,其实并不能从尊重人之尊严的角度为帕累托改进提供正当性证明。     

柯亨对罗尔斯的四重道德批判

柯亨在肯定罗尔斯理论进步意义的基础上,从差别原则、帕累托最优的现实可行性、基本结构理论和建构主义理论四个方面对罗尔斯进行了道德批判。在批判中,柯亨试图通过对正义的拯救,论证理想的社会主义社会才是人类真正、彻底的自由和解放之路。     

论马克思的道德黄金律

马克思不是非道德论者,马克思提出了道德黄金律:即在自由人联合体,"每个人的自由发展是一切人自由发展的条件"。条件是影响人的存在与发展的物质经济与与精神道德因素。马克思金律是经济金律与道德金律的统一。经济金律在"帕累托最佳"那里被应用了,而道德金律却被悬隔。马克思道德金律是:每个人的自由发展是一切人自由发展的善的价值,而不是恶的障碍、危害。它是儒家与《圣经》、功利主义、康德金律等的扬弃。马克思道德金律,既有普遍必然性,也具有规范性,是"人类命运共同体"的践行原则。     

带着神的一切丰富,直奔标竿——访北京君太百货总经理章启正弟兄

“如果说,我们想获得内心的平安及每一步方向,就必须面对神。我们必须有时间与神独处,寻求他的智慧,让神在他的时刻里对我们说话。”对上世纪的经济学发展史稍有了解的人都知道,帕累托标准的盛行本身就是一个经济学开始疏远甚至道德考虑的坐标,其直接原因是人们开始怀疑基数效用,实际上当人们开始认可人际间效用不具可比性这一假设时,换一种状态相对于另一种状态来说,有人变     

“真正的经济”是内涵道德的经济

经济概念不是纯物质或物质活动概念,它与道德有着必然的联系。作为理解经济的基础或切入点的产权、经济活动的核心或前提的生产劳动、经济持续运行的分配与交换行为和最佳经济状态的帕累托佳境等,均与道德有着不可分离的十分密切的关系。因此,真正的经济是内涵道德的经济。     

自由主义儒学是否可能?

在各种可能的儒学进路中,自由主义儒学颇受关注,但这一进路在群己权界问题上存在着实质性的困难。本文择取卖淫问题作为儒学进路的试金石,通过虚拟对话揭示儒学和自由主义在该问题上的各自立场。自由主义主张卖淫合法化有三个基本根据:性可以成为商品、性交易合乎帕累托标准、自我所有权是人们性自由交易的权利依据。在这一检验过程中,这三大根据都无法在儒学中得到证成,而儒学以家庭为本的群己观势将反对卖淫,并与自由主义构成群己权界问题上的根本对立。     

武汉市老年护理医院出院患者疾病构成帕累托图分析

为了解武汉市老年护理医院患者主要病种、多发病种构成情况,以武汉市5家老年护理医院的病案统计数据为资料,运用帕累托图分析法对1236例出院患者的情况进行分析。武汉市老年护理医院患者中病种以心血管病、脑血管病、脑卒中后遗症、慢性支气管炎、糖尿病、肺气肿、骨折等疾病为主,其构成占到老年护理医院出院病例疾病构成的90％以上。     

再论古代印度唯物主义

灯喜(Dipak Nandy)的论文“古代印度唯物主义”(载于《今日马克思主义》1962年2月号)分析了恰托帕驮耶(D.P.Chattopadhyaya)的《顺世学派。古代印度唯物主义研究》(Lokayata.A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism);他的分析是有力的,引起人们的兴趣。我很赞成灯喜给恰托帕驮耶的这部书以高度评价。同时,在我这方面,我想详谈一     

Gender, Discrimination, and Capability: Insights from Amartya Sen

This essay critically examines economist and philosopher Amartya Sen's writings as a potential resource in religious ethicists' efforts to analyze discrimination against girls and women and to address their well-being and agency. Delineating how Sen's discussions of "missing women" and "gender and cooperative conflict" fit within his "capability approach" to economic and human development, the article explores how Sen's methodology employs empirical analysis toward normative ends. Those ends expand the capability of girls and women to function in all aspects of their society. It concludes with a discussion of ways to engage Sen's work within religious ethics.     

密尔自由观的伦理辨析

约翰·密尔从个人与社会关系的独特伦理视角对自由主义进行了新的阐释,他认为自由就是由社会合法地对个体行施的那种权力的本性和限制.密尔坚持个人自由,主张张扬人的个性,提出自由要以社会的进步和人类整体的幸福为其价值目标.尤其是密尔对自由的伦理道德诉求、对个性自由的伦理价值分析、给自由以限度、给自由以功利主义解释等伦理主张和理论建构,不仅极大地丰富和完善了自由主义理论,推动了自由主义理论与实践的发展,而且还具有重要的现代价值.     

Everything is What it is,and Not Another Thing: Knowledge and Freedom in Isaiah Berlin's Political Thought

Although Isaiah Berlin's critique of positive liberty has achieved canonical status, its place within his wider political philosophy remains obscure. However, the re-publication of one of his most important philosophical essays, From Hope and Fear Set Free, as part of a new edition of Four Essays on Liberty, simply entitled Liberty, has opened the door to a re-evaluation of Berlin's political project.

At the heart of Berlin's argument, which gains its fullest expression in From Hope and Fear Set Free, stands his contention that positive liberty, in its incarnation as self-realisation, conflates liberty with knowledge, which leads to the distortion of our phenomenologically inescapable structure of experience. This transgression against the conceptual framework in terms of which we think, Berlin argues, played its desolate part in linking the ‘totalitarian temptation’ latent in liberty as self-realisation with the totalitarian politics of the mid-twentieth century.     

Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to show that Shaftesbury’s thinking about liberty is best understood in terms of self-mastery. To examine his understanding of liberty, I turn to a painting that he commissioned on the ancient theme of the choice of Hercules and the notes that he prepared for the artist. Questions of human choice are also present in the so-called story of an amour, which addresses the difficulties of controlling human passions. Jaffro distinguishes three notions of self-control that are present in the story of an amour. Although I agree with many aspects of Jaffro’s interpretation, I question his conclusion that self-control in the Stoic sense is best reserved for ‘moral heroes.’ I propose an alternative developmental interpretation, according to which all human beings are on an intellectual journey aimed at personal and moral improvement. My interpretation takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to be practical and help improve our lives. I end by arguing that rather than trying to situate Shaftesbury’s concept of liberty within debates among compatibilists and incompatibilists it is more promising to understand it in terms of self-mastery and thus regard it as a version of positive liberty.     

Plato's Criticism of the ``Democratic Man' in the Republic

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato's account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato's assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato's criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person's way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.     

Critical notice of On the people's terms: a Republican theory and model of democracy,by Philip Pettit,Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii+333pp.

This paper is a critical notice of Philip Pettit's On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Pettit argues that only Republicanism can respond appropriately to the ‘evil of subjection to another's will – particularly in important areas of personal choice’ because its ideal of liberty – freedom as non-domination – both captures better than liberalism our commitment to individual liberty and explains better our commitment to the legitimacy of democratic decision-making than standard democrat accounts. If this argument succeeds, it demonstrates that there is no real tension between the liberal thought that justice provides a standard for evaluating public decisions independent of the fact that they are taken democratically and the democratic thought that the fact that a decision is democratic suffices to make it legitimate. I argue, however, that Pettit finds himself caught between two contradictory positions: a version of Isaiah Berlin's negative concept of liberty and a positive liberty account of democracy. And I show that his attempt to resolve the tension fails because it requires him to embrace the positive liberty account he is committed to rejecting.     

John Stuart Mill and the Conflicts of Equality

John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else.

     

RAWLS AND THE STATUS OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

Abstract:  In his late work, Rawls makes strong claims about the status of political liberty. These claims, if accepted, would have significant implications for the content of "justice as fairness." I discuss the nature of these claims, clarifying Rawls's fair value guarantee of the political liberties and critically discussing the arguments that he and others have given for assigning special importance to the political liberties. I conclude that justice as fairness, properly understood, is not a deeply democratic conception of justice.     

The Irrationality of Choosing Egoism—A Reply to Eshelman

Despite the vast literature on Rawls's work, few have discussed his arguments for the value of democracy. When his arguments have been discussed, they have received staunch criticism. Some critics have charged that Rawls's arguments are not deeply democratic. Others have gone further, claiming that Rawls's arguments denigrate democracy. These criticisms are unsurprising, since Rawls's arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty needs to include democratic liberties, are incomplete. In contrast to his trenchant remarks about core civil liberties, Rawls does not say much about the inclusion of political liberties of a democratic sort – such as the right to vote – among the basic liberties.

In this paper, I complete some of Rawls's arguments and show that he has grounds for including political liberties, particularly those of a democratic nature, in the principle of equal basic liberty. In doing so, I make some beginning steps toward illustrating the genuinely democratic nature of Rawls's arguments. Rawls believes that a few different arguments can be given for democratic institutions and that these arguments work together to support the value of democracy. In this paper, I focus on Rawls's arguments relating to self-respect. I focus on this set of arguments because they are among the strongest of Rawls's arguments for equal political liberty and its fair value.     

Institutions of Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism

This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate valuation of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe.