Bilinguals who stutter: A cognitive perspective

PurposeBrain differences, both in structure and executive functioning, have been found in both developmental stuttering and bilingualism. However, the etiology of stuttering remains unknown. The early suggestion that stuttering is a result of brain dysfunction has since received support from various behavioral and neuroimaging studies that have revealed functional and structural brain changes in monolinguals who stutter (MWS). In addition, MWS appear to show deficits in executive control. However, there is a lack of data on bilinguals who stutter (BWS). This literature review is intended to provide an overview of both stuttering and bilingualism as well as synthesize areas of overlap among both lines of research and highlight knowledge gaps in the current literature.MethodsA systematic literature review on both stuttering and bilingualism studies was conducted, searching for articles containing “stuttering” and/or “bilingualism” and either “brain”, “executive functions”, “executive control”, “motor control”, “cognitive reserve”, or “brain reserve” in the PubMed database. Additional studies were found by examining the reference list of studies that met the inclusion criteria.ResultsA total of 148 references that met the criteria for inclusion in this paper were used in the review. A comparison of the impact of stuttering or bilingualism on the brain are discussed.ConclusionPrevious research examining a potential bilingual advantage for BWS is mixed. However, if such an advantage does exist, it appears to offset potential deficits in executive functioning that may be associated with stuttering.     

The Cognitive Architecture of Perceived Animacy: Intention,Attention, and Memory

Human vision supports social perception by efficiently detecting agents and extracting rich information about their actions, goals, and intentions. Here, we explore the cognitive architecture of perceived animacy by constructing Bayesian models that integrate domain‐specific hypotheses of social agency with domain‐general cognitive constraints on sensory, memory, and attentional processing. Our model posits that perceived animacy combines a bottom–up, feature‐based, parallel search for goal‐directed movements with a top–down selection process for intent inference. The interaction of these architecturally distinct processes makes perceived animacy fast, flexible, and yet cognitively efficient. In the context of chasing, in which a predator (the “wolf”) pursues a prey (the “sheep”), our model addresses the computational challenge of identifying target agents among varying numbers of distractor objects, despite a quadratic increase in the number of possible interactions as more objects appear in a scene. By comparing modeling results with human psychophysics in several studies, we show that the effectiveness and efficiency of human perceived animacy can be explained by a Bayesian ideal observer model with realistic cognitive constraints. These results provide an understanding of perceived animacy at the algorithmic level—how it is achieved by cognitive mechanisms such as attention and working memory, and how it can be integrated with higher‐level reasoning about social agency.     

The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited

The hypothesis of extended cognition maintains that cognitive processes sometimes span the brain, body, and world. One of the most prominent types of arguments for this hypothesis begins with observations of the role of certain sorts of bodily and environmental influences on cognitive processes, then concludes that these bodily and environmental influences are themselves cognitive processes. This paper will argue that, while it is widely appreciated that the simplest versions of these “coupling arguments” are fallacious, the advocates of extended cognition still seem to underestimate how prevalent even the simplest forms are in the literature, why they are so pervasive, and how these fallacious arguments might be avoided by greater attention to a plausible theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.     

重要还是笨重?——概念表征对重量具身效应的影响

本研究考察在"重量-重要性"和"重量-灵活性"两种情境下重量具身效应的表现,进而探讨概念表征对具身效应所产生的影响。实验结果表明,在"重量-重要性"情境下,被试认为重鼠标的价格显著大于轻鼠标的价格,并且更容易将重鼠标与高价值货币,轻鼠标与低价值货币建立联系,表现为经典的"重量-重要性"具身效应;而在"重量-灵活性"情境下,被试认为重鼠标的价格显著小于轻鼠标的价格,并且鼠标重量与高低价值货币之间的联系并没有明显倾向性,重量具身效应出现明显变化。研究结果表明,重量具身效应受概念表征的显著影响,该效应的表现不仅取决于对客体重量的经验,更取决于主体如何对重量感进行认知表征。。     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Are expert athletes ‘expert’ in the cognitive laboratory? A meta‐analytic review of cognition and sport expertise

Recent literature has demonstrated the usefulness of fitness and computer‐based cognitive training as a means to enhance cognition and brain function. However, it is unclear whether the combination of fitness and cognitive training that results from years of extensive sport training also results in superior performance on tests of cognitive processes. In this study we examine, in a quantitative meta‐analysis (k = 20), the relationship between expertise in sports and laboratory‐based measures of cognition. We found that athletes performed better on measures of processing speed and a category of varied attentional paradigms, and athletes from interceptive sport types and males showed the largest effects. Based on our results, more research should be done with higher‐level cognitive tasks, such as tasks of executive function and more varied sub‐domains of visual attention. Furthermore, future studies should incorporate more female athletes and use a diverse range of sport types and levels of expertise. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

具身双加工观点：解析具身效应的边界条件

为了找出具身效应在认知加工上的边界条件,在综合分析具身理论中的双加工内涵和具身实验研究中的双加工证据基础上,提出了具身双加工观点：具身效应与直觉性的一型加工更为契合,会被反思性的二型加工所抑制。具体而言,抽象思维的发展程度、认知加工的无意识状态、认知负荷和心理冲突性均可能会导致两种加工类型之间的转换,从而调节具身效应。该观点对提高具身实验操控的有效性,解决具身效应的可重复性危机具有指导意义。     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

认知心理学的实用性转向

认知心理学实用性转向的根本涵义在于强调认知对于行动的效用与价值。传统认知心理学视认知系统的主要工作是怎样精确地 “表征” 世界，以便在大脑中建立一个外部世界的心理模型。实用性转向则强调认知系统的主要工作不是 “表征” 或 “反映”，而是指导有机体更有效地行动，认知是有 “效用” 的，它的效用就在于指导有机体适应和改造环境的活动。认知产生于行动、服务于行动，与行动水乳交融。这些理论观点来源于实用主义哲学。詹姆斯、杜威等人的经典实用主义对行动和效果的强调深刻影响了部分认知心理学家，促使他们放弃表征为中心的认知观而转向行动导向的认知观。在作者看来，由于这种转向强调了认知的 “效用”，因而对于认知心理学的健康发展将产生积极影响。     

The topological inventions of life: From the specialization of multicellular colonies to the functioning of the vertebrate brain

The evolution of biological (intermediary) complexity strongly depends upon the information‐processing advantages it confers to cells and organisms. As a matter of fact, highly complex biological structures such as the cellular signaling system and the vertebrate nervous system have been evolved in order to inform the living system about its surround, subsequently orienting the internal, productive activities. The evolutionary success of these types of informational structures ("infostructures") exemplifies that, almost universally, the “bit” may act as a successful substitute for the “joule”. Recent molecular biology research on cellular signaling systems has disclosed their amazing information‐processing sophistication and the crucial role they play in the formation and functioning of the vertebrate brain. In the neurosciences, duality theory has highlighted the way in which the cortical maps and the cerebral substructures of the vertebrate brain are “topologically” integrated in order to perform an adaptive information‐processing. The development of comprehensive conceptualizations relating brain processing and intracellular processing may well be a strategic step in the development of a vertical “information science”.     

The impact of demographics and nutritional status on cognitive functioning in an Iranian adults sample

This study investigated the impact of demographic variables and nutritional status on adult cognitive functioning using structural equation modeling. Demographic variables that were considered were height, weight and gender, whilst nutritional status was measured on the Nutrition Assessment Inventory (NAI). Cognitive functions, such as executive cognitive functions, cognitive flexibility, cognitive ability and cognitive vulnerability were measured using the Amsterdam Executive Function Inventory (AEFI), the Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS), the Cognitive Ability Questionnaire (CAQ), and the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale Form A-Revised (DAS-A-R) respectively. Findings indicated that ethnicity and weight variables contribute to 8.8% of the nutritional status variations observed. A SEM analysis showed that nutritional status has an impact on 13% on the measured cognitive abilities of adults. The effects of “healthy nutrition”, “use of complementary nutritients”, “coping with high fat foods”, and “high fat food assumption” subscales of the nutrition scale were found to play a role in cognitive ability. This study shows a fitted SEM for the predictive roles of ethnicity, weight and nutritional status on the cognitive ability in adults.     

Nutrition et intelligence

This article provides an overview of the literature on the relation between intelligence and nutrition. The first two sections introduce some data on the prevalence of malnutrition across the planet, and show how studies of animal cognition can help to understand the impact of malnutrition on human cognitive functioning. The third section introduces the effects of general “denutrition” and of iron, zinc, iodine, and vitamin deficiencies. The last two sections emphasize the impact of breastfeeding on intellectual and academic performance, and the importance of breakfast with regard to the ability to learn.     

基于眼动数据的一例角色书信疗法临床案例的分析与启示

采用眼动法,探究来访者阅读去信与回信时认知信息的变化,以及新手型咨询师与来访者在阅读角色书信时认知信息的差异。结果表明,来访者阅读回信时,对去信中诱发不良情绪的部分认知因素予以回应;新手型咨询师的注视时间显著短于来访者,注视次数多于来访者,热点区域不同于来访者。结果说明,往复的角色书信可以促进来访者转变不良认知;新手型咨询师对角色书信的理解与来访者存在不同。     

Primacy of Affect Over Cognition in Determining Adult Men's Condom–Use Behavior: A Review1

Prior research suggests that failure to use condoms can be understood within the context of condom‐related attitudes. We reviewed quantitative and qualitative literature on adult men's condom‐use attitudes; condom‐related attitudinal beliefs were classified as cognitive (e.g., effectiveness) or affective (e.g., pleasure‐related), and their relationships to behavior were examined. To determine differences in the effects of cognitive and affective beliefs, we conducted a critical qualitative review, a meta‐analysis, and a “vote‐count.” In support of the primacy of affect hypothesis (Zajonc, 1984), cognitive beliefs were weaker predictors of condom use than were affective beliefs. Results suggest that HIV‐prevention interventions will have greater success by addressing negative affective reactions to condom use in addition to promoting the protective value of condoms.     

The “Feeling of Movement”: Notes on the Rorschach Human Movement Response

Human movement responses (M) on the Rorschach have been traditionally viewed as lying neither completely in the inkblot (external reality) nor within the subject's mind (inner world). The authors contend that M is not reducible to the “body that I have” but to the “body that I am,” which is a higher level organization of bottom-up and top-down brain networks, integrating body implicit awareness, psychological functioning, and social cognition. Two sources of evidence suggest the close relationship among M, psychological functions, and brain mechanisms. One comes from meta-analytical evidence supporting the close association between M and higher level cognitive functioning or empathy. The second comes from some preliminary studies showing that M activates brain circuits included in the mirror neuron system (MNS). Two conclusions can be drawn: (a) M is related to the effective use of the mentalization function; and (b) future neuroscientific investigations could lead to an understanding of the neuropsychological mechanisms underlying Rorschach responses and variables.     

Creating Computer-Mediated Communities of Practice in Special Education

Summary

The convergence of theory and research on socially shared cognition represents a promising new direction for understanding how to enhance the intellectual growth of individuals. In this article, we draw upon the metaphor of “apprenticeship” to explain how individual cognitive development of children and adults alike can be enhanced by mentoring relationships within a particular educational “culture.” The view advanced here is that computers and related technologies can be instrumental in creating socially interactive and reflective learning communities. Within these communities there is active transmission of knowledge between individuals as they are guided from the periphery through to the center of the learning enterprise. Examples of communities of learners are provided to illustrate the process of socially shared cognition and development of knowledge networks. Principles for the creation of sustainable learning communities apply equally to traditional educational settings and on-line communities. The concept of the “collective zone of proximal development” is advanced here to explain how cognitive growth progressively occurs for community members who are operating within a socially interactive and reflective learning environment. Finally, principles and recommendations are offered on how to design communities so that all individuals can achieve their optimal functioning level through guided social participation.     

Assessing Conversational Cognition Levels of Cognitive Theory and Associated Methodological Requirements

Despite the prominence of cognitively oriented research in interpersonal communication, relatively little is known about the interplay of cognitive and communicative processes during conversation. For interpersonal communication scholars or at least those interested in interaction, the study of cognition is most useful if it reveals how interactants produce, monitor, modify, and process messages while engaged in conversation. The failure to collect data about in-process conversational cognition is partially due to excessive reliance on what have been identified as “implementation level” cognitive theories and models. Such theories are primarily concerned with specifying cognitive “architectures” and provide little guidance about how cognition is adapted to conversational tasks. However, a dearth of methodological creativity is also partially to blame for the lack of data about in-process conversational cognition. On encountering the admittedly formidable methodological difficulties of collecting data about conversational cognition, researchers have tended to rely on traditional but inadequate methods, or worse, have simply ignored theoretical questions pertinent to cognition in-process. This article suggests that claims about cognition can be made at four levels—biological, implementation, algorithmic, and rational—but that theoretical claims about conversational cognition can most usefully be pursued at the rational and algorithmic levels. In an effort to promote more research at these levels, criteria for studying conversational cognition are proposed, and promising methods are reviewed.     

Retiring the central executive

Reasoning, problem solving, comprehension, learning and retrieval, inhibition, switching, updating, or multitasking are often referred to as higher cognition, thought to require control processes or the use of a central executive. However, the concept of an executive controller begs the question of what is controlling the controller and so on, leading to an infinite hierarchy of executives or “homunculi”. In what is now a QJEP citation classic, Baddeley [Baddeley, A. D. (1996). Exploring the central executive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 5–28] referred to the concept of a central executive in cognition as a “conceptual ragbag” that acted as a placeholder umbrella term for aspects of cognition that are complex, were poorly understood at the time, and most likely involve several different cognitive functions working in concert. He suggested that with systematic empirical research, advances in understanding might progress sufficiently to allow the executive concept to be “sacked”. This article offers an overview of the 1996 article and of some subsequent systematic research and argues that after two decades of research, there is sufficient advance in understanding to suggest that executive control might arise from the interaction among multiple different functions in cognition that use different, but overlapping, brain networks. The article concludes that the central executive concept might now be offered a dignified retirement.     

Extended cognition,personal responsibility,and relational autonomy

The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for actions, in addition to or in place of the individuals typically held responsible? What does it mean to be “autonomous” when one’s cognition is influenced and supported by a milieu of environmental factors? To answer these questions, I explore strong parallels between HEC’s critique of individualism in cognition, and feminist critiques of individualist accounts of self, agency, and autonomy. This relational and social conception of autonomous agency, as scaffolded and supported (or undermined and impaired) by a milieu of social, relational, and normative factors, has important lessons for HEC. Drawing together these two visions of distributed and decentralized aspects of personhood highlights how cognition, action, and responsibility are inextricably linked. It also encourages a reconceptualization of all cognition and all concerns about responsibility for actions, not simply as sometimes “extended” around individuals, but as fundamentally communal, social, and normative, with individual cognition and individual moral responsibility being derivative special cases, not the paradigm examples. Individuals are merely one of many possible loci of cognition, action, and responsibility.