Modality,Si! Modal Logic,No!

This article is oriented toward the use of modality in artificial intelligence (AI). An agent must reason about what it or other agents know, believe, want, intend or owe. Referentially opaque modalities are needed and must be formalized correctly. Unfortunately, modal logics seem too limited for many important purposes. This article contains examples of uses of modality for which modal logic seems inadequate.I have no proof that modal logic is inadequate, so I hope modal logicians will take the examples as challenges.Maybe this article will also have philosophical and mathematical logical interest.     

Look: No hands! Driving on the motorway

How drivers hold their steering wheels when they are driving has been studied in restricted ways for many years. Here I describe the advantages (and disadvantages) of a more naturalistic way of studying this phenomenon, and present the results from two studies that observed the hand positions of motorway drivers from an elevated vehicle. In the first study I tape-recorded the data as we passed traffic on the left, and in the second I used paper and pencil to record the data as traffic passed us on the right. In both studies few drivers kept to the recommended 10-2 (or more generous 9-3) position for holding the steering wheel, and approximately one-third of them were driving with one hand on the wheel. Very few of the drivers observed (some 2%) were using mobile phones, but two were driving with no hands on the wheel. The paper concludes with some discussion of the value of this methodology for obtaining realistic data.     

Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Conflicting evidence has been obtained whether or not patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) share an attentional bias towards disorder-related stimuli. Some of these inconsistencies can be accounted for by suboptimal stimuli selection. In consideration of the heterogeneity of OCD, we investigated Stroop interference effects for two classes of OCD items (i.e., washing and checking) in 23 OCD patients and 23 healthy controls. In order to cover prevalent OCD concerns, item compilation was based on experts' appraisals. Patients neither displayed greater immediate as well as delayed Stroop interference nor any bias for OCD and subtype-congruent stimuli. On the contrary, for washing-related items, OCD patients, and here especially washers, displayed facilitation relative to healthy controls. Although the present study at first sight refutes the notion of an attentional bias in OCD in contrast to other anxiety disorders, several potential moderators need to be considered before this account is ultimately dismissed. In particular, an attentional bias may only be elicited using visual material that is more attention-grabbing than verbal stimuli. Finally, blockwise instead of random item administration and greater consideration of individual relevance may be crucial prerequisites for the effect to emerge.     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

No special K! A signal detection framework for the strategic regulation of memory accuracy

Two experiments investigated criterion setting and metacognitive processes underlying the strategic regulation of accuracy on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) using Type-2 signal detection theory (SDT). In Experiment 1, report bias was manipulated by penalizing participants either 0.25 (low incentive) or 4 (high incentive) points for each error. Best guesses to unanswered items were obtained so that Type-2 signal detection indices of discrimination and bias could be calculated. The same incentive manipulation was used in Experiment 2, only the test was computerized, confidence ratings were taken so that receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves could be generated, and feedback was manipulated. The results of both experiments demonstrated that SDT provides a viable alternative to A. Koriat and M. Goldsmith's (1996c) framework of monitoring and control and reveals information about the regulation of accuracy that their framework does not. For example, ROC analysis indicated that the threshold model implied by formula scoring is inadequate. Instead, performance on the SAT should be modeled with an equal-variance Gaussian, Type-2 signal detection model.     

北京顺义一中学生科学世界观调查报告

引言: 科学世界观是素质教育之魂,是辩证唯物主义观点指导下的科学自然观、进步社会观、健康人生观、正确价值观和正确方法论的有机统一。加强青少年科学世界观教育,对于培养青少年的正确观点和科学的思想方法,提高他们的综合素质,自觉抵御“法轮功”等不良思想的侵害,具有极其重要的意义。     

No thanks! Autonomous interpersonal style is associated with less experience and valuing of gratitude

Gratitude has been promoted as a beneficial emotional experience. However, gratitude is not universally experienced as positive. The current work examines whether an autonomous interpersonal style is associated with differential experience of gratitude. Study 1 found an inverse relationship between trait autonomy and both trait gratitude and positivity of response to receiving a hypothetical benefit from a friend. Study 2 replicated the finding that those higher in autonomy report less trait gratitude, and also demonstrated an inverse relationship between autonomy and valuing gratitude. Study 3 found that those higher in autonomy had more self-image goals and reduced compassionate goals in relationships, and that valuing gratitude mediated the relationship between autonomy and relationship goals. These results show a consistent inverse relationship between autonomy and the experience and valuing of gratitude, suggesting that degree of autonomy is one determinant of whether gratitude is experienced as positive.     

Imagine There Is a War and No One Turns Up! A Response to the Commentaries

In this response to the commentaries, we make one concession and try to clarify two critical points raised by the commentators. The concession is about the common stock of knowledge on which social representations approaches draw in general, and the model outlined in our article in particular. The two points we attempt to clarify concern the importance of both an intergroup perspective and of the structural components of power to our model of social representations.     

The magic of collective emotional intelligence in learning groups: No guys needed for the spell!

Using a cross‐lagged design, the present study tests an integrative model of emergent collective emotions in learning groups. Our results indicate that the percentage of women in the group fosters the emergence of collective emotional intelligence, which in turn stimulates social integration within groups (increases group cohesion and reduces relationship conflict) and the associated affective similarity, with beneficial effects for group effectiveness.