Asymmetric Perception of Gains versus Non‐losses and Losses versus Non‐gains: The Causal Role of Regulatory Focus

Recent studies show that, while losses loom larger than equivalent non‐gains, gains loom larger than equivalent non‐losses. This finding has been interpreted within the framework of regulatory focus theory. In this study, we highlight the importance of considering the motivational focus independently of the framing and the valence of outcome, thus exploring the causal effect of regulatory focus on the asymmetric perception of gains versus non‐losses and losses versus non‐gains. In two studies, we examine the perceived effects of either actual or hypothetical changes in monetary wealth, while orthogonally manipulating framing, valence, and regulatory focus. We find a significant interaction between the three factors. The gain versus non‐loss asymmetry in perceived satisfaction is stronger in promotion focus, whereas the loss versus non‐gain asymmetry in perceived dissatisfaction is stronger in prevention focus. The results suggest that the effects of incentives framed in terms of (non)gains and (non)losses depend on their congruence with the individual's motivational state. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

得失程数的变化: 损失规避现象的新视点

损失规避是预期理论的核心部分之一, 指等量的损失和获得产生的心理效用并不相同, 前者大于后者。大量研究从生理、认知、情感等角度探讨损失规避的内在机制和规律, 以期认识、预测并控制损失规避导致的偏差。本研究假设损失规避与获得或损失的“程数”(route)有关, 以往研究发现了损失规避现象, 是由于其采用的“双程损失-单程获得”典型情境中, 损失程数多于获得程数。为检验该假设, 本研究设计了不同于传统范式的“获得和损失程数相等”的镜像情境、“单程损失－双程获得”及“三程获得”三种不同的得失情境。研究结果支持本假设: 当损失的程数等于或少于获得的程数时, 损失规避现象消失; 获得或损失的程数越多, 个体对其的心理感受强度趋于越高。建议未来研究进一步检验心理感受强度在程数和损失规避行为之间的中介作用。     

Policy bundling to overcome loss aversion: A method for improving legislative outcomes

Policies that would create net benefits for society that contain salient costs frequently lack enough support for enactment because losses loom larger than gains. To address this consequence of loss aversion, we propose a policy-bundling technique in which related bills involving both losses and gains are combined to offset separate bills’ costs while preserving their net benefits. We argue this method can transform unpopular individual pieces of legislation, which would lack the support for implementation, into more popular policies. Study 1 confirms that bundling increases support for bills with costs and benefits and that bundled legislation is valued more than the sum of its parts. Study 2 shows this finding stems from a diminished focus on losses and heightened focus on gains. Study 3 extends our findings to policies involving costs and benefits of the same type (e.g., lives) generated by different sources (e.g., food vs. fire safety).     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

When gains loom larger than losses: reversed loss aversion for small amounts of money

Previous research has generally shown that people are loss averse; that is, they weigh losses more heavily than gains. In a series of three experiments, we found that for small outcomes, this pattern is reversed, and gains loom larger than losses. We explain this reversal on the basis of (a) the hedonic principle, which states that individuals are motivated to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain, and (b) the assumption that small losses are more easily discounted cognitively than large losses are.     

Show me the Money: The impact of actual rewards and losses on the feedback negativity

The feedback negativity (FN) is an event-related potential component which is typically conceptualized as a negativity in response to losses that is absent in response to gains. However, there is also evidence that variation in the FN reflects the neural response to gains. The present study sought to explore these possibilities by manipulating the context in which loss and gain feedback was presented in a straightforward gambling task. In half the blocks, participants could win or lose money (Value condition), and in half the blocks, participants could not win or lose any money (No Value condition). The degree to which losses and gains were differentiated from one another (i.e., the ΔFN) was greater in the Value condition than in the No Value condition. Furthermore, though the responses to loss feedback and gain feedback were each enhanced in the Value condition relative to the No-Value condition, the effect of the monetary manipulation was substantially larger for the positivity to gains than the negativity to losses. This is consistent with the notion that the FN might reflect two independent processes, but that variation in the FN depends more upon the response to rewards than losses.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neurobehavioral evidence for the "Near-Miss" effect in pathological gamblers

The purpose of this translational study was twofold: (1) to contrast behavioral and brain activity between pathological and nonpathological gamblers, and (2) to examine differences as a function of the outcome of the spin of a slot machine, focusing predominately on the "Near-Miss"--when two reels stop on the same symbol, and that symbol is just above or below the payoff line on the third reel. Twenty-two participants (11 nonpathological; 11 pathological) completed the study by rating the closeness of various outcomes of slot machine displays (wins, losses, and near-misses) to a win. No behavioral differences were observed between groups of participants, however, differences in brain activity were found in the left midbrain, near the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (SN / VTA). Near-miss outcomes uniquely activated brain regions associated with wins for the pathological gamblers and regions associated with losses for the nonpathological gamblers. Thus, near-miss outcomes on slot machines may contain both functional and neurological properties of wins for pathological gamblers. Such a translational approach to the study of gambling behavior may be considered an example that gives life to B. F. Skinner's conceptualization of the physiologist of the future.     

The influence of self‐efficacy on the effects of framed health messages

Health promoting messages can be framed in terms of the gains that are associated with healthy behaviour, or the losses that are associated with unhealthy behaviour. In this study, we examined the influence of self‐efficacy to quit smoking on the effects of gain framed and loss framed anti‐smoking messages in a randomized controlled trial among 539 adult smokers. Participants with a high self‐efficacy to quit smoking reported higher levels of motivation to quit smoking after receiving a loss framed message than after receiving a gain framed message or no message. For these participants receiving a gain framed message did not result in a higher motivation to quit smoking than receiving no message. For participants with a low self‐efficacy to quit smoking there were no differences in motivation to quit smoking between the gain framed message condition, loss framed message condition and control condition. Our results suggest that self‐efficacy can moderate the effects of message framing on persuasion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.     

Distinct pathways to persuasion: The role of affect in message‐framing effects

Health‐promoting messages can be framed in terms of the gains that are associated with healthy behaviour (gain frame) or the losses that are associated with unhealthy behaviour (loss frame). In the present research, we examined the role of positive and negative affect in the persuasive effects of gain‐ and loss‐framed health‐promoting information. Experiment 1 (N = 98) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance than loss‐framed information and that this effect was mediated by positive affect. The results of Experiment 2 (N = 129) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance and attitude, an effect that was again mediated by positive affect. In addition, loss‐framed information resulted in more negative affect than gain‐framed information and negative affect increased participants' intention to engage in the healthy behaviour. These results suggest that affect may be of great importance in the persuasion process and may be particularly helpful to explain the underlying mechanisms of message framing effects. The findings also suggest that gain‐ and loss‐framed messages offer distinct pathways to persuasion. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subjective relative income and lottery ticket purchases

Despite a return of only $.53 on the dollar, state lotteries are extremely popular, especially among the poor, who play the most but can least afford to play. In two experiments conducted with low‐income participants, we examine how implicit comparisons with other income classes increase low‐income individuals' desire to play the lottery. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to purchase lottery tickets when they were primed to perceive that their own income was low relative to an implicit standard. In Experiment 2, participants purchased more tickets when they considered situations in which rich people or poor people receive advantages, implicitly highlighting the fact that everyone has an equal chance of winning the lottery. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can Culture Influence Body‐Specific Associations Between Space and Valence?

People implicitly associate positive ideas with their dominant side of space and negative ideas with their non‐dominant side. Right‐handers tend to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left,” but left‐handers associate “bad” with “right” and “good” with “left.” Whereas right‐handers' implicit associations align with idioms in language and culture that link “good” with “right,” left‐handers' implicit associations go against them. Can cultural conventions modulate the body‐specific association between valence and left‐right space? Here, we compared people from Spanish and Moroccan cultures, which differ in the strength of taboos against the use of the left hand, and therefore in their preference for the right. Results showed stronger explicit associations between space and valence in Moroccan participants than in Spaniards, but they did not show any increased tendency for right‐handed Moroccans to associate “good” with “right” implicitly. Despite differences in cultural conventions between Spaniards and Moroccans, we find no evidence for a cross‐cultural difference in the implicit association between space and valence, which appears to depend on patterns of bodily experience.     

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility—people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning—the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within‐group and between‐group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Goat Framing in Job Advertisements on Organizational Attractiveness1

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of goal framing in job advertisements on organizational attractiveness. Job ads were created that emphasized the potential costs or losses of not applying (i.e., loss frame) or the potential gains or benefits of applying (i.e., gain frame). The first experiment (N= 70) found that participants were more attracted to the company in the gain‐framed ad than in the loss‐framed ad. The second experiment (N= 100) attempted to determine the reason for the greater attractiveness of the gain‐framed ad compared to the loss‐framed ad. Two possible explanations— valence‐based encoding and regulatory focus—were examined. Results suggest that both valence‐based encoding and regulatory focus mediated the relationship between framing and organizational attractiveness.     

Increased social distance makes people more risk-neutral

Individuals are consistently observed to be risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. This study examined whether increased social distance would change these behavioral patterns. To test our hypothesis, social distance was manipulated by asking the participants to make decisions either for themselves or for another person (Experiment 1), either for a known person or for an unknown person (Experiment 2), and either for a close friend or for a distant friend (Experiment 3). The results of Experiments 1 and 3 showed that increased social distance made people more risk-neutral, and such an effect was stronger in the gain domain than in the loss domain. However, the effect of social distance was not observed in Experiment 2. These findings suggest that risk preferences are influenced by the social distance between decision makers and beneficiaries.     

Implicit learning of evaluative vs. non-evaluative covariations: The role of dimension accessibility

Implicit covariation learning, the development of simple associations without awareness, has been demonstrated repeatedly along the evaluative dimension [De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., & Baeyens, F. (2001). Associative learning of likes and dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 853-869], but associations involving other dimensions appear more difficult to learn implicitly. The present research highlights the unique properties of the evaluative dimension that may predispose it to implicit learning. We provide evidence in the first experiment that implicit covariation learning occurs along the evaluative dimension, but does not spontaneously occur along non-evaluative dimensions. In Experiment 2, implicit learning along non-evaluative dimensions occurred when participants were subliminally primed with the to-be-learned dimension. In the discussion, we integrate findings from implicit evaluative conditioning research with the broader implicit learning literature.     

Judgments in a hurry: Time pressure affects how judges assess unfairly shared losses and unfairly shared gains

Human society has evolved to allow third parties—the court system, parents or other societal arbitrators—to punish norm violators and compensate victims. Few studies explore the effect of stress or time pressure on a third‐party judge. Under time pressure, people will likely show a more instinctual reaction or judgment style. We investigated third‐party punishment and compensation within the context of unfairly shared losses and gains in a dictator game under time pressure. Our results show that under no time pressure, participants were inclined to punish dictators who unfairly split windfall gains; however, participants chose to compensate victims more than punish the norm‐violating dictators in the context of unfairly shared losses. With added time pressure, third‐parties were disposed to inflict punishment upon the dictator in both the gain and loss contexts—punishment became the action of choice. Our results shed light on the way observed behavior and stress affect social cognition and decision making in the context of altruistic social interventions and the enforcement of social norms.