大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向

主要考察大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向。实验1中的两个单类内隐联想测验结果与前人研究基本一致：虽然被试对穷人热情的评价相对积极,但总体上认为穷人低能力、低热情。实验2通过源监测任务发现,在忘记特质词来源的情况下,被试倾向于猜测消极特质词来自贫困者,积极特质词来自小康者。研究不仅证实了大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象,而且进一步发现大学生存在对穷人的消极猜测偏向。     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Presence of Odd Pricing in the Texas State Lottery1

We examined 443 drawings from the Texas state lottery from 1992 to 1997 to determine whether odd pricing effects would be found in multimillion-dollar lotteries. Specifically, we predicted that many more lottery tickets than expected would be purchased when the jackpot amount was $10 million than when it was $9 million. Three findings emerged. First, the higher the jackpot, the more tickets were purchased. Second, odd pricing effects were found at $10 million such that approximately 670,000 more tickets were purchased than expected. Third, controlling for the jackpot amount, there were approximately 620,000 fewer tickets purchased for each drawing per year. This final finding provides evidence that people are becoming less interested in multimillion-dollar lotteries.     

Mindless resistance to persuasion: Low self‐control fosters the use of resistance‐promoting heuristics

In our consumer society, people are confronted on a daily basis with unsolicited persuasion attempts. The present research challenges the prevailing view that resisting persuasion is more likely to fail when consumers have low self‐control. Four experiments tested the hypothesis that impaired self‐regulation may actually facilitate resistance to persuasion when the influence context contains resistance‐promoting heuristics. Indeed, participants with low self‐control were less likely to comply with a persuasive request (Experiments 1 and 3), reported a less favourable attitude towards an advertised product (Experiment 2), and generated more negative responses towards a persuasive message (Experiment 4) than participants with high self‐control, when they could rely on resistance‐promoting heuristics: a violation of the norm of reciprocity (Experiments 1 and 3), an advertisement disclaimer (Experiment 2), or negative social proof (Experiment 4). Together, these studies demonstrate that contextual cues can bolster resistance when one does not carefully scrutinize an influence attempt.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of affect in the WTA/WTP disparity

Four studies demonstrated robust within‐ and between‐subject differences in willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) and willingness‐to‐accept (WTA) measures of the value of lottery tickets. Buyers and sellers attended to different numerical cues and interpreted the same numbers differently when setting these two kinds of monetary values. Affective influences appeared to guide the valuation process. Buyers with stronger positive feelings about owning a ticket were willing to pay more for a ticket; sellers with stronger negative feelings about no longer having a ticket required a greater minimum payment in exchange for their ticket. In addition, the WTA/WTP disparity tended to be greater for more affectively‐laden lottery tickets. The results suggest that WTA and WTP prices are constructed using salient numerical cues and affective feelings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post‐decision information search

The effect of emotional and situational factors on the decision to seek out post‐decision information about un‐chosen alternative was examined in five experiments. Experiment 1 tested participants' willingness to find out the outcome of an un‐chosen investment that was likely to have a higher value than the chosen investment. It was found that participants were more willing to acquire information when they were responsible for the decision. Experiment 2 showed that responsibility affects information seeking, in particular when one suspects that a wrong decision was made. Experiments 3–5 examined the role of regret on information seeking. It was shown that regret about making the wrong investment (Experiment 3), forgetting to send in a lottery ticket (Experiment 4), and missing an opportunity to use a discount card after spending a month in Australia (Experiment 5), mediates the information‐seeking behavior. Experiment 5 also demonstrated that the experience of regret (and not its anticipation) influences post‐decision information seeking even when the information is of no future use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence for Opportunity Cost Neglect in the Poor

People often neglect opportunity costs: They do not fully take into account forgone alternatives outside of a particular choice set. Several scholars have suggested that poor people should be more likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs, because budget constraints should lead to an increased focus on trade‐offs. We did not find support for this hypothesis in five high‐powered experiments (total N = 2325). The experiments used different products (both material and experiential) with both high and low prices (from $8.50 to $249.99) and different methods of reminding participants of opportunity costs. High‐income and low‐income participants showed an equally strong decrease in willingness to buy when reminded of opportunity costs, implying that both the rich and the poor neglect opportunity costs. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

The Reinforcing Value of Lottery Tickets,and the Synergetic Effect of Distinct Reinforcements

We present two experiments that explore the reinforcing value of lottery tickets. Participants are faced with a repeated choice task between a safe alternative and a risky prospect that provides a chance to win a lottery ticket to be played at the end of the study. Study 1 considers situations in which the risky option leads to a slightly higher expected value than the safe alternative. It shows that the risk‐taking rate increases with the probability to win the lottery ticket, but it is below 50% even when this probability is high. Study 2 shows limited sensitivity to the expected value of the risky prospect. The results can be explained with the assumption that participants rely on small samples of past experiences, and that their reaction to lottery tickets reflects large variability. The relationship between the current results and previous research on the synergetic effect of distinct reinforcements and the “pat on the back paradox” is discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A new spin on losses looming larger than gains: asymmetric implicit associations from slot machine experience

Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory states, among other things, that losses loom larger than gains. As much research as this simple idea has generated, key questions remain. How fundamental is the losses‐looming‐larger effect: will it emerge under more minimal circumstances than previously tested and will it manifest in implicit associations? And how does the actual experience of predominant losses or gains affect the losses‐looming‐larger effect? In two experiments employing non‐traditional methods, participants experienced slot machine spins in which symbols were paired with gain, loss, and neutral outcomes. After experiencing these pairings, participants took Implicit Association Tests (IATs). In Experiment 1, implicit associations formed by the minimal experience of the slot machine were lopsided: negative associations with the loss symbol were stronger than positive associations with the gain symbol. In addition, it was found that the extent to which losses loomed larger depended on the context of the slot machine experience, with losses looming implicitly larger than gains most when they were fewer in number (participants experienced a net‐gain) and least when they were the predominant outcome (participants experienced a net‐loss). Finally, in Experiment 2, a potential artifact was ruled out and a replication obtained by showing that slot machine losses implicitly loom larger whether conceptualized from the perspective of a casino player or a casino owner. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasion, they can perceive this resistance and become more certain of their initial attitudes. This research explores the role of source credibility in determining when this effect occurs. In two experiments, participants received a counterattitudinal persuasive message. When participants counterargued this message, they became more certain of their attitudes, but only when it came from a source with high expertise. When the message came from a source with low expertise, resisting it had no impact on attitude certainty. This effect was shown using both a traditional measure of attitude certainty (Experiment 1) and a well‐established consequence of certainty—the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions (Experiment 2). In addition, the effect was confined to high elaboration conditions, and occurred even when participants were not explicitly instructed to counterargue. These results are consistent with a metacognitive framework proposed to understand resistance to persuasion.     

The relationship between lottery ticket and scratch‐card buying behaviour,personality and other compulsive behaviours

The study examines how demographics, other forms of compulsive behaviour and personality are related to the buying frequency and compulsiveness in lottery tickets and scratch‐cards. An integrative framework is developed and tested in a sample of respondents. Results indicated that the buying compulsivenesses in lottery tickets and scratch‐cards have the same correlates. The buying compulsivenesses in both lottery tickets and scratch‐cards were found to be positively related to cigarette consumption and the extraversion dimension of personality and negatively related to the agreeableness and intellect dimensions of personality. Copyright © 2002 Stewart Publications Ltd.     

Explicit thoughts of security activate implicit self‐doubt in anxiously attached participants

People high in attachment‐related anxiety experience greater anxieties and ambivalence (e.g., M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, N. Bar‐On, & T. Ein‐Dor, 2010 ) when feelings of relationship security are activated. The current research suggests that anxiously attached people also experience a decrease in implicit feelings of self‐worth. Across two studies participants high (vs. low) in attachment anxiety reported more negative implicit self‐evaluations after thinking about a time they felt loved and cared for by a close other. Study 2 further revealed that more negative implicit self‐evaluations are not a function of differences in the type of events recalled by high anxiety participants. These latter results suggest that security‐enhancing thoughts automatically activate a negative association with the self that is not consciously reflected in participants' written responses.     

大学生智慧内隐认知的实验研究

以55名大学生为被试,采用内隐联想测验(IAT)和单类内隐联想测验(SC-IAT)测量被试对智慧的内隐认知.实验1中,被试对人慧者与良好道德人文素质属性词联结以及物慧者与良好智力思维素质属性词联结的反应速度更快,表明大学生存在人慧者更具备良好道德人文素质和物慧者更具备良好智力思维素质的内隐认知取向;实验2中,被试对智慧者与良好德智属性词联结比愚蠢者与良好德智属性词联结的反应速度更快,表明大学生存在智慧者更兼备良好道德人文素质与良好智力思维素质的内隐认知取向.两项实验中,被试智慧内隐认知效应的性别与专业差异显著.综合两项实验表明,智慧是良好道德人文素质与良好智力思维素质的有机结合;学习与经验影响大学生对智慧的内隐认知.     

Another look at why people are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets

People are reluctant to exchange lottery tickets, a result that previous investigators have attributed to anticipated regret. The authors suggest that people's subjective likelihood judgments also make them disinclined to switch. Four studies examined likelihood judgments with respect to exchanged and retained lottery tickets and found that (a) exchanged tickets are judged more likely to win a lottery than are retained tickets and (b) exchanged tickets are judged more likely to win the more aversive it would be if the ticket did win. The authors provide evidence that this effect occurs because the act of imagining an exchanged ticket winning the lottery increases the belief that such an event is likely to occur.     

外显与内隐选择的多效性原则

个体的选择可能是外显目标和内隐目标共同作用的结果,同时满足意识到的和未意识到的需要,这就是目标选择的多效性。通过两个行为学实验来验证内隐选择的多效性原则。实验一,被试随机分为积极和消极启动两个组,不同的启动后,要求判断两张不同颜色纸张的质量高低。结果发现在积极认同组,大多数的被试选择红色织物,在消极认同组（惭愧组）,少数的被试选择红色织物。实验二,被试同样被分为两组,其中一组施加积极启动,另一组为控制组,之后,所有被试被邀请参加一项研究涉及雇佣人员的决策。结果发现当被试没有分配任何目标时,被试选择四位应征者并无显著之差异;当被试分配了外显或内隐的目标时,大多数的被试选择了具有相应特征的应征者;当被试的外显目标和隐性目标都存在,被试的选择表现出多效性。实验结果表明,在追求明确的外显目标时,个人可能与此同时试图满足他们的已经激活的内隐背景目标,选择者可能并没有意识到这种影响。在二选一或者多选一选择背景下,对一个已知选项的选择,受到多效性影响,其多效性是基于个人选择的价值最大化,并同时满足几个目标的原则。     

Realism in confidence judgements of performance based on implicit learning

In two experiments we employed calibration methods to investigate the realism of participants' confidence ratings of their own classification performance based on knowledge acquired after training on an artificial grammar. In Experiment 1 participants showed good realism (but overconfidence) for grammatical strings but very poor realism for non-grammatical strings. Method of training (string repetition in writing or mere exposure) did not affect the realism. Furthermore, the participants underestimated their overall performance. In Experiment 2, using a more complex grammar and controlling for two types of associative chunk-strength, participants showed good realism (but still overconfidence) for both letter and symbol strings, irrespective of grammaticality. Together, these experiments show that implicit learning can give rise to knowledge products that are associated with fairly realistic meta-knowledge. It is argued that both the zero-correlation criterion and the guessing criterion are misplaced when used to define implicit knowledge; two reasons being that confidence judgements may be affected both by implicit knowledge and by inferences.     

Predicting Driver's Intention Based on Own Vulnerability: A Social Interaction Process between Road Users at an Intersection in Japan

When road users predict the future movement of an approaching vehicle at an intersection, they need to consider not only the physical environment but also the predicted behavioral intention of the approaching driver. In the present experiments, we asked participants to imagine how a vehicle would approach in a natural traffic environment. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time‐to‐contact with an approaching vehicle as longer when they were physically vulnerable. In Experiment 2, we confirmed that differences in participants’ eye height did not explain the findings of Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, we asked participants to indicate the last possible moment at which they could cross an intersection in front of an approaching vehicle. Participants left a shorter safety margin when they were more physically vulnerable than the approaching vehicle. The results indicate that road users’ perceived vulnerability is a cue for them to trust the approaching driver's intention to decelerate. This viewpoint is important for interventions to prevent unrealistic trust that an approaching vehicle will avoid an accident and subsequent trust‐based behaviors.     

Evaluating arguments during instigations of defence motivation and accuracy motivation

When people evaluate the strength of an argument, their motivations are likely to influence the evaluation. However, few studies have specifically investigated the influences of motivational factors on argument evaluation. This study examined the effects of defence and accuracy motivations on argument evaluation. According to the compatibility between the advocated positions of arguments and participants' prior beliefs and the objective strength of arguments, participants evaluated four types of arguments: compatible‐strong, compatible‐weak, incompatible‐strong, and incompatible‐weak arguments. Experiment 1 revealed that participants possessing a high defence motivation rated compatible‐weak arguments as stronger and incompatible‐strong ones as weaker than participants possessing a low defence motivation. However, the strength ratings between the high and low defence groups regarding both compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments were similar. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants possessed a high accuracy motivation, they rated compatible‐weak arguments as weaker and incompatible‐strong ones as stronger than when they possessed a low accuracy motivation. However, participants' ratings on both compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments were similar when comparing high and low accuracy conditions. The results suggest that defence and accuracy motivations are two major motives influencing argument evaluation. However, they primarily influence the evaluation results for compatible‐weak and incompatible‐strong arguments, but not for compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments.